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I. ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
In United States v. Salvucci,' the United States Supreme Court
held that a defendant may assert the exclusionary rule only when he
demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.
2
Previously, a defendant convicted of a possessory crime could automat-
ically claim that evidence seized had been confiscated illegally.3 The
issues of standing and reasonable expectation of privacy haice become
virtually indistinguishable since Saivucci. Once a defendant has
demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched,
the threshold for invocation of the exclusionary rule is met, and most
courts apparently avoid a separate discussion of standing. Courts,
however, still focus upon standing when a third party attempts to ex-
clude evidence obtained through the violation of another's fourth
amendment rights.4
1. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
2. Id at 85.
3. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
4. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant lacked standing to ex-
clude incriminating evidence indicating tax evasion involvement seized during search of
third party's briefcase).
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1. Reasonable expectation of privacy
a. containers
In United States v. Anderson, defendants charged with the posses-
sion of cocaine were given an opportunity on remand to establish their
reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage that had been searched.'
DEA agents received a tip from a confidential informant that a
chartered plane leaving Fort Lauderdale, Florida, would arrive in Or-
ange County, California, with narcotics aboard. DEA computers re-
vealed that one of the pilots (Rhodes) and the plane's charterer
(Maestrales) were narcotics transporters.7
After their arrival in Orange County, defendants were met by
DEA agents, escorted to a small room in the airport terminal and ques-
tioned. During the questioning, the defendants were asked to identify
the luggage the agents had brought in from the plane. Though defend-
ant Anderson claimed an attache case he was carrying, each defendant
twice disclaimed ownership of two grey and two burgundy suitcases.
Defendants were arrested after a narcotics detector dog alerted the
agents that drugs were hidden inside the suitcases.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the
narcotics on the grounds of illegal stop and arrest.9 The Ninth Circuit,
however, remanded the case, requiring that defendants establish their
reasonable expectation of privacy in the luggage and that their words
and acts did not constitute an abandonment of that privacy interest.10
Had a voluntary abandonment of the luggage taken place in the air-
port, the court indicated that defendants would be unable to exclude
5. 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981).
6. Id at 938. Defendants were charged with possession of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) which provides: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(l) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance."
7. 663 F.2d at 936. One DEA agent was aware of previous narcotics activity at the
Florida airport. DEA agents also knew that drugs were often transported by chartered plane
because passengers could avoid baggage inspections which were not required by FAA secur-
ity regulations. Id
8. Id at 937.
9. Id The district court considered the informant's tip, the DEA agent's knowledge,
and the computer information insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for the initial
detention. It also held that no probable cause existed at the time of the arrest. Id
10. Id at 938. The Supreme Court did not decide Salvucci until after the defendant's
suppression hearing and the district court ruling. Relying on the "automatic standing" rule
of Jones, defendants had no opportunity to demonstrate their reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the luggage. Id at 937-38.
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any seized evidence because they would have no standing to complain
of its search or seizure. 1 If instead, defendants demonstrated the req-
uisite expectation of privacy on remand, they would then be permitted
to challenge the legality of the search and seizure. 2
The Ninth Circuit directly addressed the abandonment issue in
United States v. Kendall,13 where defendants voluntarily abandoned a
suitcase containing cocaine. The court held that once the defendants
abandoned the suitcase, they no longer had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in its contents, and therefore, defendants' motions to suppress
were properly denied.
14
Defendants had flown from Florida to California and transported
three pounds of cocaine in a suitcase identified by a fictitious name.
Narcotics agents in San Diego were notified of the smuggling operation
and were given descriptions of the defendants and their luggage. 5
Upon arrival in San Diego, defendants were placed under surveil-
lance. Defendant Kendall was stopped and questioned after he exited
the baggage claim area with a suitcase that matched the description
given to the agents. As he followed the agents back into the terminal
for additional questioning, Kendall informed them that the suitcase he
picked up had someone else's name on it, and that the baggage claim
11. Id at 938 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976) (no
abandonment where defendant simply dropped suitcase and began to walk away from ap-
proaching police officer)). See United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1981)
(officers' warrantless search of defendant's leased premises was justified because objective
facts indicated abandonment despite defendant's subjective intent to return).
12. 663 F.2d at 938. The court distinguished Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981), where the Court refused to remand a case for a determination of whether defendant
demonstrated a violation of his fourth amendment rights. Officers conducted a warrantless
search of defendant's home based solely upon an arrest warrant issued for a third party.
Defendant was arrested when the officers found cocaine on the premises.
Relying on the "automatic standing" rule of Jones, the Government never challenged
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the house searched. The Court held that
based on its previous failure to raise the issue, even though Salvucci had not yet been de-
cided, the Government could not now assert it. Id at 208-09.
In Anderson, however, the Government had previously raised the privacy issue before
the district court on two grounds: (1) defendants did not assert a proprietary interest in the
luggage; and (2) they voluntarily abandoned the luggage, as well as any privacy interest in it.
Therefore, the Government was permitted to raise the issue on appeal. The Government's
failure to challenge defendant's privacy interests during submission of supplemental briefs
prior to the district court's final ruling did not preclude its subsequent challenge. Anderson,
663 F.2d at 938-39 n.4.
13. 655 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
14. Id at 202.
15. Id at 200.
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numbers did not match those on his ticket.' 6  One of the agents re-
turned the suitcase to the baggage claim area and exchanged it for one
with claim numbers matching Kendall's ticket. 7
Kendall's partner, Akers, was stopped and questioned after DEA
agents saw him observing and following Kendall.' 8 Both defendants
permitted a search of their luggage, but no narcotics were found. After
Kendall and Akers left the terminal, the agents conducted a warrant-
less search of the fictitiously marked suitcase and discovered three
pounds of cocaine. ' 9
On appeal, defendants contended that their scheme involving two
identical suitcases indicated a subjective intent not to abandon the lug-
gage.2" In rejecting this argument, the court relied upon the objective
standard suggested in United States v. Jackson.2' When one volunta-
rily abandons his property, he also relinquishes any right to challenge
its search.22 Although the Jackson court did not expressly adopt an
objective standard, it indicated that abandonment is primarily a ques-
tion of intent which may be inferred from objective facts such as words
or conduct.' Examining Kendall's conduct objectively, the court con-
cluded that he abandoned the suitcase prior to the warrantless search.24
16. Id Kendall admitted at trial that he purposely disclaimed the suitcase to prove to
agents that he had no interest in the bag. Id
17. Id The suitcase in question was marked with the name "Estrada" or "Estarda." A
subsequent investigation indicated that no one by that name had been on the flight. Id
18. Id Akers had in his possession the claim tickets which matched those on the "Es-
trada" suitcase, but he was not questioned about the luggage at that time.
19. Id Defendants were convicted of conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) (1976). Section 846 provides:
"Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is
punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punish-
ment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or
conspiracy." See supra note 6 which sets forth section 841(a)(1) in its entirety. The district
court denied defendants' motion to suppress and affirmed the conviction. 655 F.2d at 200,
20. 655 F.2d at 200-01.
21. Id; 544 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1960) (government lawfully appropri-
ated abandoned property found in vacated hotel room).
23. 544 F.2d at 409 (citations omitted). See also United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d
517 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendants held to have abandoned four kilos of marijuana which they
threw out of a truck after narcotics agent attempted to stop it), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904
(1976); United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972) (under objective standard, de-
fendants had no justifiable expectation of privacy in two large crates containing marijuana
they hid near a campsite); Lurie v. Oberhauser, 431 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendants
permitted search of all but one suitcase which both defendants disclaimed and were held to
have abandoned it). Accord United States v. Williams, 569 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1978) (defend-
ant was held to have abandoned trailer containing marijuana which he disconnected from
his truck when he realized he was being followed by narcotics agents).
24. 655 F.2d at 202.
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The court found that Akers had also abandoned the suitcase, having
observed his partner disclaim interest in it.
2 5
Therefore, defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the suitcase, and the court held that the subsequent warrantless search
did not violate any fourth amendment rights.26 The court reasoned
that a subjective standard would not deter unlawful searches and
seizures, but would instead provide incentive for schemes such as the
one executed by Kendall and Akers.27
In United States v. Brock,28 the electronic surveillance of defend-
ant's drug manufacturing activity was considered a minimal intrusion
and did not constitute a search.29 Defendant Bernard placed an order
at a chemical supply company for phenyl-2-propanone, methylamine
and other precursor chemicals used to manufacture amphetamines.3 0
Shortly thereafter, DEA agents were contacted by Boehm, who worked
for the chemical supply company. He suspected that Bernard was in-
volved in manufacturing narcotics.' When Bernard placed a second
order for more chemicals, DEA agents inserted an electronic beeper in
one of the canisters Bernard was to purchase. The beeper monitored
the canister's location, serving to keep defendants under surveillance.32
The beeper led DEA agents to a cabin in Meacham, Oregon, but they
failed to execute their search warrant at that location. 3
On appeal, defendants argued that they had a subjective expecta-
25. Id The court also relied on Aker's concealment of the claim check for the "Estrada"
suitcase.
26. Id Defendants' convictions were therefore affirmed.
27. Id
28. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982). Two previous Ninth Circuit opinions arise from the
same set of facts. See United States v. Bernard, 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), revised, 623
F.2d 551, 553-54 (9th Cir. 1980); and United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir.
1980).
29. 667 F.2d at 1322.
30. Id at 1314. Bernard claimed to have purchased these chemicals to manufacture
fertilizer. Id
31. Id Upon being contacted by Boehm, the DEA decided to place Bernard under vis-
ual surveillance after he picked up the chemicals. The surveillance proved unsuccessful
when Bernard discovered he was being followed. Id
32. Id at 1314. The installation was performed while the canister was in the lawful
possession of DEA agents. Id at 1319 n.4.
33. Id at 1314-15. Defendants Brock, Bard, Bernard, Childress, and Cochran were
charged by indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), and 846 (Count I), manufac-
ture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 and 841(a)(1) (Count II), and
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 and
841(a)(1) (Count III). Id at 1313. Section 812 identifies methamphetamine as a controlled
substance. See supra note 6 which sets forth § 841(a)(1) in its entirety. Defendants Brock
and Bard were convicted as to Counts I and II and acquitted as to Count III. Id
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tion of privacy in the canister of non-contraband chemicals when it was
taken inside the private residence.31 The court conceded that defend-
ants' expectation of privacy was reasonable but held that it had not
been invaded.35
The Ninth Circuit's analysis began with a discussion of Katz v.
United States,36 in which the United States Supreme Court stressed
that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, and held that an
FBI wiretap of a public phone booth violated defendant's fourth
amendment rights. The court also relied upon Smith v. Maryland,37
which held that a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the numbers dialed from his telephone, which had been monitored
with a pen register. These decisions were distinguishable because the
pen register used in Smith was not capable of monitoring actual con-
versations as was the wiretapping in Katz, and was therefore less intru-
sive.38 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that an electronic beeper, which
merely identifies location, was also much less intrusive than a wire-
tap.39 The court justified the beeper's dramatic sense enhancing capa-
bilities by analogizing it to the use of drug detection dogs, which has
not been treated as a search.4° The court suggested, however, that its
holding was not without limits. Use of an electronic beeper which
could convey more information than just location might constitute an
unreasonable search under the Katz analysis.41
b. premises
The Ninth Circuit refused to acknowledge a defendant's reason-
34. Id at 1320.
35. Id at 1322.
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
37. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
38. 667 F.2d at 1320 (relying on the Court's language in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at
741-42).
39. Id at 1321-22. The court noted that its inquiry focused upon the degree of intrusive-
ness of eavesdropping devices. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1981), see infra note 42 and accompanying text; United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (placement of electronic beeper on outside of defendants' car involved
only minimal intrusion and did not violate fourth amendment); United States v. Dubrofsky,
581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (intrusion of an electronic beeper placed in a package of heroin
too slight to amount to a search); but see, United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir.
1980) (use of beeper hidden in chemicals used for manufacturing PCP violated defendant's
fourth amendment privacy interests).
40. 667 F.2d at 1321-22. See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881-83 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bronstein, 521
F.2d 459, 461-463 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976).
41. 667 F.2d at 1322.
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able expectation of privacy in the open fields of his two-hundred-acre
ranch in United States v. Allen.42 Defendant Allen purchased secluded
coastal property near Coos Bay, Oregon. The land was parallel to the
ocean but separated from the beach by a narrow strip of federal prop-
erty. The Allen Ranch, as it was known, became the target of extensive
surveillance after complaints by local residents aroused the suspicions
of U.S. Customs officials.43
The surveillance began on December 5, 1977, with a helicopter
flight by the Coast Guard over the Allen Ranch. During the flight,
U.S. Customs officer Gano took photographs of the ranch using a 35
mm. camera with a 70-230 mm. zoom lens. The photos revealed ex-
tremely wide tire tracks leading to and from a new extension that had
been built onto Allen's barn.
On December 6, Gano and two Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) officials went to see Allen about acquiring a public easement
across his property for local hunters and fishermen. Gano did not re-
veal his identity in order to avoid arousing Allen's suspicion. Gano
observed that the ranch was not being farmed and that Allen's hands
were uncalloused.
Additional surveillance included placement of seismic sensors at
the ranch's entrance to monitor vehicular activity. Gano also set up a
command post in the adjacent hills. By December 8, the ranch was
under continuous surveillance. A second helicopter flight was made by
Gano on December 21. Using binoculars, one of Gano's officers no-
ticed a large van and a semi-trailer on Allen's property. A warrantless
search of a parking lot on Allen's property was conducted on Decem-
ber 29, but nothing was found. This extensive surveillance culminated
in the interdiction of a marijuana smuggling operation on December
31, 1977.44
42. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1981).
43. Id at 1286-87. The ranch's previous owner permitted local hunters and fishermen to
cross his land to use the federal property. Unlike his predecessor, Allen posted his property
with "No Trespassing" signs and refused the local residents access. Id at 1286.
U.S. Customs officer Gano became aware of the residents' complaints, and after investi-
gating Allen's background, he began to suspect that the ranch was being used for drug
smuggling. Id
44. Id at 1287. Defendants Allen, Diffenderfer, Kerr, Kolander, D. Sherman, S. Sher-
man and Theriaque were convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976); see supra note 6.
With the exception of Kolander, defendants were also convicted of conspiracy to pos-
sess marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976); see supra note
19. Allen was also convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 963 (1976) which provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense
1983]
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed four specific types of sur-
veillance which defendants claimed violated their fourth amendment
rights: (1) helicopter surveillance; (2) seismic sensors; (3) binocular sur-
veillance; and (4) physical intrusions.
The court determined that defendants had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as to the objects and landscape modifications observed
during the helicopter flights.45 Although these observations could be
made only from the air, the photographic equipment used was not con-
sidered more advanced than that available to the general public.46 The
court suggested that a property owner's expectation of privacy in unen-
closed areas was virtually nonexistent due to advancements in elec-
tronic photographic equipment.47
The Ninth Circuit also relied upon Officer Gano's initial suspicion
of Allen's drug smuggling involvement in an attempt to justify such
extensive surveillance.48 In the absence of federal court precedent, the
court sought additional justification for the Government's helicopter
surveillance from two California Court of Appeal decisions.49 Finally,
the court assumed that the residents of the ranch would be aware of the
Coast Guard's routine helicopter fRights because of the ranch's proxim-
ity to the sea-coast border.5 0 The expectation of privacy asserted by
defendants was therefore considered unreasonable."
The court avoided a direct discussion of the complex privacy is-
defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was
the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 633 F.2d at 1288.
45. 633 F.2d at 1290.
46. Id. at 1289.
47. Id
48. Id at 1290 (citing United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1977) (court order
for installation of electronic beeper on rented airplane not required where officers had relia-
ble information that defendant was involved in drug smuggling)).
49. 633 F.2d at 1290 (citing People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 3d 836, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1974) (routine helicopter observation of stolen automobile parts in defendant's
backyard not considered unlawful search); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110
Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (defendant's three-quarter-acre tract of land, surrounded by forests,
where he cultivated marijuana not entitled to reasonable expectation of privacy from over-
head observation by airplanes)); but see People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr.
146 (1973) (sheriffs helicopter flying twenty feet above defendant's backyard to observe ma-
rijuana cultivation violated fourth amendment).
50. 633 F.2d at 1290 (citing United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 666 n.6 (9th Cir.
1976) (en banc) (three mile limit from U.S. coast considered a border for fourth amendment
purposes), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978)).
The court also assumed that the ranch residents could expect the Coast Guard helicop-
ters to be equipped with sense-enhancing devices. 633 F.2d at 1290.
51. 633 F.2d at 1290.
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sues presented by placement of seismic sensors on Allen's property be-
cause defendants failed to introduce any evidence obtained from those
devices that was not already known from other methods of surveil-
lance. 2 In dicta, however, it was suggested that the Government's tres-
pass onto Allen's property for purposes of placing and maintaining
such eavesdropping devices would present unusual fourth amendment
problems.
53
The third type of surveillance challenged by defendants involved
the use of binoculars from a command post set up on property adjacent
to the ranch. 4 The court simply relied on previous Ninth Circuit deci-
sions in which the use of sense-enhancing devices did not constitute a
search. Thus, the use of binoculars was not considered objectionable.5
Finally, defendants unsuccessfully argued that Officer Gano's con-
cealment of his identity while accompanying BLM officers onto Allen's
property violated their fourth amendment rights. 6 Similarly, because
no evidence was obtained or apparently tainted as a result of the De-
cember 29th warrantless parking lot search, the court summarily dis-
missed this trespass issue.5 7 Thus, the court concluded that the trespass
did not constitute a fourth amendment violation. 8
52. Id Any possible fourth amendment violations were dismissed as harmless error. Id
53. Id (citing United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (placement of
electronic beeper in package containing heroin intercepted at post office not considered im-
permissible search); United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.) (defendants had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a truck containing marijuana located 100 yards from
their house), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 920 (1978); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th
Cir.) (use of electronic beeper on drum of caffeine did not violate fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976); United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1970) (civil
trespass on open field area did not violate fourth amendment)).
It is puzzling that the court cites these decisions which seem to contradict its suggestion
that government trespass and use of electronic surveillance may present complex fourth
amendment problems.
54. 633 F.2d at 1290-91.
55. Id (citing United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding
the validity of a variety of sense-enhancing devices such as "[b]inoculars, dogs that track and
sniff out contraband, searchlights, flourescent powders, automobiles and airplanes, burglar
alarms, radar devices, and bait money.")).
The court summarily concluded that United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
1977), did not compel a different result. 633 F.2d at 1291 n.9.
56. 633 F.2d at 1291 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (misrepresenta-
tion of identity by undercover narcotics agent not violative of defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 941
(1974)).
57. 633 F.2d at 1291.
58. Id (citing United States v. Basile, 569 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 920 (1978); United States v. Williams, 569 F.2d 823, 826 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in immobile trailer he disconnected from his car after
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In United States v. Gilman, 9 unclaimed pornographic magazines
found in a rented storage garage were considered voluntarily aban-
doned and thus were property admitted into evidence. 60 Postal inspec-
tors obtained information implicating defendants Gilman and Martin
in a mail order scheme through which sexually explicit magazines were
distributed. Pursuant to warrants, three locations were searched and
incriminating evidence was seized.6'
Police first searched a building (the Grove Street offices), believed
to be Gilman's headquarters. The warrant failed to indicate that the
building was also a residential dwelling. The trial court suppressed evi-
dence seized from the residential portion of the building but admitted
evidence seized from the Grove Street office. 62 Evidence found in a
nearby garage and in a rented storage space was also admitted. 63 De-
fendants were convicted of seven counts of mailing obscene material
and one count of conspiracy.64
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's admission of
evidence seized from the Grove Street office, the garage, and the rented
storage space.65 Specifically, the court held that Gilman had no stand-
ing to challenge the search of the rented storage space because he had
voluntarily abandoned the property. Gilman failed to respond after
being notified by the storage company's management that additional
rent payments were due. The unclaimed magazines in Gilman's stor-
age space were turned over to the police twenty-seven days after notice
of the delinquent rent was given.66 On these facts, the court considered
that "'the officers acted reasonably in relying on the appearance of
noticing approaching police officers); United States v. Capps, 435 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.
1970)).
59. 684 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1982).
60. Id at 620.
61. Id at 618.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id at 617. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every obscene,
lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance . . . [i]s
declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from
any post office or by any letter carrier." 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States,. . . and one or more of such per-
sons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
65. 684 F.2d at 618-20.
66. Id at 619-20 (citing United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976)
(defendant lacked standing to challenge a search where his dropping of a suitcase, and walk-
ing away from law enforcement officers constituted voluntary abandonment)). See also
United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1981) (officers' reasonable belief
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abandonment.' "67
The court rejected defendant's argument that abandonment of the
magazines was the result of police misconduct.68 Defendants failed to
establish the requisite "nexus between the allegedly unlawful police
conduct and abandonment of the property" that would be indicative of
involuntary abandonment.69 Thus, the seizure of the magazines was
proper.70
2. Third party standing
In United States v. Crozier,71 defendants were given the opportu-
nity on remand to establish that each had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the residence of the other. 2 On April 9, 1980, narcotics
agents conducted a warrantless search of the Crozier-Wolke residence.
The premises had been "effectively seized" before a warrant was ob-
tained. The district court considered the search unjustified because the
agents did not have probable cause to believe that any controlled sub-
stance would be found in the residence and no exigent circumstances
that defendants abandoned rented premises was sufficient to justify search despite defend-
ant's subjective intent to return).
67. 684 F.2d at 620 (quoting United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d at 1082). See also United
States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d at 202; see supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
68. 684 F.2d at 620 (citing United States v. Maryland, 479 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1973)
(defendant had no standing to challenge search of police vehicle in which he voluntarily
abandoned counterfeit currency; however, it was still necessary to determine whether the
loss of standing was the result of unlawful police misconduct); United States v. Humphrey,
549 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's conduct indicative of abandonment is not to
be considered by trial court if tainted by police misconduct)).
69. 684 F.2d at 620 (citing United States v. Maryland, 479 F.2d at 568; United States v.
Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 975 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant, who was ejected from hotel room
for good cause and who told the owner he did not want any items left behind, had no
standing to challenge warrantless search of the room)). Cf. United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d
726, 729-30 (5th Cir. 1979) (evidence properly suppressed where defendant's abandonment
of marijuana from an automobile was result of an illegal stop without reasonable suspicion).
70. 684 F.2d at 620. Police were unable to find the magazines specified in the affidavit in
Gilman's storage facility and, as a result, they seized other materials that were subsequently
shown to the magistrate who issued a second warrant. Id at 620. Unless the materials
seized for the procurement of the second warrant were in plain view, they may have been
unlawfully obtained. The court disregarded any "possible impropriety," however, as being
"too remote to have tainted seizure of the abandoned materials." Id (citing United States v.
Haddad, 558 F.2d at 975 n.6). That footnote suggested that even if two prior searches had
been illegal, the incriminating evidence found in the third search was not the result of ex-
ploitation of the first two searches (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478
(1963)). In Gilman, however, the first search was arguably exploited because the second
search would not have occurred but for the initial search and seizure.
71. 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 1299-1300.
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justified the warrantless entry.73
The district court held that the search warrant, which arrived six
hours after the agents entered the residence, was not sufficiently spe-
cific.74 The supporting affidavit was more specific, but the court felt the
search went beyond the scope of the affidavit and gave the agents un-
limited discretion.
7"
Defendants Crozier, Pine, Stein, Wolke and seven others were
charged with the manufacture and possession of methamphetamine
with intent to distribute.76 The district court suppressed all evidence
seized during the warrantless searches of the Crozier-Wolke and Stein
residences, not only as to the respective homeowners but as to all
defendants.77
Because they often spent time in each others' homes and left their
belongings in both places, defendants contended that each had a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the residence of the other.78 Although
the Government conceded that Wolke resided with Crozier, it argued
that evidence should not have been suppressed as to those defendants
not residing in the homes searched.79
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the suppression of illegally seized evi-
dence only as to those defendants whose homes had been searched. 80
The suppression issue as to the non-resident defendants was remanded
in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Salvucci.8l
In Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner,8 2 a theater owner un-
successfully attempted to assert his patrons' fourth amendment rights
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures while they watched
73. Id at 1298.
74. Id at 1299.
75. Id
76. Id at 1295. See supra note 6 for the full text of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). In
addition, defendants were charged with conspiracy and tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201 (1976), which provides in pertinent part: "Any person who willfully attempts in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall. . . be
guilty of a felony and. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both." In a second count, Crozier was charged with engaging in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976), which provides in pertinent
part: "Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which may be up to life
imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000." 674 F.2d at 1295.
77. Id at 1296.
78. Id at 1299.
79. Id
80. d at 1299-1300.
81. Id at 1299. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
82. 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 16
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
pornographic films in private viewing booths.8 3 The Ninth Circuit re-
lied upon Rakas v. Illinois,84 in which the Supreme Court rejected a
vicarious assertion of another's fourth amendment rights.
8 5
Ellwest appealed a district court decision upholding the constitu-
tionality of a Phoenix, Arizona, ordinance which required that viewing
booths in movie arcades be visible from a common aisle.86 The ordi-
nance was prompted by complaints of increased sex-related criminal
activity in Phoenix. 7 In addition to its first and fourteenth amendment
arguments,8 8 Ellwest asserted the fourth amendment rights of its pa-
trons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.89 Ellwest ar-
gued that the requirement of open video booths was analogous to the
use by police officers of peep holes in public restrooms.90 Ellwest's
primary concern was that the ordinance would have a "chilling effect"
on its patrons' freedom to engage in unobserved masturbation while
viewing the sexually explicit films.91
Ellwest failed to allege specifically that any unreasonable police
surveillance or searches had occurred, and, as a result, the premature
claim was not justiciable.92 Even with such allegations, Ellwest's claim
would have failed because Ellwest had no standing to assert the fourth
amendment rights of its patrons.93 The Ninth Circuit quickly dis-
pensed with Ellwest's fourth amendment claim, holding that such
rights may only be personally asserted.
9 4
3. State action
Searches and seizures conducted by private parties do not nor-
83. Id at 1248.
84. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
85. Id at 133-34.
86. 681 F.2d at 1244. Section 7-30(a)(6)(b) of the Phoenix City Code provides: "All
viewing areas must be visible from a continuous main aisle and must not be obscured by any
curtain, door, wall, or other enclosure." Id at 1244-45.
87. Id at 1245. There were 783 sex-related arrests in the two year period preceding
Ellwest's lawsuit. Id
88. Id at 1247-48. Both arguments were rejected.
89. Id at 1248. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
90. 681 F.2d at 1248. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 408 (1973) (policeman's clandestine observation of defendant in doorless stall of public
restroom violated fourth amendment).
91. 681 F.2d at 1247.
92. Id at 1248.
93. Id (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (such "'rights are personal'" and
"'may not be vicariously asserted.' ") (citations omitted)).
94. 681 F.2d at 1248. The court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and af-
firmed the judgment of the district court.
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
mally implicate the fourth amendment. An exception arises, however,
when a private party has acted as an agent of the state.
95
In United States v. Andrini,96 a motel clerk was not considered an
agent of the state when he searched an unidentified piece of luggage in
the presence of a law enforcement officer.97 On May 7, 1980, an arson-
ist, using gasoline-filled water jugs and a pyrotechnic fuse, set fire to an
office building which was under construction. Andrini was convicted
for the malicious destruction of the building. 98
While staying at a motel shortly after the fire, Andrini misplaced
his luggage. It was returned to the motel clerk by another guest. Pur-
suant to "routine motel procedure," and in the presence of a Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms officer, the clerk opened the unidenti-
fied suitcase and found a gun which was subsequently turned over to
the police. No explanation was given for the officer's presence during
the opening of the suitcase; however, Andrini's motel room had been
under surveillance.99 Andrini was arrested for illegal possession of a
firearm, and the search incident to his arrest revealed twelve feet of
pyrotechnic fuse resembling that used by the arsonist."
Andrini argued on appeal that the motel clerk became an agent of
the state when the luggage was searched by the clerk in the presence of
the officer. 10' The court rejected this argument because the clerk
searched the luggage under "routine motel procedure" and not under
95. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
96. 685 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. Id at 1097-98.
98. Id at 1095. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever mali-
ciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of an explosive,
any building ... shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than
$10,000, or both .... In addition, Andrini was sentenced to a term of forty months under
18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976) which provides: "[Tihe court may fix the maximum sentence
of imprisonment to be served in which event the court may specify that the prisoner may be
released on parole at such time as the Commission may determine." 685 F.2d at 1095 & n.l.
99. Id at 1097. The court suggested that Andrini's position as a union organizer may
have provided him with a motive to commit arson. The company constructing the building
that was destroyed refused to honor Andrini's union's labor dispute with another company.
I.d at 1095. Knowledge of this apparent motive may have led to the surveillance of An-
drini's hotel room and might explain the officer's presence during the search of Andrini's
suitcase.
100. Id at 1097.
101. Id at 1097 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (private
party may violate another's fourth amendment rights only when acting as agent of state);
United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (airline employee considered
agent of the government where he had previously been an informant and expected reward
from DEA for discovering illegal narcotics in packages shipped on the airlines)).
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instruction of the officer. 10 2 The court further held that the clerk did
not become the agent of the state simply because the officer failed to
inform him that he believed the suitcase belonged to Andrini. °3
The Ninth Circuit refused to suppress evidence seized by a U.S.
Customs officer unauthorized to conduct a search of a private residence
in United States v. Harrington.l'" In 1973, enactment of an Executive
Reorganization Plan (Plan) consolidated in the DEA all authority over
federal narcotics law violations with the exception of fixed check point
and border searches.10 5 Pursuant to a warrant, but in violation of the
DEA's exclusive authority, U.S. Customs officers searched defendant
Harrington's residence and seized drugs, $100,000 in cash, and drug
paraphernalia implicating him in a drug smuggling conspiracy."°6
Reasoning that the investigation was a usurpation of the DEA's exclu-
sive authority over federal drug law violations, the district court sup-
pressed the evidence.10 7 The district court relied upon United States v.
Soto-Soto, °s in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the suppression of
evidence seized during a warrantless border search by an unauthorized
law enforcement agent. 0 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the use of the exclusion-
ary rule in Soto-Soto was limited to border searches and therefore in-
applicable to these facts."10 The Harrington court held that courts
should not automatically suppress evidence seized by an officer who
technically should not have conducted the search."' Thus, the court
102. 685 F.2d at 1097-98. The court noted that the officer stayed approximately ten feet
away from the suitcase while the clerk conducted the search, and the officer did not look
inside.
103. Id at 1098 (citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d at 792).
104. 681 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
105. Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1973, 3A C.F.R. 263, 264 (1973), reprinted in 87 Stat. 1091
(1973), amendedby Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 95-253, 88 Stat. 50. This concentration
of authority in the DEA was motivated by a desire to make enforcement of federal narcotics
laws more efficient. 681 F.2d at 613. However, the legislative history of the Plan did not
suggest that the exclusionary rule was to be used as a deterrent to noncompliance with the
DEA's exclusive authority over federal drug law violations.
106. 681 F.2d at 613.
107. Id
108. 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. Id at 550 (19 U.S.C. § 482 did not authorize FBI agent to conduct warrantless
search for general law enforcement purposes).
110. 681 F.2d at 614. The court found it unnecessary to address the Government's con-
tention that United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), in which the defendant lacked
standing to challenge the warrantless search of a third party's briefcase which contained
incriminating evidence of defendant's income tax evasion, overruled Soto-Soo, because the
t search in Soto-Soto was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. 681 F.2d at 614-15.
111. 681 F.2d at 615.
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refused to suppress the evidence on the basis that Customs officers are
prohibited from conducting federal drug law investigations) 12 The
court suggested that an "exceptional reason," usually the protection of
a constitutional right, must be at issue before the exclusionary rule may
be invoked." 3
B. Search Warrants
The fourth amendment mandates that no warrant will issue except
upon a finding of probable cause, supported by an oath as set forth in
an affidavit. The warrant must describe with particularity the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. The Ninth Circuit has recently
decided several cases which bear directly on these considerations.
1. Sufficiency of affidavit
The probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment is satis-
fied if the affidavit sets forth facts and circumstances such that a rea-
sonably prudent person would be warranted in believing that an
offense had been committed and that evidence of that offense would be
found on the person or premises to be searched." 4
In United States v. Fogarty, I5 the court upheld the sufficiency of
an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the defendant's apart-
ment." 6 Employees of a photographic film developing business noti-
fied the police department that the defendant had delivered film for
developing that depicted nude minor females. During their investiga-
tion, the police discovered that the defendant had been previously con-
victed of indecent exposure and solicitation of lewd conduct and had
failed to register as a sex offender as required by the California Penal
Code."
7
112. Id at 615. 21 U.S.C. § 873(b) (1976); Exec. Order No. 11727, 38 Fed. Reg. § 18357
(1973), explains that other agencies may assist the Attorney General in the enforcement of
federal drug laws. The Government argued that some of the DEA's authority was delegated
to the U.S. Customs officers; however, the issue was unclear, and the Ninth Circuit was
unable to resolve the dispute. 681 F.2d at 613 n.l.
113. 681 F.2d at 615. See United States v. Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387, 1390 (10th Cir.
1980) (execution of federal search warrant by state law enforcement officers was insufficient
deviation from FED. R. CriM. P. 41(c) to justify use of the exclusionary rule), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 938 (1981); accord United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. For a statement of the general rule see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584
(1971); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925).
115. 663 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
116. Id at 930.
117. Id at 929.
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These facts were contained in two affidavits, one submitted in sup-
port of the search warrant and the other in support of an arrest war-
rant. On appeal from a conviction for three counts of mailing obscene
matter"18 and three counts of violating the Sexual Exploitation of Chil-
dren Act, 1 9 the defendant argued that the affidavit supporting the
search warrant did not provide the probable cause necessary to support
a search.'20 The defendant contended that some of the facts necessary
to constitute probable cause were contained in the affidavit supporting
the arrest warrant.
21
The court held that each affidavit was independently sufficient to
provide the degree of probable cause required to issue a warrant.
122
The court further stated, in dicta, that it had not been presented with
any legal authority that limits the warrant-issuing magistrate to the
four comers of a single affidavit when facts supporting probable cause
are presented simultaneously in related affidavits seeking two war-
rants."2 The court believed that no fourth amendment considerations
would be abridged by allowing a magistrate to find probable cause
from two related affidavits.'
24
In United States v. Armstrong, 25 the court upheld the sufficiency
of an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the defendants' offices.1
26
The defendants were engaged in a scheme to solicit advance fees for
loan guarantee agreements. The affidavit submitted in support of the
search warrant was a detailed fifteen page document setting forth infor-
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "'Every obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance . . . [i]s declared to be
nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office
or by any letter carrier."
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. IV 1980) provides in pertinent part:
Any person who knowingly transports or ships in interstate. . . mails, for the pur-
pose of sale or distribution for sale, any obscene visual or print medium, if the
producing of such visual or print medium involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and such visual or print medium depicts such conduct
• * , shall be punished ....
120. 663 F.2d at 929.
121. Id at 930.
122. Id, affirming the conviction.
123. Id at 929-30.
124. Id at 930 (citing United States v. Dudek, 560 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (6th Cir. 1977)
(two affidavits supporting search warrants for two warehouses co-owned by the defendant
were considered together to determine probable cause as to each affidavit), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1037 (1978)). See also United States v. Nolan, 413 F.2d 850, 853 (6th Cir. 1969) (no
fourth amendment violation in considering an affidavit for a search warrant for defendant's
car together with an affidavit for a search warrant for defendant's apartment to find prob-
able cause).
125. 654 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
126. 1d at 1335.
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mation from numerous victims of the loan scheme, as well as informa-
tion establishing why the records sought were believed to be in the
defendants' offices.
On appeal from convictions for mail fraud, 127 wire fraud, 128 in-
ducement to travel interstate in order to defraud,1 29 and giving false
information in a loan application, 30 the defendants contended that the
affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish probable
cause to believe a specific crime had been committed.
131
The court held that the facts revealed by the affidavit suggested
that it was probable that criminal activity was present, 132 and thus there
was a sufficient showing to support the issuance of the search war-
rant. 133 The court reasoned that a magistrate need only find that crimi-
nal activity is probably shown; a prima facie case of a crime is not
necessary.134 Hearsay statements from victims are to be considered re-
liable, 135 and therefore when the affidavit was realistically interpreted
with common sense, 136 probable cause was shown.
37
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud
• . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service. . . shall be fined
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud
• . . transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pic-
tures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined
129. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud. . . induces any person to travel in, or
to be transported in interstate commerce in the execution or concealment of a scheme or
artifice to defraud that person of money or property.., shall be fined. .. "
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever knowingly makes any
false statement or report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or security, for the pur-
pose of influencing in any way the action of. . . any bank the deposits of which are insured
. . . upon any application, advance.. . or loan.., shall be fined. .. .
131. 654 F.2d at 1335.
132. Id
133. Id at 1335-36.
134. Id at 1335 (citing United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.) (affidavit need
only provide that criminal activity is probably shown), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978)).
See also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); United States v. Traylor, 656
F.2d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981).-
135. 654 F.2d at 1335 (citing United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir.)
(statement of an extortion victim held reliable), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971)).
136. 654 F.2d at 1335 (citing United States v. Bowers, 534 F.2d 186, 192 n.5 (9th Cir.)
(affidavit read as a whole and language given a realistic and common sense interpretation),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 942 (1976)).
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In United States v. TrayIor,138 the court upheld the sufficiency of
an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the defendants' luggage.'
39
Pursuant to an ongoing Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in-
vestigation, the defendants were suspected of the trafficking and distri-
bution of cocaine. Agents were informed that the defendants had
boarded a Princess Cruise ship and disembarked in Cartegena, Colom-
bia, for several hours. Cartegena was known as a major source area of
cocaine. The defendants then flew from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Los
Angeles en route to the Seattle-Tacoma airport. On arrival at the Los
Angeles airport, a Los Angeles Police Department narcotics dog ex-
amined by smell the defendants' luggage and "alerted" on three of the
six suitcases. A search warrant was obtained, and nine pounds of co-
caine were found during a search of the luggage upon the defendants'
subsequent arrival at the Seattle-Tacoma airport.
On appeal from convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine, con-
spiracy to possess and distribute cocaine, importing cocaine, and pos-
sessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, the defendants contended
the affidavit lacked the requisite probable cause to justify a search of
their luggage. 14°
The court held that the affidavit was sufficient to support a finding
of probable cause. 1 ' The DEA agent submitted an affidavit outlining,
among other things, information received from a confidential inform-
ant. The court rejected the informant's report, as no facts in the affida-
vit demonstrated that this informant was credible or that his
information was reliable. 142 However, the DEA investigation provided
information which, when combined with the narcotics detection dog's
scent examination, established probable cause to issue the search war-
rant. 143 The court reasoned that the DEA investigation indicated that
the defendants had the opportunity to obtain cocaine.'" The narcotics
detection dog's reaction to the luggage was also considered reliable. 145
The affidavit set forth the dog's training record, as well as its past per-
formance record, allowing the magistrate to properly evaluate the facts.
137. 654 F.2d at 1335, affirming the convictions.
138. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
139. Id. at 1331.
140. Id at 1329.
141. Id at 1331.
142. Id at 1330. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (when affidavit is
based on hearsay information it must contain facts that show the informant is credible or the
information reliable).
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Therefore, the dog's reactions and the DEA investigation established
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.1
46
The defendants also contended that the search of their handbags
was not within the scope of the search warrant.147 The search warrant
authorized the search of "baggage and bags" belonging to the defend-
ants. The court held that the search warrant must be read in a common
sense and realistic fashion, 148 and as such the language of the warrant
encompassed the defendants' handbags. 149 Therefore, the search was
valid.'
50
In United Sta'es v. Anderson,'5' the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's order to suppress evidence seized from five pieces of lug-
gage. 152 DEA agents received a tip from a confidential informant that
a certain aircraft containing narcotics would be landing at Orange
County airport. Upon the airplane's arrival at the airport, the agents
detained the pilots and the passengers. The luggage was taken to an
area where a narcotics detection dog examined them by smell, and
alerted on four of the five pieces of luggage. The passengers were ar-
rested, and a search warrant was obtained for the luggage. Varying
amounts of cocaine were discovered in each of the five pieces of
luggage.
The district court granted the motion to suppress the evidence on
the ground that it was tainted by an illegal stop and arrest. 153 The
Ninth Circuit reversed the order and remanded for further findings on
that issue.15 4 The court, however, did rule that probable cause existed
for the issuance of the search warrant to search the defendants' suit-
cases.'55 The defendants contended there was no probable cause to
search the one piece of luggage to which the dog did not alert.15 6 The
affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant detailed the facts
146. Id (citing United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980) (response by
narcotics detection dog coupled with other information set forth in affidavit provided suffi-
cient probable cause to issue search warrant for luggage), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981)).
147. 656 F.2d at 1331.
148. Id For the general rule that affidavits are to be interpreted in a common sense and
realistic fashion, see United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.s. 102, 108 (1965).
149. 656 F.2d at 1331. The court noted that to construe the search warrant to encompass
only the suitcases would be to read it in a "hypertechnical" manner.
150. Id, affirming the district court's denial of the motion to suppress and appellant's
convictions.
151. 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981), reversing suppression order.
152. Id at 936.
153. Id at 937.
154. Id at 942. See infra sections on Investigative Stops and Warrandess 4rrests.
155. 663 F.2d at 937 n.1.
156. Id
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that all the defendants had arrived together in the same taxicab at the
point of departure, and that all the suitcases on board the airplane be-
longed to the defendants. The court held that the defendants' associa-
tion with each other and with the four pieces of luggage to which the
dog had alerted provided the magistrate with probable cause to issue a
search warrant for the one piece of luggage to which the dog did not
alert.' 7 Therefore, the search warrant was properly issued as to all five
pieces of luggage.15 8
In United States v. Cates,159 the defendant unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the sufficiency of a state search warrant issued to search his resi-
dence.' 60  The defendant was convicted of receipt of firearms by a
felon. On appeal, the defendant argued that the warrant did not meet
the requirements for the use of informants as set forth in the Aguilar-
Spinelli test.1
6 1
The Ninth Circuit held that the affidavit contained enough of the
underlying circumstances to support a finding of probable cause.'
62
The informant related personally observed facts.163  The court rea-
soned that it was not critical that the informant did not state how he
knew that the contraband was a controlled substance.164 An informant
157. Id See United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981) (dog alerted on three
out of six suitcases); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1980) (dog alerted on one
out of four suitcases), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
158. 663 F.2d at 937 n.1.
159. 663 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1981).
160. Id at 948.
161. Id (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410, 416 (1969)). InAguilar, police officers applied to a local magistrate for a warrant
to search for narcotics in the defendant's home. The affidavit submitted in support of the
warrant stated that the officers had received reliable information from a credible person. In
overturning the conviction for illegal possession of heroin, the Supreme Court held that
when an affidavit is based on hearsay information, the magistrate must be informed of some
of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded the contraband was
where it was claimed to be, and from which the affiant concluded that the informant was
credible or his information reliable. In Spinelli, the affidavit in question merely stated that
the affiant was informed by a reliable source that the defendant was engaged in bookmaking
activity by means of two telephones. In reversing the conviction for travelling in interstate
commerce with the intent to conduct illegal gambling activities, the Supreme Court elabo-
rated on the Aguilar two-pronged test and stated: "[i]n the absence of a statement detailing
the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip
describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail ... " 393 U.S. at 416.
162. 663 F.2d at 948.
163. Id See United States v. Garrett, 565 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1977) (informant's
personal observation of heroin in defendant's residence held to satisfy first prong of Aguldar-
Spinelli test), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974 (1978).
164. 663 F.2d at 948 (citing United States v. Shipstead, 433 F.2d 368, 372 (9th Cir. 1970)
(affidavit that did not state how informant identified substance as methamphetamine held
sufficient)). But see United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319, 324 (8th Cir. 1981) (affidavit
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is deemed credible when he relates in detail facts personally ob-
served.' 6- Therefore, the search warrant was valid.
In United States v. Goff, 166 the Ninth Circuit upheld the sufficiency
of an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the defendants' person.'67
DEA agents received a tip from an informant that the defendants were
planning a trip from Seattle to Miami to purchase a large quantity of
cocaine. The informant then identified both defendants at the Seattle-
Tacoma airport. The agents noticed that one of the defendants ap-
peared to be wearing a money belt. Subsequent investigation disclosed
that one of the defendants previously had been engaged in drug smug-
gling activities. While the defendants were in flight from Miami back
to Seattle, a search warrant was issued. The search was conducted at
the Seattle-Tacoma airport and cocaine was recovered from both
defendants.
On appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine, the defend-
ants argued that the affidavit did not establish probable cause.'68 They
contended that the affidavit was insufficient because it failed to estab-
lish the credibility of the confidential informant.
169
The court held that the informant's tip, corroborated by independ-
ent DEA investigation, was enough to create a reasonable suspicion
that unlawful activity was under way.170 Further, no statement of cred-
ibility was necessary because the details described by the informant
were corroborated by the investigation. 17 1
The defendants also argued that the warrant was invalid because
the cocaine was not in Washington at the time the warrant was is-
sued. 172 The court disagreed, stating that the real issue was whether
insufficient to show probable cause when informant did not state how he knew a large quan-
tity of white powder he had seen was angel dust).
165. 663 F.2d at 948 (citing United States v. Garrett, 565 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1977)
(informant personally observed heroin in defendant's residence), cer. denied, 435 U.S. 974
(1978); United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir.) (informant saw defendant with a
zip-lock bag containing a fluffy white powder), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976)).
166. 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982).
167. Id at 1240.
168. Id.
169. Id
170. Id (citing United States v. Johnson, 641 F.2d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 1980) (informant's
information that several pounds of cocaine could be found inside a safe in defendant's home
was corroborated by independent government observations)).
171. 681 F.2d at 1240 (citing United States v. Johnson, 641 F.2d at 658; United States v.
Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir.) (information received from a confidential inform-
ant that defendant was falsifying books and records was independently corroborated by
information already known to the IRS), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)).
172. 681 F.2d at 1240.
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probable cause existed at the time of the search. 173 The facts indicated
that the defendants would arrive in the state within a reasonable time
after the issuance of the search warrant, and that the warrant could not
be executed until such time.' 74 Therefore, merely anticipating future
events did not detract from probable cause at the time of such a
search. 175 The warrant was held to be valid and the convictions were
affirmed.1
76
In United States v. Gallo, 7 7 the Ninth Circuit held that the magis-
trate had probable cause to issue a warrant to search the defendant's
bookmaking office.' 78 The defendant was suspected of bookmaking
and failing to comply with the registration requirements and taxes im-
posed upon such activity. Gallo became the subject of an intense two-
month investigation and surveillance, at the conclusion of which a
search warrant was sought and issued. The warrant was based upon a
forty-one page affidavit which set forth in great detail the extensive
prior experience of the agent involved, the observations by the agent of
the defendant accepting bets and payoffs and paying several individu-
als in cash, and the acceptance of bets from the undercover agent. The
search uncovered substantial quantities of evidence indicating the de-
fendant's bookmaking activity.
On appeal from a conviction for attempting to evade or defeat wa-
gering excise taxes 179 and for failure to file return and pay wagering
occupation tax,18 0 the defendant attacked the sufficiency of the affidavit
on the ground that it did not show probable cause to believe that he
was engaged in criminal activity. 8'
The court summarily rejected the defendant's contention and held
that the affidavit was more than adequate to establish probable cause to
173. Id (citing United States v. Nepstead, 424 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir.) (search of defend-
ant's house for drug manufacturing equipment occurred six days after the search warrant
was issued; passage of time did not detract from probable cause due to continuous surveil-
lance of the house), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970)).
174. 681 F.2d at 1240.
175. Id at 1240 n.1.
176. Id at 1240.
177. 659 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1981).
178. Id at 113. Bookmaking is legal in Nevada.
179. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who willfully at-
tempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax... or the payment thereof shall... be
guilty of a felony .... "
180. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person required. . . to
pay any. . . tax, or. . . to make a return. . . who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax,
make such return,. . . shall. . . be guilty of a misdemeanor .
181. 659 F.2d at 112.
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believe that the defendant was participating in criminal activity.'8 2
The magistrate was justified in issuing the search warrant.
18 3
In United States v. Barnett,'84 the court reversed the district court's
order suppressing all items seized pursuant to a search warrant, and
upheld the sufficiency of the affidavit supporting the warrant authoriz-
ing the search of the defendant's residence.' 85 Drug enforcement
agents executed a federal search warrant at the residence of a man sus-
pected of phencyclidine production. Pursuant to the search, agents re-
covered brochures on drug synthesis distributed by the defendant. An
investigation followed, culminating with the sale of drug synthesis doc-
uments to an undercover agent. Upon search of the defendant's apart-
ment, numerous instruction pamphlets, business correspondence, order
forms, and advertisements relating to drugs were recovered. The de-
fendant was indicted for aiding and abetting in the attempted manufac-
ture of phencylidine and using the United States mails to cause and
facilitate the commission of the crime of attempted manufacture of
phencyclidine. At trial, the defendant successfully moved to have all
evidence recovered pursuant to the search suppressed, on the ground
that none of the items seized were contraband or evidence of criminal
activity. '8
6
On appeal from the suppression order, the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered the issue of whether the affidavit for the warrant contained suffi-
cient facts to establish probable cause.187 The court held that the
affidavit established the required probable cause. 188 The court stated
that an affidavit for a search warrant must contain facts to establish
probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime will be found at
the premises to be searched. 8 9 The instant affidavit sufficiently did
182. Id at 112-13, comparing this forty-one page affidavit to the insufficient affidavit in
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969). In Spinelli, the affidavit detailed only the
facts that Spinelli had been seen four times travelling to and from his apartment, and that
his apartment contained two separate telephones.
183. 659 F.2d at 113 (citing United States v. Besase, 521 F.2d 1306, 1308 (6th Cir. 1975)
(affidavits recite "in exhaustive detail" facts leading to conclusion that defendants were en-
gaged in a numbers lottery); United States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934, 941 (3d Cir. 1973)
(affidavit detailed ten times in which defendant visited residence to be searched)). See also
United States v. Hirschhorn, 649 F.2d 360, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1981) ("long and detailed" affi-
davit unquestionably showed probable cause to search for gambling paraphernalia).
184. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982), reversing suppression order.
185. Id at 841.
186. Id at 838.
187. Id at 840.
188. Id
189. Id (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) (valid warrants may
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so.' 90 It set forth in detail the conduct of the defendant in advertising
for sale drug manufacturing instructions and reliable suppliers of
chemicals. All correspondence was traceable to a post office box regis-
tered in the defendant's name.' 91 The defendant was observed receiv-
ing mail from this post office box. The court concluded that a
magistrate could find probable cause to believe that evidence of the
crime would be found in Barnett's apartment.1
9 2
The court further held that evidence relevant to a prosecution of
the party being searched may lawfully be seized if it tends to substanti-
ate the suspect's intent regarding the criminally proscribed conduct de-
scribed in the affidavit.'93 The presence of the manufacturing
instructions in the defendant's apartment would be admissible to prove
that the defendant acted with criminal intent.1
94
In United States v. Poland,95 the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity
of warrants issued to search the defendants' residences. 196 The facts
revealed an intricate and organized plan to commit robbery and mur-
der. The defendants robbed a security van containing currency and
murdered the drivers, disposing of the bodies and evidence in canvas
sacks at the bottom of Lake Mead. The bodies were recovered and a
detailed investigation led to the defendants. Search warrants were is-
sued to search the defendants' homes, wherein incriminating evidence
was seized.
On appeal from convictions for robbery' 97 and kidnapping, 198 the
be issued to search any property at which there is probable cause to believe that evidence of
a crime will be found)).
190. 667 F.2d at 840-41.
191. Id
192. Id at 841.
193. Id at 843 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483-84 (1976) (records seized
pertaining to another lot in subdivision could be used to show intent to defraud with respect
to the lot 13T transaction)). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (uphold-
ing the seizure of "mere" evidence that will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction).
194. 667 F.2d at 843. The seizure of manufacturing instructions in defendant's apartment
would establish at trial the fact that United News Service, the name appearing on the letter
head of the instructions, was the fictitious alter ego of the defendant. This fact, together with
proof that the defendant had mailed instructions to others, would prove criminal intent.
195. 659 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
196. Id at 897.
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, by force and vio-
lene.., takes.., from the person or presence of another any property or money ... in
the care, custody. . . of, any bank ... shall be fined ... "
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, in committing any
offense.., kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of
such person, shall be imprisoned. .. ."
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defendants contended that the search warrants were invalid, 19 9 and
there was no sufficient indication why the items sought were expected
to be at the residences to be searched.2°°
The Ninth Circuit held that although the affidavit did not contain
any direct evidence to connect the items to be searched for to the de-
fendants' residences, the existence of probable cause was not af-
fected.2"' Direct observation is not necessary.20 2 Normal inferences as
to where criminals are likely to hide evidence will supply probable
cause, taking into account the type of crime, the nature of the items
sought, and the opportunity for concealment. 0 3 The court found it
very probable that the defendants would hide the stolen money in their
homes.2o
In United States v. Gilman,20 5 the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity
of several search warrants issued for the defendants' offices and ga-
rages.2° The defendants were partners in a mail order business distrib-
uting sexually explicit magazines and brochures. Pursuant to an
investigation begun by postal inspectors, the San Francisco police ob-
tained warrants to search a building housing the defendants' offices, a
nearby garage, and a public storage garage rented by the defendants.
The items to be seized were certain magazines, a film, and business
records. Upon execution of the warrants, it was discovered that the
office building was also a residential dwelling. Materials described in
199. 659 F.2d at 896.
200. Id at 897.
201. Id
202. Id
203. Id (citing United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1976) (items
specified in warrant were types of things that a person who had participated in a kidnap-
ping/extortion plot might possess), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); United States v.
Spearman, 532 F.2d 132, 133 (9th Cir. 1976) (reasonable to infer that a heroin dealer would
keep heroin in his car)). See also United States v. Minis, 666 F.2d 134, 139-40 (5th Cir.)
(property was a logical place to find a garden of marijuana), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946
(1982); Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d 870, 874-75 (10th Cir. 1981) (reasonable to as-
sume evidence of assembled wire-tapping equipment would be found in defendant's home),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133 (1982); United States v. Jackstadt, 617 F.2d 12, 13-14 (2d Cir.)
(infer defendant carried container of ether into his house), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980);
United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 828-29 (9th Cir.) (inference that heroin would be
found in residence), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d
208, 213 (9th Cir. 1978) (inference that heroin would be found in home).
204. 659 F.2d at 897, affirming the convictions. The defendants had been unemployed
and in debt for some time. It would have aroused suspicion if suddenly they began to make
large bank deposits. Therefore, it was logical for them to hide the stolen money at home.
Id
205. 684 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1982).
206. Id at 618-20.
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the search warrant were seized from the offices. When the police en-
tered the nearby garage, they observed in plain view three different
magazines not described in the warrant. They took one copy of each
magazine to a magistrate, obtained a second warrant, returned to the
garage and seized the magazines.
The search of the public storage garage also did not uncover any
of the magazines described in the warrant. Police obtained a second
warrant after seizing copies of other materials and taking them to a
magistrate. The magazines seized pursuant to this second search war-
rant, however, were not introduced at trial. Rather, abandoned
magazines belonging to the defendants were turned over to the FBI by
the owner of the public storage garage.
On appeal from a conviction for mailing obscene material2 °7 and
conspiracy,20 8 the defendants challenged the validity of each of the
search warrants. They argued that the warrant for the office building
described the entire building, dwelling areas included, yet showed
probable cause only for a search of the offices.209 They contended that
the warrant was overbroad and therefore invalid.2 °
The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument.211 The court
held that a warrant, which authorized the search of an entire building
containing multiple units while providing probable cause to only a por-
tion of the building, is not necessarily void if it falls within a recognized
exception to the general rule voiding a warrant for an undisclosed
multi-unit structure.212 The exceptions include a situation where the
defendant was in control of the entire building or it was occupied in
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious,
indecent, filthy or vile article. . .[i]s declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be
conveyed in the mails. . ....
208. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States. . .and one or more of such persons
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined .
209. 684 F.2d at 618.
210. Id.
211. Id
212. Id (citing United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 1004 (1981), for this proposition)). Whitney involved a search warrant issued
for a residence described as a two-story, single-family dwelling. In actuality, the house had
been converted into two apartments, one on each level. The defendant resided in the upper
apartment. In holding the warrant sufficient, the court found that the defendant was in full
control of the house; that the officers were unaware of the two separate apartments until they
entered the house; and that the officers believed a search of the entire house was warranted.
Id at 907-08. For the general rule voiding a warrant for an undisclosed multi-unit struc-
ture, see United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1955) (voiding a search warrant
authorizing the search of an entire apartment building consisting of four apartments).
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common rather than individually; where the entire building was under
suspicion; or where the multi-unit character of the building was not
known to the officers at the time they applied for and executed the
search warrant. 21 3 The record showed that the police were not aware
that the building contained separate living quarters.214 Further, there
was some indication that the defendants were in complete control of
the entire building and that the entire building was suspect.21 s The
court held that probable cause to search was stated for the offices, and
therefore the overbreadth of the warrant did not require exclusion of
the evidence seized therein.
216
The defendants also contested the validity of the second search
warrant issued for the nearby garage, as it was based on samples of
magazines taken from the garage by the police. They contended that
the police were not allowed to take those samples.21 7 The court held
that the police took the samples to the magistrate for the express pur-
pose of securing a second warrant. 218 They reasoned that issuance of a
second warrant was the proper and preferred procedure, as compared
to seizing the magazines under the plain view doctrine.219 This allowed
the magistrate to make a finding of probable cause based on direct evi-
dence. Therefore, the warrant was valid.
Lastly, the court held that probable cause supported the issuance
of the first search warrant for the public storage garage.220 The portion
of the affidavit referring to the public storage garage, when read in con-
junction with the entire affidavit, supplied probable cause to search. 221
Police then obtained a second warrant for other magazines found in the
garage, in compliance with the procedure followed earlier for the ga-
rage adjoining the office building.222 Therefore, no impropriety oc-




217. Id at 619 (relying on United States v. Sherwin, 572 F.2d 196, 199 (9th Cir. 1977)
(seizure of magazines not identified in the search warrant held improper; plain view excep-
tion does not apply when materials seized are protected by the first amendment), cert, de-
nied, 437 U.S. 909 (1978)).
218. 684 F.2d at 619.
219. Id The court distinguished Sherwin on the fact that the officers in that case seized
the magazines directly and did not seek a second search warrant. The Sherwin court itself
suggested that the preferable procedure was for the officers to seal the area while they ob-
tained another warrant. 572 F.2d at 200. That is exactly what the San Francisco police did
in this case.





curred. The court further stated that even if the second warrant was
not valid, the abandoned magazines actually introduced into evidence
at trial were sufficiently remote to remove any taint from an illegal
search.223 The evidence was properly admitted and the convictions
were affirmed.224
In United States v. FHores,225 the defendant unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the sufficiency and accuracy of an affidavit supporting a warrant
to search his apartment. 226 A police officer had arrested a third party,
Douglas Bontempi, in the defendant's apartment on a murder conspir-
acy charge. During the arrest the officer had observed firearm para-
phernalia and photographs depicting Bontempi and several other
people holding rifles and other firearms. A week later the FBI received
an anonymous phone call informing them that a box of guns had been
observed in a storage area adjoining the defendant's apartment. Gun-
shots were heard in the neighborhood the next day. A warrant for the
defendant's apartment was obtained, the purpose of which was to
search for evidence that Bontempi was illegally possessing firearms.
The search revealed several firearms, .including a carbine weapon be-
longing to the defendant.
On appeal from a conviction for possessing a firearm as a con-
victed felon,227 the defendant argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to connect Bontempi with his apartment and with the
firearms.228 The court first held that the affidavit contained sufficient
evidence to enable the magistrate to conclude that it would be reason-
able to suspect that weapons might be found in the defendant's apart-
ment.2 29 The affidavit stated that the arresting officer had seen firearms
and paraphernalia in plain view in the apartment, and the anonymous
phone call tended to corroborate the suspected presence of firearms.
23 °
The court then examined whether there were sufficient facts stated in
the affidavit to determine that Bontempi's relationship with the defend-
ant's apartment was significant enough to justify a belief that some of
the firearms observed belonged to him.231 The court held that a sus-
223. Id
224. Id. at 618-20.
225. 679 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 791 (1983).
226. Id. at 174.
227. 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who has
been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision
thereof of a felony. . . and who receives, possesses. . . any firearm shall be fined ....
228. 679 F.2d at 174.
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pect's mere presence in a residence was too insignificant a connection
with the residence to establish the relationship.232 In this case, how-
ever, the affidavit contained additional allegations of Bontempi's rela-
tionship with the defendant's apartment.233 The apartment contained
photographs depicting Bontempi holding rifles and other firearms. The
court found that any inference that was to be drawn from this fact was
for the warrant-issuing magistrate to draw, and no error in having
made this inference could be found.234 Therefore, the search warrant
was properly issued.
The defendant also challenged the validity of the warrant on the
ground that the police officer intentionally or recklessly omitted from
the affidavit the facts that the adjoining storage area where the box of
guns was observed belonged to the apartment superintendent, and that
Bontempi was in jail at the time the gunshots were heard in the neigh-
borhood.2 35 He contended that these facts would vitiate a finding of
probable cause to search the apartment and that the district court erred
in refusing to grant his request for an evidentiary hearing on the truth-
fulness of the affidavit.236 The Ninth Circuit held that even if it were
demonstrated that the officer deliberately omitted this information
from the affidavit, the omission must be material in order to invalidate
the warrant 37 Upon review of the affidavit, the court found these
omissions were not material.238 The affidavit stated that the apartment
232. Id (relying on United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1972) (insufficient
relationship between a house to be searched and two bank robbery suspects, where the affi-
davit stated only that one suspect was seen in the house and that the other was arrested
there; no reason to believe that the suspects were anything other than casual social guests in
the house)).
233. 679 F.2d at 175. The Bailey affidavit contained no additional information linking
the suspects to the residence.
234. Id at 176.
235. Id
236. Id The defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing stems from the Supreme
Court's holding in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false state-
ment knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement
is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that
a hearing be held at the defendant's request.
Id at 155-56.
237. 679 F.2d at 176 (citing United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1981)
(affidavit omitted fact that police informant incorrectly named the motel at which a truck
containing marijuana would be found; omission immaterial as affiant testified he easily lo-
cated the truck by following street directions given by the informant); United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.) (affidavit did not state that the confidential informant
was the defendant's wife), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)).
238. 679 F.2d at 176.
CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
superintendent had allowed the tenants to use "his" storage area. Fur-
ther, that Bontempi was in custody at the time the shots were fired was
not a controlling fact concerning his possession of the firearms, as pos-
session can be either actual or constructive.239 Therefore, the defend-
ant failed to establish a basis for an evidentiary hearing to challenge
the accuracy of the affidavit.240
In United States v. Kunkler,24" the Ninth Circuit upheld the accu-
racy of an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the defendant's
home.242 Pursuant to a DEA investigation into the higher levels of a
cocaine dealing operation, suspicion focused on a dealer in the San Di-
ego area. Surveillance of the dealer led the agent to the defendant's
house. Each time the undercover agent would begin a transaction with
the dealer, the dealer would drive to the defendant's house and meet
with the defendant. Upon returning to the agent, the dealer would de-
liver one ounce of cocaine.
Subsequent trips by the dealer out to his van or to his apartment
were necessary to deliver a second ounce of cocaine to the agent. Dur-
ing one such transaction the DEA agents decided to terminate the un-
dercover operation, and arrested the dealer. Fearful that the defendant
would become suspicious when the dealer did not return to the house,
the agents entered the defendant's residence and secured the premises
while a search warrant was obtained. A search of the defendant's
house revealed drug paraphernalia and an ounce of cocaine.
On appeal from a conviction for conspiring 243 to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute2 " and aiding and abetting the distribution of
cocaine,245 the defendant contended that the affidavit was defective be-
cause it failed to identify the source and reliability of the affiant's infor-
mation, and to include the fact that the dealer returned to his van
before delivering the cocaine to the agent. The defendant contended
that this omission prevented the inference that the cocaine was in the
239. Id at 176-77.
240. Id at 177, affirming the conviction.
241. 679 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1982).
242. Id at 190-91.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever commits an offense
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its com-
mission, is punishable as a principal."
244. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
245. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable .... "
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van rather than the defendant's house.246
The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the defendant's conten-
tions.2 47 It held that it was "readily apparent" that the DEA under-
cover agents were the source of the information in the affidavit.248
Police officers are deemed per se reliable and therefore their reliability
need not be proved.24 9 The court characterized the defendant's conten-
tion pertaining to the omission of the fact that the dealer returned to his
van before delivering the cocaine as "frivolous. ' 250 The court held that
the omission was immaterial.2 5 1 Even if this omitted information was
considered together with the information set forth in the affidavit,
probable cause to issue the search warrant still existed.252
The defendant also contended that the affidavit did not establish
probable cause. 53 The court held that the warrant was properly is-
sued.254 The dealer's repeated trips to the defendant's home followed
by the delivery of cocaine to the agent, combined with the dealer's
statements implicating someone else as his "source" were sufficient to
conclude that criminal activity was probably shown.255 Accordingly,
the conviction was affirmed.256
246. 679 F.2d at 190-91.
247. Id
248. Id
249. Id (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (observations made
by investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service
are a reliable basis for a warrant); Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir.
1969) (county sheriff is reliable informant), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 840 (1970); United States v,
Desist, 384 F.2d 889, 896-97 (2d Cir. 1967) (information provided by narcotics agents
deemed reliable), a'd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 320
(9th Cir. 1962) (information provided by agent of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics held
reliable)). See also United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296, 1303 (5th Cir.) (information pro-
vided by government officials engaged in investigatory or regulatory activities is deemed
reliable), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930 (1982).
250. 679 F.2d at 191.
251. Id
252. Id (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.) (even if inform-
ant's identity had been revealed, affidavit still would have supported a finding of probable
cause), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (if
there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable
cause, the inaccuracies are irrelevant)).
253. 679 F.2d at 191.
254. Id
255. Id (citing United States v. Fried, 576 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.) (affidavit need only
provide that criminal activity is probably shown), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978); Rocha v.
United States, 387 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1967) (similar facts as in Kunkler held to
supply probable cause for an arrest), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1004 (1968)).
256. 679 F.2d at 192.
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In United States v. Chesher,2 57 the Ninth Circuit upheld the suffi-
ciency of an affidavit supporting an indicia warrant,258 but held the
defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the accuracy of
statements made in that affidavit.25 9 An indictment was filed charging
the defendant with participating in the conduct of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.260 Specifically, that enter-
prise was the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. Pursuant to the indict-
ment, officers obtained a warrant authorizing the seizure of any indicia
of the defendant's membership in the Hell's Angels Club. During a
search of the defendant's house, officers discovered in plain view a lab-
oratory used in manufacturing of methamphetamine. A second war-
rant was obtained, and the laboratory was seized. The original
racketeering indictment was dismissed, and the defendant was subse-
quently convicted of having manufactured methamphetamine.261
On appeal, the defendant first contended that the seizure of the
laboratory could not be justified under the plain view doctrine. The
court, however, found a valid plain view seizure.262 The defendant
then contended that the affidavit in support of the indicia warrant
failed to establish probable cause to believe that the evidence sought
would be found.2 63  Specifically, Chesher argued that the affidavit
failed to provide enough information to allow the magistrate to evalu-
ate the reliability of the informant's information.2 " While conceding
that the defendant was correct in his statement of the requirements for
verifying hearsay information, the court held that the affiant based his
information on personal knowledge and not on hearsay information.265
Therefore, the affidavit was adequate to support a finding of probable
257. 678 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1982).
258. Id. at 1360. The Ninth Circuit appears to be using the term "indicia warrant" to
indicate a warrant which authorizes a search only for evidence which supports the existence
of a specific fact. In this case, the warrant authorized only the seizure of evidence which
indicated that the defendant was a member of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. Other
examples of indicia warrants might be those authorizing only seizure of evidence indicating
ownership of a house, or of a car.
259. Id at 1363-64.
260. The statute the defendant violated was Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, commonly known as The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976)).
261. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); for statutory definition see supra note 244.
262. 678 F.2d at 1356-57. See infra section on Warrantless Searches.
263. 678 F.2d at 1359.
264. Id The statement in question was: "'as a result of my experience and conversations
with CRI's (confidential and reliable informants) 1, 2, and 3, I know that LAWRENCE
GILBERT CHESHER is a member of the HELLS ANGELS MOTORCYCLE CLUB."'
Id
265. Id The court stated that it was unclear from the face of the affidavit whether the
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cause.266
The defendant also contended that he should have been granted
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the affidavit was based on
an intentionally or recklessly false statement. 67 The court stated that
Franks v. Delaware2 68 permitted a defendant in certain circumstances
to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements made in an affidavit
supporting a warrant.269 However, a defendant must satisfy a two-
pronged test to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing.270 First, the de-
fendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit
contains actual falsity, and that this falsity is either deliberate or the
result of reckless disregard for the truth.27' These allegations must be
accompanied by a detailed offer of proof.27 2 Second, the court must
determine that the challenged statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause. 73 The excision of the statement would necessarily
leave the affidavit with insufficient content to establish probable
cause.
274
The Ninth Circuit held that a substantial preliminary showing of
actual falsity in the affidavit was satisfied by the Government's conces-
sion that the challenged statement in the affidavit was false.275 The
court then found four items of evidence that the statement was inten-
tionally or recklessly false.276 The first item of evidence was a sworn
statement by the defendant that anyone with close knowledge of the
Hell's Angels Club would have known that he had been expelled from
affiant was relying exclusively on hearsay information or on his own experience as well.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the statement was made from personal knowledge,
266. Id
267. Id at 1360, referring to the statement set forth in supra note 264.
268. 438 U.S. 154 (1978); see supra note 236.
269. 678 F.2d at 1360.
270. Id The court in Franks v. Delaware was careful to avoid creating a rule which would
make evidentiary hearings into an affiant's veracity commonplace and obtainable on a bare
allegation of bad faith.
271. Id
272. Id (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 171; United States v. Young Buffalo, 591
F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir.) (affidavit reported incorrect height and weight descriptions of the
robber, that defendant owned a Honda motorcycle similar to the one used in the robbery
when in actuality defendant's motorcycle had been destroyed before the robberies; that de-
fendant had rented a white over maroon 1976 AMC Pacer similar to one used by the robber
when defendant's rented Pacer was actually maroon over white), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 950
(1979)).
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the club four years earlier.277 The second item of evidence was the fact
that the affiant based his statement on stale information pertaining to
the defendant's membership status between four and eight years ago.278
The court held that the use of information so out of date as a basis for a
statement of the affiant's current belief tended to support a claim of
recklessness. 279 The third item of evidence was the failure of the affiant
to discover a four-year-old report of the California Bureau of Narcotics
(CBN)28 ° which would have informed him that the defendant's club
membership had been terminated.28" 1 The last item of evidence was the
allegation that the affiant had spoken on several occasions to the CBN
agent who had filed the report on the defendant.282 The court held that
the evidence, taken together, constituted the required substantial pre-
liminary showing of deliberate or reckless falsity.283
The court proceeded to determine whether probable cause existed
independent of the affiant's statement in the affidavit that he knew the
defendant to be a club member.284 The affidavit supporting the search
warrant contained only two other statements relating to the defendant's
relationship with the club. The first stated that a six-year-old investiga-
tive report identified the defendant as a club member. 285 The second
statement concerned the RICO indictment,286 which charged the de-
fendant with being associated with the Hell's Angels Motorcycle
Club.2 87
The Ninth Circuit held that a showing of probable cause required
that the affidavit provide sufficient facts to permit a reasonable person
to conclude that Hell's Angels indicia was likely to be found at the
defendant's home.288 To do so, there must be probable cause to believe
277. Id. A California Bureau of Narcotics agent reported on Chesher's expulsion from
the club within months after the occurrence. The court interpreted this fact to indicate that
not only was such information about Chesher true, but it was also quickly available to inves-
tigative agents. Id. at 1361.
278. Id at 1361.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 277.
281. 678 F.2d at 1361. The court stated that his unexplained failure also tended to sup-
port a claim of recklessness.
282. Id The affiant claimed, however, that neither the defendant nor the agent's report
were ever discussed during their conversations.
283. Id at 1362.
284. Id.
285. Id
286. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
287. 678 F.2d at 1362.
288. Id (citing United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049, 1052-53 (9th Cir.) (only the
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that the defendant was still a member of the club.289 The court held
that the six-year-old investigative report was too old to be of any real
value to the magistrate.290 An affidavit "must speak as of the time of
the issue" of the search warrant.29' Nor could a finding of probable
cause be grounded on the RICO indictment.292 Probable cause to in-
dict for RICO violations is quite different from the probable cause nec-
essary to believe that indicia of club membership will be found in the
indicted individual's home.293 A person may be indicted under RICO
for having committed an act of racketeering within the last five years.
Therefore, the affidavit contained no basis for concluding that there
was any evidence of the defendant's current association with the
club.
2 94
The court held that once the critical allegation of the affiant's
knowledge of the defendant's club membership was set aside, the re-
maining content of the affidavit was insufficient to support a finding of
probable cause.295 Under Franks the defendant was therefore entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on whether the affiant's statement pertaining
to the defendant's club membership was deliberately or recklessly
false.296 The conviction was reversed and the case was remanded to the
district court with instructions to conduct such an evidentiary
hearing.
297
2. Specificity of things to be seized
In United States v. Brock,2 98 the Ninth Circuit upheld the specific-
ity of a warrant authorizing the search of defendants' cabin.299 The
defendants became the target of a Drug Enforcement Agency investiga-
tion when they placed an order for chemicals commonly used to manu-
facture amphetamines. Four months of surveillance resulted in the
probability of finding the described items at a particular location must be shown), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 972 (1978)).
289. 678 F.2d at 1362.
290. Id
291. Id at 1362-63 (citing Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 211 (1932) (warrant au-
thorizing the search of a hotel for intoxicating liquor issued three weeks after the affidavit
was sworn out held invalid)).




296. Id at 1363-64 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172).
297. 678 F.2d at 1364, expressing no opinion on whether the defendant will prevail at the
hearing.
298. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
299. Id at 1322-23.
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discovery of a methamphetamine laboratory and the defendants' subse-
quent arrest.
On appeal from a conviction for conspiring to possess with intent
to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine 3 ° and the manufac-
ture of methamphetamine,3°' the defendants unsuccessfully contended
that the search warrant was invalid for lack of particularity because it
did not list a canister of methylamine known to the agents to be in the
cabin.30 2
The court held that the warrant at issue was sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that a warrant describe with reasonable specificity the ob-
jects of the search.3 °3 The law does not require that warrants list in
detail every item the agents know are to be found at a certain loca-
tion.3° The court held that the canister of methylamine was included
within the scope of the warrant's language.30 5
The court further reasoned, in dicta, that even if the law did re-
quire that the warrant must specifically refer to the canister, this was
accomplished through the affidavit.30 6 The affidavit described the can-
ister and its location in the cabin and was incorporated by reference
into the warrant. The court stated that when a warrant incorporates an
affidavit, the warrant and affidavit together satisfy the specificity re-
quirement if the affidavit specifically lists the items expected to be
found.30 7
300. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1976) provides in pertinent part that methamphetamine is a con-
trolled substance for purposes of this chapter. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in perti-
nent part: "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a con-
trolled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who
attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable.
301. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) (1976); see supra note 300.
302. 667 F.2d at 1322-23. The defendants incorrectly relied on Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), which established the inadvertency requirement for warrantless
seizures under the plain view doctrine.
303. 667 F.2d at 1322 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976) (warrant
upheld which authorized the seizure of "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime
at this [time] unknown")).
304. 667 F.2d at 1323.
305. Id The warrant authorized a search for "chemicals and glassware commonly uti-
lized in the manufacture of methamphetamine." Id
306. Id
307. Id (citing United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 752 (9th Cir. 1979) (affidavit
incorporated in warrant made it clear that agents were to search for evidence of the manu-
facture of methamphetamine), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980)). See also United States v.
McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1978) (search of basement within scope of warrant
because affidavit established that contraband was stored there); United States v. Roche, 614
F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1980) (warrant could have been cured if affidavit had been incorporated).
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Defendants also contended that no probable cause existed to
search the cabin after the discovery of the methamphetamine labora-
tory in a motor home.30 8 The court summarily rejected this argument,
holding that it was reasonable to believe that some paraphernalia
would have remained behind in the cabin. Furthermore, a beeper that
agents had placed in the canister of methylamine indicated that it was
in the cabin.30 9 Therefore, the search warrant was held to be valid and
the items seized within the scope of the warrant.310
In United States v. Hiloyard,31' the court upheld the specificity of
warrants to search for stolen vehicles at two locations.31 2 The defendant
was suspected of running a stolen vehicle operation. The affidavit sub-
mitted in support of two search warrants described in detail the affi-
ant's observations of the defendant's acquisition of stolen vehicles and
storage at one or the other of the places to be searched. The affidavit
also detailed the defendant's method of concealing the thefts by alter-
ing the identification numbers on the vehicles. The defendant was
known to have a box full of vehicle serial number plates, titles, docu-
ments, and keys to fit different kinds of machinery. The search war-
rants were executed at both locations, and two stolen vehicles were
recovered.
In attacking his conviction for interstate transportation of stolen
motor vehicles, concealment of stolen motor vehicles, and interstate
transportation of stolen property, the defendant contended the search
was a general one and beyond the scope of that which a warrant can
properly authorize. 1 3 The Ninth Circuit disagreed.3"4
The court held it was proper to direct a search of both of the loca-
tions identified in the affidavit because it was reasonable to conclude
that stolen vehicles would be found at either or both of the premises.
3 1
When property to be seized is being moved from place to place, it may
be reasonable to issue warrants directed to multiple locations. 316
The requirement that a warrant not be a general one is derived in
308. 667 F.2d at 1323.
309. Id
310. Id at 1322-23, affirming the conviction.
311. 677 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982).




316. Id (citing United States v. Johnson, 641 F.2d 652, 659 (9th Cir. 1981) (reasonable to
search for cocaine at defendants' residence); United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 654
(9th Cir. 1980) (evidence could be sought either in car or house)).
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substance from the particularity requirement of the fourth amend-
ment,31 7 and insures that nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the search warraht.311 The court reasoned, though, that this
does not preclude the use of generic language in special circum-
stances.31 9 The court held that when probable cause exists to believe
the premises to be searched contain a class of generic items, only some
of which are contraband, a search warrant may direct inspection of all
items if there are objective, well-defined criteria by which the executing
officers can distinguish contraband from lawfully possessed prop-
erty.320 The warrant itself or the affidavit must incorporate the stan-
dards to be used by the officers to avoid the seizure of protected
property.32' In the instant case, the executing officers used the guide-
lines set forth in the affidavit to distinguish stolen vehicles from those
lawfully owned.322 Therefore, the search was valid.323
In United States v. Allen ,324 the Ninth Circuit upheld the specific-
ity of a warrant issued to search the ranch of one of the defendants.3 2
317. The fourth amendment states "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
318. 677 F.2d at 1339 (citing Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), for the
proposition that the particularity requirement makes general searches impossible and there-
fore nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant).
319. 677 F.2d at 1339-40 (citing United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1981)
(discussing cases upholding warrants with generic descriptions); United States v. Federbush,
625 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrant proper because it specified the crime and the
enterprise to which the items listed were to pertain); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463,
479-82 (1976) (upholding search warrant listing in generic terms various types of documents
and including catch-all phrase interpreted as authorizing search for other evidence relevant
to criminal fraud involving certain real estate)).
320. 677 F.2d at 1340 (citing United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 188 (Ist Cir. 1977)
(warrant held to be invalid because the affidavit did not establish a method to differentiate
contraband from the rest of the inventory); Montilla Records of Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Morales, 575 F.2d 324, 326-27 (1st Cir. 1978) (warrant was similarly invalid for lack of
method of differentiation)). See also United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 545 (1st Cir.
1980) (if the means of identification required some analysis and matching there would be
sufficient guarantee of particularity).
321. 677 F.2d at 1340 (citing In re Seizure of Property Belonging to Talk of the Town
Bookstore, Inc., 644 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981) (warrant expressly limited the property
subject to seizure to that described in detail in the attached affidavits); United States v.
Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977) (warrant made no reference to affidavit and
affidavit did not accompany the warrant)).
322. 677 F.2d at 1341. The affidavit explained that vehicle alterations could be discov-
ered by comparing secret identification numbers with those openly displayed, that true num-
bers could be checked with police computerized lists, and that some engine serial numbers
could be checked with lists provided by sellers of heavy equipment.
323. Id, affirming the conviction.
324. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
325. Id at 1292.
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The defendants were the subject of an intense investigation into an am-
phibious operation to import over eight tons of marijuana. Pursuant to
the arrests on the night of the attempted offloading of the marijuana, a
search warrant was issued to search the defendant's ranch for mari-
juana and any "papers and documents" 326 relating to its distribution.
Two small amounts of marijuana and a receipt identifying one of the
defendants as the owner of a vehicle involved in the crime were seized.
On appeal from convictions for possession of marijuana with in-
tent to distribute,327 conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute,328 and conspiracy to import marijuana,329 the defendants
contended that the warrant was defectively overbroad.33 °
The court rejected the defendants' argument.33' While noting the
United States Supreme Court's concern for warrants that authorize the
seizure of "papers and documents,' 332 the court reasoned that warrants
with language similar to that as in the instant warrant have been up-
held on appeal in other cases.333 The court stated that in any event, the
items seized were cumulative evidence of facts established primarily
through other evidence.334
In United States v. Crozier,335 the court held that the warrants
which authorized the search of defendants' residences were overbroad
and therefore invalid.336 The defendants were charged with the manu-
facture and possession of methamphetamine with intent to dis-
tribute,337 conspiracy and tax evasion.338 In the district court, the
326. Id at 1291.
327. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976); for statutory definition see supra note 300.
328. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976); for statutory definition see supra note 300.
329. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable .
330. 633 F.2d at 1292.
331. Id, affirming the convictions.
332. Id (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480-83 (1976) (there are grave dan-
gers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of personal paper)).
333. 633 F.2d at 1292 (citing United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir.
1978) (evidence of residency and narcotics); United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082, 1086
(7th Cir.) (correspondence addressed to the defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977);
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1313-15 (8th Cir. 1976) (marijuana and parapher-
nalia)). See also United States v. Coppage, 635 F.2d 683, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1980) (papers
relating to manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine); United States v. Brock, 667
F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (notes used in manufacture of methamphetamine). But see
United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982) (warrant authorizing seizure of
papers indicating ownership and control of premises was defectively overbroad).
334. 633 F.2d at 1292.
335. 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
336. Id at 1298-99.
337. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976); for statutory definition see supra note 300.
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defendants successfully moved to suppress physical evidence recovered
from their residences pursuant to the search warrants.339 The search
warrant for one of the residences authorized the seizure of amphet-
amines, notes, formulas, and any indicia of ownership and control of
the premises. The other search warrant did not describe any particular
property but rather authorized the seizure of any material evidence re-
lating to the aforementioned crimes.3 °
On appeal, the Government contended that the search warrant
was sufficiently specific because it enabled the searching officers to rea-
sonably ascertain the objects to be seized.34' The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, however, holding that the warrants allowed the agents wide
discretion in their search, as evidenced by the many irrelevant papers
seized. 342 The court reasoned that the fourth amendment prohibits
general searches, and therefore nothing could be left to the discretion
of the officer executing the search warrant.343 Distinguishing the cases
cited by the Government as involving narrowly drawn warrants,344 the
court found the warrants in the instant case to be overbroad.345
In United States v. Cardwell,346 the defendants successfully chal-
lenged the specificity of a search warrant issued for their offices.3 47 One
338. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who willfully at-
tempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof
shall ... be guilty of a felony ..
339. 674 F.2d at 1296.
340. Id at 1298-99.
341. Id at 1298 (citing United States v. Coppage, 635 F.2d 683, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1980)
(search warrant authorizing the seizure of any and all books, records, chemical equipment
and personal papers relating to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine held
to describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity so as to protect the defendant's
right to be free from general searches)). See also United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311,
1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (search warrant for chemicals, glassware, notes, instructions and formu-
las utilized in the manufacture of methamphetamine upheld as it described with great speci-
ficity the objects of the search), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
342. 674 F.2d at 1298.
343. Id at 1299 (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)). See also supra
notes 317 & 318 and accompanying text.
344. 674 F.2d at 1298 (citing United States v. Federbush, 625 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.
1980) (warrant which authorized the seizure of all documents, papers, and mechanical in-
struments associated with issuing documents pertaining to the Windward International
Bank of Kingston, St. Vincent, in the West Indies upheld as sufficiently specific); United
States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1389 (9th Cir.) (held that a warrant which authorized
the seizure of materials pertaining to the efforts of the defendants to obtain confidential
telephone company information about certain individuals was not general and therefore was
valid), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978)).
345. 674 F.2d at 1298-99, affirming order suppressing evidence.
346. 680 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1982).
347. Id. at 78.
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of the defendants' employees notified the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) that the defendants were incorrectly reporting income on the cor-
porate tax returns. Company income had been diverted to the defend-
ants and they had caused checks to be issued for nonexistent services,
which were then deducted as business expenses. IRS agents conducted
an audit, finding indications of fraud. A search warrant was obtained
for the defendants' offices. The warrant authorized the seizure of cor-
porate books and records which were the fruits and instrumentalities of
violations of the general tax evasion statute.348 IRS agents seized 160
boxes of corporate records containing over 100,000 documents dating
back nine years. Defendants were convicted of aiding in the prepara-
tion of a false corporate tax return, willfully subscribing to a false cor-
porate tax return, and conspiracy.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of whether
the search warrant described the items to be seized with sufficient par-
ticularity.349 The Government contended that the United States
Supreme Court decision inAndresen v. Maryland350 compelled a simi-
lar result in this case.351 The court, however, found Andresen distin-
guishable.352  The warrant in this case contained no preambulatory
statement limiting the search to evidence of particular criminal epi-
sodes.353 The only limitation on the search and seizure of the defend-
ants' business records was the requirement that the records be evidence
of tax evasion.354 The court held that limiting a search to only records
that are evidence of the violation of a certain statute is generally not
enough.355 The warrant must contain some guidelines to aid in the de-
348. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who willfully at-
tempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax... or the payment thereof shall... be
guilty of a felony ......
349. 680 F.2d at 77.
350. 427 U.S. 463 (1976); see supra notes 303 & 319.
351. 680 F.2d at 77.
352. Id The defendant inAndresen was suspected of fraud in connection with the sale of
Lot 13T and other land transactions. The warrant authorized the seizure of only evidence of
the crime of false pretenses with respect to the sale of Lot 13T. As so limited, the warrant
was deemed sufficiently particularized.
353. Id
354. Id
355. Id at 77-78. The court relied on Alioto v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Wis.
1963) (warrant to seize books and records which were instrumentalities of crime involving
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1621 held to be impermissibly general); United States v. Cook, 657
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981) (warrant authorizing the seizure of cassettes onto which copyrighted
films had been transferred and recorded held to be invalid since it did not specify methods
by which the items to be seized could be determined); United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541
(Ist Cir. 1980) (warrant authorizing the seizure of certain business and billing and medical
records that evidenced a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 held invalid for lack of description as
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termination of what may or may not be seized.356 The warrant at issue
contained no such guidelines. 357 Therefore, the warrant was invalid.
35 8
3. Execution of the warrant
In United States v. Wright,359 the Ninth Circuit upheld the propri-
ety of utilizing the assistance of other law enforcement officers in the
execution of a search warrant.360 Agents of the Federal Bureau of Al-
cohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) executed a federal search warrant
authorizing the seizure of a California driver's license. An agent from
the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) assisted in the
search. A small black ledger containing narcotics notations, a drum of
mannitol and $7000 cash were also seized.
36 1
The defendant unsuccessfully contended that no independent jus-
tification existed for the presence of the BNE agent who discovered and
seized the mannitol.362 The court held that an officer executing a
search warrant clearly may utilize the assistance of other law enforce-
ment officers.363 The ATF agents' execution of the warrant required
the assistance of the BNE agent.36 Thus, the presence of the BNE
to what specific records were to be seized); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6 (lst Cir. 1980)
(warrant authorizing seizure of books, records, and documents which were evidence of vio-
lation of the mail fraud statute held impermissibly broad); In re Lafayette Academy, Inc.,
610 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1979) (warrant authorizing seizure of books and papers that evidenced
violations of a number of listed statutory provisions held invalid); and United States v.
Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977) (warrant authorizing the seizure of illegally repro-
duced and stolen copies of copyrighted films and documents relating to the manufacture and
sale of such films in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 held invalid for lack of description as to
how the items to be seized could be determined), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978).
356. 680 F.2d at 78 (citing United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d at 1322-23).
357. 680 F.2d at 78. The IRS had conducted a lengthy investigation before seeking the
warrant. In conducting the audit particular attention was paid to those items indicated by
the employee. The results of this investigation, however, were not used to refine the scope of
the warrant.
358. Id., suppressing all materials seized under the warrant and reversing the convictions.
359. 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982).
360. Id at 797.
361. Id. at 795. The defendant was convicted of tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201 (1976), in connection with his sale of narcotics. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) provides in
pertinent part: "Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall... be guilty of a felony ... .
362. 667 F.2d at 796.
363. Id at 797 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1976)). Section 3105 provides:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its
direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other
person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting
in its execution.
364. 667 F.2d at 797.
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agent was justified.365 Further, the court stated that the fact that the
BNE agent was a state, rather than a federal, drug enforcement agent
made no material difference.366
In United States v. Johnson,367 the court upheld the validity of a
search warrant368 although it was not obtained in the manner pre-
scribed by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.369 Pur-
suant to information received from a Drug Enforcement Agency agent,
officers of the San Diego County Narcotics Task Force (NTF) began
surveillance of the defendants. After observing a narcotics transaction
taking place, the NTF agents entered the house and arrested the
defendants.
To obtain a search warrant, an agent participated in a conference
call with a municipal judge and a deputy district attorney. The search
revealed, among other things, eleven pounds of cocaine and $75,000 in
cash.
On appeal from a conviction for conspiring to possess a controlled
substance with intent to distribute370 and possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute,37! the defendants contended that the
evidence should be suppressed because the warrant was issued by a
state, and not a federal, magistrate.
372
The court held that only a fundamental violation of Rule 41 re-
quired automatic suppression of evidence,373 and the defendants did
365. Id (citing United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1296-98 (6th Cir. 1979) (upholding
the seizure of narcotics by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency participating in the exe-
cution of a search warrant which authorized ATF agents to search defendant's home for
firearms and ammunition)).
366. 667 F.2d at 797 (citing United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1306 (8th Cir. 1972)
(upholding a search conducted by Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents with the assistance of
two city policemen), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974)).
367. 660 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912 (1982).
368. Id at 753.
369. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A) provides: "If the circumstances make it reasonable to
dispense with a written affidavit, a Federal Magistrate may issue a warrant based upon
sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone or other appropriate means."
370. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable. .. ."
371. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ..
372. 660 F.2d at 753.
373. Id (citing United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir. 1980) (only a funda-
mental violation of Rule 41 requires automatic suppression and a violation is fundamental
only where it renders the search unconstitutional; tape-recorded affidavit cannot be classified
as a fundamental violation), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928 (1981)).
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not argue that such a violation had taken place.374 The test to be ap-
plied in such a case, then, is whether there was prejudice in the sense
that the search would not have occurred or would not have been so
abrasive if Rule 41 had been followed, or whether there was evidence
that Rule 41 was intentionally and deliberately disregarded.375 The
court noted that the defendants did not argue that the search would not
have occurred nor would have been less offensive if Rule 41 had been
technically observed.3 76 Further, there was no evidence that the NTF
agents deliberately and intentionally violated the rule.377 Rather, the
record indicated that the warrant was proper under state procedure and
that the only infirmity was that a federal magistrate had not issued the
warrant.37 8 The agents discussed whether a federal warrant was neces-
sary and decided it was not.3 79 After the search was completed, agents
discovered that one of the suspects was a Colombian citizen and turned
the case over to federal authorities. 380 The court held that the agents
acted in good faith, and thus the search warrant was valid.381
The defendants also contested the validity of a second search war-
rant issued to search the residence of two of the defendants. 382 The
court summarily rejected the notion that probable cause did not exist
for the issuance of the search warrant.383 The affiant stated that addi-
tional evidence was likely to be found in the suspects' home.384 The
court held that the information was sufficient to support the issuance of
374. 660 F.2d at 753.
375. Id. (citing United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d at 510, (quoting United States v. Burke,
517 F.2d 377 (2d. Cir. 1975):
[Violations of Rule 41 alone should not lead to exclusion unless- (1) there was
"prejudice" in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have
been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of inten-
tional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.
Id at 386-87)). For cases following the Burke rule, see also United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d
436, 441 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981); United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 372 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979); United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1125 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979); United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Mendel, 578 F.2d 668, 673 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964
(1978); and United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1977).




380. Id at 752.
381. Id at 753.
382. Id
383. Id, affirming the convictions.
384. Id
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a search warrant.3 8 -
In United States v. Crawford,386 the Ninth Circuit again upheld the
validity of a search warrant that technically violated the requirements
of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 7 The defend-
ant was arrested in his home pursuant to a federal arrest warrant. Dur-
ing the execution of the arrest warrant, the officers lawfully observed
several firearms, drug paraphernalia, drugs, and a single fifty dollar bill
scattered throughout the house. The officers discussed obtaining a
search warrant and decided against a federal warrant, believing that
the federal government would not prosecute this type of case.3 8 A
state warrant authorizing a search for counterfeit money was procured
from a municipal court judge. A photograph of Crawford and
$150,000 in counterfeit money was seized.
On appeal from a conviction for uttering and possessing counter-
feit Federal Reserve Notes,389 the defendant contended that compli-
ance with Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
mandatory, and that the state search warrant did not comply with that
rule.390 The defendant further argued that the officers deliberately vio-
lated the provisions of the rule.3 91 Therefore, according to the defend-
ant, the warrant was invalid, and the evidence should have been
suppressed.392
The court held that violations of Rule 41, if not of constitutional
magnitude, should not lead to mandatory exclusion of evidence. 93 Ev-
idence should be excluded only if it can be shown that there was
"prejudice" in the sense that the search would not have occurred or
have been as offensive if Rule 41 were followed, or if there is evidence
of an intentional and deliberate disregard for the provisions of the
rule.
394
385. Id (citing United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir. 1978) (heroin,
paraphernalia, passport, and alien registration card probably found at his home)).
386. 657 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1981).
387. Id at 1048. See supra note 369.
388. 657 F.2d at 1046. It was the United States Attorney's office policy not to authorize
prosecution on the basis of one counterfeit note and it was Secret Service policy not to
obtain search warrants for drugs, guns and stolen property.
389. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, with intent to defraud,
passes, utters . . . or attempts to pass, utter . . . or keeps in possession or conceals any
falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United
States, shall be fined. .. ."
390. 657 F.2d at 1045.
391. Id
392. Id at 1046.
393. Id at 1047.
394. Id (citing United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
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The defendant did not, in the court's view, produce any evidence
to indicate that he had been prejudiced by the officer's failure to com-
ply with the technical provisions of Rule 41 .39 Further, the record indi-
cated that the decision to seek a state, rather than federal, warrant was
made in good faith.396 The court therefore held that the technical viola-
tions of Rule 4I under the facts as established did not require the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule.
397
4. Administrative
In Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency,398 the court upheld the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's (EPA) authority to obtain an inspection warrant ex
parte.399 The EPA, pursuant to the Clean Air Act,4° ° attempted to in-
spect the Bunker Hill Company's lead and zinc smelter complex in
Idaho. After one inspector was denied entry into the plant because he
was not an EPA employee,0 1 the EPA obtained an inspection warrant
from a federal magistrate authorizing that inspector's entry into the
plant. Nonetheless, the inspection was refused.
On appeal from a judgment holding the warrant valid, the plain-
tiffs argued that the warrant should not have been issued ex parte.4 °2
In essence, they argued that because there was no need for surprise, the
ex parte procedure should not have been employed.4 °3 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held to the contrary.4°4 Relying on a previous decision405 in which
the Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor had the authority to
v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1978)). See supra note 375 for a statement of the
Burke rule.
395. 657 F.2d at 1047.
396. Id at 1047-48. The court did not want to preclude cooperation between state and
federal law enforcement officials.
397. Id at 1048, affirming the conviction.
398. 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981).
399. Id at 1285.
400. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981).
401. The primary issue in this case was whether a non-EPA employee may be allowed to
conduct inspections under the authority of the Clean Air Act. The court held that independ-
ent contractors employed by the EPA were authorized to carry out inspections on the EPA's
behalf. Bunker Hill's real concern was to protect its trade secrets. They were willing to
allow a non-EPA employee to inspect the plant if he agreed to sign a hold harmless and
secrecy agreement. The EPA refused to permit the hold harmless and secrecy agreement to
be signed. The court rejected Bunker Hill's fear of dissemination of trade secrets as specula-
tive and unwarranted. 658 F.2d at 1284.
402. 658 F.2d at 1282.
403. Id.
404. Id
405. Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1980).
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obtain ex parte warrants to conduct Occupational Safety and Health
Administration inspections, the court reasoned that surprise was not a
necessary factor to an ex parte application.40 6 The agency simply had
the authority to obtain its warrants ex parte.4 °7
C. Warrantless Searches
1. The plain view doctrine
The "plain view" exception to the fourth amendment warrant re-
quirement was given a detailed analysis by the United States Supreme
Court in Coolidge v New Hampshire.4 °8 As with other fourth amend-
ment exceptions, however, new fact situations consistently create new
"gray areas" which escape easy application of the Supreme Court's
somewhat extensive guidelines.40 9
The plain view doctrine dictates that incriminating evidence in the
plain view of a law enforcement officer may be seized without a war-
rant if. (1) the intrusion immediately preceding the plain view observa-
tion is legitimized by one of the "jealously and carefully drawn"410
fourth amendment exceptions, 4 11 (2) the discovery is inadvertent,
412
and (3) the evidence is obviously incriminating in nature.413 The doe-
406. 658 F.2d at 1282.
407. Id
408. 403 U.S. 443 (1970).
409. ' The problem with the 'plain view' doctrine has been to identify the circumstances
in which plain view has legal significance rather than simply the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal." Id at 465.
410. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). Due to the recent expansion of
exceptions to the warrant requirements both in number and manner of application, it ap-
pears that reliance on language such as "a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), is no longer justified. See also
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
411. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1970), the Court stated: "In each
case, [the] initial intrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as 'hot pursuit' or
search incident to a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer's pres-
ence." Id at 467. Later, the Court stated: "[Pllain view alone is never enough to justify the
warrantless seizure of evidence." Id at 468 (emphasis in original).
412. Id at 469.
413. The Court in Coolidge makes several references to what constitutes "incriminating"
evidence: "An example of the applicability of the 'plain view' doctrine is the situation in
which the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the
course of the search come across some other article of incriminating character." Id at 465
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). "[T]he 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertantly
comes across an incriminating object." Id at 466 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertantly across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused." Id (emphasis added). "The extension of the
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trine rests on the proposition that if an officer sees incriminating evi-
dence in plain view from a lawful vantage point, a warrant is
unnecessary.414
Basing its decision on the plain view doctrine, the court in United
States v. Astorga-Torres,415 summarily upheld the warrantless seizure
of documents from a toilet bowl. 4 16 Federal agents arranged to buy
heroin from co-defendant Ambriz at a motel designated as a meeting
place. Defendants traveled by car with Ambriz to the motel where,
upon arrival, Ambriz was assigned to cabin 7 and defendants to cabin
4.417 After consummating the sale with Ambriz and arresting him
outside of cabin 7, the agents proceeded to cabin 4 where they knocked,
identified themselves, and demanded entrance. When no one re-
sponded, one of the agents kicked in the door after hearing a clicking
sound which he thought was the cocking of a firearm. A shooting en-
sued and the other defendants surrendered after tear gas was fired into
the cabin. While conducting a protective sweep search of the cabin to
check for other occupants, 418 the agent discovered and seized docu-
ments from the toilet bow1. 419 Defendants' motion to suppress the doc-
uments as the products of an unlawful warrantless search was denied
by the trial court.42°
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the agents' demand and subse-
quent forcible entry into defendants' cabin without a warrant was law-
ful.4 21 Citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire,422 the court's entire analysis
of the plain view issue consisted of this conclusion: "Once lawfully
inside the cabin, it was proper for the agent to seize any evidence which
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them." Id (emphasis added). See also id at 468, 471. The lower
courts, however, have not uniformly adhered to this requirement.
414. "Where, once an otherwise lawful search is in progress, the police inadvertently
come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes
dangerous-to the evidence or to the police themselves-to require them to ignore it until
they have obtained a warrant particularly describing it." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. at 467-68.
415. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1982).
416. Id at 1334-35.
417. Id at 1333.
418. Id
419. Id at 1333-34. During the search, the agent removed "debris" including a wallet
and papers from the toilet bowl, and placed them on top of the tank to dry. The cabin was
sealed and later that night the "debris" was retrieved by the DEA.
420. Id at 1335.
421. For discussion of the lawfulness of the officer's demand and subsequent entry into
the cabin, see infra discussion of Astorga-Torres in Exigent circumstances.
422. 403 U.S. at 465-66.
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he observed in plain view. ' 423 Thus, the legality of the seizure of docu-
ments under the plain view doctrine was predicated upon the legality of
the officer's initial intrusion.
The opinion failed to discuss the "inadvertence" requirement of
whether the scope of the search was proper.424 Moreover, the court did
not discuss the requirement that objects in plain view must be obvi-
ously incriminating before their seizure is lawful.425 Although the de-
fendants moved to suppress the seized documents, no facts were given
as to why-the documents were incriminating or why the agent believed
they were incriminating at the time of seizure.426 Because the facts
given in the decision were scant and analysis was relatively brief, it can
only be pointed out that the "incriminating" requirement seems to be
fairly well-entrenched, at least in theory, in other circuits, 427 but was
423. 682 F.2d at 1335.
424. If the agent was securing the premises for safety reasons, it was certainly reasonable
for him to check the bathroom. Nevertheless, it is left to the reader to assume that when the
agent entered the bathroom, the toilet seat was up and the documents were plainly visible in
the bowl.
While the court's main justification for the agent's entry into the cabin was that of a
protective search, it did not seem convinced that the agent was in any danger from accom-
plices remaining in the cabin. "While the presence of anyone else in the cabin was most
unlikely, officers who have been subjected to pistol fire... can hardly be said to be acting
unreasonably when they take steps to make sure of their safety." Id. at 1334-35. Addition-
ally, while the agent may have been justified in lifting the toilet seat and checking the bowl
for evidence (the toilet bowl is a standard and common depository used by holders of con-
traband when presented with startling circumstances) under a different exception, i.e., search
incident to arrest to prevent destruction of evidence (cf Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510
(1978) (cited inAstorga-Torres at 1335)), such a lifting of the lid could not have constituted
an inadvertent discovery for purposes of the plain view doctrine. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469-70 (1970).
425. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 466. The Supreme Court, however, may be
softening its requirement that the evidence be "obviously incriminating." In the more recent
case of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court stated that there must be "prob-
able cause to associate the property with criminal activity." Id at 587.
426. The recovery of the documents may have been justified to prevent the destruction of
evidence. See supra note 424. This is suggested by the Astorga-Torres court: "[Hiad the
material in the toilet bowl not been removed, any indication that the bowl had once con-
tained heroin might well have been lost." 682 F.2d at 1335.
427. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 524 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1975) (incriminating nature
of evidence seized must be immediately apparent; observation of gun barrel protruding from
duffel bag led to seizure of gun under plain view doctrine), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 945 (1976);
United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1977) (incriminating nature of evidence
seized must be obvious; defendant did not dispute incriminating nature of quantity of televi-
sion sets); United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1977) (incriminating nature of
article observed must be immediately apparent; billfold on top of bureau was not immedi-
ately inculpatory); United States v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1971) (sawed-off shot-
gun observed in officer's plain view was properly seized because it was an incriminating
object); United States v. Bills, 555 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1977) (sixty-five weapons were prop-
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not addressed by the Ninth Circuit in this case.428
In United States v. Wright,429 however, the Ninth Circuit reversed
defendants' conviction for tax evasion, holding that the seizure and pe-
rusal of a ledger could not be justified by the plain view exception be-
cause the evidence seized was not obviously incriminating. Agent
Kelly of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and
other federal agents conducted a search of Wright's apartment pursu-
ant to a valid search warrant which authorized the seizure of the
driver's license of one Deborah Luckie.43° Investigator Frantzman of
the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement also helped conduct
the search.43'
During the search for the driver's license, Frantzman discovered a
erly seized because of sufficiently incriminating character, and officer was not required to
know weapons were unregistered before seizure).
Other decisions recognize and have attempted to define the obviously incriminating
requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 527 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1975) ("For an object to
be 'incriminating' for constitutional purposes, the seizing authority need only have reason-
able or probable cause to believe that the object is evidence of a crime." Id. at 985 (citations
omitted). In Ross, the seizure of two handguns in plain view was upheld.), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 945 (1976); United States v. Shye, 473 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1973) (article must "consti-
tute evidence, a fruit or an instrumentality of the crime." Id at 1066. In Shye, the seizure of
money found in a plain brown bag was held unlawful.); United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d
160 (2d Cir. 1975) (court recognized that articles must be incriminating, but stated that
"[s]eizure of mere evidence, as well as instrumentalities or contraband, is justified." Id at
166 (citations omitted). In Rollins, seizure of passports evidencing intent to quickly leave the
jurisdiction was upheld.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); United States v. Teller, 412 F.2d
374 (7th Cir. 1969) (fact that index cards were evidence as opposed to fruits or instrumentali-
ties of a crime did not preclude seizure under plain view doctrine), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949
(1971).
Only the D.C. Circuit has consistently ignored the obviously incriminating require-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (plain view doc-
trine justifies seizure of items which police "recognize to be of importance to the prosecution
of the arrestee .... "d at 1232. In Thweatt, seizure of jackets hanging in closet upheld.);
United States v. Wheeler, 459 F.2d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (seizure of closed brown envelope
from ashtray upheld because officer suspected it contained narcotics); United States v. Ma-
son, 523 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (officers seizure of car keys from arrestee's apartment
upheld).
428. In United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit sum-
marily concluded that the seizure of a gun and a large amount of money in plain view in an
automobile was lawful because they "reasonably appear[ed] to be the instrumentalit[ies] of a
crime." Id at 640.
429. 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982).
430. Id. at 795. Luckie was believed to be sharing Wright's residence with him. Id
43 1. Id After the warrant was issued, Kelly asked Frantzman to participate in the search
because: (1) Frantzman was assisting federal agents in another investigation of narcotics
conspiracy involving Wright, (2) Wright had a reputation as a narcotics dealer, and
(3) Frantzman's knowledge of narcotics was extensive. Id
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drum of manntol,432 and Kelly found a small black ledger.43 3 Kelly
then gave the ledger to Frantzman, who examined it and concluded
that the notations in/volved drug trafficking. 434 The ledger was seized
and introduced into evidence at trial.435 Wright was convicted of tax
evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7201,436 based on the inference
that the source of his income was the sale of narcotics.437
On appeal, Wright contended that the plain view seizure of the
mannitol was unlawful because Frantzman's participation in the search
was unjustified.438 The court recognized that the plain view exception
requires "the seizing officer [to] have a prior independent justification
for being present at the point of observation, '439 but held that Kelly's
good faith utilization of Frantzman was clearly lawful."
The court discussed the requirements of the plain view doctrine as
set forth by the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,441 and
then specifically addressed Wright's contention that the ledger was not
obviously incriminating evidence of a crime." 2 The court recognized
that the incriminating nature of an item in plain view must be "imme-
diately apparent" to the seizing officer to prevent "exploratory rum-
maging."'4 3 The court then stated, however, that a "closer inspection"
of the item may be necessary to discover its "immediately apparent"
incriminating nature.4 " The Wright court then stated the issue as be-
432. Although mannitol is a nutrient that has a number of legal uses, it is also used as a
cutting agent for cocaine and heroin. Id at 795 n.2.
433. Cash in the amount of $7,000, a .38 caliber revolver, and Ms. Luckie's driver's i-
cense were also found during the search. Id at 795.
434. Id
435. Id at 795-96. The drum of mannitol and the $7,000 in cash were also introduced
into evidence. Id
436. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) states:
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax im-
posed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties pro-
vided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the
costs of prosecution.
437. 667 F.2d at 796. The Government used a complex net worth method of calculating
taxable income in its case against Wright. Id at 795.
438. Id at 796.
439. Id (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see supra note 4 and
accompanying text).
440. 667 F.2d at 797. The court also held that it made no difference that Frantzman was
a state, rather than federal, officer. For a full discussion of the issue of Frantzman's partici-
pation in the search, see Search Warrants.
441. 403 U.S. 443 (1970). See supra notes 408-414 and accompanying text.
442. 667 F.2d at 795.
443. Id at 797.
444. Id
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ing not whether an officer may conduct a closer examination of an item
seized in his plain view, but when he may do so." 5 Quoting Professor
LaFave4 6 and citing a number of federal and state decisions in a foot-
note," 7 the court held that a closer inspection of a "plain view" item
445. Id The only authority for the "closer inspection" theory was stated by the court in a
footnote: "In United States v. Chesher, 654 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), we recog-
nized that it is occasionally necessary to peruse an item to determine whether an item is
evidence of a crime." 667 F.2d at 798 n.4. The Chesher opinion cited by the court, however,
has been withdrawn from the bound Federal Reporter volume at the request of the court.
446. 667 F.2d at 798.
[E]ven "mere inspection" of items seen but not named in the warrant must be
reasonable, and for such a minimal intrusion to be reasonable the officers must first
be aware of some facts and circumstances which justify a reasonable suspicion (not
probable cause) that the items are the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a
crime.
Id (citing 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.11 at 174 (1978)).
447. 667 F.2d at 798 n.5. The court cited the following cases: United States v. Chesher,
654 F.2d 1285, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1981) (of which the Wright court stated: "[W]e upheld the
plain view seizure of a drug laboratory not described in the search warrant because the
police had probable cause to believe it to be evidence of a crime."); United States v. Ochs,
595 F.2d 1247, 1258 (2d Cir.) (Wright court stated that the decision in Ochs, "discuss[ed] the
'highly suspicious' nature of two bankbooks and two notebooks as justifying their perusal."
667 F.2d at 798 n.5. The Ochs court stated, however, that "[e]ven under the plain view
doctrine in [sic] the incriminating nature of an object is generally deemed "immediately
apparent' where police have probable cause [not a reasonable suspicion] to believe it is evi-
dence of crime." 595 F.2d at 1258. (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979);
United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) (Wright court stated that in Duckett
the "officer knew 'that something was amiss' when he seized envelopes found in Duckett's
car while searching for the vehicle identification number." 667 F.2d 798 n.5. The court in
Duckett found that the officer had probable cause to believe an offense was being committed
in his presence without stating that probable cause was required before conducting a closer
examination of an item.); United States v. Hamilton, 328 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Del. 1971) (Of
Hamilton, the Wright court stated that the "officer knew gun was evidence of a crime upon
seeing that it was without a serial number." 667 F.2d at 798 n.5. In Hamilton, officers, while
conducting a search with a warrant, opened an unlocked attache case, observed a sawed-off
shotgun and examined it further. While the court held that the discovery of the gun was
"inadvertent," there was no discussion of the "obviously incriminating evidence" require-
ment, and no recital that the officer had either a "reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause"
to believe that the gun was evidence of a crime. Although the decision did not state whether
it was unlawful to possess a sawed-off shotgun, it seems that if the presence of the gun was
unlawful, the officer's search for a serial number was justifiable. Moreover, if possession of
the gun was lawful, it was not obviously incriminating and the officers were not justified in
picking it up and examining it more closely.); People v. De La Fuente, 92 Ill. App. 3d 525,
529-30, 414 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (1981) (The Wright court said of the decision in De La
Fuente: "[The] officer had [a] 'reasonable belief that [the] wallet contained evidence of
criminal activity." 667 F.2d at 798 n.5. At least two distinguishing aspects of De La Fuente
should be noted, however. First, the standard actually used by the court to judge the legality
of the plain view seizure of the wallet was not "reasonable suspicion," but "probable cause."
Second, the court concluded that, prior to closer examination of the wallet (during which the
officer discovered that the wallet contained identification belonging to a mugging victim),
the officer had probable cause to believe that the wallet was evidence of a crime and was
therefore justified in seizing it without conducting a closer perusal.).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
may be conducted if a "reasonable suspicion" exists that the item is
evidence of a crime."4 The court admonished the use of the plain view
exception to justify "exploratory rummaging" and discussed cases in
support of this limitation of the doctrine."49
448. 667 F.2d at 798. It is not clear why the court felt it necessary to discuss the "reason-
able suspicion" issue. Wright's conviction was reversed on the basis that the examination of
the ledger was not properly within the scope of the plain view exception. The court merely
could have recited the "obviously incriminating evidence" requirement and held that any
perusal of the ledger other than to look for the driver's license was unlawful. Instead, it held
that no "reasonable suspicion" existed to merit a closer inspection. Id at 799.
It is possible that this approach was taken to clarify language set forth by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974). The Wright court distin-
guished Damitz stating:
In United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d 50,56 (9th Cir. 1974), we upheld the seizure of
a small notebook lying next to small scales and found after the discovery of mari-
juana bricks during a warranted search for "marijuana together with paraphernalia
for packaging marijuana." In doing so, we applied the plain view doctrine even
though the officer ascertained the incriminating nature of the notebook only upon
examining the notations it contained. The Damitz warrant was for drugs and the
notebook was found on the counter next to scales commonly used in connection
with drug sales. Arguably there was probable cause to believe the notebook con-
tained criminal evidence because of its location . . . . Moreover, the notebook
was related to the general purpose of the authorized search. The case before us is
clearly distinguishable. First, the Wright ledger was not found in close proximity
to other incriminating evidence. Second, the Wright warrant authorized a search
for a driver's license, not for evidence of narcotics activity.
667 F.2d at 799 n.7.
However, in Damitz, there was no recognition of the "obviously incriminating evi-
dence" requirement. The Damitz court, citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), merely concluded that the search was lawful under the plain view exception because
it was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant and because the evidence was discov-
ered inadvertently. United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d at 56.
449. 667 F.2d at 799 & n.6. The court cited the following cases in the text of its decision:
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (During a war-
ranted search for bookmaking material, agents discovered films which they viewed through
the appellant's projector and determined to be obscene. The Court reversed the conviction
on first amendment grounds. Justice Stewart, however, took the position that the films were
the product of an illegal search and, because of the officers' examination, the seizure could
not be justified by the plain view doctrine.); Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1976)
(photographic slides viewed by officers by holding them up to a light held not a plain view
search); State v. Shinault, 120 Ariz. 213, 584 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. App. 1978) (officers' perusal of
entries in closed pad of paper not within plain view exception because evidentiary value not
immediately apparent); Commonwealth v. Bowers, 217 Pa. Super. 317, 274 A.2d 546 (1970)
(serial number inside television set not in plain view when officer located number by remov-
ing back of set).
The Wright court also cited the following cases in a footnote: State v. Turkal, 93 N.M.
248, 599 P.2d 1045 (1979) (recording tapes seized during a warranted search for marijuana
and photographs should have been suppressed because plain view doctrine did not give
officers a right to listen to the tapes); State v. Murray, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974)
(seizure of serial number from television set obtained by tilting the set not justified by plain
view exception because officers could not have reasonably concluded that the set was incrim-
inating evidence). The Ninth Circuit also compared State v. Stagner, 12 Or. App. 459, 506
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In concluding that the examination of the ledger by Frantzman
was illegal, the court observed that searching the ledger for the driver's
license did not require examination of the ledger's written contents.4 50
The court stated that "nothing about the ledger, its whereabouts or
contents immediately indicated to Kelly that the ledger contained evi-
dence of a crime.' 4s Because none of the facts gave rise to a "reason-
able suspicion" that the ledger constituted evidence of a crime, the
court held that the seizure and delivery of the ledger to Frantzman by
Kelly and the inspection of. its contents by Frantzman were
unlawful.
452
In United States v. Hilyard,453 the Ninth Circuit again considered
the "obviously incriminating evidence" requirement of the plain view
exception. In Hillard, however, the examinations by officers of a log-
book, a notebook, and a map were upheld by the court as falling
squarely within the "plain view" exception.
A magistrate issued search warrants which" 'commanded' the exe-
cuting officers 'to search all motor vehicles and heavy equipment found
on the premises to determine if said vehicles [were] stolen and to seize
those vehicles which possess[ed] altered or defaced identification num-
bers or which [were] otherwise determined to be stolen.' ",414 While
searching one truck, the officers found a driver's logbook, a spiral
notebook, and inside the notebook, a hand-drawn map. These were
seized by the searching officers when they realized that the contents
placed Hillyard in a certain locale at the time and place of various
thefts.455
The court cited its decision in Wright for the proposition that an
officer may inspect an item seized in plain view if there exists a "rea-
sonable suspicion" that it constitutes evidence of a crime.4 56 Here, the
perusal of the items was upheld because it was reasonable for the of-
P.2d 510 (1973) (officer's inadvertant observation that television set serial number had been
scratched off gave him probable cause to believe set was stolen). 667 F.2d at 799 n.6.
450. 667 F.2d at 799.
451. Id (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Damitz, 495 F.2d at 56.
452. 667 F.2d at 799.
453. 677 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982).
454. Id at 1339. The court held the warrants valid and determined that the scope of the
officers' search was permissible. For a full discussion of this aspect of Hi//yard, see supra
Search Warrants.
455. Id
456. Id at 1342. As in Wright, the court cited United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d
Cir. 1979), stating that "other courts have validated searches of suspicious documents under
the plain view exception even though a perusal, generally brief, of the documents was neces-
sary to perceive their relevance." 677 F.2d at 1342.
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ficers to believe that the items were connected with Hillyard's alleged
stolen automobile scheme. The court distinguished Wright, stating that
neither the ledger seized in Wright nor its location suggested any in-
volvement in criminal activity. "Its incriminating nature was revealed
only after a close examination and minute inspection. 457
The Ninth Circuit noted that the facts presented in Hillyard, how-
ever, closely resembled those in United States v. Damitz 8 In Damitz,
the Ninth Circuit "upheld the warrantless seizure of a notebook that
was shown, after examination, to contain evidence of drug sales, when
the notebook was found during a valid search for drugs and drug para-
phernalia, in plain view next to the drug paraphernalia. ' 459 The exam-
ination in Hilyard was therefore upheld because the map, notebook,
and logbook were found not only close to, but inside, a stolen vehicle
and because the items were "'related to the general purpose of the au-
thorized search.' "460
The only other guidance the court offered as to whether the plain
view items may be more closely examined is a determination of their
proximity in relation to other incriminating evidence.461 The court did
not set forth other criteria as to what might give rise to a "reasonable
suspicion" 'of criminal activity, and it took no further steps to develop
its new principle.
In United States v. Chesher,462 the Ninth Circuit again addressed
the "obviously incriminating evidence" requirement of the plain view
exception. Federal agents conducted a sweep search of Chesher's home
pursuant to arrest and search warrants, 463 and one agent discovered
457. Id (citing United States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1982)).
458. 495 F.2d 50 (9th Cir. 1974).
459. 677 F.2d at 1342.
460. Id The court's statement, however, that the evidence seized was related to the pur-
pose of the search is an ex post facto rationalization. The officers could not have realized
that the items seized were related to the purpose of the search until after they had examined
them.
461. Id The basic flaw in the court's discussion of Damitz, Wright, and Hllyard stems
directly from its apparent conclusion that a closer examination is sometimes necessary to
determine whether the incriminating nature of an item seized in plain view is "immediately
apparent." See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
462. 678 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1982).
463. Id at 1355. The arrest warrant was issued pursuant to an indictment filed against
Chesher and others in the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club for violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1976), commonly known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). Id 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to con-
duct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
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laboratory apparatus in one of the back rooms of the home.4"
One of the federal agents was summoned and testified that on his
way into the room, he smelled acetone, which he knew was used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.465 The agent turned on the light
and observed an exhaust fan in the doorway, plastic covered walls, and
laboratory glassware.466 The agent then sent another agent to obtain a
supplemental warrant authorizing the search of the room, and gave or-
ders not to conduct a search until the warrant arrived.467 The supple-
mental warrant arrived during the course of the initial warrant search,
and the laboratory apparatus and a quantity of methamphetamine
were then seized.468
The district court denied Chesher's motion to suppress the labora-
tory apparatus, holding that it was in plain view. Chesher was subse-
quently convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance in violation
of 21 U.S.C. section 841(a)(1). 46
9
Chesher argued that acetone has legal uses and that the agents'
examination did not indicate that the laboratory was being used for
illegal purposes. Therefore, the incriminating nature of the evidence
could not have been apparent to the officers, and the seizure could not
be justified by the plain view exception. 70
The RICO charge against Chesher was later dropped pursuant to a motion made by the
Government. 678 F.2d at 1355. The officers also obtained a Prescott warrant, which autho-
rizes the search of a home for a person named in an accompanying arrest warrant. Id at
1335 n.1 (citing United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978)). Also issued were
"indicia warrants" authorizing a search of Chesher's residence and seizure of any indicia of
association with the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. 678 F.2d at 1355.
464. 678 F.2d at 1355.
465. Id at 1355-56.
466. Id at 1356.
467. Id
468. Id
469. Id at 1355. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) states in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be un-
lawful for any person knowingly or intentionally. . . to manufacture. . . or possess with
intent to manufacture. . . a controlled substance."
470. 678 F.2d at 1356. Chesher also contended that because the agents obtained a supple-
mental warrant before examining the laboratory, they could not have believed that the
seizure was justified by the plain view exception. The court rejected this contention, stating
that cautious police behavior should not be penalized. "Neither the delay in time between
the initial discovery of the laboratory and its ultimate seizure, nor the obtaining of the war-
rant in the interim, nor the agent's belief that the eventual seizure was pursuant to the sup-
plemental warrant, weighs against finding a valid plain view seizure .. " Id at 1356 n.2.
Citing United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852
(1974), and United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229, 236 (9th Cir. 1973), the court also stated
that "the need for artificial illumination of an area or object does not preclude a valid plain
view seizure." 678 F.2d at 1356 n.2. Therefore, the fact that the agent turned on the light in
the back room was not legally significant. (In both Hood and Walling, articles in
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The court observed that the Supreme Court had given almost no
guidance about its "obviously incriminating evidence" requirement as
set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,471 but concluded that it is not
necessary that an object be "conclusively incriminating. 472 Quoting
the decision in United States v. Ochs,47 3 the court specifically adopted
the Second Circuit's rule that the "immediately apparent" requirement
is met if the searching officers have probable cause to believe the item
observed is evidence of a crime.47
The court asserted that this principle was legitimate because of the
plain view exception's rationale: "If the benefit of permitting warrant-
less seizure. . . is avoidance of the inconvenience of obtaining a war-
rant for inadvertently discovered evidence, . . . it follows that an
object's possible relevance as evidence need not be shown to any
greater degree than would be sufficient to obtain a warrant were one
sought. 4 75 The court recited its new test: "[I]f facts sufficient to pro-
vide probable cause to believe an object is incriminating are immedi-
ately apparent to the officer, the third Coolidge requirement is met.
476
The Chesher court held that the smell of acetone, the appearance of the
room which housed the laboratory and the presence of the laboratory
automobiles were held to be in plain view even though officers used flashlights to illuminate
the inside of the automobiles. See Hood, 493 F.2d at 680; Walling, 486 F.2d at 236.)
471. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
472. 678 F.2d at 1356-57. In a footnote, the court cited three Supreme Court decisions
other than Coolidge that have alluded to the obviously incriminating requirement: Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (would have held unlawful
the seizure of films which were discovered inadvertently, but which officers had to view
through defendant's projector in order to discover their obscene nature); Sedillo v. United
States, 419 U.S. 947 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari, disputed
whether a forged check was in plain view when forgery was not discovered until after envel-
ope containing check was seized from suspect's pocket and check removed from the envel-
ope.); Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 980 n.l (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of writ of certiorari, queried whether the plain view exception was properly invoked
when officers examined a stolen check almost entirely hidden from view by wadded cloth-
ing.) 678 F.2d at 1356 n.2.
473. 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). In Ochs, officers read and examined a variety of docu-
ments found in a briefcase seized from Ochs' possession. The court found that officers were
justified in examining the documents by the plain view doctrine because they had probable
cause to believe the items constituted evidence of a crime. The Second Circuit stated:
"Even under the plain view doctrine in [sic] the incriminating nature of an object is gener-
ally deemed 'immediately apparent' where police have probable cause to believe it is evi-
dence of a crime." Id at 1258. See Chesher, 678 F.2d at 1357.
474. 678 F.2d at 1357.
475. Id
476. Id Although the Ninth Circuit has now conclusively established that the "immedi-
ately apparent" requirement is met if probable cause exists to believe an object is evidence
of a crime, it is not clear whether any initial examination of an object, however brief, may
supply the probable cause necessary to conduct a closer examination.
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equipment presented the officers with probable cause to believe the lab-
oratory was evidence of a crime. Therefore, its examination and subse-
quent seizure were justified by the plain view exception to the fourth
amendment.477
In United States v. Glenn,4 7 8 defendant Glenn moved to suppress
marijuana found in his car after being lawfully stopped for erratic driv-
ing. The motion was denied on the basis of the plain view doctrine.
The arresting officer testified that he saw baggies of a leafy substance
protruding from a jacket pocket on the front seat of the car. Under the
jacket, he noticed a plastic bag also containing a leafy substance, pro-
truding from a toolbox. The officer seized and opened the toolbox, dis-
covering that it contained a number of plastic bags filled with
marijuana.
Glenn conceded that the plain view doctrine was applicable if the
officer's view of the facts was accepted, but testified at trial that the tool
box was covered with a blanket. Upholding the district court's denial
of Glenn's motion to suppress, the court stated: "the court explicitly
adopted [the officer's] version of the facts, and found that the search
was authorized under the 'plain view' exception to the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement."47 9
After Glenn's concession that the plain view doctrine was applica-
ble if the officer's version of the facts was accepted, his only argument
was that the trial court should have chosen his version instead of that of
the officer.480 The court held that the trial court's finding of fact as to
the officer's credibility was not clearly erroneous and should not be dis-
477. Id. Chesher's conviction was reversed on other grounds and remanded to the dis-
trict court. Id at 1364.
478. 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982).
479. Id at 1271. See also United States v. Coletta, 682 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1982). In
Coletla, a Drug Enforcement Agency informant was scheduled to buy a quantity of cocaine
from the defendant in a car. The cocaine was in a zipped travel bag. After entering the car,
the informant unzipped the defendant's bag and prepared to transfer the drugs to his own
empty bag. The informant did not make this transfer because of defendant's insistence, but
instead left both bags unzipped. The informant then signaled arresting agents. Defendant
was arrested and both bags were seized from the car. Id at 822. The agents testified that the
contents of defendant's bag were plainly visible. The trial court denied defendant's motion
to suppress the cocaine on the basis of the plain view doctrine. Defendant had testified at
trial that his bag was zipped and on the car's rear floor, and that its contents were covered
with a towel. He contended on appeal, therefore, that the trial court's "plain view" ruling
was erroneous. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention stating that the trial court had
believed the agents' testimony, rather than that of defendant, and that such a credibility
determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Id at 825 (citing United States v. Harring-
ton, 636 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1980)).
480. 667 F.2d at 1271.
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turbed on appeal.48 '
2. Exigent circumstances
The Supreme Court has ruled that searches and seizures con-
ducted without a warrant are '"per se unreasonable" under the fourth
amendment, unless the search or seizure can be justified under an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement.482 These exceptions are "carefully
drawn' 483 and narrowly interpreted. The burden is on the Govern-
ment484 to prove that the required warrant procedure would have been
impossible or impracticable 485 based on the facts and circumstances of
each case.4 86 The "exigent circumstances" exception is generally used
to justify official action in emergencies.487 The Ninth Circuit will over-
turn a district court's ruling regarding exigent circumstances only if it
was "clearly erroneous."488
In United States v. Brock,489 the Ninth Circuit held that Drug En-
forcement Agency (DEA) agents were justified in conducting a war-
rantless search of a motor home that was secreted in a remote area of a
state park.490 Defendants Brock and Bard were convicted of conspiring
to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute
491 492methamphetamine,49' manufacturing methamphetamine, and pos-
sessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine.4 93 Defendants ar-
gued that their fourth amendment rights had been violated because no
481. Id (citing United States v. Vargas, 643 F.2d 296, 297 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1976)).
482. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
483. 403 U.S. at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1957)).
484. 403 U.S. at 455; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
485. 403 U.S. at 455; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
486. United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836
(1978).
487. Id at 1354-55. Standard exigencies are: (1) evidence in imminent danger of being
destroyed; (2) risk of danger to officers or third persons; and (3) risk of escape. Id
488. Id at 1357 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948): "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.").
489. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271-72 (1983).
490. Id at 1317-18. During an ongoing drug investigation, DEA agents followed a con-
voy of vehicles, including the motor home, to a secluded area of a state park. On the after-
noon of the arrest, the agents smelled chemicals "cooking" and observed one defendant rush
out of the motor home, choking. Id at 1314-15, 1318.
491. Id at 1313. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), and 846 (1976).
492. 667 F.2d at 1313. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) (1976).
493. 667 F.2d at 1313. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) (1976).
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exigent circumstances existed to justify the search.494 Preliminarily, the
Ninth Circuit stated that if the Government does not comply with the
warrant requirement, it must show that exigent circumstances existed
which justified the search.495 The existence of exigent circumstances is
a factual issue,4 96 and the appellate court applies the "clearly errone-
ous" standard of review to the district court's findings.
497
The Brock court noted that a warrant to search the motor home
could not have been obtained earlier, as probable cause to arrest did
not exist until shortly before the search.498 The court pointed out that
494. 667 F.2d at 1317.
495. Id at 1317-18. See United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1980)
(Government presented specific, articulable facts indicating the officers reasonably believed
other persons present in residence during arrests might endanger them; exigent circum-
stances justified cursory, warrantless, protective search); United States v. Hoffman, 607 F.2d
280, 282-84 (9th Cir. 1979) (Government's burden not met by conjecture or speculation;
officer's entry into trailer after fire was extinguished, with probable cause, but without war-
rant, not justified because no immediate emergency existed); United States v. Robertson, 606
F.2d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dugger, 603 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1979)
(district court erroneously placed burden on defendant to invalidate warrantless entry into
apartment by police who followed trail of blood from fight to defendant's door). The Rob-
ertson court articulated the exception as follows:
Exigent circumstances are those in which a substantial risk of harm to the per-
sons involved or to the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to
delay a search until a warrant could be obtained. The need for an immediate
search must be apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the important
protection of individual rights provided by the warrant requirement.
United States v. Robertson, 606 F.2d at 859.
496. 667 F.2d at 1318. See also United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir.)
(no findings of fact were made or requested; denial of motion to suppress upheld because
trial court had weighed inferences from officers' decisions and could have found that manu-
facture of controlled substances created special dangers), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1980);
United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.) (exigent circumstances question is
based on factfinder's experience with human conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978).
497. 667 F.2d at 1318. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(e) provides:
A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court, for
good cause, orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial of the general
issue or until after verdict, but no such determination shall be deferred if a party's
right to appeal is adversely affected. Where factual issues are involved in deter-
mining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record.
See also United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir.) (upholding finding of
exigent circumstances because reasonable view of evidence sustained it), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 865 (1980); United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d at 909, 911 (court not convinced of
mistake); United States v. Dugger, 603 F.2d at 99 (mistake committed because district court
erroneously placed burden on defendant to disprove any emergency; Ninth Circuit set aside
findings of exigency); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1356-57 (appellate court's
function is not to decide factual issues de novo, but to defer to the trier of fact; Ninth Circuit
found that, although a close question of exigent circumstances existed, factors as a whole
supported findings).
498. 667 F.2d at 1318. The issue of probable cause was addressed in a related case,
United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 558-61 (1979).
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DEA agents knew that the defendants were engaging in illegal chemi-
cal manufacturing in the motor home, and that they were using highly
explosive chemicals. The agents observed one man run from the motor
home, choking, and they were unsure whether anyone remained inside.
The court stated that these facts justified the agents' belief that the mo-
tor home had to be searched immediately to prevent an explosion.4 99
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court's finding of exigency
was not clearly erroneous and allowed the search.co
In United States v. Crozier, ° t the Ninth Circuit held that no exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into defendants' resi-
dences." 2 DEA agents had remained on the premises to secure them
while other agents obtained a warrant. Every room of the residence
was searched during the six hours before the warrant arrived.
The Government argued the danger that evidence would be de-
stroyed justified entry before the search warrant was issued.0 3 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that even if there was evi-
dence of drug trafficking at the Crozier residence, 504 a "'search cannot
be justified solely because an agent knows that there is contraband on
499. 667 F.2d at 1318. The district court relied on United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d
1322 (9th Cir. 1980), and decided that the search did not have to be delayed for a warrant.
In Williams, the court upheld the warrantless search of a motor home five hours after the
arrest of the occupants because the volatility of half-manufactured PCP created special dan-
gers. Id at 1327. In the present case, the court found that "the [agents'] need to check was
even more urgent" than in Williams. United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d at 1318.
500. 667 F.2d at 1318. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395;
United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d at 911.
501. 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982). Crozier, Stein, and nine other defendants were
charged with manufacturing and possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), and with conspiracy and tax evasion, in violation
of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976). 674 F.2d at 1295. Crozier was further charged with engaging in
a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976). 674 F.2d at 1295.
After a hearing on defendants' motions, the district court suppressed certain items of physi-
cal evidence seized following warrantless entries into the residences of Crozier and Stein.
Id at 1290. The Ninth Circuit recognized jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal by
the Government. Id at 1296-97.
502. Id at 1298-99.
503. Id at 1298.
504. Id at 1298-99. The Ninth Circuit noted the district court's holding that the agents
had no probable cause to believe that any controlled substance would be located in the
residence. See United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979) ("A4lard1"). In
41lard!, the Ninth Circuit held that DEA agents' warrantless entry into Allard's hotel room
was not supported by probable cause to believe the room contained contraband. Id at 1303,
The court also held that the entry and search were not justified solely by the agents' knowl-
edge of the presence of contraband, because the agents had no knowledge of the presence of
Allard's accomplice in the room, no facts to suspect the destruction of evidence, and no
belief that exigent circumstances existed. Id at 1304.
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the premises.' "505 Moreover, upon entry, the agents did not know
whether anyone was inside the residence who was capable of destroy-
ing evidence.so 6 The court thus upheld the district court's finding that
no exigent circumstances justified entry into the Crozier residence.
5 0 7
The court further found that the agents were less justified in enter-
ing the unoccupied Stein residence .50  Agents entered and secured
Stein's residence for six hours while others obtained a search warrant.
Agents photographed jewelry within the residence, and then obtained a
warrant to seize the jewelry two days later.50 9 The court stated that the
district court's finding that no exigent circumstances existed with re-
gard to the searches of either residence was not clearly erroneous.510 It
therefore affirmed the orders to suppress the seized evidence.1
In United States v. Mayes,5 2 the Ninth Circuit upheld as reason-
able the warrantless search of defendant's apartment and seizure of an
object that had been lodged in the throat of defendant's infant daugh-
ter.51 3 The court acknowledged the fourth amendment's protection of
individuals' privacy and security interests against arbitrary invasions
by government officials.51 4 It stated, however, that if a government offi-
cial reasonably believes a life-threatening emergency necessitates a
505. United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d at 1299 (quoting Allard I, 600 F.2d at 1304).
506. 674 F.2d at 1299. Upon entry of the residence, the agents discovered that the resi-
dence was occupied. The agents, however, made no arrests until the warrant arrived.
507. Id. (citing Alard I, 600 F.2d at 1304). For a discussion of the sufficiency of the
warrants eventually obtained for the searches of the Crozier and Stein residences, see Search
Warrants, supra section B.
508. 674 F.2d at 1299.
509. Id
510. Id (citing United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d at 1357 (proper standard of review
for exigent circumstances is "clearly erroneous")).
511. 674 F.2d at 1299. The district court relied on United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182
(9th Cir. 1980) ('Wllard II"). In Allard II, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an ongoing illegal
seizure of a hotel room was neither justified by exigent circumstances, AllardI, 600 F.2d at
1304, nor cured by subsequently procured warrant. 634 F.2d at 1183. The court observed
that the agents' "dilemma ... could have been avoided by not seizing the room," and by
using other "nonintrusive means ... while police seek a search warrant." A/lard 11, 634
F.2d at 1187. In Crozier, the evidence seized in both residences was not suppressed for non-
resident defendants. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the trial court the issue of what evi-
dence may be admitted against non-resident defendants. 674 F.2d at 1300.
512. 670 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1982). Defendant's conviction on one count of involuntary
manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 was affirmed on appeal. Defendant Mayes reported
that his ten-month-old daughter was not breathing. A fireman and a hospital corpsman
responded to the emergency call. In Mayes' apartment, they removed a wad of paper from
the infant's throat and tried to revive her. They then rushed her to the hospital emergency
room. After stabilizing the infant's condition, the attending chief pediatrician wanted to
examine the object that caused the injury. Id at 127.
513. Id at 128.
514. Id (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
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warrantless search or seizure, the fourth amendment does not prevent
him from conducting it. 15
Mayes argued that a hospital corpsman had conducted an unrea-
sonable warrantless search when, following doctor's orders, he ob-
tained a key from Mayes, returned to the apartment, and retrieved the
wad of paper on which Mayes' infant daughter had choked." 6 The
court stated that requiring the doctor to apply for a search warrant
under such circumstances would be unreasonable, considering the "ex-
tremely critical" condition of the child and the doctor's "imperative"
need to examine the object that had caused the injury.' 1 7 The court
held that the warrantless entry of Mayes' apartment was reasonable
under the fourth amendment because the critical condition of the in-
fant constituted an exigency. 18
In United States v. Johnson," 9 the Ninth Circuit considered a
magistrate's conclusion52 that exigent circumstances justified the war-
rantless entry by Narcotics Task Force (NTF) agents into a home
where a narcotics transaction was taking place.5 2' The court applied
515. 670 F.2d at 128 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)). The Mincey
Court recognized the right of police to respond to emergency situations, and stated that the
fourth amendment does not bar police from "warrantless entries and searches when they
reasonably believe a person within is in need of immediate aid." 437 U.S. at 392. The Court
then found the four-day warrantless search of Mincey's apartment unreasonable because it
was not justified by any emergency threatening life or limb. The Court stated that a war-
rantless search must be "'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initia-
tion.'" Id at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)).
The Mayes court relied on Mincey without discussing the possible difference between a
warrantless entry because aperson inside needs immediate aid, and a warrantless entry be-
cause an object inside is needed to aid a person who has been taken elsewhere. 670 F.2d at
128.
516. Id at 127.
517. Id at 128. The doctor wanted to examine the wad of paper to determine:
(1) whether fragments could have entered the lungs, requiring immediate surgery; and
(2) whether the child had been abused. The court commented that the doctor's suspicions of
criminal child abuse did not detract from the emergency. Id
518. Id The court found it unnecessary to consider the Government's alternative argu-
ments: (1) that the search was by a private party and not subject to the fourth amendment;
and (2) that the defendant had vacated his apartment and no longer had any expectation of
privacy in it. Id
519. 660 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 912 (1982).
520. Id at 752. Defendants contended that the magistrate, rather than the district court,
had erred.
521. Id at 752-53. NTF agents were observing the narcotics transaction in the house
through an open window while standing on public property. Neighborhood residents be-
came aware of unusual activities. One resident telephoned a man living across from the
suspects' house. That man called the police about "prowlers" and stood on his porch to
intimidate the agents. An NTF agent requested support from the local police. A television
news team arrived before the additional police support. Id at 751.
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well-established Ninth Circuit law that the existence of exigent circum-
stances is a question of fact and that "the proper standard of review of
a finding regarding exigent circumstances is whether the finding was
clearly erroneous." '522 The court found that the magistrate's conclusion
was not clearly erroneous,2 3 rejecting the defendants' claim that "the
exigent circumstances were the product of the officers' misfeasance."5 24
The Ninth Circuit concluded that exigent circumstances existed and
that the officers were justified in first entering and securing the resi-
dence, evidence, and suspects, and then seeking a telephonic
warrant.525
In United States v. Allen,526 the court held that exigent circum-
stances justified Customs Bureau agents' search of a ranch house for
additional suspects in a massive arrest of drug smugglers.5 27 The court
noted that the information that the agents gathered from conducting
extensive surveillance of activities on and around defendants' ranch,
and the agents' observation of suspects unloading cargo from an un-
lighted vessel in the middle of the night, gave them probable cause to
arrest defendants without a warrant. 28 When one arrestee told officers
that more unarmed men were in the ranch house, - 9 the officers were
522. Id. at 752 (citing United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356-57 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978)).
523. 660 F.2d at 753. The federal magistrate's conclusion of exigent circumstances was
based on his personal investigation of the surveillance site. He found: (1) five agents were
inadequate to properly surveil the residence's four exits or five known suspects if suspects
decided to leave; (2) at least one suspect had a history of violence; (3) not all exits were
visible from public areas; (4) a large narcotics transaction had occurred; (5) narcotics traf-
fickers usually leave shortly after a transaction; (6) evidence would have been lost if suspects
left; (7) unknown suspects were likely to escape if they decided to leave; (8) securing the
residence avoided safety problems for the agents and the community; (9) a search warrant
could not be obtained for two hours; (10) neighbors were aware of unusual police activity;
and (11) a television news crew had arrived. Id. at 752. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
the defendants had not shown that these findings were clearly erroneous. Id at 753.
524. Id Defendants argued that the agents could have requested additional agents to
surveil adequately and then waited for a warrant. Id The Johnson court emphasized that
the risk of discovery was increasing and stated that the residence had to be secured to pre-
vent detection of the surveillance and escape by the suspects. The additional officers that
NTF agents had requested did not arrive until after the news team. Id
525. Id at 752-53. Defendants' convictions, on stipulated facts, for violations of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1976) (conspiring to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute)
and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) (possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute)
were affirmed. 660 F.2d at 754.
526. 675 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1980).
527. Id at 1382.
528. Id
529. 675 F.2d at 1373. The court commented that "[tihe agents were not obliged to be-
lieve the arrestee's statement that the men in the house were unarmed." Id
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justified in making a brief search of the house for additional suspects
who might be armed, who might destroy evidence, or who might
escape.53°
In United States v. Astorga-Torres,53 I the Ninth Circuit held that
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents' warrantless entry and search
of a motel cabin following a shoot-out with drug conspirators was
proper.5 32 The agents entered the cabin to check for other occupants,
to survey property damage, and to halt destruction of evidence. 33 The
court approved the agents' actions, 534 relying on traditional grounds for
530. Id These possibilities commonly constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to justify
a warrantless search. The Allen court supported its conclusion by citing without discussion a
familiar Ninth Circuit exigent circumstances case, United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d
1349, 1355-56 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978) (probable cause plus exigent cir-
cumstances validates a warrantless entry into a private place to arrest or search), and a Fifth
Circuit case, United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1146-48 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980).
In Gaultney, officers entered the defendant's apartment to arrest persons suspected of
cocaine trafficking. The court characterized the apartment as a "beehive of activity" with
several unknown and unrelated people going in and out. Agents had probable cause to
believe that a felony had been committed inside, that the offender was still inside commit-
ting another felony, and that the recent arrest of a co-conspirator might alarm the occupants,
causing them to either shoot their way out or flee with contraband. The court upheld the
officers' warrantless entry of the apartment, stating that such a "powder keg" situation de-
manded immediate officer action. 581 F.2d at 1147-48. The situation inAllen similarly was
a "powder keg."
531. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1982). InAstorga-Torres, de-
fendants were convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin, possessing with intent to dis-
tribute heroin, assault with deadly weapons upon special agents of the DEA, and carrying a
firearm during commission of a federal narcotics felony. Id at 1333. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed all the convictions except possession with intent to distribute heroin, a violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). 682 F.2d at 1337.
532. 682 F.2d at 1334. DEA agents arrested co-defendant Ambriz in his motel room
upon completion of a heroin sale to an undercover agent. During the course of the surveil-
lance, agents had seen defendants met Ambriz and travel to the motel with him, carrying
similar paper bags. When the total amount of heroin offered for sale was not found in the
Ambriz cabin, agents had probable cause to believe that defendants possessed the balance in
their cabin. The agents knocked, identified themselves, and demanded entry. Defendants
responded with gunfire. Agents fired shots in exchange and then fired a tear gas cannister
into the cabin. Id at 1333.
533. Id at 1333-34.
534. Id at 1334-35. The court concluded that the agents' entry was "reasonable to guard
against any threat of fire created by the tear gas cannister." Id The court compared its
conclusion with the Supreme Court's in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). The Tyler
Court held that a fire official was justified in entering a burned building without a warrant to
discover continuing dangers and to preserve arson evidence from destruction. Id at 509-10.
The Court recognized the necessity of the exigent circumstances exception to justify war-
rantless entries by regulatory officials as well as criminal law enforcement officials. The
Tyler Court then found that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971), al-
lowed the official to seize arson evidence in plain view. 436 U.S. at 509.
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exigent circumstances,5 3 but without explicitly mentioning the
doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit rejected defendants' contention that an agent
had improperly returned to the cabin without a warrant to retrieve doc-
uments that the agent had laid out to dry.536 In its discussion of the
agent's reentry, the court avoided any citation to authority, including
Michigan v. Tyler,537 where the Supreme Court granted a fire official a
limited right of reentry within a reasonable time when physical condi-
tions frustrated the purposes of the original lawful entry.5 38 The As-
torga-Torres court simply described the reentry as retrieving
abandoned material already properly seized. 39
In United States v. Kunkler,540 the Ninth Circuit held that Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents' warrantless seizure of defendant's
house was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement.54' Kunider was suspected of being the supplier
to a dealer, Jacobs, with whom DEA agents had arranged to obtain a
steady, substantial supply of cocaine.5 42 During one transaction with
535. 682 F.2d at 1334-35. Traditional grounds for exigent circumstances as applied to
this case are: (1) to ensure officers' safety (see United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 911
(9th Cir. 1980) (protective search permissible when officers reasonably believe dangerous
persons present); United States v. Coates, 495 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (court's hind-
sight should not limit ability of police to protect themselves because they routinely face
danger)); (2) to prevent destruction of evidence (cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510 (im-
mediate investigation by fire official necessary to preserve evidence of arson from intentional
or accidental destruction)); and (3) to note the extent of property damage that agents may
later be asked to justify. 682 F.2d at 1334-35.
536. 682 F.2d at 1335. During the first entry, one agent discovered "debris" in the toilet
bowl, removed it, and spread it out to dry. All occupants were arrested. The cabin was
sealed and placed under police control. Later that night, the agents returned to collect the
dried "debris." Id For a discussion of the plain view issues in Astorga-Torres, see The
plain view doctrine.
537. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
538. Id. at 511.
539. 682 F.2d at 1335. The court stated that the defendants' privacy rights were not fur-
ther prejudiced, because the evidence had already been properly seized by the agent and
clearly abandoned by the defendants. Id
540. 679 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1982).
541. Id at 192. The court rejected defendant's argument that evidence was not in the
process of destruction because agents had found cocaine laid out in "lines" on a table, ready
to be ingested. Id at 192 n.5.
542. Id at 189-90. The principal DEA agent completed several transactions with lower
level intermediaries and then met with Jacobs, a middle level dealer, to discuss a regular
supply. Id at 189. Other agents observed a pattern emerge during the meetings: Jacobs
lived in apartment "D" in a complex in Carlsbad, told the agent to meet him in apartment
"A," drove a van to Kunkler's house, and then returned to apartment "D." Jacobs subse-
quently delivered cocaine to the agent in apartment "A;" the agent left, and Jacobs returned
to Kunlder's house. Id at 189-90.
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Jacobs, the agents decided to terminate the purchase because they were
afraid that Jacobs had discovered the undercover investigation. Jacobs
was immediately arrested, and the agents then proceeded to Kunkler's
home. The agents were afraid that Kunkler would be suspicious be-
cause Jacobs had not returned. They knocked, announced themselves,
and entered when no one answered. Kunkler was arrested, and his
home was secured for four hours while a warrant was obtained.
5 43
Kunkler appealed his conviction for conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute54 and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine,
5 45
claiming that the warrantless seizure of his residence was unlawful, and
the evidence seized as a result should be suppressed.
5 46
The Ninth Circuit initially stated that the protections of the fourth
amendment apply with equal force to the seizure as well as the search
of a residence.147 The court then conducted a de novo review of the
record548 to determine whether the agents, acting on probable cause
5 49
and in good faith,55 could have reasonably believed from the totality
of the circumstances that evidence would be destroyed, or that the na-
ture of the crime or the character of the suspects posed a risk of danger
to the arresting officer or to third persons.
5 5 1
543. Id at 190.
544. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
545. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1976).
546. 679 F.2d at 191.
547. Id at 189 n.1 (citing United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1980)
(llard I1) ("Fourth Amendment . . . prohibits both unlawful searches and unlawful
seizures.") (emphasis in original).
548. 679 F.2d at 192 n.6. See United States v. Bates, 533 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1976)
(court "will, where necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, make an in-
dependent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record so that it can determine for
itself whether in the decision as to reasonableness the fundamental--- e., constitutional-
criteria established by this Court have been respected.").
The Kunkler court did not consider whether "clearly erroneous" was the proper stan-
dard of review for determinations of exigent circumstances. 679 F.2d at 191. Cf. United
States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court's findings of fact in sup-
pression hearing are subject to "clearly erroneous" standard).
549. 679 F.2d at 191. The court paid "substantial deference" to the judicial determina-
tion of probable cause and found that the search warrant was properly issued. Id
550. Id The court defined the good faith standard as "not acting with the intent improp-
erly to circumvent the warrant requirement by purposefully precipitating a situation,
'through illegal conduct,' in which the destruction of evidence or contraband is likely." Id
at 191 n.3 (citing United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d at 1187 (llard I) ("police may not...
create their own exigencies through illegal conduct and then 'secure' the premises"); United
States v. Allard, 600 F.2d at 1304 n.2 (Alard I) ("[i]f exigent circumstances were created,
they resulted from the agents' own conduct")).
551. 679 F.2d at 191-92. See United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 910-12 (9th Cir.
1980) (possibility that dangerous suspects might enter house undetected by surveillance team
justified cursory warrantless search); United States v. Spanier, 597 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir.
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The court held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
seizure of the premises,552 concluding that the agents' reasonable infer-
ences justified their warrantless seizure of defendant's house pending
issuance of a search warrant. The court found that the agents had rea-
sonably inferred from their undercover observations of the cocaine
dealing operation that: (1) defendant was the main supplier of cocaine;
(2) defendant was extremely wary and cautious in his dealings; (3) de-
fendant was expecting his dealer to arrive at the house shortly; and
(4) defendant's conduct indicated he was suspicious that something had
gone wrong when the dealer did not return.55 3 Therefore, Kunkler's
motion to suppress the seized evidence was properly denied.554
In Washington v. Chrisman, the United States Supreme Court
overturned a Washington Supreme Court ruling5 6 by upholding the
seizure of contraband found in plain view by a police officer who was
monitoring an arrestee's actions pursuant to a lawful arrest.55 7 Accord-
ing to the Court, such a seizure was proper even in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances which suggested a need for further arrestee
monitoring.5
5 8
Defendant Chrisman's roommate, Overdahl, was arrested for pos-
1977) (prudent for officers to check house for additional confederates after two known bank
robbers emerged and surrendered); United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir.
1977) (definite possibility of destruction of incriminating evidence due to agent's belief that
person might still be in motel room); United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (suspect arrested, home secured to prevent destruction of evidence pend-
ing warrant), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1051 (1977); United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220,
1222-23 (6th Cir. 1976) (agent's cover blown; fire indicated efforts to destroy evidence of
counterfeiting were underway and likely to be completed unless agents entered promptly);
United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1975) ("exigent circumstances
justify an entry to arrest and to secure the premises to the extent necessary to prevent the
destruction or removal of the evidence. . . . Nothing else is justified."), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 904 (1976); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 35-36 (9th Cir. 1974) (actual removal
of evidence and potential for discovery justified "an immediate raid"); Theobald v. United
States, 371 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1967) (contraband present and threatened with imminent
destruction).
552. 679 F.2d at 192.
553. Id
554. Id
555. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
556. Id at 10. At trial, defendant Chrisman was convicted of possessing more than 40
grams of marijuana and LSD, both felonies under WASH. RE. CODE § 69.50.401(d) (Supp.
1983). The Washington Court of Appeals upheld his convictions and the validity of the
search. The Washington Supreme Court reversed. 94 Wash. 2d 711, 718 (1980) (en banc),
holding that although a police officer can accompany an arrestee to his room, he has no right
to enter the room or to examine or seize contraband without a warrant, absent exigent
circumstances.
557. 455 U.S. at 9-10.
558. Id at 6-7.
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sessing alcohol,5 59 and asked by state police officer Daugherty for his
identification. When Overdahl requested permission to retrieve the
identification from his dormitory room, Daugherty insisted on accom-
panying him. Chrisman was in the room when they arrived. From a
doorway, Daugherty observed Chrisman nervously putting a small box
into the medicine cabinet and noticed a pipe and some seeds lying on a
desk. Daugherty entered the room and examined the pipe and seeds,
confirming his suspicions that the seeds were marijuana and that the
pipe had been used to smoke it. Daugherty advised both individuals of
their Miranda rights.
5 60
Under the plain view exception to the fourth amendment warrant
requirement, a law enforcement officer may seize clearly incriminating
evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a location where the
officer has a right to be.5 6' In determining whether Officer Daugherty
had a right to be in the dormitory room where the evidence was seized,
the Court initially considered whether the fourth amendment allows a
police officer to monitor an arrestee's movements after an arrest. 62
Noting that the absence of any indication of an available weapon or an
escape attempt and the nature of the offense have no effect on the ar-
resting officer's authority to maintain custody and surveillance over the
arrestee, 63 the Court held that a police officer may reasonably monitor
559. Id at 3. Officer Daugherty had seen Overdahl leave a student dormitory carrying a
bottle of gin. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270 forbids possession of alcoholic beverages by
anyone under 21 years. WASH. REv. CODE § 66.44.270 (1981).
560. 455 U.S. at 4. Chrisman and Overdahl both acknowledged and waived their rights,
When asked whether they had any other drugs in the room, Chrisman handed Daugherty a
small box from the medicine cabinet which contained three small bags of marijuana and
$112 in cash. Daugherty told Chrisman and Overdahl that a search of the room was neces-
sary and explained that they had an absolute right to insist upon a search warrant, but that
they could voluntarily consent. Chrisman and Overdahl conferred and consented to the
search which yielded more marijuana and LSD. Id
561. Id at 5-6 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)). The Coolidge
Court identified the following situations in which the plain view doctrine may be applied:
(1) police have a warrant to search for specific objects and discover other
incriminating articles (citations omitted);
(2) the initial police intrusion is justified by a recognized exception to the
warrant requirement, such as hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
(3) police discover an object during a search incident to arrest, properly lim-
ited in scope, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); and
(4) police are not searching for evidence against the accused but inadver-
tently discover an incriminating object, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968).
403 U.S. at 465-66.
562. 455 U.S. at 6-7.
563. Id at 6. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977) (officer's regular
practice of ordering drivers out of stopped vehicles held reasonable as precautionary meas-
ure to protect officer despite lack of suspicious behavior); United States v. Robinson, 414
19831 CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
an arrestee's movements as a matter of routine.56
The Court, therefore, concluded that: (1) the officer's presence in
the doorway or in the room was lawful;565 and (2) his observations of
contraband were a "classic instance" of incriminating evidence found
in plain view, as Daugherty had, for unrelated but entirely legitimate
reasons, obtained lawful access to defendant's area of privacy.566 Con-
sequently, the Court held that the lawfully seized evidence was prop-
erly admitted at trial.567
The dissent568 acknowledged that Daugherty was entitled to keep
Overdahl in sight, but only to protect himself or to prevent an escape
attempt. The plain view doctrine did not, in their opinion, justify the
U.S. 218, 234-36 (1973) (officer's search incident to full-custody arrest of suspect, pursuant to
prescribed police department procedures, held reasonable to protect officer before transport-
ing arrestee). Cf United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 ("The danger to the
police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncer-
tainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.").
The Court thus rejected the premise of the Washington Supreme Court that the officer
was not entitled to accompany Overdahl from the hallway absent exigent circumstances.
The Court noted that an officer cannot reliably predict how any particular person will react
to arrest or the degree of potential danger. 455 U.S. at 7.
The Court also rejected the Washington court's finding that Overdahl had little chance
of escaping from his room, noting that the officer's authority over an arrestee does not de-
pend upon a court's hindsight review of the particular arrest situation. Cf New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) (scope of authority to search incident to a lawful arrest
extended to search of vehicle passenger compartment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973) (search incident to a lawful arrest held an exception to the warrant require-
ment and "reasonable" under the fourth amendment, thereby permitting a full search of the
individual in custody).
564. 455 U.S. at 7. The Court commented that this monitoring does not impermissibly
invade the privacy or personal liberty of an arrestee, reasoning that a contrary rule would
operate to prohibit an arrestee from returning to his residence in all circumstances. Id at
n.4.
565. Id. "It is of no legal significance whether the officer was in the room, on the thresh-
old, or in the hallway, since he had a right to be in any of these places as an incident of a
valid arrest." Id at 8. The Court thus rejected defendant's argument that the officer lacked
the authority to seize the contraband because he was outside the room when he made the
observations.
Defendant's argument that the officer's 30 to 45 second hesitation in seizing the pipe
and seeds was fatal to the legality of the seizure was similarly rejected by the Court as
having the "perverse effect of penalizing the officer for exercising more restraint than was
required under the circumstances." Id at 8. The Court stated that the officer had the right
to act as soon as he observed the seeds and pipe. Id at 9.
566. Id The Court did not consider whether the possible destruction of contraband could
independently justify the officer's entry under the exigent circumstances exception. Id at
n.6.
567. Id at 9. Other drugs seized with defendant's valid consent were also properly ad-
mitted. Id at 9-10.
568. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented.
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warrantless seizure of contraband observed from outside a dwelling.569
Noting that the record did not demonstrate any exigent circumstances
necessitating Daugherty's entrance into Chrisman's room, the dissent
recommended that the case be vacated and remanded. 7 °
3. Search incident to an arrest
In United States v. Torres,571 the Ninth Circuit upheld the war-
rantless search and seizure of objects from two automobiles after the
arrest of four defendants for counterfeiting. 72 The court agreed with
the district court's5 73 careful analysis of the facts574 and incorporated its
reasoning by reference.
5 75
Defendants Torres, Montes, and Buenrostro challenged the legal-
ity of their arrests and the incidental search and seizure of a paper bag
from the console of their car. Local secret service agents, conducting
surveillance of a suspected counterfeiting operation in a garage, ob-
served the three defendants leaving the scene by car. One of the de-
fendants carried a package suspected of containing counterfeit bills.
Agents stopped the car, arrested the defendants, and seized a paper bag
from the console located between the defendants. 76 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's decision that the agents had probable cause
569. 455 U.S. at 11 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent quoted Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971), for the proposition that:
[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.
This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle. . . that no amount of probable
cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent circumstances."
Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises
belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of prob-
able cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly
stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a war-
rantless seizure.
Id at 11-12 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
570. 455 U.S. at 15. The dissent acknowledged the usefulness of bright line rules in ap-
propriate circumstances but cautioned that great care should be taken when the home or
living quarters are involved. Id (White, J., dissenting). "[I]t is the physical entry of the
home that is the chief evil against which the [fourth] Amendment is directed." Id at 13-14
(White, J., dissenting). See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980); United States
v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
571. 659 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926 (1982).
572. Id at 1013.
573. United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
574. Id at 868-70.
575. 659 F.2d at 1013 (citing United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 870-72). The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) ("clearly erroneous" rule applied to ques-
tion of fact raised on appeal in criminal case; trial court's finding sustained unless clearly
erroneous), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
576. United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 869.
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to arrest the defendants and seize the bag, ruling that the trial court's
findings were not clearly erroneous. 57 7 The Torres court therefore af-
firmed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to suppress, and
upheld their convictions for manufacturing, possessing, and concealing
counterfeit federal reserve notes.
578
Defendant Salsedo, who was arrested as he approached his locked
car, contended that the search of his car and the seizure from the car of
a receipt for printing supplies was also unlawful.5 79 The Ninth Circuit
held that even if the admission of the receipt into evidence was errone-
ous, it constituted harmless error in light of the other evidence of Sal-
sedo's guilt.580
4. Pat-down search
In United States v. Corona,5 8' the Ninth Circuit held that the stop
and pat-down search of the defendant were unlawful because they were
"not based on the requisite founded suspicion, drawn from articulable
facts." '82 Although the court viewed the evidence in a light most
favorable to the Government 83 and applied the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review, 84 it concluded that the district court's findings were in
error.
585
A police officer observed the defendant standing and later
hitchhiking around midnight, in the rain, in an area of recent thefts
577. 659 F.2d at 1013. In upholding the seizure, the district court ruled that it was bound
by the majority opinion in United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1980)
(defendant did not show expectation of privacy in paper bag; bag may be searched as part of
car under automobile exception to warrant requirement). United States v. Torres, 504 F.
Supp. at 871. The district court added, however, that it was persuaded by the dissent.
United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 871 (citing Mackey, 626 F.2d at 688 (Tang, J.,
dissenting) (burden on government to show an exception to the warrant requirement, not on
defendant to show he is entitled to its protection)). See 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 469, 500-04
(198 1) for a critical analysis of United States v. Mackey.
578. 659 F.2d at 1012. The defendants were convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) (manu-
facturing counterfeit federal reserve notes), and 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) (possessing and con-
cealing of counterfeit federal reserve notes).
579. 659 F.2d at 1013.
580. Id. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[B]efore a federal constitu-
tional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
581. 661 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1981).
582. Id at 808.
583. Id at 806. See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Upon
review of a denial of a motion to suppress after conviction, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government.").
584. Corona, 661 F.2d at 806.
585. Id at 806, 808.
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from vehicles. Defendant, who had arrived in the area only ten days
earlier, was uncertain of his address and had no identification. After
questioning him, the officer conducted a pat-down search of the de-
fendant, which revealed that he had a sawed-off shotgun concealed on
his person.586 The defendant was convicted of possessing an unregis-
tered firearm.
87
The court applied the rule that a police officer must be entitled to
stop the person before conducting a pat-down search588 and analyzed
first the stop,58 9 and then the pat-down. Although the court stated that
the defendant's actions may have been "unusual, 5 90 the court did not
find that such actions indicated a crime had been or would be
committed.591
The court stated that in order to uphold the search, the police of-
ficer must have "a founded suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that
[the defendant] was armed and presently dangerous. 592 The court
found that the "mere circumstance" of defendant's wearing a long coat
on a cold, rainy night was not sufficiently suspicious, even when com-
586. Id at 806-07.
587. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1980), 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (1980).
588. Corona, 661 F.2d at 807, citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (brief
investigatory stop of suspicious individual held reasonable to determine identity or obtain
additional information).
589. See infra discussion of Corona under Invesigative Stops.
590. Corona, 661 F.2d at 807.
591. Id The court stated that the totality of circumstances failed to furnish the articulable
facts necessary to determine that the defendant committed or was about to commit a crime,
citing three border-search cases. Id See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884
(1975) (roving patrol officers may stop vehicles only if aware of specific articulable facts,
with rational inferences that warrant suspicion that persons are illegal aliens); United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (founded suspicion reached by: (1) considering all cir-
cumstances, including objective observations, information from police reports, patterns of
operation of lawbreakers, and officer's inferences; and (2) suspecting that the particular per-
son being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing); United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476,
477 (9th Cir. 1975) (no substantial difference between Supreme Court's "reasonable suspi-
cion" and Ninth Circuit's "founded suspicion" test which requires police officer to have
reasonable belief, under all circumstances, that person to be detained briefly was involved in
criminal activity), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976).
The court compared defendant's actions with: Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (two
defendants in alley walked away from each other in high drug traffic area; no reasonable
suspicion); United States v. Collum, 614 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1979) (in area plagued by auto
thefts, defendants stooped down suspiciously at rear of car, quickly walked away when they
saw police officer, founded suspicion existed), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); United
States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 7789, 791 (9th Cir.) (at 4:45 A.M., deputies observed defendant in
car in high-crime area; defendant got out of car, threw object over wall when he saw patrol
car, founded suspicion existed), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
592. Corona, 661 F.2d at 807 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
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bined with the other factors.59 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
defendant's claim that the district court had erred in not suppressing
the sawed-off shotgun found during the pat-down search, and reversed
his conviction
94
The dissent5 95 objected to the majority's conclusion, stating that
the application of specific "verbal formulas"5 96 and invocation of the
exclusionary rule was insufficient.597 The dissent stated that the of-
ficer's pat-down search was reasonable, and further reasoned that ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule was inappropriate because it would
not deter police behavior from future intrusions under similar
circumstances.598
5. Protective sweep search
In United States v. Wiga,599 the Ninth Circuit, under the protective
sweep search doctrine, upheld the cursory inspection of a mobile home
which was undertaken incident to the driver's arrest for parole viola-
tions."° The Government sought to justify its warrantless entry under
the automobile exception, plain view doctrine, protective sweep doc-
trine, and as a search incident to an arrest.6 l
Wiga was under investigation for parole violations. He was
stopped by FBI agents while driving his mobile home and was arrested.
The agents had observed someone in the mobile home before it was
stopped, although Wiga denied that anyone was inside. The agents
593. Corona, 661 F.2d at 808. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (unlawful pat-
down search; defendant wearing coat suited to weather, no criminal history known, no indi-
cation that he carried weapon, no threatening gestures); United States v. Mireles, 583 F.2d
1115 (10th Cir.) (lawful pat-down search; defendants, overdressed for weather in long trench
coats and stocking caps, had noticeable and suspicious bulge under coats), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1977) (lawful pat-down
search; defendant wore jacket on warm night, wore hat from beneath which pantyhose pro-
truded, and reacted suspiciously to patrol car), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978).
594. Corona, 661 F.2d at 806.
595. Id at 808 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
596. Id The dissent stated that the majority's specific verbal formulas detracted from the
"central inquiry" under the fourth amendment as to the reasonableness of the Government's
intrusion under all the circumstances (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). The
dissent found that the officer's limited intrusion was reasonable, considering the incidence of
crime in the area, the vagueness of defendant's direction, out-of-the-way spot where defend-
ant left the patrol car, hour of night, and absence of any identification on defendant. Id at
808.
597. Id at 809.
598. Id
599. 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982).
600. Id at 1333.
601. Id at 1328-29.
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subsequently ordered the person, Moody, out of the vehicle, and then
entered it to make sure no one else was present. They immediately
noticed two weapons in the mobile home.60 2 The defendant was con-
victed of two counts of being a felon in transportation of a firearm, 613and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.6  ,
Declining to uphold the search under the automobile exception,60 5
the court then discussed whether possible exigencies exist in stops of
motor homes which are not present in stops of ordinary automobiles.
60 6
The court applied the protective sweep doctrine, articulated in United
States v. Gardner,60 7 because of characteristics common to motor
602. Id at 1328.
603. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1976).
604. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) (1976). The district court sentenced the defendant on a
single count of possession under § 1202(a)(1) and vacated the other three convictions. 662
F.2d at 1327. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and denial of the motion to sup-
press and reversed the dismissal of the separate violation of § 1202(a)(1). Id
605. 662 F.2d at 1329. The court followed United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322 (9th
Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Murchison v. United States, 449 U.S. 865 (1980), which held that
greater expectations of privacy make the automobile exception inapplicable to a motor
home. See infra discussion of Wga under Automobile exception.
606. 662 F.2d at 1329. "A motor home may shield from the view of officers unknown
occupants who could either present a threat to the officers' safety or destroy or secrete con-
traband while the driver is being interrogated." Id
607. 627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1980). The Gardner court held that the exigent cir-
cumstances exception permitted arresting officers to make a protective search of a residence
when the officers had reasonable cause to suspect the presence of other potentially danger-
ous occupants. 662 F.2d at 1329-30.
The Wiga court cited pre-Gardner cases which upheld warrantless premises searches to
assure officer safety based on more than the "mere physical capacity of a structure to harbor
unseen occupants." Id at 1330. See United States v. Blalock, 578 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.
1978) (quick search behind shop counter for accomplices); United States v. Hobson, 519
F.2d 765, 776 (9th Cir.) (quick search of each room in house for additional persons and
weapons where house known to contain "small arsenal"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 931 (1975);
cf United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973) (brief inspection of open
closet where officer suspected person might be hiding with a weapon), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
930 (1974).
The Wiga court also cited cases which "upheld the right of officers to check for individ-
uals who might destroy evidence." 662 F.2d at 1330. See United States v. Spanier, 597 F.2d
139, 140 (9th Cir. 1977) (prudent for officers to check house for additional confederates after
two known bank robbers emerged and surrendered); United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1325,
1327 (9th Cir. 1977) (definite possibility of destruction of incriminating evidence existed
where agent believed that person might still be in motel room); United States v. McLaugh-
lin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1975) (warrantless entry to arrest and to secure premises to
extent necessary to prevent destruction or removal of evidence; nothing else justified), cer.
denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 35-36 (9th Cir. 1974)
(actual removal of evidence and potential for discovery justified immediate raid).
The court contrasted the above cases with United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 789
(9th Cir. 1974) (protective search held unreasonable where only justification was that arres-
tee turned toward his house and yelled: "It's the police."). 662 F.2d at 1330.
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homes and residences." 8 The court examined the facts609 which led to
the officers' reasonable suspicions610 and found that the search was a
lawful protective sweep incident to an arrest.6 ' Since the arrest and
search were upheld,612 the court also ruled that the officer's discovery
of weapons in plain view was lawful.61 3 Thus, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.61 4
6. Automobile exception
For more than fifty years, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that police may conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles,61 5 provided that objective circumstances support an of-
ficer's conclusion that probable cause exists that would otherwise jus-
608. 662 F.2d at 1329. See supra note 606.
609. Id at 1328, 1331. The court considered that: (1) agents had seen a woman enter
Wiga's motor home in a shopping center and then had been unable to see her inside the
vehicle; (2) Wiga lied about the woman's presence; (3) agents could not be sure that no one
else was inside; (4) the vehicle was licensed to a handicapped person, yet Wiga was not
handicapped; (5) agents conducted a cursory search for the limited purpose of searching for
other occupants. Id at 1331. The court expressly declined to address the constitutional
validity of a broader sweep search. Id at 1331 n.5.
610. Id at 1330-31. The court noted that although most of the other circuits endorse
protective searches, they disagree over the necessary degree of reasonable suspicion to justify
a sweep. See, e.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1977) (secur-
ity check of residence to check for persons, not things, justified only when police officers
reasonably believe other persons might cause violence; court sympathetic to officer's suspi-
cions); United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (officer's hypothesizing
presence of armed felons and snipers not sufficient justification for protective search of en-
tire house; court required detailed showing of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Gam-
ble, 473 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1973) (arrestee's reputation for violence and "rustling" noises
within house not legitimate justification for intrusion beyond room of arrest).
The Wiga court stated that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the "protective
sweep" doctrine. 662 F.2d at 1330-31.
611. 662 F.2d at 1331. The court proceeds on a case-by-case basis to avoid "[a]n overly-
restrictive view. . .[which] might expose arresting officers to unnecessary dangers. . .[or]
[a]n overly-deferential attitude toward officers' suspicions. . .[which] could seriously in-
fringe upon the right to be free from unreasonable searches." Id
612. Id
613. Id (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam) ("[O]bjects
falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.")).
614. 662 F.2d at 1333. The Ninth Circuit did not disapprove of the district court's reli-
ance on United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1971) (arresting officer may
search vehicle incident to lawful arrest of driver because vehicle is a thing "under the ac-
cused's immediate control"). The court stated that reliance on Berryhill is permissible as
long as the search is properly limited to the passenger compartment by the rule of New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (police officer may search the passenger compartment
and any containers incident to lawful arrest of occupant of vehicle). 662 F.2d at 1332.
615. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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tify the issuance of a search warrant by a neutral magistrate.6 1 6 This
significant exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement is
recognized "where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as
danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence,
outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. ' 617 The
automobile exception is based on the rationale that automobiles are
very mobile, and therefore may be quickly moved out of a
jurisdiction.1
United States V. Sears619 presents a recent example of the applica-
tion of this exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
Police officers observed defendants Werner and Sears looking through
binoculars at a bank across the street while sitting in a vehicle bearing
out-of-state license plates. As defendants pulled the car away from the
curb it was stopped by police officers.620 When asked by the officers to
produce the car's registration, Werner told them that a gun, as well as
the registration, was in the glove compartment.621 Sears informed the
officers of another gun in the back seat.622 Werner and Sears were then
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon.623 The court held that the
facts giving rise to the initial stop and Werner's admission of the pres-
ence of the guns supplied the officer with probable cause sufficient to
justify a warrantless search of the automobile.
624
In United States v. Wiga,625 the Ninth Circuit upheld a warrantless
616. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
617. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979).
618. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
619. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1981).
620. Id at 902.
621. Id
622. Id at 902-03.
623. Id at 903. This arrest occurred in May 1979. The FBI later used Werner's booking
photographs from this arrest to form the basis of a warrant of her arrest for bank robbery.
On the basis of information in this arrest warrant, Werner was arrested for bank robbery in
January 1980. On appeal from her conviction, Werner contended that the May 1979 arrest
was unlawful and therefore her booking photographs could not be used as the probable
cause basis for the subsequent arrest warrant. Thus, although Werner was not appealing a
conviction directly linked to the May 1979 arrest, it was nevertheless necessary for the court
to determine its legality. Id at 902-04.
Citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), the court held that the officers were justified
in their suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, and therefore upheld the warrantless in-
vestigatory stop. Sears, 663 F.2d at 903.
624. Sears, 663 F.2d at 903 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
625. 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1981).
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search of a motor home as a search incident to arrest,626 but expressly
noted that it could not be justified "merely on the basis of the 'automo-
bile exception'" to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.627
Wiga was stopped in his motor home and arrested for violation of pa-
role.6 28  The federal agents who executed the stop knew that Wiga's
traveling companion, Moody, was inside the motor home. Wiga, how-
ever, told them no one else was inside.62 9 Moody emerged from the
vehicle when requested to do so.630  An agent then entered and
searched the motor home for other occupants.6 3 ' Two guns were visi-
ble, both of which were seized by the agent and later introduced into
evidence by the Government at trial. 32 Wiga was convicted of being
an ex-felon in possession of a firearm.
633
On appeal, the court rejected the Government's argument that the
automobile exception justified the warrantless search, holding that
"'[w]hatever expectations of privacy those travelling in an ordinary car
have, those travelling in a motor home have expectations that are sig-
nificantly greater.' "634 Relying on its prior decision in United States v.
Williams,635 the court stated that "'[pleople typically do not remain in
an auto unless it is going somewhere. The same is not true of a motor
626. Id at 1333. The court found that the agents involved entertained a "legitimate con-
cern that other occupants may have been concealed within the motor home." Id
627. Id at 1329.





633. Id at 1327. Wiga was convicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1).
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any person...
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.. . to. . .transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce
18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1) states in pertinent part:
Any person who. . . has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a
State or any political subdivision thereof a felony. . . and who. . . receives, pos-
sesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce,. . . any firearm shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
The district court vacated convictions on three of the four counts and sentenced Wiga to
two years imprisonment on a single count of violation of 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1). On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reinstated Wiga's conviction under the additional count of viola-
tion of section 1202(a)(1). Id
634. 662 F.2d at 1329 (quoting United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1981)).
635. 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1981). In Williams, the
Ninth Circuit first confronted the question of whether a motor home qualified as an automo-
bile for purposes of the "automobile exception."
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home, in which people can actually live . . . [and which] in some
senses [is] more akin to a house than a car.' "636
Instead of concluding that the auto exception did not apply in
Wiga simply because the vehicle in question was a motor home, the
court considered the facts in light of Wiga's expectation of privacy.
637
Thus, in future cases, it is likely that the Ninth Circuit will determine
whether the automobile exception applies in a particular case based on
whether there existed a heightened expectation of privacy in the vehicle
in question.
In United States v. Ross,6 38 the United States Supreme Court held
that the automobile exception as defined in Carroll v. United States
63 9
allows police to search a car as thoroughly as if they possess a warrant
issued by a magistrate once they determine that probable cause
exists.64°
An informant told police that a man later identified as the defend-
ant, Albert Ross, was selling drugs out of the trunk of his car.641 After
identifying Ross and his car, officers pulled him over and ordered him
out. The officers searched Ross and the interior of his car.642 Ross was
arrested after officers found a bullet on the front seat and a pistol in the
glove compartment. 643 Then, using Ross' keys, one of the officers
opened the trunk. Inside was a "'lunch-type' brown paper bag" which
held a number of glassine bags containing heroin.' 4 Ross was con-
victed of possessing heroin with intent to distribute. 645
The court of appeals reversed Ross' conviction, holding that
636. WPiga, 662 F.2d at 1329 (quoting United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d at 1326).
637. Wiga, 662 F.2d at 1329. Factors deemed by the court to be of significant importance
were: (1) Wiga's vehicle was similar to the one under scrutiny in Williams; (2) Moody was
shielded from the officers' view until she stepped out of the motor home; (3) the motor home
had a bathroom and a closet; and (4) Wiga pulled down a sunscreen which hid his face from
the agents' view before being pulled over. Id
638. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
639. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
640. 456 U.S. at 799-800.
641. Id. at 800. Information given to police was quite detailed, adequately describing
Ross, his car and the neighborhood in which the drug transactions were taking place.
642. Id at 801.
643. Id
644. Id The bag and its contents were returned to the trunk and the car was impounded.
During a more thorough search at the station, police also found a zipped leather pouch
which contained $3,200. Id
645. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rey'd, 456 U.S. 798
(1982). Ross was convicted of violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) which states in pertinent part:
"[it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally. . . to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a con-
trolled substance. .. "
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while police had probable cause to search the car, the search of the
paper bag was impermissible because Ross had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in its contents. 6 The Supreme Court, citing the need
for feasible and workable rules in the area of automobile searches, 6' 7
set out to balance the conflicting interests between privacy rights and
effective law enforcement. 648
The issue before the Ross Court was "the extent to which police
officers-who have legitimately stopped an automobile [without a war-
rant] and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is con-
cealed somewhere within it-may conduct a probing search of
compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not
in plain view." 9 In holding that police may carry out a search that is
as thorough as one otherwise authorized by a magistrate,65 ° the Court
stressed that the exception to the warrant requirement "applies only to
searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause. ' '61l The
Court reasoned that if probable cause exists for a search, "absurd re-
sults inconsistent with" previous holdings in automobile search cases
could be produced if the opening of containers discovered during the
search was prohibited.652 In its holding, the majority specifically stated
that "practical considerations that justify a warrantless search. . . ap-
ply until the entire search of the automobile and its contents has been
completed. 65 3
The reasoning which led the majority to this conclusion was sim-
ply expressed. "[T]he privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove com-
partment may be no less than those in a movable container."654 A
trunk or a glove compartment is allowed to be searched without a war-
rant as long as probable cause exists.655 Therefore, a container in the
automobile also may be searched provided that "probable cause is
646. 655 F.2d at 1171. See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 801-02.
647. 456 U.S. at 803-04. See also id at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
648. Id. at 804.
649. Id at 800.
650. Id
651. Id at 809 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
652. 456 U.S. at 818. The Court specifically referred to the holdings in Carroll, 267 U.S.
at 153 (Court permitted the warrantless search of an automobile, during which agents tore
open a seat cushion in the car to uncover 68 bottles of gin and whiskey, because "it [was] not
practicable to secure a warrant") and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (Court
permitted a warrantless search of an automobile at a police station, long after the automo-
bile containing the contraband had been immobilized).
653. 46 U.S. at 821 n.28 (emphasis added).
654. Id at 823.
655. Id at 821 & n.28. "[W]hen a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose
and its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between . . . glove compart-
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given to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. '65 6 This
rationale compelled the conclusion that "an individual's expectation of
privacy in a vehicle and its contents may not survive" where probable
cause exists for the search. 7 In this regard, the majority found auto-
mobile searches to be similar to border searches, searches incident to
arrest, and searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. The Court noted
that, with respect to those three searches, an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy could not prevent an immediate search. Thus,
neither should the same expectation of privacy prevent a warrantless
search of an automobile.65 8 The only apparent limitation placed on a
search authorized by Ross was that it should be limited to those places
in the automobile in question where there is probable cause to believe
that the object of the search may be found.65 9 This "limitation," how-
ever, permits a search of an entire trunk 660 and not just a particular
suspicious container, as was the case in Ross.
66 1
In his concurrence,662 Justice Powell stated that "in many situa-
tions one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a decisive factor
in a search case. ' 663 He also noted that Ross represented an applica-
tion of the "bright line" rule, consistent with the approach taken in New
York v. Belton.
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent in Ross, 66 - expressly ar-
ticulated the primary reasons that justify warrantless searches of
ments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages ... must give away to the...
prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand." Id at 821.
656. Id at 823.
657. Id
658. Id
659. Id at 823-25.
660. The majority clearly overruled Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (warrantless search of two opaque containers seized after being retrieved from a
recessed portion of a luggage compartment held impermissible in spite of the fact that prob-
able cause existed to search the interior of the car) and the portion of the opinion in Arkan-
sas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) on which the plurality in Robbins relied. 456 U.S. at 824.
In Sanders, police officers had probable cause to believe that contraband was being trans-
ported in a container prior to the time the container was placed in the vehicle, and the
Sanders holding is limited to that factual situation. Thus, in Ross, the majority overruled
that portion of the Sanders opinion in which it had stated that police with probable cause as
to the container could search only the container and not the rest of the vehicle. Id at 814.
661. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1168.
662. Justice Blackmun also concurred. 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
663. Id at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).
664. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The "bright line" rule for automobile searches, which permit-
ted the search of the passenger compartment and containers found therein incident to a
lawful custodial arrest of a passenger or driver, was created to "establish the workable rule
this category of cases requires .... ." Id at 460.
665. 456 U.S. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justice Brennan.
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automobiles: the exigency created by the mobility of the automobile666
and the diminished expectation of privacy associated with
automobiles. 67 He disagreed that these reasons could justifiably be ap-
plied to containers because containers may "easily be. .. brought to
the magistrate 66 8 and do not "reflect diminished privacy interests. 669
He criticized the majority "not only [for] repeal[ing] all realistic limits
on warrantless automobile searches, [but for] repeal[ing] the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement itself."670 Justice Marshall concluded
that expediency was the only explanation for the broad rule enunciated
by the majority.6 7 1 In so doing he emphasized the notion that "'the
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.' 9672
7. Seizures made pursuant to inventory search
In United States v. Scott,6 73 the Ninth Circuit upheld the inventory
search of defendant's car. Scott was pulled over by Officer Elms of the
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), who noticed that the car Scott
was driving did not have current registration tags. Scott showed the
officer identification bearing Scott's picture and the name of Cornelious
Green. Identifying himself as Cornelious Green, Scott told the officer
that the car was registered to his brother, Robert Green. While Scott
rummaged in the car for the registration, Elms noticed what appeared
to be a treasury check in an envelope on the floor of the car. The
officer then radioed the station and found that there was a warrant out-
standing for Cornelious Green's arrest. He informed Scott that he was
under arrest and asked him whether the car should be impounded or
left at the scene. Scott stated that he preferred the car to be left at the
scene and that he would arrange to have it picked up. The officer in-
formed Scott that he would roll up the windows and lock the doors
before leaving the car. After Scott was taken away in a patrol car, the
officer discovered that he could not lock all the doors and that the elec-
tric windows were inoperable.674
The officer then conducted an inventory of the contents in plain
666. Id at 830.
667. Id
668. Id at 832.
669. Id
670. Id at 827.
671. Id at 841.
672. Id at 842 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
673. 665 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1981).
674. Id at 875.
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view inside the car, including the treasury check, which was made out
to Cornelious Green. He took the check and other valuables to the
police station for safekeeping. At the police station, Scott admitted his
true name. After subsequent questioning by postal inspectors, Scott
also made incriminating statements about his intention to cash the
check.675 Scott's motion to suppress the treasury check was denied by
the trial court, and he was convicted of receiving stolen property be-
longing to the United States. 67 6 At trial it was established that the of-
ficer had complied with pertinent LAPD regulations when he removed
the treasury check from the car.677
The Ninth Circuit recognized that warrantless searches under the
fourth amendment are per se unreasonable, and that such searches
must be justified by one of the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment.678 The Scott court found that exception in the Supreme Court's
decision in South Dakota v. Opperman,679 which upheld the inventory
search of an impounded vehicle. 6 ° The court cited Opperman for the
proposition that the usual probable cause analysis for conducting a
search or seizure does not apply to administrative searches because
they are noncriminal in nature. An administrative inventory search,
therefore, even if conducted without a warrant, may be adjudged rea-
sonable, and thus, lawful under the fourth amendment. 68' The Ninth
Circuit declared that an inventory search is reasonable if "it respond[s]
to three legitimate needs: 'the protection of the owner's property while
675. Id at 875-76.
676. Id at 875. Scott was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976), which states:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States
or any department or agency thereof, or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his
use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both ....
677. 665 F.2d at 875. The court cited the regulation as follows:
Property In a Vehicle To Be Impounded or Left Parked.
When a vehicle is impounded or left legally parked at the scene of a police investi-
gation, the following items shall be removed and booked in accordance with estab-
lished procedures:
All monies found, whether in plain sight or as a result of a legal search.
Manual of the Los Angeles Police Department, 222.60 (February 1980).
665 F.2d at 875.
678. Id at 876 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)).
679. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
680. 665 F.2d at 876.
681. Id
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it remains in police custody. . . the protection of the police against
claims or disputes over lost or stolen property. . and the protection
of the police from potential danger.'"682 Moreover, the scope of an
inventory search is properly limited if "'standard police proce-
dures' ",683 are followed. 684
The court found that the officer's inventory of Scott's car was non-
criminal in nature6 85 and was conducted in accordance with "standard"
LAPD procedures. 86 The search was not, therefore, subject to the re-
quirements of probable cause and was proper in scope. Finally, the
court found that the search was reasonable because the officer's only
objective was to secure and protect Scott's belongings. This furthered
legitimate police caretaking functions.6 87 Thus, in accordance with Op-
perman, the court held that the inventory search did not violate the
fourth amendment. 88
8. Warrantless detention of personal luggage
The United States Supreme Court has held that law enforcement
officers may detain an individual temporarily for investigatory pur-
682. Id at 877 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369).
683. 665 F.2d at 877 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376).
684. 665 F.2d at 877.
685. Id at 876. The court held that the search was not a pretense to a criminal investiga-
tion because "[the officer] had no reason to believe that Scott was not the named payee on
the check when he removed it from the automobile." Id at 877.
686. Id
687. Id The court cited United States v. Prazak, 500 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) as author-
ity for its holding. In Prazak, the Ninth Circuit ruled that, after the defendant was arrested
for drunk driving and requested that his car be secured at the scene in place of impound-
ment, it was lawful for an officer to open the trunk to place defendant's coat inside. Id at
1217.
688. 665 F.2d at 877.
In another inventory search case, United States v. Daniel, 667 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1982)
(per curiam), the Ninth Circuit held that neither Rule 41(d) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure nor the fourth amendment require the owner of the premises searched to be
present during an inventory. 667 F.2d at 785. Daniel's home was searched pursuant to a
warrant, and certain items were seized when officers conducted an inventory out of Daniel's
presence after the search. The defendant sought to suppress the items. Rule 41(d) provides
that inventories "shall be made in the presence of. . .the person from whose possession or
premises the property was taken, ff they are present." FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(d) (emphasis
added).
The court upheld the inventory, citing a Third Circuit decision, United States v. Ger-
vato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973), without discussion. 667 F.2d at
785. In Gervato, the Third Circuit examined the history and purposes of Rule 41(d) and the
fourth amendment, and found that searches based on probable cause, and accompanying
inventories, need not be conducted in the owner's presence in order to be valid. Gervato, 474
F.2d at 43-45.
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poses if they have a reasonable and well-founded suspicion that crimi-
nal activity is afoot.689 The warrantless detention of personal luggage,
however, presents a troublesome fourth amendment issue. Controversy
over whether the warrantless seizure and detention of inanimate ob-
jects such as luggage and other personal containers requires probable
cause or only reasonable suspicion has been enhanced by the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Van Leeuwen.690
In Van Leeuwen, a postal clerk's suspicions were aroused when the
defendant mailed two packages which he said contained coins. After
investigation by authorities, it was determined that the addressee of one
package was being investigated for illegal coin trafficking. The pack-
ages were detained while a search warrant was obtained. Two and
one-half hours later the packages were searched, rewrapped and
mailed. The Court held that the detention of the packages was permis-
sible under the fourth amendment.69
The Court relied on Terry v. Ohio692 for its holding. 693 It stated
that the packages were detained under a suspicion, and that the suspi-
cion later matured into probable cause.694 However, the Court did not
indicate which standard is to be used in future situations. At the point
the packages were detained, it was held that no fourth amendment in-
terest had been invaded.695 However, it was also stated that such a
detention could at some point become unreasonable.696 This language,
taken in isolation, is open to an interpretation that the detention ofinanimate objects is to be judged by a standard of "reasonableness" as
opposed to probable cause.
In United States v. O'Connor,6 97 the Ninth Circuit held that the
warrantless seizure and detention of a briefcase was lawful where
agents had probable cause to believe that it contained evidence of
bookmaking.698 O'Connor was under surveillance in his hotel room
where Internal Revenue agents suspected he was conducting illegal
bookmaking activity.699 Agents observed two men leave the room.
One of them, whom the agents thought was O'Connor, got into a cab
689. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
690. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
691. Id at 252.
692. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).




697. 658 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1981).
698. Id at 693.
699. Id at 689.
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which was followed by Agent Kindt. The cab drove evasively but
eventually Kindt pulled it over. Kindt discovered that the cab's pas-
senger was not O'Connor, but a man named Davis with whom Kindt
was not familiar.7°° Davis admitted that he had come from O'Connor's
room but refused to allow Kindt to search the briefcase he was carry-
ing. The briefcase was detained in custody overnight and searched the
next day pursuant to a search warrant. Cocaine was found inside,
which was later ordered suppressed at a pretrial hearing. 0 The trial
judge ruled that because it was not O'Connor in the cab, Agent Kindt
lacked probable cause to seize the briefcase.702
On appeal, the Government argued that probable cause is not nec-
essary to justify the warrantless seizure of an object, pending applica-
tion for a search warrant. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument.70 3
The court stated that not only is probable cause a prerequisite to both
searches and seizures, but that a warrantless search or seizure must also
be justified by the existence of exigent circumstances.7°4 The possibility
of the briefcase being spirited away in the cab, it was held, presented
the exigent circumstances necessary to justify Kindt's warrantless
705seizure.
The court stated that the Supreme Court's decision in Van
Leeuwen was distinguishable, and therefore not controlling, because in
that case the police merely removed items from the flow of the mail,
whereas the briefcase was taken directly from Davis' physical posses-
sion.7°6 The court nevertheless held that the seizure of the briefcase
from Davis was in fact supported by probable cause.707 The finding
was based on agents' observations of the activity in and around
O'Connor's hotel room and the evasive driving of the cab.708 The court
700. Id at 689-90.
701. Id at 690.
702. Id
703. Id at 692 n.6.
704. Id
705. Id
706. Id In support of this proposition, the court cited United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d
888, 893 (5th Cir. 1974), which made a similar distinction. Neither the O'Connor court nor
the Hunt court cited any direct authority from Van Leeuwen as a basis for the distinction.
The opinion in Van Leeuwen does not contain any language which either directly supports
or contradicts the holding. However, the distinction suggests that neither the Hunt court nor
the O'Connor court was willing to hold that Van Leeuwen is limited to its facts, or to those
situations involving the mail. By the same token, neither court appears willing to apply the
Van Leeuwen exception to all cases involving detention of items pending application for a
search warrant.
707. 658 F.2d at 692-93.
708. Id at 693.
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also noted that the agents would have been justified in searching the
briefcase if it had been present when they were conducting the search
of O'Connor's hotel room. 70 9 Thus, it was held that the trial court's
finding that Kindt lacked probable cause to seize the briefcase was
clearly erroneous.710 Finally, the court held that retention of the brief-
case pending issuance of the search warrant was lawful because prob-
able cause existed to seize it initially.711
In United States v. Martell,71 2 the Ninth Circuit held that the de-
tention of suitcases for twenty minutes, without probable cause, but
upon a well-founded suspicion, does not violate the fourth amend-
ment.713 In Martell, Agent Kenerson of the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) was informed by another DEA agent that Martell, a known
drug trafficker, and Minneci were to fly into San Diego from Alaska on
two separate fRights. Agents watching the airport first observed Min-
neci arrive carrying two suitcases. Minneci made two phone calls and
then took a cab to a hotel. Martell arrived the next morning, called
Minneci's hotel,714 proceeded there and checked into a different room.
At 11:30 a.m. that same day, both men went back to the airport and
bought tickets for a flight to Alaska. When they checked their baggage
at the airport, the agents sent for a narcotics detector dog. Ten minutes
before departure, the agents arrested both men715 and asked for and
were refused permission to search their suitcases.
Twenty minutes later, with both men and their suitcases still in
custody, the narcotics detector dog signalled the presence of narcotics
in the luggage. The trial court held that probable cause first arose at
the time of this alert.716 Martell and Minneci were detained for four
hours until a search warrant arrived. Inside the luggage the agents
found a large quantity of cocaine. Both men were convicted of posses-
709. Id (citing United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970) (affidavit
describing materials that one would expect to be hidden at a suspect's residence justified a
warrant to search the subject's home)).
710. 658 F.2d at 693. The court held that a determination of probable cause by a trial
judge is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Id at 691.
711. Id (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1979)). The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's motion to dismiss and remanded the cases for further proceed-
ings. 658 F.2d at 691.
712. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981).
713. Id at 1363.
714. Id at 1358. The court's recitation of facts does not explain how the agents discov-
ered the destination of Martell's phone call.
715. Id While the defendants were not formally arrested, agents testified that the two
men were intentionally detained and were not free to leave. ld
716. Id.
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sion of cocaine 7l7 and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute.7 18
On appeal, Martell and Minneci contended that their detention
constituted an illegal arrest719 and that the seizure of the narcotics was
tainted by that arrest. The court disagreed,720 and focused instead on
whether the seizure and detention of the suitcases was lawful.
721
The Ninth Circuit held that the standard of reasonableness, as re-
quired by the fourth amendment, was to be applied to the detention
and seizure of inanimate objects.722 It relied on United States v. Van
Leeuwen723 for the proposition that detaining an inanimate object
without probable cause, but with a reasonable suspicion that the object
was included in the scheme of criminal activity, is proper and not "per
se unreasonable."
724
The court stated that the length of time the defendant's luggage
was detained is a relevant factor to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the detention. 25 In the instant case, the suitcases
were only detained for twenty minutes before the reasonable suspicion
ripened into probable cause.72 6 A narcotics detector dog arrived and
alerted the agents to the presence of a narcotic within the suitcases.727
It was the dog's alert which provided the probable cause for the war-
rantless seizure of the suitcases, pending the issuance of a search war-
717. Id. at 1357. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) states in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be un-
lawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to .. .possess with intent to. ..
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
718. 654 F.2d at 1357. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) states: "Any person who attempts or con-
spires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or
fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the
commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
719. 654 F.2d at 1358. The appellants cited Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)
(progeny of Terry v. Ohio do not support the application of a balancing test so as to justify
taking a defendant into custody on the basis of mere "reasonable suspicion") in support of
their argument.
720. 654 F.2d at 1358-59. The court dismissed appellants' detention argument stating
that their initial momentary detention was justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
654 F.2d at 1358-59. The court specifically refused to address whether that initial "momen-
tary" detention later became an unlawful arrest under Dunaway. Id at 1361 n.4. No expla-
nation of this refusal was given. The court merely held that even if the detention was
unlawful, it did not taint the seizure and detention of appellant's suitcases. Id at 1361.
721. Id at 1358.
722. Id at 1359.
723. 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970).
724. 654 F.2d at 1360.
725. Id The court acknowledged the fact that there was no case law which established
the permissible outer time limit for the detention of impersonal objects. Id
726. Id
727. Id at 1358.
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rant.72 8 The court thus held that this detention did not violate
constitutional standards. 29
9. Warrantless searches of personal luggage
In United States v. Monclavo-Cruz,7 ° the court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction for using a false alien registration receipt in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. section 1426(b). 1 1  After being informed that
Monclavo-Cruz was selling false immigration documents, Immigration
Investigator Cluff followed her in her car.732 Cluff stopped the car and
asked Monclavo-Cruz where she was from. After Monclavo-Cruz ad-
mitted that she was in the country illegally, Cluff arrested her and
seized her purse from the car. Cluff testified at trial that he did not
search the purse immediately, because to do so would have been a se-
curity risk.
After arriving at the police station, Cluff searched Monclavo-Cruz'
purse in her presence without a search warrant. Inside a closed purse
found in the large purse, Cluff found a false alien registration number.
Monclavo-Cruz then confessed that she had used the number on a false
registration card.7 33
The Ninth Circuit first rejected the Government's argument that
Monclavo-Cruz had no reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse,
stating that its decision in United States v. Clear73 negated any such
contention.735 The court stated that "society recognizes that an expec-
tation of privacy in purses is reasonable. 736
After rejecting the argument that the search of the purse was justi-
fied as incident to an arrest,737 the court addressed the Government's
728. Id at 1360.
729. Id
730. 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981).
731. 18 U.S.C. § 1426(b) (1976) states in part:
Whoever utters, sells, disposes of or uses as true or genuine, any false, forged,
altered, antedated or counterfeited. . . documentary evidence of naturalization or
citizenship,. . . knowing the same to be false, forged, altered, antedated or coun-
terfeited ....
[slhaU be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
732. 662 F.2d at 1286. Monclavo-Cruz had a male companion with her who was arrested
after he admitted that he was an illegal alien. Id
733. Id
734. 656 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2919 (1982).
735. 662 F.2d at 1287. Note that Cleary has been vacated in light of United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).




contention that Cluff's actions constituted an inventory search.738 The
Government argued that the Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota
v. Opperman739 justified the search of Monclavo-Cruz' purse. In Op-
perman, police acting without a search warrant found marijuana while
conducting an inventory of the contents of the defendant's car after it
had been impounded. The Court upheld the search. 4° The Monclavo-
Cruz court reasoned, however, that the basis for upholding the search
in Opperman had little or nothing to do with the search of Monclavo-
Cruz' purse. First, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the police in
Opperman were following standard procedures which were designed to
protect the police from immediate danger and subsequent claims of
stolen or lost property.741 Second, the expectation of privacy in one's
car is significantly less than that in one's personal luggage.742 Third,
there was no evidence in Opperman which suggested that the police
had any investigatory motive when they inventoried the contents of the
car.
743
The Ninth Circuit then noted significant aspects of United States v.
Chadwick71 which further undercut the Government's assertion that
Opperman was controlling.745 In Chadwick, both the defendant and
his footlocker were in custody when the footlocker was searched. The
searching officers had no reason to believe that the footlocker's contents
presented any danger to them. The court further noted that in Arkan-
sas v. Sanders,746 the Supreme Court had extended the Chadwick rule
to all personal luggage.
747
The court then noted the pertinent facts which foreclosed any
characterization of the search of Monclavo-Cruz' purse as an inven-
tory: (1) the officer's purpose in searching the purse was clearly investi-
gatory; (2) there was no evidence offered by the Government that the
purse could not have been secured in the police facility until a warrant
was obtained; (3) it was unnecessary to empty the purse in order to
secure its contents, and the officer's search merely increased the
chances of a claim of lost or stolen property; and (4) there was no rea-
738. Id at 1288.
739. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
740. Id at 376.
741. 662 F.2d at 1288.
742. Id (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)).
743. 662 F.2d at 1288.
744. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
745. 662 F.2d at 1288.
746. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
747. 662 F.2d at 1289.
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son to suspect that the purse's contents included any inherently danger-
ous items. Finally, in concluding that the search of Monclavo-Cruz'
purse was not justified as an inventory search, the court adopted the
Eighth Circuit's view that "the community caretaking functions of the
police are usually well served by simply [taking inventory of) personal
baggage as a unit without searching it."'7 48 The Ninth Circuit therefore
reversed the defendant's conviction, suppressing the evidence derived
from the unlawful search of her purse.7 4 9
10. Consent searches
Police may conduct a warrantless search if the defendant volunta-
rily consents to the search. 0 The issue of voluntariness is determined
from the totality of the circumstances.7 5 Courts will consider the cir-
cumstances surrounding the search and the characteristics of the indi-
vidual.75 2 In United States v. Fleishman,753 the Ninth Circuit upheld
the admission of a piece of paper seized in Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) agents' warrantless search of a hotel room, based on
the defendant's voluntary consent to the search.- 4 Defendant Combs
was convicted 55 of conspiring to distribute,756 aiding and abetting and
possession with intent to distribute,757 and the distribution of co-
caine.758 DEA agents went to Combs' hotel room following an under-
cover drug investigation that resulted in the purchase of cocaine by a
748. Id (citing United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200, 1202-03 (8th Cir. 1979)
(tightly sealed knapsack which presented no danger to police should not have been searched,
but rather inventoried as a single unit); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1173 (8th
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (briefcase, which presented no danger to police, was securely in police
custody and away from arrestee, and could have been easily stored, should not have been
internally searched)).
749. 662 F.2d at 1291.
750. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
751. Id at 227.
752. Id at 226-27.
753. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982).
754. Id at 1334.
755. Id at 1332.
756. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which
may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of
which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
757. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) provides: "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(i) to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled sub-
stance . ... "
758. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal."
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DEA agent from one of Combs' co-conspirators.759 After the agents
identified themselves and stated that they were conducting a drug in-
vestigation, Combs allegedly invited them into the room and consented
to a search. The agents discovered a piece of paper on a table which
linked Combs to the drug transaction.760 On a pretrial motion, Combs
sought to suppress the paper and any statements he had made before,
during and after the warrantless search, arguing that they had been
illegally obtained.6 The trial court denied the motion.762
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the determination of vol-
untary consent to a search is a question of fact,763 and the trial court's
ruling on the issue will be overturned only if clearly erroneous.7 4 The
court then examined the record and found that defendant Combs had
freely consented to the entry and search of the hotel room.
7 65
The court then applied the reasonable person test 766 to determine
whether Combs understood that he was free to leave during the search
and questioning. Relying on testimony given at the pretrial hearing
that the agents expressly told Combs he was free to leave during the
search and questioning, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court
could have concluded that the statements were voluntary.7 67 Thus, the
district court's findings were not clearly erroneous.7 6 8
11. Border searches
In United States v. Ek,7 6 9 the Ninth Circuit delineated the special
rules which apply to border searches. After disembarking from a flight
from Lima, Peru, Ek and a cohort were detained at 7:30 a.m. by cus-
759. 684 F.2d at 1332-34.
760. Id at 1334.
761. Id.
762. Id
763. Id (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227 ("[W]hether a consent to a
search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is
a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.")).
764. 684 F.2d at 1334 (citing United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.
1981) (where defendant gave "indicia of consent" to DEA agents' entry into his hotel room
and to their search, court placed burden on defendant to show that finding of consent was
clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982).
765. 684 F.2d at 1334.
766. Id (citing United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Based
upon a review of all the pertinent facts, the court must determine whether a reasonable
innocent person in such circumstances would conclude that. . . he or she would not be free
to leave.")).
767. 684 F.2d at 1334-35.
768. Id at 1335.
769. 676 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982).
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toms agents at Los Angeles International Airport. The detention was
based on an informant's tip that the two men would be smuggling co-
caine hidden in swallowed capsules. A search of the men's bags proved
fruitless. At 4:00 p.m. a court order authorizing an X-ray search ar-
rived, and the suspects were X-rayed at a hospital at about 7:00 p.m.
770
The X-rays revealed objects in both men's intestines. Ek was arrested
and advised of his constitutional rights. He signed a full confession at
4:30 a.m., some twenty-one hours after his initial detention.77' Ek was
convicted of importing and possessing a controlled substance with in-
tent to distribute.77 z
On appeal, Ek first contended that, according to Dunaway v. New
York,7 73 his detention constituted a formal arrest and was therefore
unlawful because it was not supported by probable cause. 7 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this contention, holding that "[n]either a warrant nor
probable cause is needed to detain persons for a search at the border, so
long as the period of detention does not exceed what is reasonably nec-
essary to conduct a valid search. ' 775 In a footnote, the court carefully
pointed out that it was addressing the applicability of Dunaway to Ek's
detention, and not to statements made during such a detention.776
Ek next contended that the detention was unreasonable because he
770. Id at 381. Both suspects had refused to submit voluntarily to an X-ray examination.
771. Id Ek was given his Miranda rights immediately after his arrest. He then admitted
to swallowing capsules containing cocaine. At 2:00 a.m. he was again read his rights and
then made a full confession. A statement was signed at 4:30 a.m., and Ek signed another
typed statement the next day. Id
772. Id at 380.
773. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
774. 676 F.2d at 381. In Dunaway, the United States Supreme Court held that a custodial
interrogation which is in essence indistinguishable from a formal arrest must be supported
by probable cause. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.
775. 676 F.2d at 381 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841
(9th Cir. 1980) (detentions not exceeding what is necessary to conduct legal border search
are proper since border officials are given broad powers to conduct searches); United States
v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1173 (9th Cir. 1980) (no warrant or probable cause required for
border searches), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); United States v. Espericueta-Reyes, 631
F.2d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Detentions during routine searches and questioning at the
border are considered 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (cita-
tions omitted))).
In a footnote, the court distinguished United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284,
1286-87 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Medina-Verdugo, 637 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir.
1980). In Perez-Esparza, the court used Dunaway to analyze a search at the San Clemente
border checkpoint. The Ek court pointed out that the San Clemente border checkpoint is
not a border and thus border search principles were not applicable. Medina- Verdugo was
distinguished because there it was determined that the brief detention did not constitute a
Dunaway-type arrest. 676 F.2d at 381 n.2.
776. 676 F.2d at 381 n.l.
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was held longer than reasonably necessary to conduct a search. He also
argued that the process of obtaining the court order was purposely
delayed in order to pressure him to confess or submit voluntarily to the
X-ray search.777 The court held, however, that detention while waiting
for a court order is reasonable,778 and that the agents acted as quickly
as possible.779
Ek then contended that the Government's suspicion that he was
carrying contraband was not strong enough to justify an X-ray search.
The court noted that although regular border searches need not be sup-
ported by probable cause, the legality of a more intrusive search must
be judged by whether a proper level of suspicion justified its initia-
tion.780 Thus, if the government suspects someone of carrying contra-
band, it must have a "real suspicion" to justify a strip search,78' and a
"clear indication" to justify a body cavity search.78 2
The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had not decided which
standard of suspicion applies to an X-ray search.783 The Ek court held,
however, that the government must have a clear indication that some-
one is involved in body cavity smuggling before performing an X-ray
search.784 The court stated: "An X-ray search, although perhaps not so
humiliating as a strip search, nevertheless is more intrusive since [it] is
potentially harmful to the health of the suspect." 785 The court found
that the informant's tip gave the agents a clear indication before Ek
777. Id at 382.
778. Id (citing United States v. Erwin, 625 F.2d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (reasonable
detention while warrant is being obtained is valid); United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254,
258-59 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1976) (warrant, although not necessary for border search, defines the
scope of the search and assures that it will be conducted in a reasonable manner)).
779. 676 F.2d at 382. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit's standard of review for the
reasonableness of detentions is "less than clear." Id at 382 n.3. Whether de novo review or
the clearly erroneous standard is the proper standard was not decided because Ek's deten-
tion was determined to be reasonable under both. Id at 382.
780. Id (citing United States v. Aman, 624 F.2d 911, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1980)).
781. 676 F.2d at 382. A "real suspicion" was defined by the court as a "'subjective suspi-
cion supported by objective, articulable facts."" Id (quoting United States v. Aman, 624
F.2d at 912).
782. 676 F.2d at 382 (citing United States v. Aiman, 624 F.2d at 912-13).
783. 676 F.2d at 382.
784. Id
785. Id The court reasoned that such medical procedures should be used only if there is a
clear indication that the suspect is concealing contraband inside his body. Id
Judge Schnacke, in a special concurring opinion, took issue with this holding. He felt
an X-ray search was less intrusive than a strip search. He conceded that his belief was not
based in fact, but he felt that because the majority had no factual basis for its conclusions,
this case was inappropriate to make such a finding. Id at 383.
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was detained that he was carrying contraband in his body."8 6 The con-
viction was therefore affirmed.
7 87
D. Arrest Warrants
1. Sufficiency of affidavit
In United States v. Sears,788 the court upheld the sufficiency of an
affidavit submitted in support of an arrest warrant. 8 9 One of the de-
fendants moved to suppress the weapons, dynamite, handcuffs, and
other items seized from her person at the time of her arrest for bank
robbery. The defendant argued that the arrest warrant affidavit did not
provide sufficient probable cause, as it relied on the bank robbery wit-
nesses' identification of an allegedly unlawfully obtained photo-
graph.79I The trial court denied the motion.9
On appeal from a conviction for bank robbery792 and kidnap-
ping,793 the defendant renewed the argument.794 The Ninth Circuit
held, after examining the pertinent facts, that the photograph was law-
fully obtained.795 The court further stated that the affidavit provided
sufficient facts to establish probable cause for the arrest warrant.796
786. Id at 382. Judge Schnacke's concurring opinion stated that the court's adoption of
the "clear indication" standard was dicta because it was not necessary to the disposition of
the case. Judge Schnacke felt that because it was clear under any standard that Ek was
smuggling contraband in a body cavity, and because a court order was obtained, the adop-
tion of the standard was unnecessary under the facts of the case. Id at 383.
In a footnote, the court assured its readers that its holding was not dictum, stating that
the required level of suspicion was set forth to enable the court to measure the agents' ac-
tions against it. Id at 382 n.4.
787. d at 383. The court also rejected Ek's contentions that his confession was involun-
tary. For a full discussion of this aspect of the case, see infra discussion of Ek under The
Right Against Sef-Incrimination.
788. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
789. Id. at 904.
790. Id. at 902-03.
791. Id. at 903.
792. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, by force and vio-
lence. . . takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property
or money... in the care, custody. . . of, any bank... [s]hall be fined. . . or impris-
oned. ... 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, in commit-
ting, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in (subsection] (a). . . assaults any
person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or
device, shall be fined. . . or imprisoned ...."
793. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, in committing any
offense defined in this section. . . kills any person, or forces any person to accompany him
without the consent of such person, shall be imprisoned ..
794. 663 F.2d at 902.
795. Id. at 902-03.
796. Id. at 903-04.
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The standard to be applied in evaluating probable cause to arrest is
whether, given the facts as established in the affidavit, a prudent person
would believe that the defendant had committed on offense.7 97 The
court reasoned that the evidence presented in the affidavit, that the de-
fendant was with a co-defendant both before and after the robbery,
that she fit the description of one of the robbers provided by several
witnesses, and that both she and one of the other robbers had abnormal
eyes and a hearing problem, was more than ample to warrant a prudent
person in believing that she had .participated in the robbery.798 There-
fore, the arrest warrant was valid.79 9
2. Execution of the warrant
In United States v. Crawford,"° the court upheld the manner in
which state and federal officers executed an arrest warrant, pursuant to
the 'knock and notice' requirements of 18 U.S.C. section 3109.801 The
defendant was under investigation for possessing and uttering counter-
feit Federal Reserve Notes. 02 A warrant was issued to arrest the de-
fendant at his home. At five-thirty in the morning, the officers knocked
on the front door and identified themselves and their purpose. After
receiving no response, they broke down the front door and entered the
house, immediately observing a .22 caliber rifle. Without knocking and
announcing their authority or purpose, the officers opened a bedroom
door on the ground floor of the residence, finding the defendant in bed.
He was immediately arrested.803
Appealing his conviction, the defendant contended that the forced
entry at the bedroom door, without notice of authority and purpose,
violated the requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C. section 3109, thereby
797. Id. at 903 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (enunciating the standard for
probable cause to make an arrest; defendant had been stopped and arrested by police based
only upon a previous record of arrests); United States v. Portillo-Reyes, 529 F.2d 844, 851
(9th Cir. 1975) (none of the agents had probable cause to make an arrest within the man-
dated definition in Beec), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 899 (1976)).
798. 663 F.2d at 904.
799. Id., affirming the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, and defendant's
convictions.
800. 657 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1981).
801. Id. at 1045. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The officer may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house... to execute a search warrant,
if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance .... "
802. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, with intent to defraud,
passes, utters... any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other
security of the United States, shall be fined ..
803. 657 F.2d at 1043-44.
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making the arrest unlawful. 8°
The court initially considered whether 18 U.S.C. section 3109,
which governs the execution of a search warrant, even applied to this
situation.8"5 The Ninth Circuit has held that section 3109 applies to the
execution, by federal officers for federal offenses, of arrest warrants as
well as search warrants. 80 6 In this case, the arrest was by federal of-
ficers, pursuant to a federal arrest warrant issued by a federal magis-
trate. Therefore, the court held section 3109 applicable.
80 7
The court rejected the defendant's contention that the officers were
required to knock at the bedroom door, after complying with the re-
quirements of section 3109 when they entered the front door.808 The
court noted that the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that when the
first or contemporaneous entry is lawful under section 3109, subsequent
entries are lawful.80 9 The court further reasoned that the officers' entry
preserved the purposes behind section 3109.810 The notice at the front
door was given loudly, with the proper interval of time observed before
entry, thereby preserving the defendant's privacy interests.8 ' Addi-
tionally, there was no needless destruction of private property because
the bedroom door was not broken down.812 Lastly, the officers' actions
could be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the potential for violence,
as the defendant had exhibited violence in the past and a rifle was dis-
covered immediately upon entering the house.81 3
The court held, therefore, that the announcement of authority and
804. Id. at 1043.
805. Id. at 1044.
806. Id. (citing Vanella v. United States, 371 F.2d 50, 58 (9th Cir. 1966) (in execution of
an arrest warrant, knock and notice of authority and purpose took place at front door, fol-
lowed a few minutes later by entry at the back door without knock or notice; 18 U.S.C.
§ 3109 held applicable), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967)).
807. 657 F.2d at 1044.
808. Id. at 1045.
809. Id. at 1044-45 (citing Cognetta v. United States, 313 F.2d 870, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1963)
(entrance through the front door after announcement of authority and purpose prior to
unannounced rear door entry); Vanella v. United States, 371 F.2d 50, 58 (9th Cir. 1966)
(lawful entry through the rear door before or contemporaneous to a forced, but announced
entry through the front door), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967); Russo v. United States, 391
F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir.) (lawful front door entry contemporaneous with a forced entry
through a rear door), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 885 (1968); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez,
488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973) (announcement of authority and purpose at the front door
simultaneous with forced entry of garage door), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974)).
810. 657 F.2d at 1045.
811. Id.
812. Id.
813. Id. The court noted that the defendant's privacy interests must be weighed against
the state's interest in securing the safety of its agents and citizens.
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purpose at the front door was sufficient to satisfy the notice require-
ments of 18 U.S.C. section 3109, thereby vitiating any obligation to
repeat the announcement at the bedroom door.8 14 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court's determination that the arrest was lawful.81 5
E. Warrantless Arrests
With the exception of Payton v. New York,8 16 Supreme Court pre-
cedent has not required that felony arrests be accompanied by war-
rants.817 The validity of such warrantless arrests is instead determined
by probable cause. 18 Probable cause has been considered the best
compromise between the frequently opposing interests of the fourth
amendment 1 9 and the facilitation of law enforcement.82° It affords law
enforcement officers the opportunity to make on-the-spot arrests with-
out a warrant, provided that its requirements are met.821
In United States v. Hammond,822 the Ninth Circuit held that a sus-
pect's description on a police radio report which coincided with police
officers' subsequent personal observations of the suspect satisfied the
probable cause requirement. 23 Police had been called to investigate a
robbery suspect seen outside a bank which had been robbed a week
earlier by a black male who walked with a limp. 24 They arrived about
fifteen minutes later and saw defendant Hammond sitting in the only
car in the bank parking lot. He was ordered to get out of the car. The
officers noticed that Hammond limped when he exited the car. The
subsequent pat-down search revealed no weapons; however, one of the
officers saw a ski mask in plain view inside the car. 25 Hammond was
814. Id.
815. Id., affirming the conviction.
816. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home for a
routine felony arrest prohibited absent exigent circumstances).
817. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976).
818. "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or
is being committed [by the person to be arrested]." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
819. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons. . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
820. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
821. Id. at 208.
822. 666 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1982).
823. Id. at 439.
824. The police radio report was initiated by a bank supervisor, who communicated the
observations of a bank teller who had witnessed the robbery. Id. at 437.
825. Id. at 437. The ski mask apparently aroused the officer's suspicion because it was an
August day. Id. at 439.
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arrested and subsequently convicted of bank robbery.82 6
On appeal, Hammond argued that his warrantless arrest was un-
lawful because the officers lacked probable cause.827 Implicit in Ham-
mond's argument was his belief that he was under arrest when initially
ordered from the car. 28 However, the Ninth Circuit characterized this
initial confrontation as nothing more than an investigative stop. 29 The
court concluded that the arrest did not take place until after the officers
observed Hammond walk to the rear of the car.83 °
In affirming his conviction, the Ninth Circuit rejected Hammond's
contention that the arresting officers lacked probable cause to arrest.8 3 1
The court found that cumulative information originating from two in-
dependent sources, the officers' personal observations of Hammond, 32
and the bank teller's information obtained from the police radio re-
port,833 satisfied the probable cause requirement.834
826. Id. at 437. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and
loan association ... with intent to commit in such bank .. any felony affect-
ing such bank... and in violation of any statute in the United States, or any
larceny-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
827. 666 F.2d at 439.
828. Id.
829. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The Ninth Circuit further stated that
"brief investigative stops lasting for a minute or so do not necessarily constitute arrests."
666 F.2d at 439 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 2 10-11).
830. 666 F.2d at 439. Butsee Gomez v. Turner, 672 F.2d 134, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (ques-
tion of whether suspect is seized depends upon whether "such conduct constitutes a show of
authority that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he is not free to go") (empha-
sis in original).
831. 666 F.2d at 439.
832. The officers saw that Hammond walked with a limp, as did the bank robber during
the robbery. They also observed a ski mask in Hammond's car on an August day, although
there was no evidence that a ski mask had been worn by the robber. Id. at 439.
833. See supra note 824.
834. 666 F.2d at 439. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the principle that information sup-
plied by an eyewitness to a crime may be presumed to be reliable, provided that the witness
is reasonably certain of the identification. Id. (citing United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d
1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir.) (unnecessary to show that an eyewitness, the victim of defendant's
extortion scheme, was a reliable informant), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971)).
The court conceded that this was a close case because the teller was not certain that the
man she observed outside the bank was the robber. This information, along with the of-
ficers' personal observations of Hammond, nevertheless constituted probable cause for the
arrest. 666 F.2d at 439. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (probable cause ex-
isted when officers observed suspects who matched police radio dispatch description and
where description of stolen articles matched those found in suspect's car). Accord United
States v. Torres, 663 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir.) (probable cause existed where police radio report
corroborated officers' personal observations of suspected bank robbers, their weapons, and
their pick-up truck), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1981).
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In United States v. Sears,8 3- an investigative stop of defendants
Sears and Werner ripened into probable cause justifying their warrant-
less arrests when they indicated to the arresting officers the presence of
concealed weapons in their car.8 36 Police officers observed Sears and
Werner sitting in a parked car which had out-of-state license plates.
The defendants had been looking through binoculars at a bank across
the street for about ten minutes. When the couple attempted to drive
away, the officers stopped them and asked to see their automobile regis-
tration. The Ninth Circuit considered the initial confrontation a per-
missible investigative stop.
837
The defendants voluntarily offered incriminating information
which gave rise to the officers' reasonable belief that concealed weap-
ons were located in the car.83 8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convic-
tions, holding that the officers "clearly had probable cause to arrest"
after finding the concealed weapons in the car.839
In United States v. Allen, 8" three of four defendants argued unsuc-
cessfully that their warrantless arrests for involvement in drug smug-
835. 663 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1981).
836. Id. at 903. Defendants Sears, Werner, and Strozyk were convicted of bank robbery
and kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) and (e) (1976). See supra note 826
for § 2113(a). 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) provides:
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in sub-
sections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life
of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
Subsection (e) provides:
Whoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, or in avoiding or at-
tempting to avoid apprehension for the commission of such offense. . . . Kills any
person, or forces any person to accompany him without the consent of such person,
shall be imprisoned not less than ten years, or punished by death if the verdict of
the jury shall so direct.
837. 663 F.2d at 903. See supra note 829.
838. Id. After the officers asked for the automobile registration, Werner told them a gun
was inside the glove compartment. Sears also mentioned that a second gun could be found
in the back seat.
839. Id. Werner moved to suppress certain evidence obtained from this arrest in her
subsequent conviction for bank robbery and kidnapping, but the court denied the motion,
holding that the arrest was lawful. Id. at 902-03 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)
(defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest for illegal pos-
session of clearing house slips; when defendant was arrested, no objective facts existed that
would lead officers to believe he was engaged in criminal activity); United States v. Portillo-
Reyes, 529 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1975) (border patrol agents had no probable cause to arrest
defendant found lying in front seat of Volkswagen at 4:30 a.m. near a known illegal entry
point; only information the agents had was that four aliens had recently entered the country
illegally and that one had keys for three cars, one of which was a Volkswagen), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 899 (1976)).
840. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
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gling were unlawful.8 41 The Allen ranch, situated along the Oregon
coast, had been under extensive surveillance by United States Customs
officers, the Coast Guard, and other law enforcement agents. Twenty-
four days of surveillance culminated in the interception of a marijuana
smuggling operation during an early morning beach raid. 42 Kolander,
Kerr, Sherman and Allen were arrested at various locations near the
Allen ranch within thirty-seven hours after the raid.843 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of each arrest except that of Allen.
844
After analyzing the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrests of
the four defendants, the court determined that only three were sup-
ported by probable cause.845
The arresting officers received notification of the drug raid through
a police bulletin. Law enforcement officers were ordered to investigate
anyone found near the ranch who was wet or cold and did not possess
identification.8 46
Kolander was found near the ranch wearing wet clothes. He also
had something protruding from his pocket, which provided the officers
with reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk for weapons. 847 The frisk
841. Id. at 1292. Defendants Allen, Diffenderfer, Kerr, Kolander, D. Sherman, S. Sher-
man, and Theriaque were convicted of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), which provides in pertinent part: "[lit shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally. . . (1) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled sub-
stance . . .
All defendants except Kolander were also convicted of conspiring to possess marijuana
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976), which provides: "Any per-
son who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punish-
able by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspir-
acy."
Allen was also convicted of conspiring to import marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 963 (1976), which contains the exact language used in 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
842. For a detailed factual analysis, see supra discussion of Allen under Scope of the
Fourth Amendment.
843. 633 F.2d at 1287-88. Kolander was arrested seven hours after the beach confronta-
tion in a field just a few miles from the beach. Kerr was apprehended approximately thir-
teen hours after the initial raid, after he was seen walking on a highway wearing a wetsuit.
Sherman was found wearing wet clothes, hitchhiking on a local highway about sixteen hours
after the beach arrests. Allen was arrested after a span of thirty-seven hours when he was
observed walking out of the bushes onto a road near his ranch. Id.
844. Id. at 1292.
845. Id.
846. Id. at 1287.
847. Id. at 1292 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1977) (frisk for
weapons when officers noticed a bulge in defendant's clothing during a routine traffic viola-
tion stop upheld)).
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
revealed a pair of pliers similar to the type used at the ranch.8 48 These
facts satisfied the court that Kolander's arrest was supported by prob-
able cause.849 Kerr's presence near the ranch wearing a wetsuit pro-
vided probable cause for his arrest.85 Sherman was seen hitchhiking
on a highway where hitchhiking was "rare,"'8 51 wearing wet and sandy
clothes. He could not explain his presence near the ranch, nor his ap-
pearance. These facts satisfied the court that his warrantless arrest was
lawful.852 Alen's arrest would have been supported by probable cause;
however, the court considered it illegal because the arresting officers
"did not know that the man they arrested was Allen until after the
arrest occurred. ' 5 3
In United States v. Bautista,854 the Ninth Circuit upheld the valid-
ity of two bank robbery suspects' warrantless arrests. The defendants'
demeanor, location, possession of large sums of cash, and inconsistent
answers during police interrogation provided the requisite probable
cause.8
55
Approximately fifteen minutes after they heard a police radio re-
port of the robbery,856 Officers Powers and Gaspar observed defend-
ants Bautista and Martinez walking in a residential area one-half mile
from the bank and three and one-half blocks from the suspected get-
away car. The suspects' appearances matched the descriptions in the
police report.857 When the officers stopped their patrol car, Bautista
approached and explained that he had gone to a house to ask someone
to call a cab. With apparently no other exchange of communication,
the suspects were frisked and handcuffed.85 8
848. 633 F.2d at 1292. The court refused to amplify its theory as to how a pair of pliers
could be considered incriminating evidence of involvement in drug smuggling.
849. Id.
850. Id.
851. No analysis was offered in support of the statement that this highway was rarely
frequented by hitchhikers.
852. Id. See United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1981) (law enforcement officers
found fifteen tons of marijuana on a boat docked at a marina; court upheld validity of
arrests where officers set up a roadblock five miles away from the boat and apprehended any
suspects who approached the roadblock), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
853. 633 F.2d at 1292.
854. 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982).
855. Id. at 1291.
856. The report described the suspects as being of either Mexican or Iranian descent. A
subsequent report revealed that a suspected getaway car was seen parked in a residential
area one-half mile from the bank. Id. at 1287.
857. Id.
858. The frisk revealed no weapons. Id. Officer Powers explained that the handcuffing
was a precaution for officer safety because tracks on the suspects' arms suggested possible
narcotics use, and Bautista appeared anxious to attempt an escape. Powers also went to the
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After Powers verified Bautista's story with the neighbor, he re-
turned to question the suspects. Bautista and Martinez were ques-
tioned separately, and their answers were inconsistent and
suspicious.8 9 The suspects were formally placed under arrest after the
officers completed the interrogations and compared their inconsistent
answers.
860
Defendants argued unsuccessfully on appeal that they were for-
mally arrested when handcuffed. 61 The Ninth Circuit rejected this ar-
gument, relying on its decision in United States v. Patterson .
862
Although the handcuffing of the defendants in Bautista was arguably
more indicative of an arrest than the blocking of a suspect's car in Pat-
terson, the Bautista court pointed out that a brief but complete restric-
tion of liberty, if not excessive under the circumstances, does not
necessarily convert a stop into an arrest. The court found the handcuff-
ing of defendants here neither excessive nor unreasonable under the
circumstances.
8 63
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that probable
cause was lacking at the time of the actual arrestA8" The defendants
neighbor's house to verify Bautista's story, and he stated that it was safer to handcuff the
suspects while Officer Gaspar stood guard. Id. at 1288. See infra discussion of Bautista
under Investigative Stops.
859. Id. The neighbor, with whom Officer Powers verified Bautista's story, explained that
Bautista requested that she call a cab because his car had broken down. When questioned,
however, Bautista denied having a car, and neither suspect knew the other's name. Both
were unaware of the street names in the area. Martinez said the car which dropped them off
was green, while Bautista said it was blue. Martinez gave the officer a name which he was
unable to spell. Bautista later altered his story, explaining that the $250 in cash he possessed
was for a narcotics purchase. Martinez also had $250 in cash with him. Id.
860. Id. After a subsequent search of the defendants at the police station uncovered "bait
bills" taken from the bank, Bautista and Martinez confessed to the robbery. Both were
convicted of unarmed robbery. Id. at 1287-88.
861. Id. at 1289. Implicit in defendants' argument was the contention that such an abrupt
arrest before any formal interrogation was made without probable cause.
862. 648 F.2d 625, 632-34 (9th Cir. 1981) (DEA agents attempted to stop and question
defendant by blocking his car;, the Ninth Circuit held that a valid investigatory stop does not
become an arrest simply because a suspect's freedom of movement is temporarily restricted).
But see United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1982) (in determining whether a
restraint is an arrest, courts look to the amount of force used, and the extent of intrusion and
restraint on the individual's freedom of movement; here, four or five DEA cars blocked the
defendant's car, agents approached with guns drawn, and two occupants of the car were
physically removed; the court held this was tantamount to a warrantless arrest).
863. 684 F.2d at 1289. The use of handcuffs was also justified in United States v. Thomp-
son, 597 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1979) (suspect repeatedly reached for his coat pocket despite
police officer's warnings). See also United States v. Purry, 545 F.2d 217, 219-20 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (handcuffing appropriate where suspect resisted after police officer placed his arm on
suspect).
864. 684 F.2d at 1291.
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were found within one-half mile of the bank and a few blocks from the
suspected getaway car shortly after the robbery. They matched the de-
scriptions on the police report and were carrying large sums of cash.
They gave inconsistent and suspicious answers during routine ques-
tioning by police. The Ninth Circuit was satisfied that the warrantless
arrests were supported by probable cause.865
In United States v. Torres,866 the defendants argued that because
their actions were susceptible to innocent as well as guilty interpreta-
tions, the officers had no probable cause to arrest them for counterfeit-
ing activity without a warrant. The Ninth Circuit upheld the
convictions, affirming the district court's decision that the defendants'
suspicious activities constituted probable cause.
8 67
Defendant Torres and three associates, Salsedo, Montes, and
Buenrostro, were involved in the printing business. Over a period of
several months, the defendants purchased various printer's supplies
which are often used in counterfeiting schemes.868 On June 15, 1979, a
local printing supplier in Stockton, California alerted Secret Service
Agent Hamilton of the suspicious nature of Torres' purchases, and an
investigation began immediately.
869
On July 2, while the Buenrostro residence was under surveillance,
agents observed three men leave the premises with a package and drive
away. After being informed of this incident, Agent Hamilton ordered
that the vehicle be stopped. Buenrostro and Torres were in the car and
were subsequently arrested. The package found in the car was opened
and found to contain incriminating evidence.870 The defendants were
convicted of counterfeiting87' and Salsedo was also convicted of pos-
sessing and concealing counterfeit currency.
72
865. Id.
866. 659 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
867. Id. at 1013. In this brief opinion, the Ninth Circuit primarily relied upon the district
court's rationale in United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. 864, 870 (E.D. Cal. 1980).
868. United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 868-69. Among the supplies purchased were
an A.B. Dick 360 printing press, offset printing plates and supplies to develop the plates,
numerical printing attachments, gothic numerals similar to those used as serial numbers on
United States currency, various inks often used for counterfeiting, and high rag content
paper. Id.
869. Id. at 868.
870. Id. at 869. The searches that followed produced additional evidence which incrimi-
nated defendant Salsedo. Id.
871. 659 F.2d at 1012-13. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) provides: "Whoever, with intent to
defraud, falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, or alters any obligation or other security of the
United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years,
or both."
872. 659 F.2d at 1012-13. 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) provides: "Whoever, with intent to
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
On appeal, the defendants contended that their arrests and the
subsequent searches and seizures were unlawful because their printing
activities were "as consistent with innocent as guilty conduct" and,
therefore, no probable cause existed. 73 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
convictions, affirming the district court's finding that the accumulated
evidence constituted probable cause.874 The district court reasoned
that where the defendant's conduct is susceptible to both innocent and
guilty interpretations, the prosecution must show that "'a prudent per-
son could say that an innocent course of conduct was substantially less
likely than a criminal one.' "875 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court's findings, concluding that they were not clearly
erroneous.
8 76
F. Retroactivity of Payton
Although new constitutional rules were generally applied retroac-
tively before 1965,77 the United States Supreme Court concluded in
Linkletter v. Walker8 78 that retroactivity was neither required nor pro-
hibited by the Constitution. 879 In that case, the Court held that the ex-
clusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio 88 0 should not be applied retroactively
to convictions that had become final before the Mapp decision, even
though it was already being applied to cases pending review at the time
Mapp was decided.88' Post-Linkletter decisions, however, departed
defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass, utter, publish, or sell. . . any
falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation. . . shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both."
873. United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 869-70.
874. 659 F.2d at 1013. See United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 870.
875. United States v. Torres, 504 F. Supp. at 870 (quoting United States v. Patacchia, 602
F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1979) (search of defendant's car by border patrol yielded marijuana;
Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's nervousness, the car's similarity to others used in
smuggling illegal aliens, the absence of a front license plate, the car's low ride and heavy
duty shocks, defendant's statement that he had no trunk key, and his sudden change of
demeanor after continued questioning taken together was insufficient "to make an innocent
course of conduct substantially less likely than a criminal one")). See also United States v.
Patterson, 492 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir.) (Ninth Circuit first adopted the "substantially more
likely to be guilty conduct" test), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974).
876. 659 F.2d at 1013 (citing United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1976) (en
banc) (upholding clearly erroneous standard)).
877. Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973) (citing Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442 (1886)). See also Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371, 374-75 (1940).
878. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
879. Id. at 629.
880. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
881. 381 U.S. at 622. "By final [the Court] mean[s] where the judgment of conviction was
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had
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from the newly established rule881 in favor of a balancing test which
resulted in inconsistent retroactive application of new rules of law.1
8 3
The Court adopted a uniform doctrine of retroactivity last term in
United States v. Johnson.884 A divided Supreme Court held that, with
the exception of cases clearly controlled by existing retroactivity prece-
dent, decisions that construe the fourth amendment are to be applied
retroactively to all convictions pending on direct appeal at the time the
new decision is rendered.885
Defendants Johnson and Dodd were suspected of attempting to
cash a misdelivered United States Treasury Check.886 Special Agents
Hemenway and Pickering arrived at Johnson's residence without a
warrant and knocked on the door, disguising their identities. Johnson
opened the door and was met by the officers, who had drawn their guns
and displayed their badges. Johnson allowed the men to enter, and
after being questioned, admitted his involvement in the check cashing
scheme. The district court denied Johnson's motion to suppress his
confession, and he was convicted of aiding and abetting the obstruction
of correspondence.
8 8 7
elapsed [or a petition for certiorari finally denied] ... " Id. at 622 n.5. See also Tehan v.
United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 409 n.3 (1966) (fifth amendment rule of Griflin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which barred comment on state defendant's failure to tes-
tify, was applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review when Griffin was decided,
but not to convictions made final before that decision).
882. Linkletter directed courts to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking
to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective
operation will further or retard its operation." 381 U.S. at 629.
883. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (Court refused to apply retro-
actively Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (custodial interrogation)); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (Court refused to
apply retroactively United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (line-ups)).
884. 457 U.S. 537 (1982). Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court in which
Justices Marshall, Powell and Stevens joined. Justice Brennan fied a concurring opinion.
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehn-
quist and O'Connor joined.
885. Id. at 562-63.
886. Id. at 539. The check was accidentally delivered to Lena Kearney who subsequently
solicited the help of Dodd and Johnson in cashing it. Kearney later described the events to
Special Agent Hemenway, who obtained an arrest warrant for Dodd, but not Johnson. Id.
at 539 n.2.
887. Id. at 540. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, coun-
sels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
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The Ninth Circuit initially affirmed Johnson's conviction, con-
cluding that the absence of a warrant was not determinative because
the agents had probable cause. 88 While Johnson's petition for rehear-
ing was pending, however, an analogous warrantless arrest decision,
Payton v. New York,88 9 was rendered by the United States Supreme
Court. In Payton, the Court held that, absent a warrant and exigent
circumstances, the fourth amendment prohibits nonconsensual entry
into a suspect's home for the purpose of making a routine felony ar-
rest. 90 After granting Johnson's rehearing petition, the Ninth Circuit
reversed his conviction, applying Payton.
891
In Payton, the Court's inquiry into the retroactivity issue began
with an analysis of the holdings in Johnson v. New Jersey,8 92 and
Stovall v. Denno, in which the Linkletter rule was abandoned in
favor of a three-part balancing test. 94 This balancing test, however,
gave rise to varying degrees of retroactivity.89 5 In numerous decisions
since Linkletter, the Court has expressed dissatisfaction with this vari-
ance and suggested that such "law-changing decision[s]" should apply
retroactively to all convictions pending on direct appeal at the time the
decision is rendered.
8 96
In holding that Payton, as well as all new fourth amendment is-
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any
authorized depository for mail matter. . . with design to obstruct the correspon-
dence. . . or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined not
more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
888. 457 U.S. at 540 (citing an unreported opinion filed Dec. 19, 1978).
889. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
890. Id. at 590.
891. United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), rep'd, 457 U.S. 537
(1982). The Ninth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's rationale emphasizing the special
protection afforded individuals in their homes and rejected the Government's argument that
because Johnson was arrested prior to the Payton decision, he should not benefit from the
decision.
892. 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See supra note 883.
893. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See supra note 883.
894. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 543-44. The three factors to be balanced are:
"'(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."' Id. See Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. at 297; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. at 728.
895. 457 U.S. at 544-45. The varying degrees of retroactivity were: (1) complete retroac-
tive effect to new constitutional rules that attempt to circumvent obstacles which create
doubts as to the veracity of prior guilty verdicts; (2) complete prospective application of new
constitutional rules, but retroactive application only to those parties at bar, and (3) denial of
the rule's benefit to the parties at bar, but complete prospective application. Id. (citations
omitted).
896. Id. at 545 (citations omitted). See id. at 545-46.
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sues, should be applied retroactively, the Court relied upon Justice
Harlan's separate opinion in Mackey v. United States8 97 and his dissent
in Desist v. United States.898 In these opinions, Justice Harlan ex-
pressed his concern over the "incompatible rules and inconsistent prin-
ciples" created by the case-by-case balancing approach. 899 He was also
troubled by the Court's exclusively prospective application of new
rules, which denied retroactive benefit to defendants other than the liti-
gant at bar.9° He felt that all similarly situated defendants should be
granted the same relief unless the Court could "'give a principled rea-
son for acting differently.' "901 Justice Harlan suggested a re-adoption
of the Linkletter analysis, applying new constitutional decisions retro-
actively to all convictions not yet final when the decision is rendered. 902
After determining that the question of applying Payton retroac-
tively was not "clearly controlled" by Supreme Court precedents,9"3 the
Johnson Court found that applying the Payton rule to all cases still
pending when Payton was decided would satisfy all three concerns es-
poused by Justice Harlan: first, the inconsistency resulting from the
case-by-case balancing approach would be alleviated;9°4 second, every
litigant, with the exception of those whose convictions were final,
would receive the benefit of the new constitutional rule;9 °5 and finally,
897. 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (refusal to retroactively apply the fifth amendment issues
raised in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968), to petitioner's conviction which had become final prior to those decisions).
898. 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (refusal to retroactively apply the fourth amendment rule of
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) to petitioner's conviction which had not become
final); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 546-48.
899. 457 U.S. at 546-48 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
900. 457 U.S. at 546-47.
901. Id. at 547 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 258-59) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
902. 457 U.S. at 548 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 258).
903. 457 U.S. at 552-54. The Court identified three categories of cases in which the issue
of retroactivity is effectively determined. First, if settled principles of law are applied to a
novel factual situation, the question whether the later decision should apply retroactively
does not arise because the rule has not been materially altered. Second, if a new rule of
criminal procedure constitutes a "clear break with the past," there is no retroactive applica-
tion because law enforcement officials have relied on the old standards and because of the
effect on the administration of justice. Third, if the trial court had no authority to render a
conviction or punish a defendant, there is complete retroactivity. Id. at 549-50 (citations
omitted).
The Court subsequently concluded that Payton fell within none of these categories, and,
therefore, it followed Justice Harlan's suggestion and re-adopted Linkletter. Id. at 562.
904. Id. at 554-55.
905. Id. at 555. "'If a 'new' constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not reverse
lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm those which have rejected the very
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all defendants in similar situations would be afforded equal treatment
under the newly adopted rule.9"6
The Court rejected the Government's argument that United States
v. Peltier907 required a different result.90 Unlike Johnson, Peltier was
specifically controlled by precedent. Peltier involved the retroactivity
of Aimeida-Sanchez v. United States,9°9 which invalidated a long-stand-
ing, judicially approved statute, resulting in a clear break with existing
law.910 In the past, this type of new constitutional rule received no ret-
roactive application, not because all fourth amendment decisions were
to be applied prospectively, "but because the particular decisions being
applied 'so change[d] the law that prospectivity [was] arguably the
proper course.' "911
The Government interpreted Peltier as denying retroactive effect
to all cases in which police officers acted in good faith compliance with
arguments we have embraced."' Id. at 555 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 259
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
906. 457 U.S. at 555. The Court thus flatly rejected the Government's argument that
Johnson could not rely on Payton because he was arrested before Payton was decided. Pay-
ton received the benefit of the new rule in his case, yet he too was arrested prior to the
Court's decision. Id. at 555-56.
907. 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (refusing to retroactively apply the decision in Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), which held that a warrantless automobile search with-
out probable cause conducted by border patrol agents twenty-five air miles from the Mexi-
can border violated the fourth amendment).
Peltier was arrested seventy miles from the border after roving border patrol agents
found narcotics in his automobile. The Court held that retroactive application of A/melda-
Sanchez was unjustified because the agents relied upon a longstanding federal statute which
permitted such searches. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539-42.
908. 457 U.S. at 557-60.
909. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
910. 457 U.S. at 558 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541). See supra note 903.
911. 457 U.S. at 559 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 659 (1971) (plural-
ity opinion) (defendant's conviction for dealing heroin affirmed where Court refused to ap-
ply retroactively new rule enunciated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),
narrowing scope of permissible searches incident to arrest)). Chimel overruled United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (warrantless search of defendant's one-room office, in-
cluding his desk, safe, and file cabinets, incident to his arrest for possession of counterfeit
stamps did not violate the fourth amendment), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) (extensive five-hour warrantless search of defendant's apartment incident to his arrest
for mail fraud did not violate fourth amendment).
See also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 254 (refusal to retroactively apply the new
rule enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), which held that the scope
of the fourth amendment "cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure"). Katz overruled Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(upholding use of a "detectaphone" affixed to a wall adjoining defendant's office whereby
phone conversations were overheard), and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)
(upholding use of wiretap of defendant's telephone conversations where no trespass was
committed).
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the Constitution. 912 Such a reading, the Johnson Court suggested,
would create an absurd "retroactivity test" in which a police officer
would have to violate a clearly established precedent before a new deci-
sion would apply retroactively.1 3 The Court declared: "[1]iterally
read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate all
Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive
application." 914
The Government further interpreted Peltier as suggesting that all
fourth amendment retroactivity contravened the underlying policies of
the exclusionary rule.9?1 5 The Johnson Court responded, however, that
Peltier merely suggested that retroactive application of new fourth
amendment rulings which involved a "sharp break" with the past
would rarely deter practices which law enforcement officers "never ex-
pected [would] be invalidated." 916 Unlike the judicially approved stat-
ute in Peltier, the warrantless home arrest issue in Payton was
unsettled, and the possibility that such police procedures could be in-
validated at any time does create a deterrent effect?
17
The Government's final argument, that such retroactive applica-
tion would serve only to release wrongdoers, was also rejected by the
Johnson Court.9 " Although it expressed reluctance to release con-
victed criminals, the Court reasoned that upholding constitutional prin-
ciples was paramount and that similarly situated defendants should be
afforded the same relief.9 19
Thus, the Court held that its decisions construing the fourth
amendment are to be applied retroactively to all convictions not yet
final at the time the decision is rendered.920 The Court further held
that this decision did not affect those cases clearly controlled by ex-
912. 457 U.S. at 559. The language in Peltier which the Government referred to sug-
gested that because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, evi-
dence should be suppressed only when the officer knowingly violated a constitutional
provision due to his reliance upon longstanding practice. Id.
913. Id. at 560.
914. Id. (emphasis in original).
915. Id.
916. Id. (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541-42).
917. 457 U.S. at 560. The Court noted that the Government's interpretation of Peltier,
that no unsettled fourth amendment rules should be retroactively applied, actually provides
incentive for police misconduct. It also encourages a disregard of Supreme Court decisions
as well as a wait-and-see approach. Id. (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 277
(Fortas, J., dissenting)).
918. 457 U.S. at 561.
919. Id. (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. at 277 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
920. 457 U.S. at 562.
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isting retroactivity precedent.921 In stating that its holding was limited
to the issue of fourth amendment retroactivity, the Johnson Court re-
fused to discuss fourth amendment retroactivity issues raised on col-
lateral attack.922 In addition, the Court affirmed the civil standard
enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson .923 Accordingly, the Court af-
firmed the Ninth Circuit's retroactive application of Payton .924
Justice Brennan concurred in the majority's opinion based on the
understanding that it left undisturbed retroactivity precedents as ap-
plied to convictions final at the time of decision.925 In a dissenting
opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, Justice White relied, as did the Government, on Peltier.926
He explained that neither "'udicial integrity'" nor deterrence of po-
lice misconduct would be served by applying Payton retroactively.
927
Justice White reasoned that judicial integrity is not offended when evi-
dence is introduced at trial which the officer reasonably believed to be
admissible.928 He stated further that deterrence of officer misconduct
occurs only when the officers knowingly violate the fourth amend-




A brief detention of a suspicious person without probable cause
for either a search or an arrest is generally considered an investigative
stop. It is unclear, however, how long the suspect may be detained
before the investigative stop turns into a full-scale arrest requiring full
921. Id.
922. Id.
923. Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (using the "clear break" principle as
determinative of retroactivity in a civil context)).
924. 457 U.S. at 563.
925. Id. at 563-64 (Brennan, J., concurring). See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967) (Wade-Gilbert rule to be applied to those convictions final at the time of the
decisions).
926. Id. at 564 (White, J., dissenting).
927. Id.
928. Id. at 565 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 537).
929. 457 U.S. at 565 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 542).
930. 457 U.S. at 566. Justice White stated: "I had thought that we long ago resolved the
problem of the appearance of inequity that arises whenever we limit the retroactive reach of
a new principle of law."
The majority noted, however, that while the Court cannot "speed up or slow down the
appellate process" to ensure that similarly situated defendants be treated similarly, it can
eliminate the inherent inequity of exclusively prospective application of new rules of law.
457 U.S. at 557 n.17.
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fourth amendment protection.931 The propriety of an investigative stop
is determined by several factors: the scope and duration of the stop; the
intrusiveness of the questioning; and the existence of specific and ar-
ticulable facts which reasonably indicate either present or future crimi-
nal activity.
932
In United States v. Martell,933 the Ninth Circuit stated that Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents' well-founded suspicion that de-
fendants were engaged in drug trafficking justified a twenty minute de-
tention of defendants and their suitcases for investigative purposes.93 4
The court refrained from deciding whether the detention of the defend-
ants exceeded limits established in Terry v. Ohio9 35 and Dunaway v.
New York,9 36 stating that "the real issue" was whether the twenty min-
ute detention of the defendants' luggage upon a well-founded suspi-
cion, but without probable cause, constituted a fourth amendment
violation.937 The court conceded that the length of time during which
the defendants' luggage was detained is relevant in determining
whether the intrusion is permissible under fourth amendment stan-
dards. 938 The court stated that it was unaware, however, of any case
which placed an outer time limit on the detention of objects.939 The
931. The detention must not be longer than justified by the circumstances. United States
v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) (detention of a jaywalker held unreasonable where
police detained him longer than necessary to write citation, so that they could call headquar-
ters on an unsubstantiated hunch that there was a warrant for his arrest). The MODEL PE-
NAL CODE § 110.2(l) (1980) provides that the length of the detention must be no longer than
reasonably necessary to learn the suspect's identity and determine the existence of any crimi-
nal activity, and in no event longer than twenty minutes.
932. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975).
933. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (appeal pending).
934. Id at 1358-59.
935. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
936. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
937. 654 F.2d at 1358. The DEA agents' well-founded suspicion was based on informa-
tion that Martell, a known drug trafficker, had made travel arrangements under an alias. In
San Diego, agents observed Martell leave his hotel room with co-defendant Minneci. They
drove in an erratic manner, known to the agents as a method of detecting and avoiding
surveillance. They returned to the hotel within five minutes, and ten minutes later, agents
observed Minneci making telephone calls. A few hours later, Minneci and Martell went to
the airport and purchased airline tickets to Alaska. At the airport, they refused to grant the
agents permission to search their suitcases. They were subsequently taken to a police office
in the airport where a canine detected drugs in the luggage. The agents did not search the
defendants' bags, however, until a valid search warrant was obtained. Id at 1357-58.
938. Id at 1360 (citing United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970) (deten-
tion of mail for one and one-half hours, without probable cause, held proper where there
was reasonable suspicion that it was included in a criminal scheme)).
939. 654 F.2d at 1360. The Ninth Circuit noted that there is a conceptual difference be-
tween the detention of the defendants and the detention of their suitcases, but the court did
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court concluded that the twenty minute detention of the defendants'
luggage was reasonable and did not violate the fourth amendment.94
In United States v. Anderson,941 the Ninth Circuit applied the test
for a seizure articulated in United States v. Mendenhall942 and held that
government agents' encounter with the defendants clearly constituted a
"seizure. '943 The defendants had chartered a plane from Fort Lauder-
dale, Florida, to Orange County, California. Upon arrival they were
met by DEA agents who had received information 9" that the plane
would be carrying narcotics. At the agents' request, the defendants
went to the aviation building with their luggage. Once inside the build-
ing, they were questioned about their identity and purposes for travel.
When asked to identify their luggage, however, all of the defendants
disclaimed ownership except defendant Anderson, who claimed an at-
tache case. Varying amounts of cocaine were found pursuant to a
search warrant in all the cases.
945
The court rejected the Government's argument that this was not
an investigative stop,946 but agreed with the Government that the en-
not state why the legality of the luggage detention was the real issue in this case. Id at 1359.
The court distinguished Terry, Dunaway, and their progeny because they involved the
"detention of persons and not inanimate objects." Id The court believed the rationale re-
lied upon by the Supreme Court in Terry, Dunaway, and other similar cases was "inappro-
priate as applied to 'things,' a seizure of which constitutes a substantially less serious
intrusion upon rights of the individual." Id
940. United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d at 1363. See infra Martell discussion under War-
rantless Searches and Fruits of the Poisonous Tree. Ultimately, the defendants' convictions
for violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 were affirmed. 654 F.2d at 1363.
941. 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981).
942. 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, a majority of the Court assumed that the stop
of Mendenhall constituted a seizure. Justice Stewart articulated the test as follows:
[A] person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that
might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.
Id at 554.
943. 663 F.2d at 939 (citations and footnote omitted).
944. The information was supplied by a government informant. Unlike the district court,
the Ninth Circuit found the informant to be reliable. Id at 940. In particular, the court
found the following facts to constitute sufficient indicia of reliability: (1) the informant's
previously accurate tips; (2) the precision of the tip as to the plane, pilots, time of departure,
and destination of the flight; and (3) the informant's belief that narcotics were on board was
not based merely on observation, but also on his personal knowledge of the pilots and own-
er. Id
945. Id at 936-37.
946. Id at 939-40. The court distinguished Mendenhall from the instant case by noting
the following five factors, which indicated to the court that the defendants were reasonable
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counter was based on reasonable suspicion.947 The court held that the
district court erred in finding that the initial stop was not based on
reasonable suspicion, stating that the assessment of adequate cause to
make the stop must be based on all the circumstances. 948 The Ninth
Circuit held that the agents were justified in drawing the inference that
the aircraft was probably carrying narcotics, and that, based on that
deduction, they were justified in stopping the occupants for
questioning.949
The court also addressed the issue of whether the length of the
detention was lawful, and thus either added to or detracted from the
reasonableness of the agents' actions under the circumstances. The
Ninth Circuit stated, however, that it was unable to evaluate the legal-
ity of the length of the detention, because the district court failed to
make factual determinations as to its length and at what point it actu-
ally began.
950
in believing that they were not free to walk away: (1) the presence of the five DEA agents,
one LAPD officer, and four uniformed Orange County deputy sheriffs; (2) defendants' testi-
mony that they were ordered, rather than requested, to leave the plane; (3) the agents' act of
escorting the defendants about 150 feet in a rainstorm, at night, to a terminal closed to the
public; (4) placement in a room measuring ten feet by twenty feet; and (5) the presence of at
least one agent or officer, even for trips to the restroom or telephone. Id at 940. The court
analogized the agents' approach to the plane to that of a vehicle stop which, according to
Justice Stewart in Mendenhall, constituted a search. Id
947. Id. at 940. The Ninth Circuit concluded that reasonable suspicion existed in part,
because the informant was reliable. See supra note 944.
948. 663 F.2d at 940. The court was enlightened by United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
418 (1981) (all the surrounding circumstances, including an officer's knowledge and exper-
tise, must be considered in determining the propriety of an investigatory stop). The Ander-
son court believed that in light of all the surrounding circumstances, there was adequate
cause for the initial stop. See supra note 944. Furthermore, the DEA agents knew that the
airport from which the plane departed had been the site of previous narcotics activity, the
pilot and owner were drug transporters, and chartered planes are frequently employed to
transport narcotics to avoid luggage inspections which are required by FAA regulations.
663 F.2d at 940-41.
949. Id. at 941.
950. I.d The court did not apply or distinguish United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025
(9th Cir. 1974) (detention found reasonable where defendants stopped while on board pri-
vate plane and, due to weather conditions, taken inside airport terminal building, questioned
and detained for over an hour).
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for findings as to how long the
detention lasted before the first canine search of the luggage, and when the detention rip-
ened into an unlawful arrest, if at all. 663 F.2d at 941. The court further suggested that, on
remand, the district court should evaluate these matters in the light of United States v. Mar-
tell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (twenty minute detention upheld as reasonable). The
Anderson court also ordered that if the district court determined on remand that defendants'
denials of ownership occurred during the initial lawful detention, and that the denials con-
stituted an abandonment of the defendants' privacy interests, then the motions to suppress
must be denied. 663 F.2d at 941-42.
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In International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck,95 the
Ninth Circuit held that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
investigators may not seize or detain workers to question them about
their citizenship status952 without a reasonable suspicion, based on ar-
ticulable objective facts, that the person questioned and detained is an
illegal alien.
953
In Sureck, three particular surveys conducted by the INS were
challenged by the plaintiffs on fourth amendment grounds.954 Search
warrants were issued for two surveys,955 and the third survey occurred
at a workplace with the owner's consent. The workers, all legally in
this country, were subjected to INS questioning at their workplaces.
Not all of the workers were questioned, however;95 6 those chosen were
selected by the agents' use of certain objective and subjective factors.95 7
The court noted that one of the threshold issues was the applicabil-
ity of the fourth amendment to the INS questioning of workers during
factory surveys. The court reiterated the well-established principle that
the fourth amendment applies to law enforcement activities involving
951. 681 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv. v. Delgado, 103 S. Ct. 1872 (1983).
952. Id at 638. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1976) is the statutory enactment under which an
INS agent may question a person regarding his right to be or remain in the United States
without forcible detention, if the agent has a reasonable belief that the questioned person is
an alien.
953. 681 F.2d at 638.
954. Id at 627. The challenged surveys, or sweeps through factories for the purpose of
locating illegal aliens, occurred at the Southern California Davis Pleating Co. on January 4,
1977, and on September 27, 1977, and at Mr. Pleat on October 3, 1977.
The plaintiff also challenged the INS practice on fifth amendment grounds; however,
the Ninth Circuit stated that in light of its disposition, it did not need to address fifth amend-
ment issues. Id at 628 n.7. Plaintiffs challenged the INS Area Control operation, which is
designed to locate and apprehend illegal aliens. Id at 626 n.2. These INS surveys are gen-
erally conducted in workplaces because of the INS success in apprehending large numbers
of illegal aliens who work in factories, most notably in the garment industry. Generally,
factory surveys begin when the INS gets a tip that a particular workplace may be employing
illegal aliens. The INS then puts the suspected workplace under surveillance in order to
verify the information., Upon verification, the INS agents seek the workplace owner's or
management's permission to enter and question suspected illegal aliens, with the ultimate
goal of arresting and deporting them. If permission to enter is not granted, then the INS
obtains search warrants to enter the workplace. Id at 626-27.
955. These search warrants were issued under FED. R. C~iM. P. 41, but did not state with
particularity the names of the individual illegal aliens sought as objects of the search. 681
F.2d at 627.
956. 681 F.2d at 627. Policy usually dictates that all the workers be surveyed; however,
manpower limitations made this impractical.
957. Id The process used by the agents employed factors such as the persons' clothing,
facial appearance, hair color and styling, demeanor, language and accent, and other subjec-
tive factors which might indicate alienage. Id at 627 n.6.
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seizure of persons, including brief detentions short of a traditional ar-
rest.958 The INS argued that neither a detention nor a seizure was pres-
ent which would implicate objective fourth amendment standards. 95 9
The plaintiffs argued alternatively: (1) that the INS surveys were a
seizure comparable to a custodial detention requiring probable cause
for arrest960 as in Dunaway v. New York;96 and (2) that the factory
surveys at least rose to the level of a seizure short of a traditional
arrest.
962
The Ninth Circuit failed to find a Dunaway custodial detention,
because the workers in Sureck were not handcuffed or placed in cus-
tody until the investigators had probable cause to suspect that those
questioned were in this country without proper documentation. 963 The
court, however, found that the INS procedure involved "more than
mere questioning or casual conversation as argued by the INS. '9 64 The
Ninth Circuit applied the test enunciated in United States v. Ander-
son9 65 to determine whether the factual circumstances of law enforce-
ment activity in Sureck rose to the level of a fourth amendment
seizure.966 The court found that the INS factory survey was sufficiently
intrusive upon the workers' privacy and security interests to amount to
958. 681 F.2d at 629 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
959. 681 F.2d at 629. The INS relied primarily on statements made in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588
F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979); and Cordon de Ruano v. INS, 554 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1977), to
support its argument that the test for a seizure is "whether a reasonable, innocent person in
the position of the plaintiffs would feel free to leave." The INS argued that there was no
fourth amendment seizure because the four named plaintiffs circulated throughout the facto-
ries and could not have reasonably felt detained by the presence of the INS investigators.
Id. at 629-30.
960. Id at 630. The plaintiffs maintained that the factory surveys are executed with
physical force and a show of authority restraining the workers' liberty. The workers' aware-
ness that the factory's exits are sealed, the large number of agents present, and the immedi-
ate arrests of those attempting to flee increase the coercive impact of the operation. Id
961. 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (detention rising to level of arrest requiring probable cause
found where defendant was escorted to police headquarters in a police car and placed in
interrogation room, but not informed that he was under arrest).
962. 681 F.2d at 630.
963. Id.
964. Id
965. 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981).
966. 681 F.2d at 630-31. Before applying the test, however, the court found the district
court's reasoning in Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1982),
aft'd, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976) persuasive. The Pilliod court found the INS practice of
sealing workplace exits to be a fourth amendment seizure. Id at 1018.
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a fourth amendment seizure. 967  The court also observed that the
number of INS investigators present, coupled with the "method of sur-
vey execution represented a threatening presence of INS agents to the
reasonable worker.
96 8
After concluding that the factory surveys constituted a seizure of
the workforce, the court proceeded to determine the constitutional
standards applicable to the INS conduct. The INS contended that even
if a fourth amendment seizure existed, the intrusion upon the privacy
and security interests of the workers was so slight that it did not consti-
tute a fourth amendment violation.969 The plaintiffs, however, main-
tained that the agents must determine that an element of illegality and
an element of individualized suspicion exist, in order to sufficiently
protect the workers' fourth amendment rights.970  The court agreed
with the plaintiffs, holding that the fourth amendment requires the INS
investigators to articulate facts providing them with a reasonable suspi-
967. 681 F.2d at 634. The INS further argued that under Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980), the present detention, if any, that existed during the surveys did not rise to the level
of a seizure contemplated by the fourth amendment. The court, however, failed to find
Mendenhall dispositive because: (I) only two justices in Mendenhall determined that there
was no seizure, while three others did not even reach the issue, and although the Ninth
Circuit has adopted Justice Stewart's test for a seizure, that test has never been adopted by a
majority of the Supreme Court; and (2) unlike Mendenhall, this case was afflicted with far
more intrusive aspects, such as the detentive environment created in the surveyed factories.
681 F.2d at 632-33.
968. Id at 634. The court noted that the verbal announcement of the agents' authority,
the display of badges, the stationing of agents at exits, the carrying of handcuffs by some
agents, the element of surprise, and the agents' procession down the rows of workers could
reasonably be viewed as a threatening presence. Id The court concluded that even before
individual questioning began, a reasonable worker "'would have believed that he was not
free to leave."' Id (quoting Anderson, 663 F.2d at 939).
969. 681 F.2d at 634. The INS relied on United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (border patrol practice at permanent checkpoints of referring some vehicles to secon-
dary inspection area for additional questioning of passengers' citizenship status, on less than
particularized or individualized suspicion as to each passenger subjected to the referral, up-
held because intrusion on motorists minimal and outweighed by substantial law enforce-
ment interest involved). The court, however, found Martinez-Fuerte inapplicable and the
INS position a concession that the fourth amendment requires agents to articulate a reason-
able suspicion of illegal alienage for detentive questioning. The INS handbook on searches
and seizures provides that to stop a person, an agent must have reasonable suspicion, based
on specific articulable facts, that the suspect is an alien. To detain the suspect, the agent
must have a reasonable suspicion that he is an alien illegally in the United States. 681 F.2d
at 634 n.12.
970. 681 F.2d at 635. The plaintiffs argued that Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200
(1979), requires the INS to limit its questioning to those it may have probable cause to arrest
during the factory surveys and, alternatively, for the application of a standard comparable to
that applied to automobile stops in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873 (1975).
681 F.2d at 634-35.
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cion that each person questioned and detained is an illegal alien.971
The court stated that the Government may not rely on 8 U.S.C.
section 1357(a)(1) 97 2 to justify the detention and questioning of an en-
tire workforce. The court stated that "[r]andom detentive questioning
of all who may appear to be aliens without objective facts giving rise to
a suspicion of illegal alienage would grant the INS impermissible dis-
cretion to detain and question at whim. 9 7 3
The INS further argued that, under the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,974 an individualized suspicion was
not required because even if there was a seizure, it was minimal, and
the Government's interest in apprehending illegal aliens outweighed
any interest of the questioned workers to be free from this minimal
intrusion.975 The plaintiffs argued that Martinez-Fuerte was inapplica-
ble because the Court's holding was limited to permanent check points,
and the facts here were more comparable to a roving border patrol
stop.976 Although the court recognized the weighty law enforcement
interests involved, it found that the Martinez-Fuerte decision supported
the plaintiffs' position more strongly than that of the INS. The Sureck
court thus rejected the notion that Martinez-Fuerte allows factory sur-
vey questioning of individual workers on less than a particularized or
individualized suspicion that each worker questioned is an illegal
alien.
9 77
971. Id. at 635. The court relied on United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), for the
proposition that law enforcement officials must have a reasonable, individualized suspicion
that the particular person detained is engaged in wrongdoing. The court also relied on
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), for the element of illegality contained in the
standard. 681 F.2d at 635. The court felt that the standard's element of illegality was neces-
sary to minimize the effects of enforcement procedures on innocent workers. Id at 638-39.
972. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (1970) provides: "Any officer or employee of the Service au-
thorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have the power without
warrant.. .(1) to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be
or remain in the United States. . ....
973. 681 F.2d at 639. The court reasoned that relying on § 1357(a)(1) to justify the deten-
tion and questioning of an entire workforce "simply ignores the truism that innocent citizens
and aliens legally employed at surveyed factories enjoy the same right to be free of the
indignity of arbitrary government intrusions which the Fourth Amendment guarantees all
individuals." Id (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)). The court ac-
knowledged that its holding limited § 1357(a)(1) questioning in the context of factory
surveys like those in Sureck. To support its decision, the court noted that "'no Act of
Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution."' 681 F.2d at 639 (quoting Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973)).
974. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra note 969.
975. 681 F.2d at 640.
976. Id
977. Id at 641. The court pointed out the Martinez-Fuerte Court's holding that the sub-
jective intrusion (concern or fright on the part of the lawful travelers) in a roving stop is
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit determined that the constitutional stan-
dards, as applied to the facts of Sureck, were not met.978 The INS ar-
gued that there was a sufficient basis for the questioning that occurred
at the two factories, 979 based on the following facts: the factories where
the surveys were conducted were garment factories, which are known
to employ large numbers of illegal aliens; before the Davis surveys,
INS investigators had arrested several illegal alien employees outside
the factory premises who stated that other illegal aliens worked in the
factory; when the INS agents entered the plants, many employees
shouted "La Migra" 8 0 and a number of employees fled or hid; and, by
the time of the second Davis survey, the INS agents knew they had
apprehended seventy-eight illegal aliens from the first survey.981 The
court stated, however, that these factors, alone or together, could not
justify the detention and questioning that occurred because the factory
surveys, by the way in which they were conducted,982 constituted a
seizure, thus implicating fourth amendment standards. 983 The court
concluded: "[t]o find the factory survey procedures evidenced by the
record before us constitutional would be . . . straining the Fourth
Amendment requirements in order to accommodate an intrusive and
objectionable method of immigration law enforcement. The Constitu-
tion, as we interpret it, cannot be so accommodating."
984
much greater than at a permanent checkpoint because at the permanent checkpoint, motor-
ists are not taken by surprise. The record in Sureck indicated that the surveys frightened the
workers. Unlike the three or four minute routine detention at the permanent checkpoint in
Martinez-Fuerte, there was a relatively greater degree of disruption in Sureck because of the
surprise entry of the workplace for the typical hour and one-half of questioning. Moreover,
the procedures employed in the factory surveys suggested more random enforcement. Id at
640-41.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Third Circuit's holding in Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d
293 (3d Cir. 1981) (INS questioning found constitutionally permissible on less than particu-
larized suspicion). 681 F.2d at 641.
978. 681 F.2d at 644.
979. 681 F.2d at 643. The INS relied on United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981), in which the Supreme Court defined reasonable suspicion to include an assessment
of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a seizure in light of a law enforcement of-
ficer's experience.
980. Slang expression which means "the INS."
981. 681 F.2d at 643.
982. The Ninth Circuit noted that even if a factory survey could be performed in a non-
detentive atmosphere, it would be inappropriate for the court to provide the INS with a list
of justifying factors for such a hypothetical survey. The constitutionality of such a survey
must be judged on the specific facts giving rise to each instance of interrogation. Id at 643
n.23.
983. Id at 643.
984. Id at 644. In light of the applicable fourth amendment standard, the circumstances
that the INS cited failed to aid the court in its analysis of whether the INS had a reasonable
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Although the Ninth Circuit has held that race or color alone is
insufficient to support the propriety of an investigative stop,985 the
court held in United States v. Bautista9" 6 that race can be a relevant
factor in making an investigative stop.9 87 In Bautista, police, patrolling
the vicinity of a bank robbery, received a description of the robbers
which indicated that they were armed and of Iranian or Mexican de-
scent9 88 Police officers familiar with the area surmised in which direc-
tion the suspects might flee989 and spotted defendants Bautista and
Martinez shortly after the robbery. The officers decided to stop the
defendants, after observing that they fit the description of the robbers
and noting that they were dressed inappropriately for the weather.990
Bautista approached the officers, and said that he had just been at a
nearby house where he had asked a woman to call a cab for him be-
cause his car had broken down. Officer Powers frisked Bautista and
Martinez, finding no weapons. They were then handcuffed, and Pow-
ers proceeded to the house to check Bautista's story. Powers verified
the story, but when he asked Bautista where the car was, Bautista re-
plied that there was no car. The officers separated the two men and
questioned them, obtaining inconsistent and suspicious answers.991 Af-
individualized suspicion of the illegal alienage of each detained worker before the execution
of the surveys. The court stated that these circumstances failed to provide "a particularized
and objective basis prior to the execution of the surveys for suspecting any of the questioned
workers" to be illegal aliens working in this country. Id The court was concerned that the
fourth amendment rights of workers would be impermissibly diminished if the court sanc-
tioned the unconstrained use of warrantless, detentive questioning like that used in Sureck.
Id at 643-44.
The court acknowledged that its decision might hinder INS efforts to seek out illegal
aliens in workplaces. The court also acknowledged that Sureck illustrated Justice White's
comment on the irony of the costly and burdensome struggle of the INS to restrict the influx
of illegal aliens into the United States in light of the fact that American employers lawfully
employ illegal aliens. Id at 644 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
914-15 (1975) (White and Blackmun, J.J., concurring)). The court reversed the summary
judgment in favor of the INS on the issue of worker questioning and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with the opinion. 681 F.2d at 644.
985. See discussion of International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, supra at
notes 951-984 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); and United States v. Malides, 473 F.2d
859 (9th Cir. 1973).
986. 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1206 (1983).
987. Id at 1289.
988. Id at 1287.
989. Id The police were also informed that the suspected getaway car was parked on a
side street in an affluent neighborhood about one-half mile from the bank. Id
990. The defendants had on short sleeve shirts and appeared relatively dry although it
had been raining throughout the day. Id
991. Id at 1287-88. The defendants did not know each other's names, the neighborhood
streets, who had dropped them off, or who they were meeting. Martinez gave a false name,
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
ter questioning, the defendants were arrested, taken to police head-
quarters, searched, and given their Miranda warnings. Bautista and
Martinez subsequently confessed to committing the bank robbery.
992
On appeal, the defendants argued that the initial stop was not sup-
ported by the necessary founded suspicion of criminal conduct, but
rather was based on their race. In discarding this argument, the court
noted that race can be a relevant factor,9 9 3 and observed that the de-
fendants' race was not the sole basis for the stop.994 Thus, treating ra-
cial appearance as a factor contributing to the necessary founded
suspicion of criminal activity was not inappropriate.
995
Defendants also argued that the use of handcuffs constituted an
arrest because once they were handcuffed they were "not free to
leave." 996 Rejecting this argument, the court determined that the use of
handcuffs during the investigative stop did not amount to an arrest,
because the police may take precautions during on-the-scene investiga-
tions involving potentially dangerous suspects.9 97 The court reasoned
that the use of handcuffs was reasonable as a measure to protect Officer
but could not spell it. Bautista changed his story and said that he was supposed to make a
$250 narcotics purchase. Id at 1288.
992. Id The defendants were convicted for unarmed bank robbery in federal district
court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Id at 1287.
993. Id at 1289. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (bor-
der patrol stop can be based partly upon an alien's characteristic appearance). See also
United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1980) (founded suspicion based in
part on aliens' characteristic appearance upheld in making border patrol stop).
994. 684 F.2d at 1289. The court noted that some of the facts and circumstances which
justified the officers' decision to make an investigatory stop of the defendants included: their
presence on a likely escape route one-half mile from the bank and a few blocks from the
suspected getaway car, their unique resemblance to the description of the robbers; their in-
appropriate dress considering the weather, and their relatively dry appearance, despite the
rain, which indicated that they had just left a car. Id
995. Id
996. Id at 1288. The defendants relied on United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497, 500-01
(9th Cir. 1979) (critical consideration in determining existence of arrest is degree and man-
ner of force used in stop and detention); and United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380
(9th Cir. 1974) (arrest found where police cars surrounded vehicle occupied by defendant,
officers approached vehicle with weapons drawn and ordered occupants to raise their
hands).
997. 684 F.2d at 1289..The court reasoned that the purpose of a Terry frisk is to permit
the officer to investigate without fear of violence. Id (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S.
143, 146 (1972)). Although the court conceded that handcuffing aggravates the "intrusive-
ness of an otherwise routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop,"
the court relied on United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 632-34 (9th Cir. 1981) (hand-
cuffing of suspects does not automatically rise to the level of an arrest) for the rule that a
"brief but complete restriction of liberty, if not excessive under the circumstances, is permis-
sible during a Terry stop and does not necessarily convert the stop into an arrest." 684 F.2d
at 1289.
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Gaspar while Officer Powers checked the defendants' story.9 9 8
Bautista and Martinez further argued that their separate question-
ing exceeded the duration and the scope of inquiry permitted by a
Terry stop, and the separate questioning was illegal because the officers
lacked probable cause,9 99 The court, however, rejected these argu-
ments, reasoning that investigative stops need not be limited to a
couple of questions, within a couple of minutes, provided the questions
asked are reasonably related to the circumstances which precipitated
the stop. 1" The court further stated that a greater period of time is
sometimes needed to investigate possible criminal activity.c °l
998. 684 F.2d at 1289. The court felt that Officer Gaspar needed protection because the
suspects were involved in an armed robbery with a third robber who might still have been in
the vicinity. Thus, in light of the type of criminal activity involved (citing United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 1977)), and viewing the evidence at the suppression hearing
in the manner most favorable to the Government (citing United States v. Vital-Padilla, 500
F.2d 641, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1974)), the court held that the district court was not clearly in
error in finding the use of handcuffs reasonable under the circumstances. 684 F.2d at 1289-
90.
999. 684 F.2d at 1290. For the proposition that investigative stops are brief in duration
and scope of inquiry, the defendants relied principally on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 210-11 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (investigative
stops usually take less than a minute and only involve a question or two); and United States
v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 1980) (reasonable suspicion justified brief stop
accompanied by a few brief questions), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981). 684 F.2d at 1290.
1000. 684 F.2d at 1290.
1001. Id The court reasoned that investigative stops are not limited to one or two ques-
tions if the questions are reasonably related in scope to the stop itself. Id (citing United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873, 881 (1975)). The court explained that the investiga-
tion need not terminate within a couple of minutes. 684 F.2d at 1290 (citing Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (holding that under certain circumstances police
must be able to detain suspects longer than brief time periods involved in Terry andAdams
to accomplish the underlying purpose of a Terry stop, the investigation of criminal activity)).
The court then noted that it had previously upheld investigative stops which took longer
than a minute or two and involved more than just a couple of questions. 684 F.2d at 1290-
91 (citing United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding the question-
ing of airplane passengers regarding their relationship with pilots and their knowledge of
whether narcotics were aboard where police reasonably suspected that aircraft transported
narcotics)). See also Anderson discussion supra; United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624 (9th
Cir. 1979) (initial stop based on founded suspicion ripened into probable cause for arrest),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978)
(scope of inquiry limited to circumstances justifying the initial intrusion); and United States
v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974) (Terry stop lasting more than an hour not viola-
tive of fourth amendment where extended detention justified by police officers' attempts to
check suspects' unsatisfactory and evasive answers to routine questions, but where scope of
inquiry did not exceed justification for stop), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924 (1975). Moreover,
the court determined that the questions were reasonably related in scope to the justification
for the stop. Therefore, even if the questioning lasted the claimed ten to twelve minutes,
"there [was] nothing in the record to suggest that the stop was for a longer period than was
reasonably necessary." 684 F.2d at 1291.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
In United States v. Corona, 10 2 the Ninth Circuit determined that a
police officer did not have a founded suspicion, based upon articulable
facts, that the defendant was armed and presently dangerous.'l°° The
court focused its analysis on the suspicion necessary for a stop and pat-
down search. A prerequisite for a pat-down is that a police officer must
be entitled to stop the suspect.'0° 4 The totality of the circumstances
must furnish the officer with articulable facts suggesting present or fu-
ture criminal activity by the suspect.1°°s The court found that no such
facts existed here; thus, the stop was illegal." °
To justify the search, the police officer had to have a founded sus-
picion, based on articulable facts, that Corona was armed and presently
dangerous. 1 7 The court, however, found nothing in the facts known to
Officer Wolfe which justified such a belief.0 8 The Corona court con-
1002. 661 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1981).
1003. Id at 807-08. Late one night Deputy Sheriff Wolfe observed Corona standing across
the street from a closed grocery store where workers were stocking shelves. Wolfe later
found Corona hitchhiking and gave him a ride, but Corona was disoriented and was able to
give only vague directions to his destination. When Wolfe let Corona out of the car, Wolfe
asked for identification, but Corona had none. Wolfe then patted down Corona and found a
loaded, sawed-off shotgun under Corona's coat. Id at 806-07.
1004. Id at 807 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (brief stop of suspicious
individual may be reasonable in light of facts known to the officer)).
1005. 661 F.2d at 807 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (investigative
stop must be justified by objective manifestation of present or future criminal activity);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (officer's belief that suspects are
armed and might be dangerous provided reasonable grounds for stop); United States v.
Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975) (conviction of marijuana smuggling upheld
where stop based on reasonable suspicion of alien smuggling), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977
(1976)).
1006. 661 F.2d at 807. Although the court conceded that Corona's behavior may have
been unusual, the facts did not indicate criminal activity, especially in the manner displayed
in the two cases relied upon by the prosecution, United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th
Cir.), ceri. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979) (one of two persons seated in car in high crime area
ran to nearby wall and apparently dropped an object over it after seeing patrol car) and
United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1979) (two persons stooping behind rear of
car ran away from approaching police officers investigating a suspected car burglary), cert,
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980). The court stated that Corona was factually similar to Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (fourth amendment violated where police officers stopped two
persons walking away from each other in high drug traffic area because activity of persons
stopped furnished no objective basis for reasonable suspicion that they were engaged in
criminal conduct).
1007. Id at 807-08 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The Ninth Circuit disagreed
with the district court's holding that the pat-down was constitutional because it was only
after the pat-down revealed a hard object that the further intrusion of reaching into Co-
rona's coat occurred. The Ninth Circuit instead held that "[a] pat-down may not be initiated
. . . in the absence of a founded suspicion that the subject is armed and presently danger-
ous." 661 F.2d at 807-08 n.2 (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979)).
1008. 661 F.2d at 807-08. The court felt that Corona's wearing a long coat on a rainy night
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sidered the instant case analogous to Ybarra v. Illinois,100 9 in which a
pat-down search was held unlawful under similar circumstances.
1010
The court therefore concluded that the district court's findings that the
officer's stop and pat-down search of Corona were based on the requi-
site founded suspicion were clearly erroneous.10 11
In United States v. Sears,1012 by comparison, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the standards articulated in Terry v. Ohio 1013 to uphold the pro-
priety of an investigative stop of the defendants. The defendants were
observed sitting in a vehicle with out-of-state license plates and looking
through binoculars at a bank across the street. The Ninth Circuit held
that these facts were sufficient to justify the stop.1
0 14
In United States v. O'Connor,101 5 the Ninth Circuit, based on the
relaxed standard of Terry v. Ohio,1016 upheld the propriety of a vehicle
stop and the questioning of its passenger, where the agents had a mis-
taken but good faith belief that the passenger was a suspect sought
under a search warrant.1
01 7
did not give rise to a suspicion that Corona was armed and dangerous. The court distin-
guished this case from United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1977) (person wearing a
coat unsuited to the weather), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978), and United States v. Mireles,
583 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir.) (coat not only unsuited, but contained a suspicious and conspicu-
ous bulge), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978). 661 F.2d at 808.
1009. 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (pat-down search held unlawful where person searched was
wearing coat appropriate for the weather, was not recognized as someone with a criminal
history, and made neither threatening overtures nor gave indications that he carried a
weapon).
1010. 661 F.2d at 808.
1011. Id Defendant Corona's conviction of possessing an unregistered firearm in violation
of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871 was reversed. 661 F.2d at 806.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sneed argued that the officer's pat-down search was
reasonable and that he did what a competent police officer would have done under the
circumstances. Id at 808 (Sneed, J., dissenting). Judge Sneed believed that Officer Wolfe's
conduct was reasonable because he had reason to be anxious about his own safety. The
area's incidence of crime, Corona's vague directions, the remote spot where Corona asked to
be dropped off, the hour of the night, and Corona's lack of identification tipped the scale in
favor of Wolfe's security interest and against the intrusion on Corona's personal security.
Id Judge Sneed reasoned that the exclusionary rule should not be invoked if its purpose, to
deter illegal police behavior, will not be served. Id. at 809.
1012. 663 F.2d 896, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982).
1013. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In order for police to conduct an investigative stop, Terry requires
only an objectively reasonable suspicion that a crime is either occurring or will occur. The
police officer must be able to provide articulable facts which, together with rational infer-
ences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Id at 21. This standard is much
less stringent than the probable cause showing necessary for an arrest.
1014. 663 F.2d at 903.
1015. 658 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1981).
1016. See supra note 1013.
1017. 658 F.2d at 691.
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), suspicious that a Mr. Cutter
and the defendant O'Connor were involved in illegal bookmaking ac-
tivities, placed O'Connor's hotel room under surveillance. 0 18 The
agents observed other bookmaking suspects leaving the room and in-
vestigated the room's telephone records. 10 19 After concluding that
bookmaking operations were being conducted in the room, the agents
sought warrants to search the room and arrest O'Connor and Cutter.
While waiting for the warrants to be issued, an agent observed two
men, whom he believed to be O'Connor and Cutter, leave the vicinity
of O'Connor's room. The two men drove off separately, one in a cab
and the other in a private car. The agents, fearing detection of their
surveillance and removal of evidence, followed the cab. 10 20  Upon
learning that the search warrants had been issued, Agent Kindt stopped
the cab. To his surprise, Kindt discovered that the passenger was not
O'Connor, but Davis. Suspicious that Davis was also involved in
bookmaking, Kindt questioned him about his reasons for leaving
O'Connor's room. 10 21 Davis, who refused to claim ownership of the
briefcase in the back of the cab, simultaneously refused to consent to a
search of the briefcase. Kindt then informed Davis that he was taking
the briefcase back to the hotel room. Davis accompanied Kindt at his
request. The next day, the briefcase was opened and searched pursuant
to a warrant. The search revealed fifty-four ounces of cocaine.
0 22
The Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of the stop, notwithstanding
the agents' mistaken belief that the passenger in the cab was
O'Connor. 1023 The O'Connor court observed that the agents possessed
a search warrant for O'Connor at the time of the stop.10 24 The court
rejected the defendants' contention that Kindt was not justified in ques-
tioning Davis, after discovering that he was not O'Connor. 10 2- The
1018. Id at 689.
1019. Id This information was used to obtain warrants to search the room as well as
O'Connor and Cutter. Id
1020. Id The agents also followed the private car but lost it. The cab, which was followed
for thirty-five minutes, was driven evasively. Id
1021. Id at 690. Meanwhile Agent Stewart, who had arrived at the scene, questioned the
cab driver. The cab driver apparently gave permission to search the back of the cab but not
the briefcase. Id
1022. Id Following an evidentiary hearing, however, the district court ordered the sup-
pression of the cocaine. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court's order.
Id at 693.
1023. Id at 691 (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1971) (mistake does not
invalidate stop if officers had good faith belief)).
1024. 658 F.2d at 691. The court stated that in executing the warrant, the agents could stop
the vehicle in which they reasonably believed O'Connor was a passenger. Id
1025. Id The Government contended that the limited questioning was permissible under
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Ninth Circuit held that Kindt was clearly justified in asking Davis
whether he had come from O'Connor's room, if only to determine
whether Kindt had followed the wrong person. After learning that Da-
vis had come from O'Connor's room, Kindt was justified in asking
more questions, particularly in view of the cab's evasive route.
10 26
In United States v. Allen,1027 the Ninth Circuit sustained the pro-
priety of the stop of an offshore vessel, the Cigale, involved in a night-
time drug smuggling operation.0 2 The court concluded that probable
cause to stop the ship and arrest the crew existed on either of two
grounds: (1) the Coast Guard had maintained radar contact with the
ship, the helicopter crew that stopped the ship was in radio contact with
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The O'Connor court stated that a Terry stop may be
grounded on a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is either occurring or contemplated.
Furthermore, the court noted that such a detention requires a "lesser quantum of evidence
than the probable cause [showing] necessary for an arrest." Id (citing United States v.
Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1979) (sheriffs lawfully in area while investigating de-
fendant's suspicious behavior, not conducting a search when they looked through window of
car parked on public street where defendant had been sitting before patrol car approached),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 (1978)).
1026. 658 F.2d at 691.
1027. 633 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981). Appellants were
convicted in federal district court of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Allen was also convicted of conspiracy to
import marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id at
1286.
1028. Id at 1291-92. Defendant Allen purchased a ranch on the coast near Coos Bay,
Oregon. Customs Bureau Officer Gano soon received complaints from local residents who
had been denied access to the ocean across the Allen ranch. Allen's predecessor had always
granted access to the ocean. Gano checked Allen's background and suspected that the ranch
might be a drug smuggling base. After Gano observed that the ranch was not being used for
farming and that Allen's hands were not calloused, Gano's suspicions were aroused, and the
ranch was put under surveillance. Id at 1286-87. The surveillance revealed a significant
increase in vehicular traffic on the ranch. Gano strongly suspected that a conspiracy to
import marijuana was underway and set up a contingency plan for hindering the operation.
Id The surveillance team observed light signals transmitted between the beach and the
vessel offshore. An amphibious vehicle was seen headed to the ship, and the government
moved to foil the operation. Soon the beach and ranch were swarming with government
personnel, and the Coast Guard ordered the Cigale, the offshore vessel, to stop and identify
itself. Boxes were thrown overboard, and the Cigale's crew abandoned ship. The Coast
Guard seized documents from the ship and retrieved 174 boxes from the water, two of which
had burst, revealing marijuana. Id at 1287. Police on shore stopped defendant Kollander,
who was sitting in a field a few miles from the beach, and noticed that he was wet and had a
bulge in his pocket. An officer frisked Kollander, found a pair of pliers similar to ones seen
at the ranch, and arrested him. Id at 1288. Shortly after the unloading of boxes from the
Cigale in amphibious vehicles, defendant Kerr was arrested while walking on the highway
and wearing a full skindiver's wetsuit. Allen was arrested when seen emerging from some
bushes approximately 37 hours after the suspects fled from the beach. Id Allen was frisked,
handcuffed, and arrested solely on the suspicion engendered by his presence in the area. Id
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the beach units, the ship had been unloaded, and there was activity on
the beach, including flight of the suspects; 10 29 and (2) even without the
three-way contact with the ship, the ship's furtive nighttime unloading
had already been established.0 30 The Cigale's presence in the area jus-
tified the Coast Guard stopping it for questioning.' 0 3' When the crew
of the Cigale failed to respond to Coast Guard communications, and
was observed throwing boxes overboard, the reasonable suspicion to
stop the ship ripened into probable cause to search and arrest.
0 32
H. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree
To effectuate the fundamental constitutional guarantees embodied
in the fourth amendment, evidence seized during an unlawful search is
generally inadmissible against the victim of the search. This exclusion-
ary prohibition applies equally to the indirect as well as the direct fruits
of such intrusions. An exception to the rule is created when the con-
nection between the illegal conduct of the officers and the evidence
sought to be suppressed has become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint.
0 33
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of attenua-
tion in Taylor v. Alabama,'°34 and held that the defendant's confession
should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. 0 35  The
1029. Id at 1292.
1030. Id
1031. Id (citing United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979) (stop and board-
ing of vessel after dark must be for cause or conducted pursuant to administrative standards
which do not leave the decision to search solely at the discretion of the Coast Guard officer);
United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1979) (Coast Guard justified in stop-
ping vessel off coast of Colombia with support boats nearby, where crew members beckoned
Coast Guard cutter for over six hours, one crew member jumped overboard and swam to
cutter and merchant vessel remained dead in water and rejected offers of assistance); United
States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1977) (brief detention of yacht upheld where
vessel not documented and had lines dragging in water which constituted a safety hazard),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978)).
1032. 633 F.2d at 1292. The court also fount that the officers had probable cause to arrest
defendants Kollander and Kerr because of.their appearance in light of the circumstances.
Id The court observed that Kerr was apprehended wearing a wet suit shortly after the
Cigale had been unloaded. Kollander's wet clothes and noticeable bulge in his pocket pro-
vided reasonable suspicion for the frisk. Id (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111-12 (1977) (upholding propriety of search after officer observed bulge in defendant's
jacket); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), see supra note 1027)). The court, however,
found Allen's arrest illegal even though there was probable cause to arrest him, because the
police did not know the suspect they had arrested was Allen until after the arrest occurred.
633 F.2d at 1292.
1033. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963).
1034. 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
1035. Id at 694.
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police had received a tip that the defendant was involved in a grocery
store robbery, but the tip was insufficient to give the police probable
cause to obtain a warrant or to arrest the defendant. Nevertheless, the
defendant was arrested without a warrant in connection with the rob-
bery and advised of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona. °3 6
At the police station he was questioned, fingerprinted, advised again of
his Miranda rights, and placed in a line-up. Although the robbery vic-
tims were unable to identify him, the defendant was told that his finger-
prints matched those on some of the items involved in the robbery.
Thereafter, an arrest warrant was filed. The defendant was allowed to
visit with his girlfriend and a male companion for approximately ten
minutes. He then signed a waiver-of-rights form and executed a writ-
ten confession. This occurred approximately six hours after his arrest.
On trial for robbery, the defendant moved to have the waiver form
and the confession suppressed. He argued that his warrantless arrest
was not supported by probable cause, that he had been involuntarily
transported to the police station, and therefore the confession was
tainted and must be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. 10 37 The
trial court admitted the waiver and confession into evidence, and the
defendant was convicted. The defendant's conviction was reversed on
appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. That court held
that the evidence should not have been admitted. The Alabama
Supreme Court reversed that decision. On writ of certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed the
Alabama Supreme Court and remanded the case.
The Court found the instant case to be a "virtual replica" of two
earlier Supreme Court decisions, Brown v. Illinois1° 3' and Dunaway v.
New york.10 39 Both cases held that a confession obtained after an ille-
gal arrest was inadmissable as evidence unless intervening events break
the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession so
that the confession is "'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the pri-
1036. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1037. 457 U.S. at 689.
1038. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). In Brown, the defendant was unlawfully arrested without a
warrant or probable cause in connection with a murder investigation. Two hours later, while
in custody, he made two inculpatory statements. The Court held that the statements were to
be excluded as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Id at 605.
1039. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, the defendant was unlawfully arrested without a
warrant or probable cause in connection with an attempted robbery and homicide. The
defendant made statements and drew sketches incriminating himself. The Court held that
the statements and sketches were to be suppressed. Id at 219.
1983]
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mary taint.' 10 Several factors to be considered in determining
whether a confession has been purged of the primary taint of the illegal
arrest are: the temporal proximity of the confession to the arrest, the
presence of any intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct.1°41
Initially, the Court held that although the confession was volun-
tary for purposes of the fifth amendment because the Miranda warn-
ings were given and understood, that by itself was not sufficient to
purge the taint of the illegal arrest."w 2 The Court found the State's
contentions regarding the temporal proximity of the confession to the
arrest unpersuasive. 1043 The State argued that the time between the
arrest and the confession was six hours, whereas in Brown and Duna-
way the confessions were obtained within two hours. °44 The Court
held that the difference of a few hours was insignificant, since during
that time the defendant was in police custody without counsel and was
being interrogated, fingerprinted, and subjected to a line-up.1° 5 The
elapsed time, by itself, was not proof that the confession was an act of
free will sufficient to purge the taint.1
46
The State also pointed to several intervening events that it con-
tended were sufficient to break the causal connection between the con-
fession and the unlawful arrest. 147 The defendant was given Miranda
warnings three times while in custody. The Court reiterated that even
though the confession was voluntary, in the sense that the Miranda
warnings were given and understood, that did not purge the taint of the
illegal arrest.' 8 The defendant was also permitted to visit briefly with
his girlfriend and a neighbor before he confessed. Immediately after
the visit, the defendant recanted prior statements that he knew nothing
of the robbery, but signed a confession. The defendant testified that his
girlfriend was very upset during the visit. The Court held that the State
1040. 457 U.S. at 690 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)); citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 217).
1041. 457 U.S. at 690 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04; Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. at 218).
1042. 457 U.S. at 690. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603; Dunaway v. New York, 422
U.S. at 217. The Court stated that fifth amendment voluntariness was merely a threshold
requirement for a fourth amendment analysis. Miranda warnings do not cure all fourth
amendment violations, because this would reduce the constitutional guarantee against un-
lawful searches and seizures to a mere form of words. 457 U.S. at 690.
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did not demonstrate how this visit served to assist the defendant to
"consider carefully and objectively his options and to exercise his free
will."
10 4 9
The State also argued that the filing of the arrest warrant after the
defendant had been arrested and while he was being interrogated was
another significant intervening act. 1050 The Court rejected this argu-
ment, however, stating that the filing of the arrest warrant was irrele-
vant to whether the confession was the fruit of the illegal arrest.' 051
The fingerprint exemplar, which was itself a tainted fruit of the illegal
arrest,'0 52 was used to extract the confession from the defendant. 1053
The Court found that the fingerprints did not constitute sufficient atten-
uation to break the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the
confession merely because they also formed the basis for the arrest
warrant. 1054
Lastly, the State argued that Brown and Dunaway should not be
followed because the lack of flagrant or purposeful police misconduct
rendered those cases inapposite. 1055 The Court rejected that conten-
tion, holding that the unlawfulness of the initial arrest was not cured by
the fact that the police did not physically abuse or threaten the defend-
ant, or because the confession may have been voluntary for purposes of
the fifth amendment. 10 56 The Court refused to adopt a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule10 57 and determined that the defend-
ant's confession should have been suppressed as the tainted fruit of the
illegal arrest.
0 58
The dissenting justices felt that although the majority correctly
1049. Id
1050. Id at 692. The arrest warrant was filed on the basis of a match between the defend-
ant's fingerprints and those found on some grocery items handled during the robbery.
1051. Id, distinguishing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972), where the act of
bringing the defendant before a committing magistrate, with counsel, to advise him of his
rights and set bail, was held to be a sufficient intervening act to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful arrest from a subsequent line-up identification. In contrast, the arrest warrant
in Taylor was filed ex parte, and the informal nature of that proceeding proved insufficient
to purge the taint of the illegal arrest.
1052. 457 U.S. at 693 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints ex-
cluded as the product of an unlawful detention)).




1057. Id The good faith exception, where it has been explicitly recognized, provides that
evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where that evidence was discov-
ered by the officers acting in good faith and in a reasonable, though mistaken, belief that
they were authorized to take those actions.
1058. Id at 694.
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stated the controlling law, it misinterpreted the facts of the case.10 59
The dissent's analysis focused on several factors which they felt collec-
tively broke the connection between the confession and the illegal ar-
rest so as to overcome the taint. 0 60 The first significant factor was that
subsequent to the arrest, the defendant received and acknowledged
three separate Miranda warnings 103 Secondly, the police conduct did
not involve any abuse or intimidation calculated to cause fright or con-
fusion. °62 Most importantly, the defendant's visit with his girlfriend
and neighbor "plainly" constituted an intervening event, followed im-
mediately by his confession."' Finally, the defendant spent most of
the time between his arrest and confession by himself. The dissent
concluded that the defendant's confession was not proximately caused
by his arrest, but rather followed from a knowledgeable decision freely
made after discussion with his friends.1064 Therefore, the dissent found
it "obvious" that there was no sufficient basis on which to overturn the
trial court's finding that the confession was purged of the taint of the
illegal arrest. 1065
The Ninth Circuit dealt with the issue of attenuation in United
States v. Hooton.' 6 In Hooton, the court held there was sufficient at-
tenuation between the police misconduct and the live-witness testi-
mony to purge the taint of an illegal search.10 67 Police officers searched
Hooton's apartment pursuant to a state search warrant 10 68 and seized
index cards listing gun transactions. These were forwarded to agents of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), who began an
investigation of Hooton for possible firearms violations. They inter-
viewed several of the people whose names were listed on the index
cards. The agents did not show the witnesses any of the records seized
during the search, nor did they refer to the information contained
therein. The defendant unsuccessfully moved at trial to suppress the
1059. Id at 697. See id at 695 and n.2.
1060. Id at 699-700. "The Court's failure to consider the circumstances of this case as a
whole may have contributed to its erroneous conclusion." Id at 700 n.7.
1061. Id at 699.
1062. Id at 699-700.
1063. Id at 700.
1064. Id at 701.
1065. Id at 700. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion.
1066. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982).
1067. Id at 632-33.
1068. The search was conducted at night, in direct violation of a warrant authorizing only
a daytime search.
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witnesses' testimony. 0 69
On appeal from a conviction for engaging in the business of deal-
ing in firearms without a federal license, 1070 the defendant argued that
the precedent relied on by the trial court, United States v. Ceccolini, 7'
was inapplicable to his case.1 72 Ceccolini set forth three factors to be
considered when applying the exclusionary rule to live-witness testi-
mony: (1) the length of the chain connecting the fourth amendment
violation to the testimony of the witness; (2) the amount of free will the
witness exercised in testifying; and (3) whether exclusion of the chal-
lenged testimony would prevent the witness from testifying about any
relevant and material facts.
10 73
The defendant first contended that the officers who searched his
apartment were looking for the documents ultimately seized, and there-
fore suppression of the witnesses' testimony would have a significant
deterrent effect upon that type of conduct. 0 74 The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that the officers did not conduct the search with the
intent of finding evidence of a federal firearms offense, and that the
search warrant did not authorize them to conduct such a search.
0 75
Therefore, as in Ceccolini, suppression of the testimony would not
serve an appreciable deterrent effect.1
0 76
The defendant also contended that the path from the unlawful
search to the witnesses was uninterrupted, and that the witnesses did
not testify voluntarily. 0 77 The court stated that to determine whether a
significant attenuation between an illegal search and the testimony of a
witness exists, the effect of the search on the witness' free will must be
assessed. 0 78 If the illegal search did not induce the witness' coopera-
1069. Id at 630-31.
1070. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, except a.. . licensed dealer, to engage in the business of importing. . . or dealing
in firearms.. .. "
1071. 435 U.S. 268 (1978). In Ceccolini, the illegal search of an envelope in the defendant's
flower shop led to the discovery of a key witness in the defendant's perjury trial. The wit-
ness was not interviewed until four months after the illegal search occurred, and willingly
testified at trial. The Court held that the degree of attenuation between the illegal search
and the witness' testimony was sufficient to dissipate the taint. Id at 279-80.
1072. 662 F.2d at 632.
1073. 435 U.S. at 275-77.
1074. 662 F.2d at 632.
1075. Id.
1076. Id
1077. Id Hooton contended that the illegally seized material prompted the federal investi-
gation and identified potential witnesses. Further, he argued that the witnesses' appearance
at trial was compelled by subpoena.
1078. Id
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tion, the testimony will not be suppressed even though the search was
one step in a series of events that led to the witness testifying. 79 The
factors the court considered were the stated willingness of the witness
to testify, the role the illegally-seized evidence played in gaining the
witness' cooperation, the proximity between the unlawful conduct, the
witness' decision to cooperate and the actual testimony at trial, and the
police motive in conducting the search. 080 The court held that the
tainted index cards were not used to coerce or induce the witnesses to
testify at trial. 10 8 1 The witnesses had time to think over their responses
and voluntarily chose to make statements to the agents. At no time
before they testified were they aware of the contents of the index cards.
Therefore, the illegally-seized evidence played no part in securing the
witnesses' cooperation. 0 8 2 Further, the initial interviews with the wit-
nesses took place several months after the search and the testimony at
trial occurred almost three years later. 0 83 Lastly, the police conducted
the search to obtain stolen firearms and documents that would indicate
who controlled the areas searched, not evidence of federal firearms of-
fenses.10 84 The court held there was a sufficient attenuation between
the illegal nighttime search and the live-witnesses' testimony, and
therefore the testimony was properly admitted. 08 5
In United States v. Martell,10 86 the Ninth Circuit held that the
seized evidence was not the fruit of an unlawful arrest and was there-
fore not tainted.10 87 Defendants were detained in the San Diego air-
port for twenty minutes while agents sent for a narcotics detector dog to
inspect defendants' luggage. The dog alerted to the defendants' suit-
1079. Id (citing United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir.) (connection be-
tween the illegal search of a motel room, leading to the discovery of the identity of a witness,
and the witness' testimony at trial sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 928 (1980)).
1080. 662 F.2d at 632 (citing United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d at 752).
1081. 662 F.2d at 632.
1082. Id
1083. Id at 633.
1084. Id
1085. Id The court summarily rejected Hooton's contention that Ceecolini applied only to
"good citizen" witnesses who were acting out of civic duty, citing United States v. Leonardi,
623 F.2d 746, 750-52 (2d Cir.) (unindicted co-conspirator testifying pursuant to a plea bar-
gain), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th
Cir. 1980) (testifying pursuant to a grant of immunity); and United States v. Stevens, 612
F.2d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1979) (co-conspirator testifying pursuant to a plea bargain), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Hooton's conviction was affirmed.
1086. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981).
1087. Id at 1361.
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cases and a search warrant was issued. The search revealed a large
quantity of cocaine, and the defendants were arrested.
On appeal from their conviction for conspiring 10 88 to possess co-
caine with intent to distribute, 10 89 the defendants contended that the
twenty-minute detention constituted an illegal arrest and therefore the
cocaine seized should have been suppressed as the fruit of the illegal
arrest.1090 The court rejected defendants' argument, holding that the
detention of the defendants' suitcases was lawful'0 9' and that therefore
the evidence seized from the suitcases was not tainted.
10 92
The court reasoned that even if the detention of the defendants
was an unlawful arrest, it would have no effect on the admissibility of
the evidence seized from the suitcases. 1093 The detention of the defend-
ants did not contribute in any way to the search and seizure of the
narcotics. Because the agents did not interrogate the defendants during
the detention, they gained nothing that they had not already known
from the outset. 10 94 The Ninth Circuit stated that evidence is to be eval-
uated depending upon whether it was obtained before or after the de-
tention became unlawful.' °95 Therefore, this evidence was not tainted
1088. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable. .. ."
1089. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess
with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance."
1090. 654 F.2d at 1358.
1091. Id at 1360. The court initially noted the conceptual difference between the deten-
tion of the defendants personally and the detention of their suitcases. The court focused
upon the seizure of the suitcases, and held that detaining the suitcases for twenty minutes
based upon a reasonable suspicion was lawful. Probable cause arose when the detector dog
alerted to the suitcases, and the warrant was then issued. "In our view such a detention
under these facts does not offend constitutional standards." Id at 1358-60.
1092. Id at 1358. The court relied on two factually similar cases: United States v. Klein,
626 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 970 (1981). In both cases reasonable suspicion as to the suitcases existed from the
beginning of the detention, and the suspects were not interrogated during the detention of
the suitcases. Detector dogs alerted to the suitcases, and in neither Klein nor Viegas were the
suitcases opened or searched until after search warrants had been obtained. Both circuits
affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d at
27; United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d at 46.
1093. 654 F.2d at 1361.
1094. Id
1095. Id at 1362 (citing United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980) (state-
ments made by defendant before detention ripened into an unlawful arrest held admissible,
while those made afterwards were excluded), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981); United States
v. Mayes, 524 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975) (contraband seized pursuant to information given to
an officer before detention turned into an illegal arrest held admissible); United States v.
Klein, 626 F.2d at 22 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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and was properly admitted by the trial court. 0 96
In United States v. Hammond, °97 evidence sought to be sup-
pressed was also held to be untainted. 0 98 The defendant was arrested
in connection with a bank robbery. He was identified by two of the
bank tellers involved in the robbery and subsequently confessed to hav-
ing robbed the bank. 0 99
On appeal from his conviction for bank robbery, I °" the defendant
contended that his confession and the identification testimony of the
two tellers should have been suppressed as fruits of an illegal arrest and
an unconstitutional show-up identification. 0' The court rejected the
defendant's contentions, holding that probable cause existed for the ar-
rest, thereby rendering it lawful. 0 2 Additionally, the show-up identifi-
cations were reliable, and therefore admissible as evidence.,10 3 Thus,
the court held that the admission of the confession and the identifica-
tion testimony of both witnesses was proper, as none were fruits of any
unlawful activity.' °
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
1. Custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda
Miranda warnings are required in cases of custodial interroga-
1096. 654 F.2d at 1363, affirming the convictions.
1097. 666 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1982).
1098. Id at 440.
1099. Id at 437.
1100. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, by force and vio-
lence ... takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another any property or
money or any other thing of value belonging to ... any bank ... Shall be fined ..
1101. 666 F.2d at 438-39.
1102. Id at 439. See supra section on Investigative Stops.
1103. Id at 439-40. The reliability of a witness' identification is determined based on:
"(I) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation." Id at 440 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite,
432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977)). The defendant spent several minutes in the bank, looking
around and generally acting in a suspicious manner. One of the tellers noticed the defend-
ant and activated the bank's surveillance cameras. Both tellers had an opportunity to ob-
serve the robber from a distance of only a few feet. Although the tellers had not given prior
descriptions of the robbers, the identification of the defendant occurred only one week after
the robbery, with a sufficiently high level of certainty to provide reasonable assurances of
reliability. 666 F.2d at 440.
1104. Id
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tion.I0o- For the purposes of Miranda, a custodial interrogation occurs
when a person is interrogated by the police while in custody at a station
house, or otherwise deprived of freedom in any significant way.
1' 0 6
The Ninth Circuit examined the meaning of custody in United
States v. Leyva.1 17 Two Secret Service agents went to the defendant's
home, identified themselves, and asked her questions about a check
forgery. The agents told her that she was not under arrest, was not
going to be arrested, and that any interview given would be purely vol-
untary. The defendant allowed them to enter her kitchen. Upon ques-
tioning, she admitted her guilt and signed a sworn statement written
out by the agents." 0  No Miranda warnings were given to the defend-
ant because the agents did not believe she was in custody. At trial, the
defendant moved to suppress her confession on the grounds that she
was entitled to but did not receive a Miranda warning. The district
court denied her motion and held that she was not in custody at the
time of her confession.
1109
The Ninth Circuit noted the trial court's application of the objec-
tive reasonable person standard in determining whether a defendant
was in custody at the time of making incriminating statements,"' 0 the
sufficiency of which was the substance of the defendant's appeal."
The defendant claimed that the trial court acted in error by not consid-
ering her lack of familiarity with the English language, or her lack of
1105. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
1106. Id See also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). In
Mathiason, the defendant voluntarily came to the police station at the request of an officer.
The police assured him that he was not under arrest and, after police made false statements
linking him to the crime, he confessed. The Supreme Court held that the defendant was not
in custody and therefore Miranda warnings were not necessary.
1107. 659 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982).
1108. Defendant contended that she was forced to forge the checks by her ex-husband. Id
at 119.
1109. Id
1110. Id at 119-20. The Ninth Circuit first established the use of the objective reasonable
person standard in Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969). The court held that
if a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he or she was not free to
leave, or to insist that the officers leave, then that person is in custody and entitled to a
Miranda warning. Id at 1397. Lowe articulated factors to be considered in applying this
standard: the language used by the officers in summoning the person; the physical sur-
roundings; the extent to which the person is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and the
extent of pressure exerted to detain the person. Id See also United States v. Luther, 521
F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 646 (9th
Cir. 1978).
1111. 659 F.2d at 119-20.
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formal education, 1112 when it determined that she was not in cus-
tody.11 13 Because the record amply supported a finding that the de-
fendant had no difficulty understanding the English language, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the basis for the defendant's claim was irrele-
vant to the district court's application of the objective reasonable per-
son standard." 14
In United States v. Booth ,"" the Ninth Circuit examined whether
the defendant was in custody at the time of his incriminating state-
ments, and whether the questioning itself constituted interrogation. A
police officer stopped the defendant because he matched a broadcast
description of a bankrobber. The officer conducted a pat-down search
for weapons and told the defendant there had been a hold-up and that
he fit the description of the suspect. Although the pat-down revealed
no weapons, the officer put the defendant in handcuffs and called for a
back-up unit. Without giving any Miranda warnings, the officer, while
waiting for the back-up, asked the defendant his name, address, age, if
he had any identification, if he had been arrested before, and what he
was doing in the area. At trial, the district court excluded the defend-
ant's statements to the officer concerning why he was in the area and if
he had been arrested before, and ordered the indictment dismissed
without prejudice.'116
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that custody is determined by
reviewing the totality of the facts involved at the time of the alleged
restraint, and reiterated the factors to be considered when applying the
objective reasonable person standard.' "17 It upheld the district court's
finding that the defendant had been in custody, based on its conclusion
that the district judge had not committed clear error in finding there to
be a custodial situation."' 8 The court stressed that handcuffing a sus-
pect does not necessarily indicate custody, since "[s]trong but reason-
1112. The defendant, a 36 year old Spanish-American woman, had lived all but four years
of her life in the United States, but attended school only through the fifth grade. Id at 119.
1113. The trial court believed that to consider these factors would be inconsistent with the
objective standard established by the Ninth Circuit. Id at 120.
1114. Id The court stated that in a proper case, educational background and an ability to
understand English may be relevant factors in determining whether a person was in custody.
Id
1115. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
1116. Id at 1234-35.
1117. See supra note 1110.
1118. The court stated that "testing the reaction of a reasonable person is nearly identical
to the standard applied to the issue of negligence, which is reviewable pursuant to the clearly
erroneous standard in almost all the circuits." 669 F.2d at 1236 (citing Miller v. United
States, 587 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1978)). Therefore, the court held that their review of this
issue should be by the clearly erroneous standard.
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able measures to insure the safety of the officers or the public can be
taken without necessarily compelling a finding that the suspect was in
custody."" 1 9 In this case, however, the defendant was told he fit the
description, was searched for weapons, handcuffed, and heard the of-
ficer request a back-up unit. A reasonable person in this situation
could have concluded that he was not free to leave after brief
questioning.'
1 20
Having decided that the defendant was in custody, the court next
addressed the issue of whether the police questioning rose to the level
of interrogation. As with custody, the Ninth Circuit insisted that this
determination be made on a case by case basis using an objective rea-
sonable person standard.'1 21 The court noted that interrogation does
not occur if the question asked is "objective" or if it was not asked in
an attempt to elicit evidence of a crime. Questions are often asked
which do not relate to the crime or the person's participation in it.
Thus, the routine gathering of background biographical data ordinarily
will not constitute interrogation."
22
However, the Booth court also recognized that such an objective
standard presents the potential for abuse by law enforcement officials.
Even a facially neutral question might provoke an incriminating re-
sponse. Accordingly, the court held that the ultimate test is "whether,
in light of all the circumstances, the police should have known that a
question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect.""123 Thus, the court determined that questions pertaining
to Booth's identity, age, and residence were not likely to elicit an in-
criminating response, while questions relating to his prior arrest record
and his reason for being in the area clearly constituted interrogation,
and could not be asked absent the safeguards provided by Miranda. 124
1119. 669 F.2d at 1236.
1120. Id. The court recognized that the scope of justifiable questioning during a custodial
interrogation and an investigative stop are similar issues, but stated that a Miranda warning
is necessary to protect a suspect in custody against inherent psychological pressures. Id. at
1237. However, voluntary or spontaneous statements by a suspect in custody are admissible
even without a prior Miranda warning. Id (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478).
1121. 669 F.2d at 1237-38. The court stated that because the test is an objective one, the
subjective intent of an officer's action is relevant, but not conclusive. Id at 1238 (citing
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)).
1122. 669 F.2d at 1238.
1123. Id
1124. Id at 1238-39. The court stated that questions concerning Booth's prior arrests
clearly sought an incriminating response. As to questions regarding Booth's presence in the
area, the court stated that a reasonable police officer should have realized that the response
would be either a denial, an admission, or an alibi, any of which might later be used against
the suspect. Id at 1238.
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In United States v. Bautista,1125 the Ninth Circuit held that because
the defendants were not in custody during police questioning, the fail-
ure to give them Miranda warnings did not require suppression of the
defendants' statements. 1126 Based on police radio descriptions of two
bank robbers, two officers stopped the defendants, frisked and hand-
cuffed them127 The officers separated the defendants by about 30 feet
for questioning about their identity, their reason for being in the neigh-
borhood, and who they knew in the neighborhood. The defendants
gave inconsistent and suspicious answers. The officers arrested them
after comparing the contradictory responses. The defendants were then
taken to the police station, searched, and given Miranda warnings.
During the search, police found several bills taken from the bank, and
the defendants later confessed to the crime." 28  The defendants
claimed that they had been in full custody during the questioning on
the street, and that all statements made during the stop or later at the
station should be suppressed because the officers did not advise them of
their Miranda rights."
12 9
The Ninth Circuit stated that Miranda warnings must be given
when a suspect has been taken into custody or when the questioning is
done in a "police dominated or compelling atmosphere."'" 30 However,
the court continued to hold that Terry stops, while inherently some-
what coercive, usually do not involve the compelling atmosphere that
necessitates the giving of Miranda warnings.'"I Therefore, the court
insisted that it is necessary to look to several factors to determine if a
1125. 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1206 (1983).
1126. 1d at 1292.
1127. The officers later stated during the suppression hearing that the defendants were
handcuffed because: (1) they were believed to be the suspects; (2) tracks were noticed on
their arms that indicated narcotics use; and (3) they seemed extremely nervous and one of
them looked as if he was thinking of running. Id at 1288.
1128. Id at 1288.
1129. Id at 1291.
1130. Id at 1291 (citing United States v. Wilson, 666 F.2d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir.), vacated,
681 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.), resubmitted and decided, 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976)).
1131. 684 F.2d at 1291. See generaly Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977):
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive
aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law
enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a
crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to eve-
ryone whom they question .... [Warnings are required only where there has
been such a restriction on a person's freedom to render him 'in custody.'
See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966): "Our decision is not intended to
hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime .... General on-
the-scene questioning ... is not affected by our holding."
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suspect has been placed in such a compelling atmosphere as to amount
to custody. 1132 Using the objective reasonable person test,"1 33 the Bau-
tista court found that the lower court's determination that defendants
were not placed in custody at the time of the separate questioning was
not clearly erroneous. 1134 The officers did not confront the defendants
with evidence of their guilt, nor could their language towards the de-
fendants, the physical surroundings during the questioning, or the
length of the stop be considered coercive within the meaning of Mi-
randa. 1135 However, unlike a routine Terry stop, the defendants in this
case were handcuffed. The court held that this factor did not dictate a
finding of custody. "Strong but reasonable measures to insure the
safety of the officer or the public can be taken without necessarily com-
pelling a finding that the suspect was in custody."' 1136 Because the de-
fendants were not in custody during the separate questioning, their
Miranda claim failed. The court, therefore, held that the police con-
ducted a valid investigatory stop followed by a valid arrest."
1 37
In United States v. Thierman,"38 the Ninth Circuit held that police
conduct after Thierman's arrest did not constitute interrogation in vio-
lation of Miranda, because it was not reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response.' 13 9 Police stopped Thierman, handcuffed him,
and after giving him Miranda warnings, questioned him about a credit-
card fraud and several post office burglaries. Thierman agreed to an-
swer only certain questions. A search of his apartment pursuant to a
warrant turned up incriminating evidence, but police could not find
over $100,000 in money orders taken from the burglarized post offices.
A police detective told Thierman that they would talk to his family and
frien:ds, including his girl friend, if he did not help locate the stolen
money orders. Thierman replied, "Can we talk about it tomorrow?"
1132. The Bautista court cited several factors enumerated in United States v. Booth, 669
F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981), to be used in determining whether a suspect had been placed
in custody: "the language used by the officer to summon the individual, the extent to which
he or she is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation,
the duration of the detention and the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual."
684 F.2d at 1292.
1133. The Bautista court used the "reasonable person" standard set out in Booth, 669 F.2d
at 1235: "Based upon a review of all the pertinent facts, the court must determine whether a
reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief question-
ing he or she would not be free to leave." 684 F.2d at 1292.
1134. 684 F.2d at 1292.
1135. Id.
1136. Id (citing United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1137. 684 F.2d at 1292.
1138. 678 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982).
1139. Id at 1336-37.
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He then asked to speak to his attorney. The detective immediately
stopped questioning him and said to another officer, "That's it. . .let's
go to the girl."'" 140 At that point, Thierman unsuccessfully attempted to
negotiate a deal, 14 1 and then called his attorney who advised
Thierman to remain silent until their meeting the next morning.
Thierman told the police he would say no more that night, and one
detective then left to question the girlfriend. The remaining officers
discussed, in Thierman's presence, the necessity of contacting
Thierman's family and friends and added that it was too bad that the
girlfriend had to become involved. Shortly thereafter, Thierman indi-
cated that he did not want to get anybody into trouble, especially his
girlfriend, and told the police the location of the money orders. He was
taken to the station where he made a taped confession.1 42 Later, how-
ever, Thierman testified that his statement was coerced by police
threats to interrogate his girlfriend. The trial court refused to suppress
the confession, stating that the police officers' comments after
Thierman invoked the fifth amendment were less evocative than those
in Rhode Island v. Znnis, 1 143 and thus did not constitute
interrogation. 144
On appeal, Thierman claimed that his Miranda rights were vio-
lated because he was interrogated after he invoked his right to counsel,
as well as after he asserted his right to remain silent."1 45 The Ninth
1140. Id at 1332.
1141. Id at 1332-33. Thierman offered to turn the money orders over in the morning if his
girlfriend was left alone, and if police promised not to prosecute the person who had them.
When informed that a United States Attorney would only consider a recommendation by
the police that the person not be prosecuted, Thierman said he wanted to call his attorney.
Id
1142. Id at 1333.
1143. 446 U.S. 291 (1979). In Innis, a murder suspect was arrested, given Miranda warn-
ings, and put into a police car. Having been told not to question the defendant, the officers
commented on the dangerousness of the missing murder weapon. They said it would be
awful if a little handicapped girl from a nearby school should find it and hurt or kill herself.
The defendant immediately interrupted the conversation and showed the officers where the
murder weapon, a gun, was hidden. Id at 294-95. The Supreme Court defined interroga-
tion to include not only express questioning but its functional equivalent, Le., "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect." Id at 301. While this definition of interrogation focuses on the perception of
the defendant, the intent of the police is not irrelevant. Thierman, 678 F.2d at 1335 (citing
United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Thierman court cautioned
that since the Supreme Court in Inns decided that police statements that acted as "subtle
compulsion" did not amount to interrogation, the Court meant that the functional
equivalent of "interrogation" be narrowly defined. 678 F.2d at 1335.
1144. Id at 1333-34.
1145. Id at 1335.
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Circuit held that the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous and
upheld the finding that Thierman's confession was the result of an ex-
change initiated by him within the meaning of Edwards v. Arizona."46
In determining whether a question was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response, the court focused on two areas which it felt the
Supreme Court in Innis placed particular emphasis: the suspect's "pe-
culiar susceptibility" to a police appeal, and whether the police knew
the suspect was "unusually disoriented or upset."" 47
The court held that the record supported the trial court's conclu-
sion that Thierman knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to re-
main silent."4" Twice Thierman was advised of his rights and each
time he responded to certain questions while refusing to answer others.
The court found nothing in the record to indicate that the police did
not respect the subject matter limitations established by the defend-
ant." 49 Thierman then claimed that he had invoked his right to remain
silent when he asked, "Can we talk about it tomorrow?" The court
noted that such a statement was not necessarily an invocation of
Thierman's fifth amendment rights. "The question is more easily con-
strued as a mere request to postpone interrogation on a single subject
than an outright refusal to answer any more questions."' 10
The court next considered whether the officers' conversation in
1146. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). InEdwards, the Court determined that "an accused. . . having
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the po-
lice." Id at 484-85. In Thierman, the court agreed that while Thierman invoked his right to
counsel, he had reinitiated the conversation when he asked to speak to the detective again
about a possible deal. Therefore, "any subsequent interrogation that led to Thierman's con-
fession fell outside the reach of Edwards." 678 F.2d at 1334 n.2.
1147. Id. at 1335 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03). While cautioning that these are just
two factors to be used to determine the perception of the suspect, the Thierman court held
them, along with the general circumstances in which the statement was made, sufficient to
dispose of the appeal. 678 F.2d at 1335.
1148. Under Miranda, once a person indicates that he wishes to remain silent, all interro-
gation must cease. 384 U.S. at 473-74. However, the Supreme Court has rejected a literal
interpretation of Miranda, holding in later cases that the exercise of the right to remain silent
does not preclude all further questions. United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 664 (9th
Cir. 1980) (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101-04, 107 (1975) (statements obtained
after the suspect decides to remain silent are admissible where "the individual's 'right to cut
off questioning' has been 'scrupulously honored.' ")).
1149. 678 F.2d at 1335. A person in custody may selectively waive his right to remain
silent by indicating that he will respond to some questions, but not to others. Id (citing
Lopez-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 664 n.2 (9th Cir. 1980)). By simply ending the questioning, the
suspect can "control the subjects discussed, the time at which questioning occurs, and the
duration of the interrogation." d (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975)).
1150. 678 F.2d at 1336.
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front of Thierman amounted to an interrogation."15 Thierman argued
that his situation was analogous to Edwards in that the police intended
that he incriminate himself."1 52 The court, however, distinguished Ed-
wards"53 and found nothing in the record to indicate that the police
conduct in Thierman's case was any more evocative than that at issue
inInnis.11"54 Thierman then claimed that his concern for his family and
friends made him "peculiarly susceptible" to the officers' conversa-
tion. 1155  The court admitted that when dealing with the police,
Thierman continually tried to keep his friends and family out of the
investigation, and that the police did try to use that concern to get
Thierman to tell the truth. However, this was found to be a normal
concern, not one that created a "peculiar susceptibility" to psychologi-
cal pressures."
1 56
Finally, the court rejected Thierman's claim that the police knew
him to be particularly upset or disoriented as a result of the investiga-
tion. He was twice advised of his Miranda rights, allowed free move-
ment in his apartment while in custody, and had his roommate present
during most of the time. The court also placed strong emphasis on the
fact that Thierman agreed to answer certain questions while declining
to answer others. This selectivity and ability to use his Miranda rights
to negotiate with police was felt to be a strong indication that Thierman
1151. Id Thierman claimed that since a police officer stated at the suppression hearing
that he was trying to get Thierman to incriminate himself by discussing the investigation in
front of him, the police were interrogating him in violation of Miranda. Id
1152. Id at 1336 n.6. In Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), defendant was arrested and taken
to the police station where he was given his Miranda rights. After police telephoned the
county prosecutor, defendant informed them that he wanted an attorney before "making a
deal." The police immediately stopped their questioning. The next day, two detectives ap-
proached the defendant and told him that he "had" to talk to them. Defendant thereafter
confessed to the crime. The Supreme Court held that this interrogation violated Edwards'
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Id at 484-85.
1153. 678 F.2d at 1236 n.6. Unlike Edwards, the police did not reinitiate Thierman's inter-
rogation and no one told him that he "had" to talk. Rather, the court held that Thierman
reopened the dialogue after "he had carefully reflected upon the options available to him, to
discuss once again the terms of the proposed deal." Further, Edwards, unlike Thierman,
had been held in jail over night, a situation which would make custody even more coercive.
Id
1154. Id at 1336. The court felt Thierman's case to be more similar to Innis than to Ed-
wards. See supra note 1143. Because conversations were brief and only concerned the prob-
able course of investigation and the consequences of Thierman not cooperating with police,
the Thierman court declined to reverse the lower court's ruling.
1155. Id at 1336-37.
1156. Id at 1337. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Thierman was both
well educated and "quite shrewd." He was majoring in engineering and understood the
complicated post office alarm systems. Finally, he also recognized the importance of con-
sulting an attorney and of attempting to negotiate a favorable deal. Id
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was not particularly upset.' 157  Furthermore, the court held that
Thierman's actions belied his claim that he was upset beyond that
which is normally incident to an arrest. He did not confess immedi-
ately after hearing the conversation but continued to explore the possi-
bility of negotiating a deal, telling the officers that he would lead them
to the money orders if they would do it his way. He also stated that he
would go against his attorney's advice and talk to the police. 115 8 These
actions were determined not to be the actions of a person "peculiarly
upset or disoriented," and the court held that it was not clearly errone-
ous for the trial court to have found that the conversation did not con-
stitute the functional equivalent of interrogation.'
15 9
2. Confession after request for counsel
In Miranda v. Arizona,116 the Supreme Court not only established
safeguards for individuals in custody but also indicated the procedures
to be followed subsequent to giving the Miranda warnings. If the de-
fendant decides he will remain silent, "the interrogations must
cease." 1161 If he requests counsel, "the interrogations must cease until
an attorney is present."' 1 62 In Edwards v. Arizona,1163 the Court reaf-
firmed the importance of these safeguards when it held that after a de-
fendant has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, the accused cannot be subjected to further interrogation until
counsel had been made available."'
1157. Id. The only circumstances that the court felt could have indicated stress beyond
what was normally incident to arrest was the fact that Thierman had been in custody for
almost five hours when he decided to confess. However, Thierman's cooperation with police
up to this point was believed to negate any possibility of coercion. Id
1158. Id.
1159. Id The dissent argued that despite the officers' good faith actions in attempting to
uncover the truth, there simply was not a principled ground upon which to distinguish Ed-
wards. Id at 1340 (Wallace, J., dissenting). Judge Wallace came to the conclusion that the
officers' conversation in front of Thierman was of the type "that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id at 1338 (citing
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301). Accordingly, the dissent rejected the majority's
position that Thierman had reinitiated the conversation with the detective which ultimately
led to his confession. It distinguished Innis as involving only a conversation between officers
which was not meant to elicit a response from the suspect. Id at 1339-40.
1160. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1161. Id at 473-74.
1162. Id at 474.
1163. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
1164. Id at 481. In Edwards, the defendant was arrested on January 19, 1976. When the
defendant was questioned by police officers on the same day, he asserted his fifth amend-
ment right to counsel and right to remain silent. Without providing counsel, the police
returned the next morning to interrogate the defendant and told him that he had to talk with
19831
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In United States v. Skinner,' 65 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the defendant's post-arrest confessions should be suppressed
because he had requested counsel during pre-arrest questioning. In
finding Skinner's confession admissible, the Ninth Circuit held that Ed-
wards v. Arizona could be distinguished," 66 and that Skinner had vol-
untarily waived his right to counsel.
167
Skinner was questioned once on July 9 and twice on July 10 con-
cerning a murder. Before the second interview on July 10, Skinner vol-
untarily accompanied the FBI agents to the police station where he
signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and a statement that his presence
was voluntary. During the questioning, Skinner requested an attorney
before answering further questions. The agents immediately stopped
the interrogation and Skinner left the station. The next day Skinner
was arrested. On the way to the police station, Skinner confessed after
being advised of his rights and indicating that he understood them. At
the station, he was again advised of his Miranda rights, signed a waiver
form, and then confessed once again to the murder. At no time during
the post-arrest interrogation did Skinner request an attorney or request
that questioning be stopped." 68 On appeal, Skinner argued that Ed-
wards v. Arizona required his confessions to be suppressed because he
had requested counsel during the questioning on the day before his
arrest.11
69
In addressing the issue of suppression, the Ninth Circuit distin-
guished Edwards. The court noted that Skinner, unlike Edwards, had a
chance to contact a lawyer, friends, or family for advice.1 7 0 Therefore,
them. The defendant stated that he would talk to them and, after being advised of his rights,
he made several incriminating statements which were used against him at trial. Id at 478-
79. The Supreme Court held that: (I) waiver of counsel must not only be voluntary but also
be a knowing and intelligent "relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privi-
lege"; and (2) when a defendant has exercised his right to counsel during a custodial interro-
gation, a valid waiver cannot be established by showing only that the defendant responded
to police-initiated questioning, even if he has been advised of his rights. Id at 483-84. A
defendant can be subjected to further interrogation only when he initiates the communica-
tion. Id at 484-85.
1165. 667 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
1166. Id at 1309. The court distinguished Edwards on the grounds that in Edwards, the
defendant had been held in continuous custody from the time he requested an attorney until
the next day when he was told that "he had to" talk. Skinner, on the other hand, voluntarily
went to the police station, left the station after saying that he wanted to talk to a lawyer and
therefore had the opportunity to speak to counsel or obtain advice from family or friends if
he so chose. Id
1167. Id
1168. Id at 1308.
1169. Id
1170. Id at 1309. See supra note 1166.
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the post-arrest questioning and resulting confessions did not violate the
Edwards requirement that a suspect, upon expressing a desire to deal
with police solely through counsel, may not be interrogated until coun-
sel has been made available.'
1 7 1
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of whether Skinner
waived his fifth amendment rights prior to his confession. A waiver of
fifth amendment rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intel-
ligently.11 72 In each case, determination of waiver depends "upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience and conduct of the accused."11 3 The Skinner
court stated that Skinner knew that he could end the post-arrest inter-
rogation at any time by asking to meet with an attorney since he had
done so the day before. 174 Skinner also had the equivalent of a high
school diploma and spoke English fluently.1 75 The court also noted
that the agents did not coerce Skinner's confession" 176 and that he con-
fessed immediately after questioning began 177 These factors were
"strong evidence" that Skinner executed a valid waiver of his fifth
amendment rights."1
7
3. Voluntariness of statements
Miranda established procedural devices to protect a suspect's right
against self-incrimination, but did not prohibit the use of all pre-trial
statements. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any co-
ercive influences is admissible into evidence.
1 79
In United States v. Leyva,"I ° the Ninth Circuit determined that
the defendant's pre-arrest confession without a Miranda warning was
voluntary. The defendant, a 36 year old Spanish-American with a fifth
grade education, was under investigation for check forgery. During
1171. 667 F.2d at 1309.
1172. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481 (1981).
1173. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1932).
1174. 667 F.2d at 1309.
1175. Id
1176. Id
1177. Id The court's decision was also influenced by Skinner having signed a waiver form,
which it considered to be additional evidence of a valid waiver.
1178. Id
1179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When determining whether a statement is
voluntary, courts: (1) examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the admission
of the statements; and (2) determine whether the defendant's will was overborne or whether
the statement at issue is the product of a rational intellect and free will. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973); United States v. Harden, 480 F.2d 649, 650-51 (8th
Cir. 1973).
1180. 659 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982).
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questioning in her home by two Secret Service agents, the defendant
confessed to the forgeries. The agents then prepared a written state-
ment and the defendant signed and swore to it. At no time did the
agents give the defendant Miranda warnings. The defendant con-
tended on appeal that her statement was involuntary.
The Ninth Circuit found that the lower court considered all the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. section 3501(b) for determining volun-
tariness."'s  Therefore, the finding of voluntariness was not an abuse
of discretion. 1 "2 The low-key tone of the agents' interview, the fact
that the defendant felt sufficiently independent and uncoerced to tell
the agents that a question was "'none of [their] business,'" as well as
her apparent understanding of the nature of her offense, "tipped the
scale in favor of voluntariness."'
18 3
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Miller"11 4 determined that
defendant Miller's post-arrest statements incriminating his co-defend-
ants were "the product of a rational intellect and a free will,"" 85 and
1181. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) provides in full:
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consid-
eration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the
confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such
defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he
was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such de-
fendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and
that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defend-
ant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel;
and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness
of the confession.
1182. 659 F.2d at 121.
1183. Id at 120-21. While refusing to decide specifically whether lack of formal education
and unfamiliarity with the English language should be formally enumerated factors in deter-
mining existence of custody and voluntariness of a confession, the district court clearly con-
sidered these factors as part of the totality of the circumstances that compelled it to find that
Leyva understood the nature of the agents' visit. Many courts consider the defendant's sub-
stantive characteristics. See United States v. Lehman, 468 F.2d 93, 100-01 (7th Cir.) (court
considered defendant's intelligence, education, maturity, and knowledge of the implications
of a tax investigation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 967 (1972); Young v. Warden, Maryland Peni-
tentiary, 383 F. Supp. 986, 1007-08 (D. Md. 1974) (court considered defendant's youth and
lack of experience); United States ex rel Castro v. LaVallee, 282 F. Supp. 718, 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (court considered defendant's age, education, mental capacity, background
and experience). However, illiteracy alone is not sufficient to render a confession involun-
tary. See United States v. Hensley, 374 F.2d 341, 350 (6th Cir. 1967) (confession found
voluntary even though defendant plainly illiterate).
1184. 676 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 126 (1982).
1185. Id at 363 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
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thus, admissible for impeachment purposes. 1 8 6 The defendants were
convicted of conspiring to commit mail fraud and making false state-
ments to federally insured savings and loan associations, as well as on
fourteen other counts. Before trial, Miller moved to suppress state-
ments he had made to an F.B.I. agent incriminating the other defend-
ants. The district court held that the statements were obtained in
violation of Miranda and excluded them from the Government's case.
However, the Government used some of the statements to impeach
Miller on cross-examination.
On appeal, Miller claimed that the statements were inadmissible
for all purposes because they were given involuntarily." 7 The Ninth
Circuit stated that the evidence did not show that "Miller's will was
overborne, or that his statements were coerced."' 1 88 Furthermore, the
agent's statements to Miller that he would be facing a long prison term
and that the agent was thinking about employing Miller in a new busi-
ness if he exonerated himself did not render the statements
involuntary.' 1
89
1186. 676 F.2d at 364. The court noted that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
may still be used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
1187. 676 F.2d at 363. Appellants also contended that even if the statements were volun-
tary, they had been used improperly for impeachment on issues not raised on direct exami-
nation. Id The court rejected this contention, stating that Miller's direct testimony
reasonably suggested the government's inquiry. Therefore Miller's testimony led to the in-
troduction of evidence obtained in violation of Miranda Id at 364.
1188. Id It is important to note the distinction the court drew between an item suppressed
due to a Miranda violation and one suppressed due to its involuntary nature. The latter is
not admissible for any purpose. See infra note 1189. Cf. supra note 1186.
1189. 676 F.2d at 364. The Miller court compared this case with United States v. Boyce,
594 F.2d 1246, 1249-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855 (1979), to illustrate that Miller's
statements were uncoerced. Boyce was arrested for conspiring to sell information to the
Soviet Union. While in custody, Boyce was advised of his rights, and subsequently gave
written consent to a search of his car and home. He refused to sign a form waiving his
rights, yet he spoke freely about his personal background. Upon being told that his co-
conspirator had been charged and was in custody, Boyce said, "Let's talk," and signed a
waiver of rights form; he then confessed. On appeal, Boyce claimed that his confession was
involuntary because agents had subjected him to psychological pressures. The agents asked
Boyce many personal questions, and attempted to appeal to his loyalty to country and fam-
ily, but the Miranda warnings were repeated periodically. The Ninth Circuit held that while
the agents may have attempted to create an atmosphere in which it would be easier to get
information, nothing suggested that Boyce's will was overborne in any way. The court
pointed to Boyce's intelligence and his selectivity in answering questions to show that Boyce
answered voluntarily. Id at 1251.
Miller also relied, unsuccessfully, on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) in
which the Supreme Court held that the defendant's incriminating statements were not "the
product of a rational intellect and a free will." Mincey was injured in a shootout with police
and was brought to a hospital in serious condition. That evening, after being given Miranda
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In United States v. Hooton,"190 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress his allegedly invol-
untary confession was not clearly erroneous. While under investigation
by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) for unlicensed
dealing in firearms, Hooton sought immunity by identifying the source
of his illegal purchases. He and his attorney met with an ATF agent,
and they allegedly entered into an immunity agreement. After the
agent discovered that Hooton was under investigation, he arranged an
interview. At the interview, Hooton was given Miranda warnings and
both he and his attorney signed a waiver which included a "declaration
that Hooton was answering questions 'freely and voluntarily. . . with-
out any promise of reward or immunity.' ,1191
At his subsequent trial for dealing in firearms without a license,
Hooton's motion to suppress his statements made during the interview
was denied.1 92 Hooton claimed that his statements were involuntary
because he believed that they were made under a promise of
immunity.
11 93
The Ninth Circuit held that Hooton had orally waived his consti-
tutional rights. Further, Hooton had signed a statement reiterating this
waiver and explicitly stating, directly above his signature, that he was
answering questions without any promise of immunity. Finally, Hoo-
ton had signed this statement in the presence of his attorney, who also
had signed the waiver form." 94 Based upon these facts, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that denial of Hooton's motion to suppress was not clearly
erroneous.
warnings, Mincey was interrogated by a detective for four hours. Despite Mincey's repeated
attempts to refuse to answer, the detective stopped only when Mincey became unconscious.
In Mincey, the Supreme Court discussed again whether a statement is voluntary within
the meaning of Miranda. Because Mincey explicitly did not want to answer the detective,
and because he was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family and legal counsel,
and barely conscious, the Supreme Court held that Mincey's statements were not a product
of free will. Because due process requires that involuntary statements be excluded at trial,
the Court reversed and remanded.
1190. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1981).
1191. Id at 630-31.
1192. Id at 631.
1193. Id Hooton also urged the Ninth Circuit to assess the voluntariness of his statements
by making an independent examination of the record. It determined that the trial court did
not let the fact that the defendant received Miranda warnings predetermine its ruling on
defendant's motion to suppress. Rather, "[tihe trial court denied the motion only after lis-
tening to and evaluating the testimony of Hooton, [his attorney, and the ATF agent]." Id
The court then subjected the trial court's ruling on voluntariness to the "clearly erroneous"




In United States v. Ek, 1195 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
prolonged confinement without food and sleep rendered the defend-
ant's post-arrest confessions involuntary." 96  Ek had attempted to
smuggle drugs into the United States by swallowing them in capsule
form. After he went through customs at 9:00 a.m., Ek was asked to
submit to an x-ray examination. When he refused, he was informed of
his Miranda rights and taken to the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion's airport office to wait for a court order authorizing the x-ray
search. The warrant was not issued until 4:00 p.m., and when he was
finally x-rayed at 7:00 p.m., the capsules were found. Ek was then ar-
rested and again advised of his rights. He confessed to swallowing bal-
loons containing cocaine and at 8:30 p.m. was taken to the county jail
for booking. At 2:00 a.m. after again being advised of his rights, Ek
made a full confession and the next day reviewed and signed a typed
version of his confession.'
197
On appeal, Ek claimed that his post-arrest statements were invol-
untary because he had been detained for a long period without food or
sleep. 1198 While acknowledgingthat Ek's condition could have made
him susceptible to coercion, the Ninth Circuit held that he was not in
any way coerced to confess, and therefore affirmed the trial court's de-
cision not to suppress Ek's confession. 1 99
In Fritchie v. McCarthy," ' the Ninth Circuit considered whether
1195. 676 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1982) (amended opinion).
1196. In fact, Ek was not deprived of food or drink but had refused offers of food or drink,
other than accepting a sip of water. Id at 382-83.
1197. Id at 381.
1198. See supra note 1196.
1199. 676 F.2d at 383. In the absence of evidence that the defendant was intimidated by
police or that force or promises were used to elicit a confession, courts have held that being
tired and hungry does not invalidate a confession given after Miranda warnings. See United
States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 796-97 (2nd Cir.) (twenty-one hour time span between de-
fendant's arrest and his confession will not make confession involuntary where no
strategems were used to take advantage of him), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972); United
States v. Ritter, 456 F.2d 178, 179 (10th Cir. 1972) (being tired and hungry when appre-
hended will not make defendant's confession, given after Miranda warnings, involuntary if
no evidence of force, threats or promises). However, courts will examine closely the specific
facts of each case and will not hesitate to exclude confessions made under duress induced by
long confinement and lack of food and rest. See Pavkovich v. Brierley, 360 F. Supp. 275
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (defendant's confession inadmissible because he had been kept up from
8:30 a.m. to 4:30 a.m. without food or drink and was prohibited by police from calling his
family or an attorney); Pugh v. North Carolina, 238 F. Supp. 721, 724 (E.D.N.C. 1965)
(confession found involuntary where defendant held in custody for almost 10 days without
obtaining counsel, questioned intermittently during the entire period, denied sleep, and
moved from place to place).
1200. 664 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1981).
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the defendant's mental health precluded his confession from being the
product of rational intellect and free will.'2 0 Fritchie had a long his-
tory of mental illness and had been committed at least ten times to state
mental hospitals. In 1970, Fritchie committed a brutal murder in Flor-
ida in a manner strikingly similar to that which led to the California
conviction at issue here. Although he had confessed to the Florida
murder, he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. In the present
case, the California trial court found that Fritchie's confession to the
Florida murder was voluntary; thus, the confession was admissible as
character evidence to prove the common identity of the two
murders. 
202
Fritchie petitioned for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the Cali-
fornia trial court erred in admitted the 1970 Florida murder confes-
sion. 20 3 Fritchie claimed that his Florida confession was involuntary
because it was made while he was insane. The Ninth Circuit held that
the California trial court had sufficiently explored Fritchie's mental
state at the time of his Florida confession.12 4 Fritchie had taken the
Florida police to the victim's body and readily admitted guilt. He had
signed a waiver form and had written the confession in longhand. Ad-
ditionally, Fritchie wrote that he had been advised of his rights, under-
stood them, and that any statement would be made freely and
1201. Id at 213. With or without Miranda, the totality of the circumstances must show
that a confession was obtained freely, voluntarily, and with due regard to fundamental con-
cepts of fairness and due process, not just that the defendant was free from coercion or
threatening conduct. Eubanks v. Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 228 F. Supp. 888,
895 (E.D. La. 1964). In determining voluntariness, courts consistently have placed great
emphasis on the defendant's state of mind at the time the confession was made. See United
States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 554 (6th Cir. 1977) (incriminating statements made by a
crying, screaming, nineteen-year old, thrashing about in the back seat of a patrol car held
not product of free and rational choice); McHenry v. United States, 308 F.2d 700, 703 (10th
Cir. 1962) (determining if defendant, at time statement made, was in possession of "mental
freedom" to confess or deny participation in crime held to be the test for voluntariness);
United States v. Stegmaier, 397 F. Supp. 611, 616-17 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (court examined effects
of valium and other medication on defendant when determining voluntariness); Eubanks v.
Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, 228 F. Supp. 888, 889-96 (E.D. La. 1964) (obtaining
defendant's confession held denial of due process where defendant, a fifteen-year-old with a
mental age of between four and seven years, had been arrested, interrogated, and treated as
an adult, and denied the protection of counsel or family).
1202. 664 F.2d at 212.
1203. Id 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) defines the standard of review for habeas corpus petitions
and requires that the state trial court's factual determination be presumed correct unless the
federal reviewing court concludes that "the 'record in the state court proceeding, considered
as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination.'" 664 F.2d at 213. If so,
then the "'burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the
factual determination by the State court was erroneous."' 664 F.2d at 213.
1204. 664 F.2d at 213-14.
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voluntarily. The Ninth Circuit recognized that a different trial court
might disagree with the California trial court's finding of voluntariness.
However, because the California trial court's finding of voluntariness
was fairly supported by the record, the Ninth Circuit denied habeas
corpus relief.
120 5
4. Scope of the privilege
In United States v. Moore,12° the Ninth Circuit determined that
co-defendant Lembric Moore was not entitled to assert a "blanket re-
fusal" when asked to be a witness in defendant Nathaniel Moore's
trial. 120 7 When sheriffs came to search the defendants' home for stolen
mail, they discovered Nathaniel and Lembric burning it in the back-
yard. After being arrested, Nathaniel denied burning the mail and
Lembric pleaded guilty. At the conclusion of Lembric's guilty plea
hearing, Nathaniel's attorney informed the court that he wanted to call
Lembric as a witness at Nathaniel's trial. Lembric stated under oath
that if called as a witness, he would assert his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. The trial court upheld this blanket refusal,
finding that because of the potential for further prosecution, Lembric
could not be compelled to testify as a witness in Nathaniel's trial. Na-
thaniel was subsequently tried before a jury and convicted of illegal
receipt of mail.12
0 8
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred when it ac-
cepted Lembric's blanket refusal to testify. 20 9 If an answer to a ques-
tion or an explanation as to why it cannot be answered would result in
"injurious disclosure," the witness may invoke his right against self-
1205. Id at 214. The foundation for objecting to the admission of a confession on the
grounds of insanity was laid down in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). There,
the defendant had been discharged from the Army as permanently disabled by psychosis,
placed in an institution, and given medical treatment over extended periods. However, the
defendant continually escaped from the institution and committed several crimes, one of
which he confessed to when apprehended by police. The Supreme Court found that the
defendant was insane and incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed and held his con-
fession therefore to be involuntary. The Blackburn Court stated:
Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of justice is
affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being on the basis of a state-
ment he made while insane; and this judgment can without difficulty be articulated
in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational choice of the
accused, or simply a strong conviction that our system of law enforcement should
not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion.
361 U.S. at 207.
1206. 682 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1982).
1207. Id at 857.
1208. Id at 855.
1209. Id at 857.
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incrimination and refuse to testify. 210 However, the claim must be
raised in response to specific questions, not as a blanket refusal to an-
swer any question. 211 In Moore, the court held that Lembric could not
broadly assert his fifth amendment rights because nothing in the record
indicated that he could have claimed the privilege to essentially all rel-
evant questions.
2 12
A trial court may allow a blanket refusal if it determines that any
response to all possible questions would tend to incriminate the wit-
ness. 213 In Moore, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had
done nothing more than accept a statement from Lembric admitting
guilt to one count of his indictment, giving the court no special knowl-
edge of either Lembric's susceptibility to further prosecution or to the
nature of the testimony requested. 1214 However, although the district
court erroneously allowed the blanket assertion, the error was held to
be harmless and therefore did not warrant reversal of Nathaniel's
conviction. 1215
1210. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951), the Supreme Court ennunciated
the standard to be used when determining if a witness can claim a right against self-incrimi-
nation and refuse to respond to questioning:
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the
question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the ques-
tion or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim must be
governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by
the facts actually in evidence.
Id at 486-87. Even when the court is satisfied that the witness has a valid fifth amendment
claim, "the court must permit questioning to establish the scope of the witness' claim and to
determine whether there are other issues as to which the witness would not be able to assert
the privilege." United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 367 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
991 (1982) (citing United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 923 (1978)). Only in the unusual situation where a trial judge's knowledge of the case
allows evaluation of the blanket assertion of fifth amendment rights will the blanket asser-
tion be allowed to stand. See infra text accompanying note 1213.
1211. 682 F.2d at 856 (citing United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d at 741).
1212. 682 F.2d at 856-57. See also United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d at 367, and infra note
1213.
1213. 682 F.2d at 856-57. The court contrasted the situation in Moore with that in Tsui.
In Tsui, the court knew from the Government's case-in-chief that the potential defense wit-
ness "was up to his neck in criminal investigations" and that further questioning would
certainly require incriminating responses. Only in this type of situation may a witness "'le-
gitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.'" Tsui, 646 F,2d at 368 (quot-
ing United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980)).
1214. 682 F.2d at 856-57.
1215. Id at 857-58. A court only affirms when it finds that an error committed by the
lower court was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id Here, however, the court found
that because clear evidence of guilt could be found in the testimony of two sheriffs, who saw
Nathaniel burying the mail, and in the inconsistencies of Nathaniel's testimony, the trial
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5. Assertion of the privilege in federal tax returns
The privilege against self-incrimination is an absolute defense to
federal prosecution for failure to file income tax returns only in those
limited circumstances where it is validly exercised. 1 6 It does not jus-
tify an outright refusal to file a tax return. The privilege must be raised
at the time of filing, and only in response to specffc questions asked,
not to the return as a whole.
1217
In United States v. Wolters, 21 8 the Ninth Circuit examined
whether the defendant's failure to file a tax return was justified by any
fifth amendment privilege. 21 9 The defendant had failed to file income
tax returns for three years, claiming that to do so would have violated
judge's allowance of the blanket assertion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at
858.
1216. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925
(1980).
1217. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). In Sullivan, the defendant re-
fused to file income tax returns accounting for profits made from bootlegging operations. In
upholding his conviction, the Supreme Court held that because profits gained from illegal
traffic in liquor were subject to income tax, filing a tax return was required. The Court
stated that if defendant wanted to test the constitutional validity of any part of the IRS form,
then he must object to specific questions on the return. The fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does not justify a refusal to fie a return altogether. Id at 264.
In two 1980 decisions, the Ninth Circuit examined the effect of asserting the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination on federal tax returns. In United States v. Neff,
615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980), the defendant had responded
"object: self-incrimination" to more than twenty-five questions concerning his financial sta-
tus. The Ninth Circuit held that the fifth amendment was not a valid defense because the
questions did not, in and of themselves, suggest that the responses would be incriminating
and because neither the setting nor the peculiarities of the defendant's case were such as to
make the questions incriminating. Id at 1238.
In United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980),
the defendant was a tax protestor who, for two years, sent in false forms to avoid having
federal income taxes taken out of his wages. The Ninth Circuit considered whether the fifth
amendment was a defense to an I.R.C. § 7203 prosecution when asserted to avoid incrimina-
tion for a past violation of the income tax laws. The Carlson court balanced the defendant's
right against self-incrimination against the public's need for efficient revenue collection and
concluded that the purposes of the fifth amendment privilege did not require protection of
the defendant's actions, and that public interest required prosecution of the defendant. See
also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), where the Supreme Court held that a fifth
amendment claim may be made in relation to a tax return, but only when "justified by a fear
of self-incrimination other than under the tax laws." Id at 650-51 n.3.
Finally, the Carlson court considered the purpose of filing yearly tax returns. Because
the method of reporting used by IRS was developed to facilitate revenue collection and not
criminal prosecution, refusal to file a return has never been protected by the taxpayer's fifth
amendment rights. Id at 522.
1218. 656 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1981).
1219. Id. at 524.
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his first and fifth amendment rights. He was convicted of failure to file
an income tax return for the 1973 tax year.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that generally taxpayers can-
not rely on the fifth amendment as an excuse for not filing an income
tax return. 1220 While acknowledging that under certain circumstances
a taxpayer may be justified in relying on the fifth amendment to avoid
filing a return, the court held that no such circumstances had been
shown in Wolter's case.
122'
In Edwards v. Commissioner, 222 the Ninth Circuit held that dis-
missal of a tax court petition for failure to produce business records did
not violate the petitioners' fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation because there was no indication that producing the records
would subject the petitioners to criminal prosecution.1223 From 1971
through 1976, the Wolters failed to report any income from their family
business. Instead, they filed "protest type" returns, claiming fifth
amendment rights on most of the relevant entries. After a notice of
deficiency was filed and penalties assessed, they petitioned the Tax
Court for a redetermination of their tax deficiencies. The Tax Court
dismissed the case because the Wolters refused to produce the books
and records of the business. On appeal, petitioners claimed that dis-
missal for failure to produce records violated their fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination.
224
The Ninth Circuit noted that to invoke the fifth amendment as a
1220. Id See also United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), and supra note 1217.
1221. 656 F.2d at 525 (citing United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518, 522 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 US. 1010 (1980), and United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1235-39 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980)). For a case in which the circumstances were held sufficient
to justify failure to file a return based upon a fifth amendment privilege, see Garner v.
United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (defendant reported his occupation on income tax returns
as "professional gambler," and reported substantial income from "wagering").
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the defendant's claim that the probation condition
requiring that he file all past and future tax returns violated his fifth amendment rights,
However, the court found this contention to be both "fundamentally unsound" and
"groundless" because probation conditions "which impinge upon constitutional freedoms"
do not impinge upon constitutional rights. 656 F.2d at 525. See United States v. Pierce, 561
F.2d 735, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) (when defendant has pled
guilty, information may be required to be disclosed upon probation conditions unless de-
fendant raises a fifth amendment claim that disclosure could lead to prosecution of other
crimes.)
1222. 680 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1982).
1223. Id at 1270.
1224. Id Defendants also made a fourth amendment claim that dismissal of their petition
for failure to produce documents constituted both an invasion of privacy and an unlawful
search or seizure. The Ninth Circuit found this claim to be "without foundation and utterly
devoid of merit." Id
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defense to filing tax returns, "the taxpayer must be faced with substan-
tial hazards of self-incrimination that are real and appreciable," not
based upon a generalized fear. 1225 Because there was no indication that
the business records would reveal criminal actions, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the defendants' fifth amendment claim as frivolous.
1226
6. Use of post-arrest silence
If a defendant elects to remain silent after receiving Miranda
warnings at the time of his arrest, use of this silence to impeach him at
trial violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 1227  In
Doyle v. Ohio ,1228 the Supreme Court explained that post-arrest silence
following Miranda warnings is "insolubly ambiguous.' 229 Moreover, it
would be fundamentally unfair and a denial of due process to use a
defendant's silence to impeach trial testimony after implicitly guaran-
teeing that silence would carry no penalty.
1230
In United States v. Muniz,'231 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the de-
fendant's conviction despite an improper question during cross-exami-
nation concerning the defendant's post-arrest silence. After the
stabbing of a fellow prison inmate, Muniz was put in the segregation
unit, given his Miranda warnings, and received an incident report. Af-
ter receiving the report, Muniz refused to say anything about the as-
1225. Id The Ninth Circuit determined that the petitioners' claim rested upon a genera-
lized fear that if required to turn over their records, they would more likely be criminally
prosecuted for tax evasion. Id.
1226. Id The Edwards court reiterated the importance of not allowing individuals to use
the fifth amendment to evade taxes. To do so would "severely impair the Government's
ability to determine tax liability" and to raise revenue. United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d
518, 523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980).
1227. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
1228. Id In Doyle, the defendants remained silent after receiving their Miranda warnings
following their arrest. During trial, the defendants claimed they were "framed." The prose-
cutor cross-examined them about their failure to make this claim when originally arrested.
The Court held that use of the defendants' post-arrest silence in this matter violated their
due process rights. Id at 618. See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975). After
receiving Miranda warnings, Hale refused to answer questions about money found in his
possession. On cross-examination, the prosecutor caused the defendant to admit that he did
not offer the exculpatory information at the time he was arrested. The Court held that
defendant's failure to offer an explanation at the time of his arrest could easily indicate a
wish to remain silent, as opposed to supporting an inference that the explanatory testimony
was a later fabrication. Because the silence lacked any significant probative value, it was
excluded and the defendant given a new trial. Id at 177-80.
1229. 426 U.S. at 617. The very nature of the required warnings causes every post-arrest
silence to be ambiguous as the silence could be no more than the individual's exercise of his
Miranda rights. Id
1230. Id at 618.
1231. 684 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
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sault. During cross-examination at trial, Muniz was asked about this
silence. 2 32 Before any response was given, Muniz's attorney objected
to the question, and the court recessed for lunch. After the recess the
judge instructed the jury, at the Government's request, to disregard
everything that occurred five minutes before the lunch recess. Muniz
was convicted, and on appeal claimed that the Government's question
about his post-arrest silence had violated his fifth amendment right to
remain silent. 1
233
The Ninth Circuit held that the Government's question was im-
proper because Muniz was in custody and had received his Miranda
warnings. 234 However, because the trial judge had instructed the jury
to disregard the Government's line of questioning, the Ninth Circuit
held that the improper question was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 235 Muniz also argued that the Government's questions con-
cerning his silence during two other incidents prior to being placed in
the segregation unit violated his fifth amendment rights. The court
held, however, that the questioning was proper because Muniz's coun-
sel had referred to these incidents during his opening statement as well
1232. Id at 637. During the trial, the Government had established that when an inmate
receives an incident report, he can call witnesses on his behalf. The Government then asked
the following question: "With respect to the incident report that you got for the assault on
Frank Zaroite, isn't it a fact that you refused to say anything about it?" Muniz's attorney
immediately objected, and Muniz did not answer the question. The jury was then dismissed.
Id
1233. Id The Auniz court cited Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), in which the Court
stated that silence in the wake of Miranda warnings "may be nothing more than the arres-
tee's exercise of these Miranda rights." Therefore, every post-arrest silence is ambiguous
and cannot be admitted into evidence at trial. Id at 617. The Doyle court further stated
that:
[WIhile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that si-
lence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives
the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a dep-
rivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach
an explanation subsequently offered at trial.
Id at 618.
1234. 684 F.2d at 637.
1235. Id at 637-38. The Ninth Circuit stated that "the trial judge did not highlight the
question, but merely instructed the jury to disregard the entire five minutes preceeding the
recess." Id
The court also noted that Muniz's reliance on United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171
(1975), was misplaced. In Hale, the defendant was arrested for robbery. After being given
Miranda warnings, he refused to disclose where he had gotten the money found in his pos-
session. At trial, the Government forced the defendant to admit to cross-examination that
he refused to tell police about the money at the time of his arrest. Id at 174. Unlike the
defendant in Hale, Muniz's attorney raised a timely objection, and Muniz was not required
to comment on his post-arrest silence. 684 F.2d at 638.
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as on direct examination. 236
In United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez,1 237 the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the Government's cross-examination of the defendant was
not intended to impeach him based upon his post-arrest silence, but
rather inquired into his inconsistent post-arrest statement. The defend-
ant was convicted of smuggling heroin into the United States from
Mexico. After the drugs had been discovered and the defendant ar-
rested and advised of his Miranda rights, a Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA) agent questioned him about his activities in Mexico
and the identity and whereabouts of the car's owner. The responses
given by defendant turned out to be inconsistent with his trial testi-
mony. On cross-examination, the Government questioned the defend-
ant about details of his direct testimony that the defendant did not
reveal to the DEA agent upon his arrest. On appeal, the defendant
contended that his due process rights were violated by the Govern-
ment's use of his allegedly "post-arrest silence" to impeach his
testimony.1
238
The Ninth Circuit first determined that the defendant did not in-
yoke his right to remain silent after being arrested and receiving Mi-
randa warnings.1 239  Instead, the defendant made post-arrest
statements to the DEA agent which were inconsistent with the defend-
ant's trial testimony. Relying on the Supreme Court decision of Ander-
son v. Charles,"z4 the Ninth Circuit ruled that when the defendant's
1236. Id Muniz additionally argued that the Government, in its closing argument, re-
ferred to his decision to remain silent. The Ninth Circuit determined that since the cross-
examination regarding his silence was not error, any reference to these incidents during
closing argument was also not erroneous. Id at 639.
1237. 676 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 219 (1982).
1238. Id at 1284.
1239. Id at 1286.
1240. 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam). Following his arrest for murder, defendant
Charles was given his Miranda warnings and questioned about his possession of a stolen car.
At trial, however, Charles gave a conflicting version, and on cross-examination the prosecu-
tor questioned Charles about his inconsistent statement. The Supreme Court held that there
was no ambiguity in the cross-examination because the questioning included an explicit
reference to the statement made by the arresting officer who had testified only a few hours
earlier. The cross-examination was meant only to obtain an explanation for the inconsistent
statement, not to refer to Charles' exercise of his right to remain silent or to construe mean-
ing from his silence. Thus, Charles' due process rights were not violated.
The Court distinguished Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), stating that "Doyle does
not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements." 447
U.S. at 408. If a defendant voluntarily speaks after receiving his Miranda warnings, then he
has not been induced to remain silent. Thus, questions on cross-examination do not make
unfair use of post-arrest silence when a defendant has elected not to remain silent but to
reply to questioning. Id In Ochoa-Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit pointed approvingly to this
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post-arrest statements differ from his trial testimony, an issue of credi-
bility is raised. 241 In such cases, the Government "may probe all post-
arrest statements and the surrounding circumstances under which they
were made, including defendant's failure to provide critical details."1
2 42
The court held that the Government's cross-examination of the de-
fendant was proper because the questioning was not intended to im-
peach the defendant by use of his post-arrest silence. 1243 Rather, the
questioning related to details that the defendant testified to at trial but
which were inconsistent with his statements to the DEA agent after his
arrest.1244
7. Use of immunized testimony
In Murphy v. Wateifront Commission,' 45 the Supreme Court held
that as a matter of constitutional law, evidence obtained pursuant to a
state grant of immunity could not be used in a subsequent federal pros-
ecution.1 246 The Court went on to say, in dictum, that it is irrelevant
whether the testimony is compelled by a state and used by the federal
government, or vice versa. The basic issue of the fifth amendment priv-
distinction and held that Doyle and its progeny did not apply to the instant case. Ochoa-
Sanchez, 676 F.2d at 1286-87.
In interpretingAnderson, the Ninth Circuit also cited Grieco v. Hall, 641 F.2d 1029 (lst
Cir. 1981) (cross-examination of defendant at trial about his failure to tell his exculpatory
story at the time of his arrest was justified as an inquiry into a prior inconsistent statement
and thus not violative of due process under Doyle).
1241. 676 F.2d at 1286.
1242. Id
1243. Id at 1287.
1244. Id The dissent, however, felt that the majority was losing sight "of the general rule
that post-arrest silence may not be used against a defendant and improperly seek[ing] to
bring the facts of this case within the limited exception to that rule set forth in Anderson .
Charles." Id at 1289 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Judge Fletcher maintained that the instant
case did not exactly fit within the pattern of Doyle or Anderson. Id at 1290. In Doyle, the
defendant stayed completely silent while in Charles, the defendant made clearly inconsistent
statements. Here, however, Ochoa-Sanchez did not stay strictly silent. Thus, the focus of
the cross-examination should have been to focus upon the inconsistencies as authorized by
Anderson. Instead, the dissent felt that the examination of the arresting officer, the cross-
examination of the defendant, and the Government's closing argument focused only on the
defendant's silence. Id The result reached by the majority was felt to reward the defend-
ant's "voluntary offering of some information, by permitting his impeachment at trial by
improper use of his partial silence." Id at 1291.
1245. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
1246. Id at 78-79. "This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to secure informa-
tion necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal Government
in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence
of a state grant of immunity." Id at 79.
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ilege remains the same.1247
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings,2 48 the Ninth Circuit specifically
held that testimony obtained under a federal grant of immunity may
not be used in a subsequent state prosecution. 249 Victor Mena was
convicted on several counts of conspiracy, bribery, and making false
statements to a government agency. The district court then granted
Mena "use" immunity for his testimony before a federal grand jury.250
When he appeared before the grand jury, however, Mena claimed his
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify.
At the contempt hearing, the district court rejected his defense of "just
cause" and held him in contempt.
125'
On appeal, Mena claimed that there was no controlling authority
guaranteeing that a federal grant of immunity would protect him
against subsequent state prosecution; thus he had just cause to refuse to
testify.1252 The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention, stating that suffi-
cient case authority existed for Mena to realize that evidence obtained
through federal immunity may not be used in a later state prosecution.
Accordingly, the court held that Mena did not have "just cause" to
refuse to testify. 253 It also stated that Murphy v. Waterfront Commis-
sion 25 4 was not intended to be so narrowly construed, and therefore,
controlled the instant case.
255
1247. Id at 53 n.l.
1248. 662 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1981).
1249. Id at 534.
1250. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976), "use testimony" prohibits witness' compelled
testimony and its fruits from being used in any manner in connection with criminal prosecu-
tion of the witness. See In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1973). Protection pro-
vided by § 6002 and "use testimony" is coextensive with the fifth amendment prohibition
against self-incrimination. United States v. Martinez-Navarro, 604 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980).
1251. 662 F.2d at 533. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976), a witness called before a grand jury
may be held in contempt if he refuses "without good cause" to testify.
1252. 662 F.2d at 533.
1253. Id The Ninth Circuit also held that "[i]nsofar as this circuit has not expressly held
that a state may not use testimony and its fruits obtained pursuant to a federal grant of
immunity, we do so now... !' Id at 534.
The Ninth Circuit also found support for its holding in other circuits (see, e.g., In re
Bianchi, 542 F.2d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 1976); In re Disclosure of Testimony Before the Grand
Jury, 580 F.2d 281, 288 (8th Cir. 1978)) (both these cases applied Murphy to situations factu-
ally similar to Mena's), and in superior court opinions subsequent to Murphy (see Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 456-57 (1972) (indicating that Murphy applied equally to
state and federal grants of immunity)).
1254. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
1255. 662 F.2d at 534. The Ninth Circuit found further support for this position in Mena's
failure to produce any reasonable arguments as to why Murphy should not apply in this
case. While admitting that Murphy did not address the exact issue presented in Mena's case,
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B. The Right to Counsel
1. Attachment of the right
The right to the assistance of counsel flows from two sources: the
fifth amendment 1256 right against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment 2 57 right to counsel. 1258 While the fifth amendment right
attaches when a suspect is held for "custodial interrogation,"' 259 the
sixth amendment right attaches only with the institution of adversary
judicial proceedings. 1
260
In United States v. Cates,'261 the Ninth Circuit held that the sixth
amendment right to counsel does not attach until a person has been
arrested, arraigned, or indicted.12 62 In Cates, the defendant claimed
that admissions made by telephone during execution of a federal search
warrant should have been suppressed. The Ninth Circuit disagreed,
holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached at
the time of the admissions because Cates had not been arrested, ar-
raigned, or indicted on the federal charges. 263 The conclusion was not
altered by the fact that adversary proceedings had already begun
against Cates on state charges.1264 Cates was not in custody when the
officer questioned him without first obtaining a clear and knowing
waiver of the right to counsel. Although the officer knew that Cates
the Ninth Circuit held that its underlying rationale supported the court's conclusion that
evidence obtained by a grant of immunity, whether federal or state, may not be admitted in
a subsequent proceeding by either the federal government or a state, without violating an
individual's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 662 F.2d at 533-34.
1256. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person. . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ...."
1257. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
1258. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1972); United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1980); Jett v.
Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1978).
1259. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966).
1260. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-
90 (1972) (pre-indictment confrontation not a critical stage of prosecution); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (preliminary hearing a critical stage of prosecution).
1261. 663 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1981).
1262. Id at 948; see, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964); United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir.
1980) (sixth amendment right to counsel attaches upon a person being arrested, arraigned or
indicted and not during pre-arrest FBI investigation).
1263. 663 F.2d at 948.
1264. Id Compare Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1966), United States v.
Missler, 414 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), and United
States v. Diamond, 492 F. Supp. 583, 586 (D. Md. 1980), in which the defendants were
questioned about a different offense being concurrently prosecuted in state court.
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was represented by counsel, federal adversary proceedings against him
had not been initiated. 261 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the
questioning did not violate Cates' sixth amendment right to counsel.
2. Effective assistance of counsel
The sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to effective
assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit, in Cooper v. Fitzharris,
1266
articulated the standard for determining ineffective assistance of coun-
sel: when the defense counsers errors or omissions reflect a failure to
exercise the skill, judgment or diligence of a reasonable, competent
criminal defense attorney and when the defendant is prejudiced by
such representation. 267
In United States v. Sanford,1268 the Ninth Circuit determined that
a question asked by defense counsel during cross-examination did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 12 6 9 Sanford was convicted
of possession and transfer of counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes. At
trial Sanford's counsel had asked the prosecution's key witness from
whom he had received the counterfeit notes. The witness responded
that he received the notes from Sanford.
1 270
The Ninth Circuit held that the defense counsers error was not
sufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.'27' The
court stated that mere error is not enough; there must be a serious dere-
1265. 663 F.2d at 949.
1266. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). In Cooper, the
Ninth Circuit stated that whether defense counsel's performance fell below an established
standard of competence depends on whether counsel's errors or omissions were those that a
"reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have
made." Id at 1330. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), the Supreme
Court set forth a standard for effective assistance of counsel. The assistance must be "within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id
1267. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1330-31. See United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d
221, 223 (9th Cir. 1980) ("in order for an act or omission of counsel to rise to the level of
constitutional error, the accused must demonstrate that he was prejudiced thereby").
In United States v. Wilder, 680 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1982), the defendant, an admitted tax
protester, refused to either obtain or accept counsel. He subsequently claimed he was denied
effective assistance of counsel when he was refused a continuance upon his finally obtaining
counsel. The Ninth Circuit found the entire appeal frivolous and found that Wilder had not
suffered any prejudice due to the late entrance of the attorney to his case. It held that the
defendant "may not urge his own recalcitrance in obtaining counsel as a grounds for rever-
sal." I at 60.
1268. 673 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1982).
1269. Id. at 1073.
1270. Id
1271. Id
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liction. 12 72 In addition, the Ninth Circuit required that Sanford show
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's question.1 273 The court found
neither sufficient prejudice nor serious dereliction to support Sanford's
ineffective assistance claim.
Similarly, in United States v. DeRosa,1274 the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel be-
cause of his attorney's alleged inadequate cross-examination of Gov-
ernment witnesses and his failure to call any defense witnesses. 12 75 The
court held that the defense counsel did not violate the Cooper v. Fitz-
harris standard 1276 because nothing in the defendant's brief indicated a
deficiency in cross-examination or suggested any specific witnesses who
defendant's counsel could have called on defendant's behalf.1
277
In United States v. Donn,'278 the defendant had pleaded guilty to
unarmed bank robbery and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Donn filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 to vacate his
sentence,1 279 one claim being ineffective assistance of counsel. In par-
ticular, Donn alleged that his counsel did not fully discuss the merits of
the case, did not investigate the case, did not inform Donn that intoxi-
cation might be a defense and did not show Donn a copy of the
presentence report containing false information.
1280
The Ninth Circuit stated that a defense counsel's failure to show
the presentence report to his client may violate the reasonably compe-
tent representation standard.1281 In addition, such nondisclosure would
be clearly prejudicial to the client when the presentence report contains
false information and is relied on in sentencing. 128 2 The court noted
that whether Donn's specific allegations supported his ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim was a factual determination. 1283 The court there-
fore remanded Donn's claim for an evidentiary hearing on its
merits. 1
284
1272. Id See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1330.
1273. Id See United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d at 223.
1274. 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 353 (1982).
1275. Id at 896.
1276. See supra note 1266.
1277. 670 F.2d at 896.
1278. 661 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981).
1279. Id at 822-23. Donn filed two pro se motions. The first was dismissed. This appeal
deals with the second motion.
1280. Id at 824.
1281. Id
1282. Id at 825.
1283. Id
1284. Id The Ninth Circuit discussed the specific factual allegations supporting Donn's
[Vol. 16
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In Cooks v. Spalding,285 Cooks claimed that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel when his attorney waived the right to a twelve
person jury. The court held that because a smaller jury presents both
potential advantages 286 and disadvantages, the defense counsel's deci-
sion to request a six person jury was tactical and, thus, did not consti-
tute ineffective assistance of counsel.
2 87
In Hines v. Enomoto,1288 defendant Hines, who had been convicted
of kidnapping, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted robbery,
sought habeas corpus relief based on numerous grounds, including in-
effective assistance of counsel. Hines based his ineffective assistance
argument on three separate claims. Hines first contended that the de-
fense counsel's failure to object to the state court's curtailment of per-
emptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The
Ninth Circuit refused to consider whether this conduct denied Hines
his sixth amendment right; 289 however, it remanded the case to deter-
mine if counsel's failure to object satisfied the "cause and prejudice"
standard required for habeas corpus review.
290
Second, Hines claimed that his trial attorney's failure both to ob-
ject to a lineup and to investigate or challenge the fairness of a photo-
graphic identification each provided the basis for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The Ninth Circuit found that the attor-
ney's actions as to the photographic identification did not prejudice
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. With regard to Donn's allegation that the
presentence report contained false information, the court noted that Donn provided docu-
mentation purporting to refute particular statements in the presentence report. The court
then considered the Government's assertion that Donn's documentation failed to conclu-
sively prove that the presentence report was false, and that Donn's § 2255 motion should
therefore be denied without an evidentiary hearing on whether the presentence report was
false. However, the court stated that it must determine whether the factual allegations sup-
porting the claim are reasonably plausible before granting an evidentiary hearing pursuant
to a § 2255 motion. Id.
1285. 660 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
1286. Id. at 740. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229-30 (1978).
1287. 660 F.2d at 740. See Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980)
("Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of inade-
quate representation.").
1288. 685 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981).
1289. Id. at 675.
1290. Id See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). FED. R. CRM. P. 12(b)(2)
provides that "[diefenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution
or in the indictment. . . may be raised only by motion before trial," and that failure to do
so "constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause may grant relief from the waiver."
The court in Hines expanded the rule to require not only sufficient cause to gain relief from
the waiver but also a showing of "actual prejudice" to his case should the court fail to grant
relief. 658 F.2d at 675.
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Hines. 129 1 The court noted that Hines' attorney did object to the identi-
fication and that a pretrial suppression hearing resulted in a finding
that the photographic identification was not suggestive. 1
292
The court also determined that Hines suffered no prejudice from
his counsel's failure to object to the lineup identification made by the
victim before Hines' preliminary hearing. 1293 After reviewing the vic-
tim's testimony as to his ability to identify Hines independently, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that "the lineup identification was merely cu-
mulative to an overwhelmingly positive identification" by the vic-
tim. 1294 Thus, the defense counsel's failure to object to the lineup did
not prejudice Hines.
Finally, Hines claimed that his trial counsel's failure to call or in-
terview two potential witnesses amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel. The court noted that "failure to interview prospective wit-
nesses can constitute ineffective assistance."' 1295 However, the court did
not find that Hines' counsel negligently investigated the case.1296 One
potential witness was the police officer who conducted the photo-
graphic identification. Since the court already had determined that
Hines was not prejudiced by the identification, failure to call the officer
as a witness likewise did not prejudice Hines. 1297 The other potential
witness was the alleged owner of the car in which Hines was arrested.
The court noted that a letter in the record demonstrated that the attor-
ney relied on Hines' assurance that he would arrange for the person to
contact the attorney. The court concluded that the defense counsel's
failure to contact this individual did not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.12
98
In Fritchie v. McCarthy, 1299 defendant Fritchie, who had been con-
victed of first degree murder and armed robbery, claimed that he was
deprived of his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel because the public defender failed to present a diminished ca-
pacity defense.130 Fritchie contended that he had told his attorney on
numerous occasions that he wanted to present a diminished capacity




1295. Id at 676. Cf. Cody v. Morris, 623 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir. 1980) (counsel's failure to
call certain witnesses did not deny the defendant effective representation of counsel).
1296. 658 F.2d at 676.
1297. Id
1298. Id
1299. 664 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1981).
1300. Id at 214.
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defense, but counsel refused. Fritchie's defense would have been based
on a psychiatrist's report which stated that Fritchie did not have the
requisite mental state required for conviction. Hlowever, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the public defender's decision not to assert the dimin-
ished capacity defense was a tactical decision, because such a defense
would have undermined the chosen trial strategy. 3° 1 The Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the defense counsel's action was within the Cooper
v. Fitzharris standard,1 30 2 and thus did not constitute a denial of effec-
tive assistance of counsel.
1 30 3
3. Governmental interference with attorney-client relationship
It is well settled that the sixth and fourteenth amendments bar the
use at a subsequent trial of incriminating statements which the govern-
ment has deliberately elicited from the defendant after indictment and
in the absence of counsel. 13 04 In United States v. Hollingshead,1315 the
Ninth Circuit considered whether the defendant's statements made to a
government informant before he was arrested violated his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. The court concluded that the Government's ac-
tion in obtaining Hollingshead's pre-arrest statements did not violate
the sixth amendment because the right to counsel had not attached;
thus the statements were admissible. 1
306
Hollingshead's sixth amendment claim was based on the Supreme
Court's ruling in United States v. Henry.1307 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, distinguished Henry on the basis that Hollingshead was not in
custody nor had charges been filed at the time he made the incriminat-
1301. Id at 215.
1302. See supra note 1266.
1303. 664 F.2d at 215. See also United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); United States v. Wilkes, 449 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); Smith v. United States, 446 F.2d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 1971) (all cases holding that
although a tactical choice may seem unwise in hindsight, it was not so unreasonable as to
constitute denial of constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel).
1304. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980); Rhode Island v. Inis, 446 U.S.
291, 300 n.4 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
1305. 672 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1982).
1306. Id at 755.
1307. 447 U.S. 264 (1980). In Henry, the issue was whether the government agent deliber-
ately elicited incriminating post-indictment statements while defendant was in custody. The
Court found three factors important in suppressing the incriminating statements: (1) the
informant was paid by the government and was acting under its instructions; (2) the inform-
ant seemed to be no more than a fellow inmate; and (3) "Henry was in custody and under
indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation." Id at 270.
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ing statements to the government informant. 130 8 In refusing to suppress
Hollingshead's statements, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Henry
Court when it recognized that "[i]t is quite a different matter when the
Government uses undercover agents to obtain incriminating statements
from persons not in custody but suspected of criminal activity prior to
the time charges are fled."'
30 9
A similar result was reached in United States v. Jones,310 where
the defendant sought to have pretrial statements that had been made to
jail inmates suppressed. The Ninth Circuit refused to suppress the
statements because the evidence failed to show that the inmates were
acting as government informants within the meaning of United States v.
Henry.
1311
In United States v. Shapiro,312 the Ninth Circuit confirmed that
post-arrest actions that interfere with the right to counsel are not per se
violations of the sixth amendment.1313 Only where the actions produce,
directly or indirectly, evidence offered against defendant at trial is there
a deprivation of the right to counsel.1314 The two defendants, Shapiro
and Howard, were convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with in-
tent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.1
315
The defendants argued for reversal of their convictions because the
trial court refused to allow their counsel an opportunity to question a
government witness who had post-arrest conversations with How-
ard. 316 No determination could be made of whether the post-arrest
conversations violated the rule established in Massiah v. United
States,1317 according to Shapiro and Howard, absent examination of
that witness.
The court determined that defendant Shapiro could not claim a
Massiah violation since none of the conversations in question involved
him. Defendant Howard's sixth amendment right to counsel, as pro-
tected by Massiah, was noted to be personal and could not be asserted
1308. 672 F.2d at 755.
1309. 447 U.S. at 272.
1310. 678 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1982).
1311. Id at 106; see 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980).
1312. 669 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1982).
1313. Id at 598 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
1314. 429 U.S. at 552.
1315. 669 F.2d at 595.
1316. Id at 598.
1317. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (information elicited by a government agent from a defendant




by a third person. 318 In considering Howard's claim, the Ninth Circuit
noted that there is no sixth amendment violation unless the government
actions produce evidence offered against a defendant at trial. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no violation because Howard
failed to show that any information obtained through the post-arrest
conversation was offered as evidence in her trial.
1319
In Cahill v. Rushen, 132 ° the Ninth Circuit determined that after de-
fendant Cahill's right to counsel had attached, the confession he made
must be excluded at any subsequent trial if it was deliberately elicited
by the prosecutor, after conviction and sentencing, without affording
Cahill an opportunity to consult with counsel.' 321 The day after Cahill
was initially convicted of murder, he was brought to the sheriffs office
and questioned without being given either Miranda warnings or being
provided any opportunity to consult with his attorney.1322 In response
to this questioning, Cahill confessed to the crime, believing that a con-
fession could have no adverse consequences. It was this confession
which later was admitted into evidence at the second trial, resulting in
another conviction of Cahill.1
323
The Ninth Circuit found that there was no question that the right
to counsel had attached since at the time of the confession Cahill had
been arrested, arraigned, and indicted. 1324 However, the prosecutor
claimed that "the right to counsel which had attached at the time of
indictment was cut off by the first conviction and sentencing, and was
not resurrected until Cahill had been rearraigned."'
1325
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that there is no
justification for the creation of a "temporal hiatus" in the right to coun-
sel, especially since at the time of the confession, Cahills conviction
1318. 669 F.2d at 598. See United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980).
1319. 669 F.2d at 598.
1320. 678 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1982).
1321. Id at 795-96. The dissent, however, argued that the sixth amendment has no appli-
cation to events which take place outside the courtroom after sentencing. It felt that the
majority extended without reason the sixth amendment's reach to a situation where it had
never before been applied. The dissent would not apply the sixth amendment to the situa-
tion in Cahill; it would have remanded for a determination of whether Cahill's fifth amend-
ment Miranda rights were violated. Id at 796 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
1322. Id at 793.
1323. Id
1324. Id (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)).
1325. 678 F.2d at 794. The court also noted that Cahill's promise to confess had been
evoked by Captain Carter at the time of indictment, so the police conduct in eliciting the
confession actually began well before the first trial. Id at 795.
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was not yet final. 1326 The evidence was therefore determined to be
inadmissible since the confession was elicited in violation of Cahill's
right to counsel and the prosecutor failed to meet its burden of estab-
lishing an intentional waiver of his sixth amendment rights. 
327
4. Waiver
The sixth amendment provides an accused the right to assistance
of counsel for his defense, but the accused may waive that right and
elect to represent himself.1323 Before a defendant can proceed pro se,
however, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must
be made.1
32 9
In Fritchie v. McCarthy, 330 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel and held that the claimed
sixth amendment violation was unfounded since adversary criminal
proceedings had not been initiated against defendant Fritchie. 331 The
issue of possible waiver of the right arose due to a confession given in a
1970 Florida murder case. Before confessing to that murder, Fritchie
signed a police form waiving his right to counsel. This confession was
allowed as identity evidence in Fritchie's California murder trial.
Fritchie claimed that the use of his 1970 Florida murder confession
violated his sixth amendment right to counsel because the waiver was
not made knowingly and intelligently.
332
In denying this claim, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the sixth
amendment right to counsel "attaches only upon the initiation of the
adversary judicial criminal procedures." 1333 Because Fritchie's waiver
was given in response to police custody and interrogation, Fritchie
should have claimed1 334 violation of the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel under Miranda v. Arizona. 335 The court also noted that if Fritchie
1326. Id at 795. See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461-63 (1981) (express rejection
of the argument that fifth amendment rights cease at time of conviction).
1327. 678 F.2d at 796.
1328. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
1329. Id at 186.
1330. 664 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1981).
1331. Id at 214.
1332. Id
1333. Id See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1972).
1334. 664 F.2d at 214. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
The fifth amendment right to counsel is derived from the fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. This right attaches only upon the initiation of adversary judicial pro-
ceedings. 664 F.2d at 214.
1335. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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had invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel prior to signing the
waiver, then the validity of the waiver would be determined by the
knowing and intelligent standard.1336 However, because Fritchie never
invoked his right to counsel prior to his confession, the Ninth Circuit
found no reason to inquire into the effectiveness of the waiver as re-
quired by Edwards v. Arizona.'337
In a 1981 case, United States v. Doe,1338 the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that defendant Doe effectively waived his right to counsel dur-
ing an investigation by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
and during a subsequent appearance before a federal magistrate.
1339
Both Roe and Doe were arrested while attempting to smuggle heroin
into the United States. DEA agents testified that when Doe requested
an attorney, no questioning took place. Subsequent to a conversation
with Roe, Doe decided to cooperate with the DEA's investigation. He
then waived his right to an attorney and answered the agent's
questions. 1340
Doe contended that he was deprived of his sixth amendment right
to counsel when the government elicited admissions from him after he
had repeatedly requested an attorney. 34' After recognizing that the
Supreme Court has not adopted a per se rule, 13 42 the Ninth Circuit
stated that the validity of a waiver is a question of fact. 1343 Based on
the district court's record, the Ninth Circuit determined that Doe had
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel during the
DEA investigation.'
31
Doe also argued that waiver of his right to counsel when he ap-
1336. 664 F.2d at 214. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 483-85.
1337. 664 F.2d at 214. In Edwards, the Supreme Court held that when an accused requests
counsel, all questioning must cease until counsel is present or until the accused himself initi-
ates further communications or conversations with the police. 451 U.S. at 484-85. The ac-
cused may waive his right to counsel only when the waiver is a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent relinquishment of a known right or privilege. Id at 484.
1338. 665 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1981), as corrected, 656 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
1339. 655 F.2d at 926.
1340. Id at 923.
1341. Id. at 925.
1342. Id at 925. In United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978), the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme
Court has not mandated a per se rule that would eliminate any possibility of a waiver of the
right to counsel after an accused has requested the assistance of an attorney. The court
found that such a per se rule "would serve only to handcuff our law enforcement officers in
the performance of their duties and to imprison the suspect in his alleged constitutional
privileges." Id at 488.
1343. 655 F.2d at 925. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 402 (1977); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
1344. 655 F.2d at 925.
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peared before the magistrate was not voluntary because Doe had be-
lieved that he had reached a plea bargain with the United States
Attorney.1345 The Ninth Circuit found that the record supported the
district court's conclusion that there was no plea agreement.1346 The
Ninth Circuit relied on the lower court's determinations regarding the
witnesses' credibility since the trial court had the opportunity to ob-
serve and assess the testimony of each witness.
1347
In United States v. Kimmel,1348 the Ninth Circuit determined that
the record did not show a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel even though the defendant, charged for distributing drugs, was
assisted by a court-appointed advisor.' 349 The Kimmel court neverthe-
less remanded to allow the district court to supplement the record. 1
3 50
The Government argued that Kimmel had received the benefit of
his sixth amendment right to legal representation upon receiving assist-
ance from a court-appointed advisor.135' Rejecting that argument, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that whenever an accused undertakes functions
traditionally performed by a lawyer, he must knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his right to counsel.
352
The court then considered the adequacy of Kimmel's waiver. It
stated the general rule that a waiver is knowing and intelligent only
when the accused appreciates the possible consequences of mishan-
dling the presentation of a defense as well as an attorney's superior
ability to make a persuasive and proper presentation. 35 3 The Ninth
Circuit indicated that the risks of self-representation are best under-
stood when explained by the trial judge. 1354 However, absent such an
explanation in the record, the particular facts and circumstances which
1345. Id at 925-26.
1346. Id at 926.
1347. Id
1348. 672 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1982).
1349. Id at 721.
1350. Id at 722-23.
1351. Id at 721.
1352. Id In United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit
stated that when an accused wants to waive counsel and proceed pro se, the trial court is
essentially faced with a two-pronged problem: first, "ascertaining whether a demand to
waive the constitutional right to the assistance of competent counsel is competently, volunta-
rily and intelligently made, and [second,] meeting its obligation to assure both the accused
and the government a fair trial conducted in a judicious, orderly fashion which is always
threatened and endangered with the gathering signs of disruptive actions or attitudes." Id
at 186.
1353. 672 F.2d at 721. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
1354. 672 F.2d at 722. See Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975).
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surround the case must be considered, including the background, expe-
rience, and conduct of the accused, to determine whether the defendant
understood the consequences of his waiver. 135  The court found that
Kimmel was educated and had previously represented himself, but
nonetheless determined that the existing record contained insufficient
evidence to conclude that the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
356
Generally, in cases where the record does not show a knowing and
intelligent waiver, the appellate court will reverse and remand for a
new trial. 1357 The Kimmel court, however, remanded the case to the
district court for the purpose of supplementing the record even though
the record showed no indication of an intelligent waiver. 1358 The court
stated that it used such a procedure because the existing record sug-
gested that additional evidence was available to determine the validity
of Kimmel's waiver.1
35 9
The dissent noted that the majority failed to follow established
Ninth Circuit precedent' 13 60 in deciding to remand the case in order to
supplement the record. In addition, it proposed that a per se rule be
adopted to provide that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to
counsel, the court must formally advise him on the record of the risks
of self-representation.' 36 ' A court's failure to give such a warning
would necessitate a reversal of the defendant's conviction. 1362 Accord-
ingly, the dissent would have reversed Kimmel's conviction and re-
manded for a new trial because the record failed to establish a knowing
and intelligent waiver. 1
363
The Ninth Circuit addressed a situation very similar to Kimmel in
1355. 672 F.2d at 722 (citing Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d at 1252).
1356. 672 F.2d at 722.
1357. Id
1358. Id See Rhinehart v. Gunn, 661 F.2d 738, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1981) (remanded for
supplementation of the record because the record itself suggested additional evidence avail-
able about waiver adequacy).
1359. 672 F.2d at 722. On remand, the district court held a hearing at which the Govern-
ment attempted to show that Kimmel made a knowing and intelligent waiver. However, the
Government subsequently decided not to pursue the issue and no relevant information was
added to the record. The Ninth Circuit then reversed Kimmel's conviction and remanded
the case for a new trial. 672 F.2d at 732 (subsequent per curiam opinion).
1360. Id at 724 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Eg., United States v. Crowhurst, 596 F.2d 389,
391 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); United States v. Aponte, 591 F.2d
1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 188 (9th Cir. 1973)
(procedure was to reverse the conviction and remand for new trial where record on appeal
failed to show that defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel).
1361. 672 F.2d at 723 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
1362. Id
1363. Id at 727.
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United States v. Harris.136" In Harris, the court reversed and re-
manded, holding that the record failed to establish that the defendant's
waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary; it was un-
clear whether the defendant was aware of the risks involved in repre-
senting himself.
3 65
Harris, a physician, was convicted for failure to file federal tax
returns. Despite being informed at his first arraignment of the right to
be represented by counsel, Harris chose to represent himself. At the
arraignment, the magistrate appointed advisory counsel but did not
question Harris as to his understanding of the charges and penalties
involved, or as to the dangers of self-representation. The advisory
counsel appeared with Harris at the second arraignment but the record
did not indicate whether counsel was present with Harris at trial or the
extent to which Harris and counsel conferred, if at all. The record also
failed to indicate whether at trial Harris was questioned about his
awareness of potential risks involved with self-representation.1
366
The court stressed the importance of a defendant's understanding
of the potential dangers involved with self-representation before there
may be a knowing and voluntary waiver of one's sixth amendment
rights. 1367 The Government argued that Harris was an intelligent and
informed man, and that since his pretrial motion contained a quotation
from the charging statute, he must have been familiar with the charges
and the penalties. 368 This argument was inconclusive since the record
did not show that Harris prepared the motion himself or understood
the import of the statute. 1369 After reviewing the record, the Ninth Cir-
1364. 683 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1982).
1365. Id at 325-26. The Ninth Circuit, in remanding for a new trial, did not use the
limited remand as it had in Kimmel. The court found that, unlike the Kimmel situation,
there were no other facts which could be used to supplement the record to show that Harris
was aware of the risks involved with self-representation. Id
1366. Id at 325.
1367. Id at 324. In United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 188 (9th Cir. 1973), the
court indicated that a district court should not grant a defendant's request to waive represen-
tation of counsel and serve as his own counsel without discussing with the defendant, in
open court, whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, with an understand-
ing of the charges, the possible penalties, and the dangers of self-representation. See also
Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975)
(omission of the colloquy between the defendant and the court was not per se reversible
error, when the record reveals a knowing and intelligent waiver; case seen as a limited ex-
ception because it involved an unusual fact situation in which the background and experi-
ence of the defendant in legal matters was apparent from the record).
1368. 683 F.2d at 325.
1369. Id The court noted that because Harris' motion asserted nonexistent jurisdictional




cuit remanded for a new trial, finding that the record failed to reveal
whether Harris understood the charges filed against him or was fully
aware of the risks of acting as his own attorney.
1370
5. Right to self-representation
A criminal defendant has both a statutory1371 and a constitutional
right 1372 to represent himself by voluntarily and intelligently waiving
his right to counsel. The demand to proceed pro se must be unequivo-
cal 1373 and made in a timely manner.
1374
In United States v. Wilson,1375 the Ninth Circuit refused to extend
the right to self-representation to include a right of access to materials,
facilities, or investigative and educational resources. 1376 At Wilson's
arraignment, the magistrate denied his request to proceed pro se and
appointed counsel to represent him. After receiving notice of Wilson's
intention to appeal the denial, the magistrate conducted a hearing and
recommended that Wilson not be allowed to proceed pro se because he
lacked a proper educational background. On the day of trial, Wilson
declined the judge's unexpected offer that Wilson represent himself,
stating he was unfamiliar with trial procedure and had been denied
access to a law library to prepare his defense. It was agreed, however,
that Wilson could ask witnesses questions during the trial.1
377
The Ninth Circuit determined that Wilson was not denied his right
to self-representation since he had access to court-appointed counsel
before trial, but had rejected the assistance, and also because he was
allowed to participate during the trial. 1378 Wilson argued that the de-
nial of pretrial access to a law library violated his sixth amendment
right to self-representation. 1379 In declining to interpret the sixth
1370. Id at 326. The court speculated that the risks, penalties, and nature of the charges
may have been explained to Harris by the appointed advisory counsel; however, there was
nothing in the record which convinced the Ninth Circuit that Harris was actually aware of
the potential danger inherent in his decision to proceed pro se. Id at 325.
1371. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976) provides that "[i]n all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such
courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein."
1372. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
1373. United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1973); Meeks v. Craven, 482
F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1973).
1374. Id.; United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
1375. 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
1376. Id at 1271.
1377. Id at 1270.
1378. Id at 1272. However, Wilson's participation was limited to the opportunity to ques-
tion witnesses himself. Id at 1277.
1379. Id at 1270.
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
amendment to include a right to conduct one's own research, the Ninth
Circuit held that a defendant's election to represent himself includes
relinquishing many of the benefits associated with representation by
counsel.
1380
The Ninth Circuit followed other circuits in rejecting Wilson's ar-
gument that the fifth amendment due process requirement of "mean-
ingful access" to the courts together with the sixth amendment right to
self-representation should be interpreted to allow him access to a law
library. 1381 The United States Supreme Court has held that the access
required by the fifth amendment can be accomplished by various
means, including access to a law library.1382 The government, however,
has the option of selecting the means of access in a particular case.
Here, although it was unclear whether Wilson was ever offered the re-
search services of appointed counsel or simply rejected those services
until the day of trial, the "availability" of legal assistance was a consti-
tutionally permissible means of access. 138 3 Because adequate access
was provided, Wilson could not object to the means provided and insist
on library privileges or any alternative means of access.
The dissent in Wilson asserted that Wilson was denied his sixth
amendment right to self-representation. 384 Judge Fletcher found that
the magistrate's failure to allow Wilson to proceed pro se because he
lacked a proper educational background was a violation of Wilson's
constitutional right to self-representation.
38 5
In Maxwell v. Sumner, 316 the district court granted Maxwell's pe-
tition for writ of habeas corpus, ruling that the state court erred in de-
nying Maxwell's motion to proceed in propria persona. 38 7 The State
first argued that Maxwell did not have a right to self-representation
1380. Id at 1271.
1381. Id See, e.g., Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Chat-
man, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. West, 557 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1977).
These cases involve findings that the defendant's right to self-representation does not in-
clude a right of access to a law library when the state has provided an alternative.
1382. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 830-32 (1977). The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated
this rule in Storseth v. Spenlman, 654 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981), where it found that legal
assistance offers a meaningful avenue of access to an indigent inmate. Id When adequate
access is provided and an inmate does not take advantage of it, he may not insist on another
means of access as it is the State's option to choose the type of access used to satisfy the
constitutional obligation. Id at 1353.
1383. Storseth v. Spelman, 654 F.2d at 1353.
1384. 666 F.2d at 1250 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
1385. Id
1386. 673 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 313 (1982).
1387. Id at 1033.
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because his trial occurred before Faretta v. California"" was de-
cided. 3 9 The Maxwell court held that Maxwell had a right to repre-
sent himself because prior Ninth Circuit law recognized a defendant's
right to self-representation equal to that subsequently granted by the
Supreme Court in Faretta.139 °
The State then contended that denial of Maxwell's motion to pro-
ceed in propria persona was proper because Maxwell's behavior was
disruptive, and his motion was both untimely and made for the pur-
pose of delay.'3 91 The Ninth Circuit atfirmed the district court's find-
ings that Maxwell's trial behavior was not outlandish and that his
motion to represent himself was timely.1392 Accordingly, it held that
Maxwell did not forfeit his right to self-representation.
In Hines v. Enomoto, the Ninth Circuit determined that de-
fendant Hines was not denied his right to self-representation when he
was given appointed counsel during an appeal in state court. 13 9 4 Hines
was convicted in a California state court of kidnapping for the purpose
of robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted robbery in
connection with the hijacking of a delivery truck. Hines appealed the
district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition on several
grounds, including the argument that the state appellate court's ap-
pointment of an attorney over Hines' objection was a denial of his right
to self-representation.
395
The Ninth Circuit noted that the state appellate court had allowed
Hines to file a supplemental brief on his own behalf. The court recog-
nized the constitutionality of "involuntary 'hybrid representation'"
during trial, and thus held that Hines' right to self-representation was
1388. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
1389. 673 F.2d at 1035.
1390. Id See Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400, 401-02 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 913 (1979).
1391. 673 F.2d at 1035. See United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 187 (1973) (out-
landish and disruptive behavior can stand as a voluntary relinquishment or forfeiture of the
limited constitutional right to proceed pro se).
1392. 673 F.2d at 1036. The Maxwell court found that since the request to proceed pro se
was made prior to jury selection, it was timely and should have been granted. The court
relied on United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1973), which held that because
the record contained no hint that Price's co-defendant, Coffey, had made a motion to repre-
sent himself for the purpose of delay, or that any delay would result from granting the
motion, it was timely made. Although Coffey's motion was made subsequent to jury selec-
tion, it was made before the jury was sworn.
1393. 658 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1981).
1394. Id at 677.
1395. Id at 670.
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not violated during the state appeal. 1396
In Fritz v. Spalding, 1397 the Ninth Circuit remanded for a determi-
nation of whether defendant Fritz' assertion of his right to proceed pro
se on the morning of his trial was a tactic to delay the start of trial.
1391
The constitutional right of self-representation must be timely as-
serted. 1399 The Ninth Circuit held that Fritz' motion to proceed pro se
was timely since it was made before the jury was impaneled. 1400
The Ninth Circuit noted that delay is not itself a sufficient ground
for denying a defendant's constitutional right of self-representation.
40 1
Any motion to proceed pro se on the morning of trial is likely to cause
delay; however, the defendant may be deprived of this right only upon
an affirmative showing that the motion is made for thepurpose of se-
curing delay. 140 2 The Fritz court stated that in determining whether the
motion is a tactic to secure delay, the court may consider the effect of
the delay. 14 3 Here, Fritz' pretrial conduct 14 ° had already caused sub-
stantial delay. However, the inquiry into whether Fritz' motion was for
the purpose of delay must consider all of the facts preceding the motion
to determine whether they are consistent with a good faith assertion of
the Faretta "5 right and whether Fritz could reasonably be expected to
have made the motion at an earlier time. 146
1396. Id at 677. See United States v. Kelley, 539 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 963 (1976). The court in Hines cited Kelley as sanctioning involuntary "hybrid repre-
sentation" in the trial context. Unlike Hines, however, Kelley refused a court-appointed
attorney, and represented himself at trial and on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The court in
Hines apparently found an involuntary hybrid representation in Kelley based upon the dis-
trict court's directing an attorney to serve Kelley in an advisory capacity.
1397. 682 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1982).
1398. Id at 786.
1399. United States v. Kizer, 569 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 435 U.S. 976 (1978);
Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A defendant must have a last
clear chance to assert his constitutional right. . . . [T]hat point should not come before
meaningful trial proceedings have commenced.").
1400. 682 F.2d at 784. See United States v. Chapman, 553 F.2d at 893-95.
1401. 682 F.2d at 784.
1402. Id
1403. Id "A showing that a continuance would be required and that the resulting delay
would prejudice the prosecution may be evidence of a defendant's dilatory intent." Id
1404. In April, 1975, after being charged with armed robbery in Washington, Fritz jumped
bail. He was re-arrested in Florida in October, 1976. Four days before trial was to begin,
Fritz' attorney moved to withdraw as counsel, complaining that he and Fritz could not de-
cide on a defense strategy. The court granted the motion, rescheduled the trial, and ap-
pointed a public defender. Other motions occurred prior to the second trial date,
culminating with Fritz' motion to proceed pro se on the morning of trial. Id at 783.
1405. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizing a person's constitutional right
of self-representation).
1406. 682 F.2d at 784-85.
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C. The Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense
1. The right to confrontation
The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees the criminally accused the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.' 14 07 The clause restricts the
admissibility of hearsay evidence"4 8 by (1) providing a defendant the
right to cross-examine witnesses unless they are unavailable, 40 9 and
(2) limiting the admissibility of hearsay evidence to that which has "in-
dicia of reliability"'1410 bearing on trustworthiness.
a. hearsay
In United States v. Regner,14 1 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court's admission into evidence of certain foreign documents over the
defendant's objection that it violated his sixth amendment right to con-
frontation. 41 2 Regner had submitted a claim on his health insurance
policy for an injury which he allegedly sustained in a taxicab accident
while visiting his native Hungary. At Regner's trial for mail fraud, the
court admitted foreign documents1 413 which revealed that neither the
Hungarian taxicab company, a state agency, nor the hospital, had any
record of any automobile accident or hospitalization involving Regner.
On appeal, Regner argued for the first time1414 that the documents were
inherently unreliable because the Communist Hungarian officials may
have been motivated to influence a former Hungarian citizen's rights
by fabricating documents. 415 The Ninth Circuit rejected his argument;
the record contained no evidence of improper motives which would
lead the court to conclude that the evidence was fabricated.
14 16
1407. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1408. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
1409. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
1410. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972).
1411. 667 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 220 (1982).
1412. Id at 758.
1413. The documents were prepared by and accompanied by the declarations of the certi-
fied custodian of records of each of the Hungarian agencies involved, authorized under
Hungarian law to attest to the genuineness of the records provided. An American Embassy
official also had certified the records. Id at 758-59.
1414. The dissent argued that Regner had raised the foundational issue below. Id at 760
(Ferguson, J., dissenting).
1415. Id at 759.
1416. Id Regner's conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976) which makes mail fraud a crime,
was affirmed because, even if the confrontation clause had been violated, no clear prejudice
resulted from the admission of the documents. Other sufficient evidence had been presented
at trial to support the jury's guilty verdict. 667 F.2d at 759.
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In dissent, Judge Ferguson admonished the majority for affirming
the admission of an authenticated foreign document, which although
labeled as a public record by Hungary, would otherwise be a private
business record in this country. He argued that the majority's approach
made such documents admissible without the proper business rec-
ord 1417 foundation and, therefore, resulted in a violation of the sixth
amendment. 41 8 Judge Ferguson was particularly concerned that the
taxi company record was not trustworthy since the recordkeeping pro-
cedures of that agency were unknown to the court. He stated that
Regner should have been permitted to ascertain and challenge the pro-
cedures followed by the taxi company.
419
The Ninth Circuit appears to be breaking new ground in Regner.
Case authority exists to support the admission of foreign business docu-
ments 42 ° and official foreign government documents, 421 but there is
no case law on the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(10)1422 to documents which would not be "official" if prepared
here. 1423
In United States v. Traylor'424 the Ninth Circuit examined the re-
lationship between the confrontation clause and the co-conspirator ex-
ception to the hearsay rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 1425
Hearsay under the co-conspirator exception must meet certain require-
ments. To overcome sixth amendment limitations the proffered state-
ments must have been made in furtherance of and during the
1417. Id
1418. Id at 766. Judge Ferguson noted that in a country such as Hungary, where the state
controls numerous activities that would be characterized as private in the United States,
essentially all documents assume a public label. Id at 760.
1419. Id at 766.
1420. See, e.g., United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1976) (admission of Swiss
bank records under FED. R. EVID. 803(6) against criminal defendants), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1103 (1977).
1421. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Lovio, 463 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1972) (admission of
Mexican birth certificate under FED. R. EVID. 803(8)).
1422. FED. R. EVID. 803(10) provides:
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record,
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or non-
existence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in
any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence
in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that dili-
gent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or
entry.
1423. Regner, 677 F.2d at 763.
1424. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
1425. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay if the state-
ment is offered against a party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." These statements are non-hearsay admissions.
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conspiracy, and there must be independent proof of the existence of the
conspiracy and of the defendant's involvement therein. 426 In particu-
lar, the Traylor court confronted the problem of applying the "in fur-
therance of' requirement;1 427 it sustained the defendant's contention
that the admission of testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) violated his sixth amendment right of confrontation.
142
The defendants were convicted of conspiring to import, possess, and
distribute cocaine. 429 The trial court admitted under the co-conspira-
tor exception the testimony of a Government witness, which contained
certain statements by one of the defendants but not the other. The tes-
timony was challenged as hearsay inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). 143 0 The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument of
the defendant who made the statements as without merit because state-
ments made by a party and offered against him are not hearsay under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). 1431 The Traylor court agreed
with the other defendant that some statements to the government wit-
ness were inadmissible against him1432 The Ninth Circuit found those
statements either to be conversations of casual admissions to someone
trusted 1433 or descriptions of activities, rather than statements in fur-
1426. Id.
1427. See, e.g., United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(statements made to impress a third party to facilitate a new conspiracy not including the
appellant are not considered "in furtherance of" appellant's already alleged conspiracy).
1428. 656 F.2d at 1332.
1429. They also were indicted on two counts each of the substantive offenses of importing
cocaine and possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id. at 1329.
1430. Id at 1331-32. See supra note 1425. The defendant who made the statement argued
that the conversations with the government witness were mere conversations which did not
relate to furthering the alleged conspiracy. 656 F.2d at 1332. The other defendant con-
tended that admission of the testimony violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation.
Id at 1333. The witness testified that she was the personal friend of the defendant with
whom she spoke, that she was in his house trailer where she was shown seven bags of alleged
cocaine, and that he described to her his cocaine smuggling operations. She said that the
other defendant also arrived at the trailer, that they had her get utensils which were used to
dilute the cocaine with mannite, and that the other defendant took a larger share of the
cocaine. Id at 1332.
1431. Id (citing United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1979) (appellants'
inculpatory statements related by prosecution's star witness admissible as party admissions
only against the individual declarants)). FED. R. EVlD. 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a state-
ment is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is "his own statement, in either his
individual or representative capacity ....
1432. 656 F.2d at 1332.
1433. Id at 1332-33 (citing United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir.) (co-
conspirator's casual admission of culpability to third party whom he individually decided to
trust held inadmissible because not made in furtherance of the conspiracy), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976); United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(see supra note 1428)).
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therance of the conspiracy. 434 The court, however, found the error as
to that defendant harmless and reversal unwarranted. 435  The other
defendant additionally argued that admission of those statements vio-
lated his right of confrontation. Because the Ninth Circuit found that
this objection had not been preserved at trial it reviewed this argument
under the plain error doctrine. 436 The inadmissible statements created
little, if any, prejudice to the defendant and the court rejected the ap-
peal on this ground also.1
437
Although a court may infer reliability from statements that fall
within a firmly established hearsay exception, 143 the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. F/eishman,1439 looked at additional factors to test the
reliability of statements which fall within the co-conspirator exception.
The Fleishman court, however, failed to find any right to confrontation
violation.'" ° The defendants' arrest and conviction 4 ' resulted from a
government sting operation. At trial, agents testified as to various
statements that Fleishman made regarding the existence, location and
activities of his alleged cohorts.'" 2 On appeal, co-conspirators Combs
and Green argued that the district court erred in admitting these state-
ments after it determined during a pretrial suppression hearing that the
statements were sufficiently reliable to preclude any confrontation
problems under Dutton v. Evans.
443
Dutton requires more than the mere satisfaction of elements of the
1434. 656 F.2d at 1333. These statements "'did not assist the conspirators in achieving
their objectives.'" Id (citing United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d at 726-27; United States v.
Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 520 (9th Cir. 1979) (see supra note 1431)).
1435. 656 F.2d at 1333.
1436. Id
1437. Id
1438. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
1439. 684 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 464 (1982).
1440. Id at 1340.
1441. Id at 1332-34. Fleishman was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and
distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) and of conspiring to com-
mit the same in violation of U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Fleishman's co-defendants, Combs and
Green, were convicted as co-conspirators and for having aided and abetted in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) & 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976).
1442. 694 F.2d at 1337. The particular statements contested are those which Fleishman
supposedly made to undercover agents which referred to "his [Fleishman's] people" who
would deliver the cocaine. Id
1443. Id at 1338 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-91 (1970) (plurality) (no right to
confrontation violation where hearsay statement contained no express assertion about past
fact, witness' personal knowledge is abundantly established by other testimony, possibility
that witness' statement was based on faulty recollection is remote in the extreme, and wit-




co-conspirator exception to meet all possible confrontation clause
problems. 4 " In particular, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the following
reliability factors:
(1) whether the declaration contained assertions of past fact;
(2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the iden-
tity and role of the participants in the crime; (3) whether it
was possible that the declarant was relying upon faulty recol-
lection; and (4) whether the circumstances under which the
statements were made provided reason to believe that the de-
clarant had misrepresented the defendant's involvement in
the crime.1
445
The court noted that these factors are not exhaustive; consideration of
whether the co-conspirator's testimony was "crucial" or "devastating"
may be determinative.1" 6
Green argued that Fleishman was motivated to lie and that Fleish-
man's statements were crucial and devastating to Green's defense. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that Fleishman's statements were not
fabrications, that his statements about his confederates were corrobo-
rated, and that the statements were not crucial and devastating because
there was substantial evidence supporting the co-defendant's involve-
ment in the conspiracy. 14 7 Thus, under the Dutton analysis, Fleish-
man's statements contained sufficient indicia of reliability to sustain
their admission.1" 8
In United States v. Brock 149 the appellants argued that their con-
victions 450 should be reversed because the district court improperly ad-
1444. 684 F.2d at 1339 (citing United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660 (9th Cir. 1981)
(admission under co-conspirator exception does not automatically comply with the confron-
tation clause)).
1445. 684 F.2d at 1339 (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-91; Perez, 658 F.2d at 661)).
1446. 684 F.2d at 1339 (citingPerez, 658 F.2d at 661; United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833,
846 n.16 (admission of "crucial" or "devastating" evidence that is below certain threshold is
harmless error), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 735
(9th Cir. 1975) (witness' testimony regarding co-conspirator's extrajudicial statements, al-
though comprising a significant portion of the testimony at trial, not considered so "crucial"
to the prosecution or "devastating" to the defense to require reversal of defendant's convic-
tion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976)).
1447. 684 F.2d at 1340.
1448. Id
1449. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982), cer. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
1450. Defendants Brock, Bard, Childress, Bernard, and Cochran were charged with con-
spiracy to possess with intent to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine, a controlled
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1), 846 (9176) (Count I); manufacture of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1) (1976) (Count II); and posses-
sion with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a)(1)
19831
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mitted co-defendant Cochran's testimony. The district court had
reversed its initial decision to take Cochran's testimony outside the
presence of a jury; and it admitted Cochran's testimony although it was
not in furtherance of the conspiracy. The appellants contended that
this was error which violated their sixth amendment confrontation
rights'451 in violation of Bruton v. United States.
452
In dismissing the appellants' contentions as meritless, the Ninth
Circuit first determined that the appellants had waived their objections
to the lower court's treatment of Cochran's testimony. 1453 The court
then distinguished Bruton, which it noted stood for the proposition that
the confrontation clause precludes the introduction of post-arrest state-
ments that implicate other defendants when the declarant will not tes-
tify at trial. 14 54 In Brock, however, the appellants confronted
Cochran, 145 5  and thus could not complain of being denied
confrontation. 1
456
In United States v. Kaiser,145 7 the Ninth Circuit found that the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion in admitting the Government's ex-
hibits as adequately identified and authenticated under Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(a) without the Government agent's testimony, 145 the
necessary foundation for the Government's exhibits.
The defendants were charged with narcotics violations and con-
spiracy.1459 At trial, a tape recorded conversation between Agent Tay-
(1976) (Count III). Brock and Bard were convicted of Counts I and II, but acquitted of
Count III. The circuit court affirmed the convictions. 667 F.2d at 1313 & n.l.
1451. Id at 1317.
1452. 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (defendant's confrontation rights violated where co-defend-
ant's confession implicated the defendant and was admitted at a joint trial during which co-
defendant did not testify).
1453. 667 F.2d at 1313. In its analysis, the court noted that the appellants' objections to
Cochran's proposed testimony stemmed from a fear that the Government would employ
leading questions to elicit Cochran's testimony. The defendants did not object to the content
of the testimony, the district court's reversal of its decision to take the testimony prelimina-
rily in the jury's absence, or to the offering of Cochran's testimony to the jury. Id
1454. Id (citing United States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968)).
1455. 667 F.2d at 1317. Cochran testified and was cross-examined at trial by the
defendants.
1456. Id
1457. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121 (1983).
1458. Id at 731. FED. R. EVID. 901 provides in pertinent part: "(a) General Provision.
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims."
1459. 660 F.2d at 728. Defendants were convicted of various counts of a thirteen count
indictment which charged conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 846, six counts of
distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and four counts of interstate travel to promote
an unlawful activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) & (3).
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lor and one of the defendants was identified only by Taylor's
testimony.1 460 The district court found a Jencks Act 14 6 1 violation and
struck Taylor's testimony from the record; however, the Government's
exhibits were admitted into evidence.
462
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding no Jencks Act violation, and
held (1) that the district court should not have stricken Agent Taylor's
testimony,1463 and (2) that the district court abused its discretion in re-
fusing to strike the tape recorded conversation." Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Government's argument that the testimony
should have been considered in evaluating the adequacy of the identifi-
cations of the exhibits. It noted that once Agent Taylor's testimony was
stricken, his cross-examination also ceased.1465 The Kaiser court, rea-
soning that the defendants would be denied an opportunity to cross-
examine Agent Taylor, refused to permit his testimony to provide the
necessary foundations for the exhibits.
1466
In United States v. Muniz, 467 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ad-
mission into evidence of the defendant's silence at the scene of a stab-
bing.1468  Muniz was convicted of assault with intent to commit
murder 1469 and conveyance of a weapon within a federal correctional
institution. 470  Muniz's conviction resulted from circumstances sur-
rounding the stabbing of fellow inmate Zarate.1471
On appeal, Muniz argued that questions asked at trial about his
silence after the stabbing violated constitutional and federal eviden-
1460. 660 F.2d at 731.
1461. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). The Jencks Act provides for government production of any
statement made by a government witness that has been approved or adopted by the witness
and which relates to the witness' trial testimony.
1462. 660 F.2d at 731. The exhibits admitted were the recorded conversation and two
small bundles of heroin.
1463. Id at 731-32.
1464. Id at 731 (citing United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977) (no
abuse of discretion when trial court excluded 45 minute tape recording of interview with
defendant shortly after her arrest, where recording was offered to facilitate psychiatrist's
analysis of defendant's condition at time of arrest and four months later), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000 (1978)).
1465. 660 F.2d at 731.
1466. Id (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (the sixth amendment right of con-
frontation encompasses the right of cross-examination)).
1467. 684 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982).
1468. Id at 639.
1469. 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1948).
1470. 18 U.S.C. § 1792 (1948).
1471. 684 F.2d at 636. Muniz defended not on the lack of intent to commit murder, but
rather on the ground that he was not the assailant. Id
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tiary standards. 1472 The Government's cross-examination of Muniz
centered on his failure to deny the stabbing when accused by Officer
Schoolcraft immediately following the incident. 1473 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Government's position that Muniz's counsel had opened
the door to cross-examination on this subject by statements made dur-
ing the opening argument 1474 and on direct examination, 1475 precluding
Muniz from contesting the admission of testimony concerning his si-
lence. The court determined that Muniz's responses warranted full de-
velopment of the subject. 1476 The court also failed to find error in the
Government's reference to Muniz's silence during both closing argu-
ments and cross-examination.
477
Muniz further argued that the trial court erred in excluding, as
hearsay, testimony that would have shown that prison officials failed to
make an adequate investigation of the incident. Such an investigation,
Muniz contended, would have revealed that someone other than Muniz
stabbed Zarate.1478 The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court acted
within its discretion in disallowing that testimony and in ruling that the
scope of the prison investigation could be pursued through other
1472. Id at 638. The cross-examination concerned the incident shortly after the Zarate
stabbing. Officer Schoolcraft heard screams from Zarate's cell, and as Schoolcraft went to
Zarate's cell, he saw Muniz place something in his back pocket and flee from the cell.
Schoolcraft grabbed Muniz, but when Schoolcraft saw Muniz reach into his back pocket for
what appeared to be a knife, Schoolcraft released Muniz who ran to another area of the
prison without saying anything to Schoolcraft. Id After Muniz fled, he threw off his shirt
and allegedly struck the knife down a shower drain. When Muniz returned to the scene of
the stabbing, Schoolcraft was telling the other guards that Muniz "definitely" had been in-
volved in the stabbing. Muniz was then taken to the detention unit. Id
1473. Id The Government's cross-examination of Muniz follows:
"Q. When Schoolcraft grabbed you, did you say anything to him?
A. No, I said nothing to him.
Q. You remained silent, didn't you?
A. Yes, I remained silent."
Id
1474. Id at 638-39. The defenses opening statement was that Muniz merely had come to
an inmate's aid. Id
1475. Id Direct examination concerned Muniz's silence when he returned to the scene of
the stabbing where the officers were gathered. 1d
1476. Id (citing United States v. Allston, 613 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1980) (use of defend-
ant's post-arrest silence allowed to impeach the defendant where he tried to give the impres-
sion that he fully cooperated with the government)).
1477. 684 F.2d at 639. The court stated that because it found no error in the cross-exami-
nation concerning Muniz's silence, the Government's reference to the silence during closing
argument was likewise not error. Id
1478. Id Muniz argued that Officer Hume would have testified that other inmates told
Hume that Muniz was the wrong man. Id
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questions.1479
b. scope and limitations of cross-examination
The right to confrontation has been interpreted to be neither abso-
lute 1480 nor unrestricted. 148' In particular, where a witness' credibility
is at issue during cross-examination, the court must allow the attorney
to provide the jury with sufficient information to appraise the witness'
reliability.
1482
In United States v. Cutler,1483 the appellant argued that the trial
court abused its discretion by restricting the cross-examination of
Levoff, a key Government witness. 1484  The trial court had deferred,
but did not prohibit, further questioning of the witness until after the
defendant's testimony. The Ninth Circuit held that no abuse of discre-
tion occurred because the deferred cross-examination simply delayed,
but did not restrict, the testing of the witness' credibility. 485 Ulti-
mately, defense counsel had full opportunity to test Levoff's testi-
mony. 1486 The court determined that the test for abuse of a trial court's
discretion-whether the jury had sufficient information to appraise the
biases and motives of the witnesses 487 -- had been met. 1488
1479. Id at 639. Concluding that Muniz's arguments were without merit, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed Muniz's convictions. Id at 640.
1480. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
1481. See Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
1009 (1978).
1482. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 300, 318 (1974); United States v. Bleckner,
601 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1979); accord United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 151 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032 (1975); United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1267 (6th
Cir. 1974).
1483. 676 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
1484. Id at 1248. Cutler was convicted of conspiring to commit mail fraud and arson in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The con-
spiracy and mail fraud charge was affirmed, but Cutler's conviction for using explosives to
destroy a building was reversed. Cutler paid his employee, Levoff, the key Government
witness, to hire an arsonist to burn Cutler's warehouse. During cross-examination, defense
counsel attempted to question Levoff about other fires that had occurred in other businesses
in which he had been involved, but upon the Government's objection, the court deferred
questioning of Levoff on this matter until after Cutler's testimony. Id at 1247.
1485. Id at 1248.
1486. Id Levoff later was questioned regarding the earlier fires-upon which Cutler based
his claim of improper restriction of Levofts testimony, his plea agreement, prior filing con-
viction, false testimony, prison parole violation and motive to testify against Cutler. Id at
1248-49.
1487. Id at 1249 (citing Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (no
denial of effective cross-examination where the jury has sufficient information to appraise
the bias and motives of the witness), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978); United States v.
1983]
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In United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez,1489 the Ninth Circuit held that
no sixth amendment violation resulted from the trial court's denial of a
subpoena request by the defendant for all information on all past cases
where an informant acting as a prosecution witness had provided infor-
mation to the police. 4 90 Ochoa-Sanchez was convicted of narcotics
violations.' 491 The Government offered testimony that its informant
was not paid for the information he provided about the defendant ap-
proximately a month after the defendant's arrest.1 492 A witness, how-
ever, revealed that the Government's informant had worked as an
informant for a year and had received $500 for his services. 1493 The
Ninth Circuit, relying on United States v. MacKey1494 and the Eighth
Circuit's holding in United States v. McGrady, 149 rejected defendant's
argument and determined that the subpoena was properly quashed be-
cause the files were irrelevant and there was no need for disclosure
which could compromise their confidentiality. 1496  In particular, the
court noted that Ochoa-Sanchez's argument was flawed because, unlike
the situation in the cases upon which he relied, Ochoa-Sanchez was
able to conduct a meaningful cross-examination "using impeaching in-
formation that the witness was an informant and had assisted the gov-
Bleckner, 601 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1975) (test for abuse of discretion by trial court is
whether the jury had sufficient information to appraise the biases and motive of the
witness)).
1488. 676 F.2d at 1249.
1489. 676 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1982).
1490. Id at 1288. The trial court refused to allow an in camera inspection and refused to
seal the records for appellate review, but this was not error. Id (citing United States v.
Lyons, 567 F.2d 777, 783 (8th Cir. 1977) (defendant's absence at in camera proceedings not
violative of sixth amendment right to confrontation where nothing occurring at the in cam-
era proceedings was used against the defendant), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978)). The trial
court also refused to instruct the jury concerning its evaluation of testimony of an inform-
ant-addict, but this was not error because defense counsel adequately cross-examined him
about the drug use. 676 F.2d at 1289.
1491. Id at 1284. Defendant was convicted of illegal importation and possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute. Id
1492. Id at 1288.
1493. Id
1494. 647 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1981) (issuance of subpoena by district court upheld where
Government sufficiently demonstrated the relevancy of the sequestered documents).
1495. 508 F.2d 13, 18 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 979 (1975) (trial court cannot
withhold subpoenaed material in a criminal case solely on grounds of sensitivity).
1496. 676 F.2d at 1288. The court also stated that the subpoena was overbroad because it
requested all information in all cases. Id (citing United States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 612
(9th Cir. 1979) (subpoena seeking all files, records, correspondence, writings, interoffice
communications, interagency communications, and reports relating to the investigation of
the defendant properly quashed as overbroad in scope)).
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eminent in other cases." 1497
In United States v. Williams,1498 the Ninth Circuit held that the
trial court committed reversible error in disallowing defense counsel's
motion on cross-examination to introduce into evidence witness
Marcheselli's prior inconsistent statement following Marcheselli's op-
portunity to explain or deny the statement. 14 99 Williams was convicted
of conspiracy, attempt to collect and collection of a debt by extortionate
means. 5 'o At trial, the evidence against him consisted primarily of
tape recorded conversations between Farmer-the individual who re-
ceived the loan-and the defendants, as well as the testimony of
Farmer and Marcheselli. Williams' defense was essentially that he did
not have the requisite intent to commit the crime of loansharking.
150 1
The Government objected to the admission of Marcheselli's prior in-
consistent statement on the basis that it was an unsigned statement. 15
0 2
The trial judge reserved ruling on the objection. Defense counsel prop-
erly authenticated the document under Federal Rule of Evidence
901(b)(1) using testimony of Marcheselli, who admitted that he had
made the statement and that it was true, and by calling a witness who
testified that Marcheselli had read the statement and concurred in its
1497. 676 F.2d at 1288. The cases cited by the defendant were inappropriate because they
related to situations where, without the requested information, the defendant was com-
pletely unable to cross-examine a Government witness about potentially impeaching events
and circumstances. Id (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (see supra note 1466);
United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1977) (constitutional error where
witness in drug prosecution testified that he had never been involved in illegal drug transac-
tions, but defense counsel on cross-examination not allowed to inquire into witness' prior
arrest on drug charges); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) (denial of right to cross-exami-
nation where defendant was denied the right to ask principal witness his name and ad-
dress)). Defendant's convictions were affirmed. 676 F.2d at 1289.
1498. 668 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1982).
1499. Id at 1069.
1500. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 894 (1976).
Williams introduced Farmer to Marcheselli and co-defendant Jenkins to arrange a
$5,000 loan. After introductions were made, Williams left and Farmer secured the loan
from Marcheselli and Jenkins on the condition that Farmer repay $8,000 within ninety days.
Before the loan was due, however, Farmer began receiving threats concerning repayment.
Farmer went to the FBI, who undertook an investigation. At the instigation of the FBI,
Farmer wore a body recorder to tape subsequent conversations with the defendants. Por-
tions of the resulting tape recordings were introduced at trial against Jenkins and Williams;
Marcheselli pleaded guilty before the trial and testified for the Government. 668 F.2d at
1066.
1501. 668 F.2d at 1067. Williams tried to persuade the jury that he was not part of the
extortion scheme, that his only purpose in introducing Marcheselli to Farmer was that
Farmer needed money but had exhausted conventional financing sources, and that once the
loan had been arranged, he was merely acting as Farmer's friend, passing on information to
Farmer concerning the seriousness of the situation.
1502. Id The Government cited no authority to support the objection.
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veracity. 15 1 The statement, however, was never admitted into
evidence.
On appeal, Williams contended that his sixth amendment right to
cross-examination had been violated because the trial judge's refusal to
admit Marcheselli's prior inconsistent statement into evidence severely
curtailed his ability to establish a defense.' 5 The Williams court
noted that the statement was admissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 6131505 because Williams properly attempted to introduce evi-
dence of Marcheselli's prior inconsistent statement only after
Marcheselli had the opportunity to explain or deny the statement. The
Ninth Circuit sustained Williams' argument on the grounds that (1) the
evidence introduced to prove Williams' guilt was subject to more than
one interpretation, 15° and (2) even assuming that the prosecution's evi-
dence demonstrated that Williams acted with the necessary criminal
intent, a review of the entire record indicated that at worst, his involve-
ment was minimal. 50 7 The court reasoned that under those circum-
stances, the exclusion of Marcheselli's prior inconsistent statement took
1503. Id Marcheselli testified that he may have talked to Williams about pressuring
Farmer to make payment. This testimony tended to prove that Williams acted with criminal
intent in that he attempted to frighten Farmer into complying with Marcheselli's demands in
furtherance of the conspiracy. On cross-examination, however, Marcheselli denied telling
Williams that Farmer was going to be hurt if Farmer did not pay. Moreover, the disputed
document in Williams was a statement by Marcheselli, made the night before he testified,
which provided in part that at no time did he- try to use Williams to scare Farmer, that
Williams had nothing to do with that, and that Williams had no part in collecting the money
at all. Id at 1068.
1504. Id at 1067.
1505. FED. R. EvID. 613 provides:
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. For examining a witness con-
cerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need
not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same
shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evi-
dence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite
party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of jus-
tice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-
opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2).
1506. 688 F.2d at 1069. The evidence could support the finding of guilty as well as a
finding of not guilty. The taped conversations between Williams and Farmer contained
threats by Williams that could have reasonably been construed as a friend's concern about
the seriousness of Farmer's situation. Moreover, the taped conversations occurred when the
participants had been drinking heavily.
1507. Id Williams was not involved in setting the repayment terms of the loan. After the
loan negotiations were completed, Williams had little contact with Farmer concerning the
loan. There was no evidence that Williams over attempted to collect the money from
Farmer. Out of sixteen taped conversations involving discussions about the loan, Williams
was involved in only three, and of these none was instigated by Williams.
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on greater significance. 08 Marcheselli was a principal actor in the ex-
tortion scheme. His testimony concerning Williams' actual role may
well have been decisive in the jury's determination that Williams was
part of the extortion of Farmer. 15°9 Moreover, Marcheselli's credibility
was crucial, and the jury was entitled to consider the impeachment evi-
dence.1510 The Ninth Circuit, accordingly, failed to find the restriction
of the defense's impeachment of Marcheselli to be harmless error and
therefore reversed Williams' conviction. 5
c. waiving the right to confrontation
A defendant may forfeit his right to cross-examine witnesses testi-
fying against him by failing to attend trial or to act when he is on notice
that a witness will not be available after a certain date. In United States
v. DeRosa,112 the Ninth Circuit rejected appellant Ponticelli's argu-
ment that he had been denied the sixth amendment right to cross-ex-
amination when the district court denied his request to call a
government agent back from Hawaii for further cross-examination.
15 1 3
Ponticelli and some of the other defendants were convicted of racke-
teering and various narcotics violations. 15 14 Discarding Ponticelli's
contention, the court, relying on Batsell v. United States, 5" observed
that during the two days in which Agent Bareng of the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency was on the witness stand Ponticeli's attorney took full
advantage of the opportunity to cross-examine him.15 16 The cross-ex-
amination questions covered a wide area of subjects, including areas in
1508. Id. at 1070.
1509. Id (citing Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1980) (not only must defense
counsel be given maximum opportunity to impeach the credibility of key government wit-
nesses, but testing a witness' credibility is especially important when the witness is the ac-
cused's accomplice)).
1510. 668 F.2d at 1070 (citing Patterson v. McCarthy, 581 F.2d 220, 221 (9th Cir. 1978)
(jury entitled to consider the impeachment evidence of witness whose credibility is crucial)).
1511. 668 F.2d at 1070.
1512. 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Bertman v. United States, 103 S. Ct.
353 (1982); DeSantis v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 372 (1982).
1513. Id. at 896.
1514. Id at 892. Defendants Ponticelli and DeRosa were convicted of racketeering under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(1976) and with distributing and conspiring to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 846 (1976). Defendants Bertman and DeSantis were convicted only of distributing and
conspiring to distribute cocaine. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. Id
1515. 403 F.2d 395, 401-02 (8th Cir. 1968) (no error where trial court failed to recall wit-
ness when defense counsel had full opportunity to cross-examine), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1094 (1969).
1516. 670 F.2d at 896.
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which, on appeal, Ponticelli claimed he was limited. 5 7 Although Pon-
ticelli's counsel knew that Bareng was going to Hawaii, he did not re-
quest that Bareng be retained as a witness at the time Bareng was
excused.15 18
In Brewer v. Raines,'51 9 the Ninth Circuit upheld Brewer's in ab-
sentia conviction and ruled that a defendant who voluntarily absents
himself from any proceeding, after sufficient notice, waives his right to
be present at that proceeding. 1520 Brewer was arraigned in Arizona on
charges of armed robbery and wearing a mask while committing a pub-
lic offense.' 52 ' At Brewer's arraignment he was informed that he could
be tried in absentia if he voluntarily failed to appear.15 22 After his re-
lease on bond, Brewer disappeared without attempting to contact his
attorney or to inform the court of his whereabouts.' 523  During this
absence, Brewer was convicted and sentenced pursuant to Arizona
Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1.1524 When Brewer reappeared, the trial
court rejected Brewer's excuse that he fled because his life had been
threatened. 1
525
After exhausting his available state remedies, Brewer petitioned
the federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. Brewer based his
constitutional claim on the sixth amendment confrontation clause'
526
which guarantees the accused a basic constitutional right to be present
at every stage of his trial. 5 27 The Ninth Circuit, stating that the ac-
1517. Id
1518. Id
1519. 670 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1982).
1520. I at 119.
1521. Id at 117.
1522. Id
1523. Id
1524. Id at 118. At Brewer's conviction and sentencing in absentia, the court found his
absence to be voluntary, and defense counsel never objected to a sentencing order. Id Ari-
zona Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.1 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, a defendant may waive his right to be
present at any proceeding by voluntarily absenting himself from it. The court may
infer that an absence is voluntary if the defendant had personal notice to the time
of the proceeding, his right to be present at it, and a warning that the proceeding
would go forward in his absence should he fail to appear.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. R. 9.1 (1973).
1525. 670 F.2d at 118. Brewer claimed that the person who posted his bond threatened to
kill him if he did not produce $5,000. The trial court rejected Brewer's excuse, stating that
he could have informed the trial court or the officers of the threats. Id
1526. Id The sixth amendment confrontation clause has been extended to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965).
1527. 670 F.2d at 118-19 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)).
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cused can waive this right,1528 vacated the district court's order granting
relief.529 Brewer had waived his sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion because he had sufficient notice to evoke a knowledgeable
waiver.15 30 The notion that a trial may never proceed in the defend-
ant's absence has been expressly rejected. 531 The Brewer court rea-
soned that an accused who flees should not be permitted to disrupt a
trial in progress until he is gracious enough to return. "'This would be
a travesty of justice which could not be tolerated; and it is not required
or justified by a record for the right of personal liberty.' ,1532
The court determined that Brewer had received sufficient notice
and that his ignorance of the proceedings was attributable to his failure
to communicate with his attorney and the court.5 33  The court also
upheld the constitutionality of Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
9.11534 because it meets the requirement of a waiver of the defendant's
constitutional rights, provided that the defendant is heard to determine
whether his absence was voluntary.
535
In United States v. Peeper,5 36 the Ninth Circuit held that a calcu-
lated failure to object to the admission of recorded conversations in the
absence of a co-conspirator did not violate Peeper's right to confronta-
tion.1 537 Peeper was convicted by overwhelming evidence of conspiring
1528. Id. at 119.
1529. Id at 118. A. district court magistrate recommended that Brewer be released unless
the state should retry him or, in the alternative, that his sentences be vacated and the case
remanded for his new sentencing. The district court ordered relief unless the state afforded
Brewer a new trial within 60 days; this order was stayed pending the outcome of Brewer's
appeal. Id
1530. Id at 119.
1531. Id. (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)).
1532. 670 F.2d at 119 (citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 457-58 (1912) (trial may
proceed in defendant's absence) (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446) (convic-
tion stemming from trial that proceeded in absence of defendant who fled the jurisdiction
upheld), appeal dismissed, 180 U.S. 636 (1901)).
1533. 670 F.2d at 119.
1534. See supra note 1524. The rule provides for a voluntary waiver because it requires
that the defendant have notice of his trial date, and it provides for a knowing and intelligent
waiver because the defendant must have been told of his right to be present and warned that
the trial would proceed in his absence.
1535. 670 F.2d at 120. The court found that Rule 9.1 had been complied with and that
Brewer was afforded a hearing once apprehended. The trial court rejected his explanation
and found that his absence was voluntary; therefore, Brewer had waived his right to be
present at trial and sentencing. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in
granting Brewer's petition for habeas corpus relief. Id The case was remanded with in-
structions to dismiss the petition. Id
1536. 685 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1982).
1537. Id at 329.
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to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. 1538 On appeal, Peeper re-
lied on Ohio v. Roberts"539 for the contention that the admission of
taped telephone conversations 5 ' with neither the co-conspirator's
presence nor a showing by the Government as to why the co-conspira-
tor was unavailable violated Peeper's sixth amendment right to
confrontation.'1
41
The Ninth Circuit, however, found Peeper's reliance on Ohio v.
Roberts misplaced because Peeper's own attorney wished to utilize por-
tions of the tapes to exculpate Peeper. Thus, the Government's use of
other portions of the tapes was not objectionable. 542 The court was
convinced the defense attorney's failure to object to the admission of
the tapes was purely tactical. Peeper's claim of a violation of the con-
frontation clause was, therefore, meritless
5 4 3
d the right to no/ice of the accusation
The sixth amendment provides the accused with the right "to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation."' 5  In Gray v.
Raines,1545 the Ninth Circuit determined a violation of this right to be
per se reversible error. 546 Gray was charged with first-degree, or forci-
ble, rape and lewd and lascivious acts.' 547 At an in-chambers jury in-
struction conference near the close of the evidence, however, Gray was
notified that the state also was seeking a second-degree rape convic-
tion.1548 Gray's counsel immediately objected to the instruction on sec-
ond-degree rape on the ground that it is not a lesser included offense of
first-degree rape.
1549
1538. Id at 328. Peeper's conviction was for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
1539. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
1540. 685 F.2d at 328. The conversations were made with a co-conspirator's knowledge.
1541. Id
1542. Id at 329. Peeper's attorney did not object to the introduction of the tapes into
evidence. Hence, the issues of co-conspirator hearsay and the co-conspirator's unavailability
never arose. Id
1543. Id The court also was convinced that the attorney's presentation met the test of
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (sixth amendment requirement that
defense counsel be competent and effective is met where counsel's errors or omissions do not
reflect failure to exercise skill, judgment, diligence of reasonably competent criminal defense
attorney, and the errors are not those that a reasonably competent attorney acting as diligent
conscientious advocate would make).
1544. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
1545. 662 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1981).
1546. Id at 572.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sustained Gray's argument that his
statutory rape conviction, when the information charged only forcible
rape, was a sixth amendment violation. 55 The court first established
that the sixth amendment's notice provision is fully applicable to state,
as well as federal, courts because it is incorporated within the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.'15 5 Thus, the state may not
organize its criminal laws in a manner which circumvents the constitu-
tional notice requirement imposed on the state when charging a de-
fendant with a crime. 552 The court determined that first- and second-
degree rape are separate offenses, and that second-degree rape is not an
included offense. 1553 Thus, the state's failure to follow the sixth amend-
ment's notice requirement constituted per se reversible error. 1554 More-
over, the notice requirement was not satisfied by mere notice of the age
of the prosecuting witness, resulting in presumptive notice to Gray that
he could have been charged with second-degree rape.'555
2. The right to compulsory process
a. the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine
The compulsory process clause was recognized by the Supreme
Court not only to enable the accused to produce witnesses but also to
have them testify at trial. Before United States v. Valenzuela-
1550. Id. at 572.
1551. Id at 571. See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (a person has a constitutional right to reasonable notice of the charge against him).
1552. 662 F.2d at 571 (citing In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171,288 P.2d 5 (1955)). The Hess court
rejected the contention that the charge of forcible rape automatically included statutory rape
and the lesser included offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 45 Cal. 2d at
173, 288 P.2d at 6.
1553. 662 F.2d at 572. The court reasoned that first- and second-degree rape are separate
offenses because each requires different elements of proof. The use of force is an element of
first-degree rape, while the victim's age is an element of second-degree rape, but neither
element is common to both. Id
1554. Id The court reasoned that because it had previously held that a violation of the
fifth amendment by convicting a defendant of a crime not charged in an indictment consti-
tutes per se reversible error (citing United States v. Stewart Clinical Laboratory, Inc., 652
F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1981)), a sixth amendment violation must also be per se error because
the purposes of both amendments-to apprise the defendant of the charge he must defend
and to protect the defendant against double jeopardy-are identical. 662 F.2d at 572.
The court stated that the procedure under which Gray was convicted was "repugnant to
the concept of due process and fundamental fairness." Gray's consent defense to the first-
degree charge effectively convicted him of the second-degree offense. Id at 573.
1555. Id at 574. The Ninth Circuit granted Gray's writ of habeas corpus and remanded
the case to the district court. Gray's conviction of lewd and lascivious acts was not disturbed
on appeal. Id
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Bernal,1556 the Ninth Circuit criterion for determining the existence of
a compulsory process clause violation was the "conceivable benefit"
test of United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez,5 57 which provided that a
constitutional violation had occurred when the testimony of an absent
witness could conceivably have benefited the defendant. 1558
In United States v. Trinidad,15 9 the Ninth Circuit did not find any
fifth and sixth amendment violations under the Mendez-Rodriguez test
even though the Government deported material witnesses. 1560 Trini-
dad was convicted of conspiring to transport aliens illegally.1
5 6 1
Twenty-one of the twenty-three illegal aliens caught were deported to
Mexico, and the remaining two were retained as material witnesses.
562
Trinidad never had the opportunity to interview the missing witnesses
in preparation for his defense.1563 In its analysis, the court stated that
under Ninth Circuit law, the determinative issue was whether Trinidad
conceivably could have benefited from the missing witnesses' testi-
mony.156 The court rejected Trinidad's contentions that the witnesses
might have provided exculpatory information, 1565 reasoning that the
aliens' testimony would relate only to the substantive charge of trans-
porting illegal aliens, while other evidence sufficiently proved that
Trinidad was guilty of conspiracy. The court stated that even if the
testimony could exculpate Trinidad on the substantive crime, it would
not affect his conspiracy conviction because it would not impeach testi-
mony that implicated Trinidad in the smuggling operation. 1
566
In United States v. Vasquez-Gaizalez,15 67 the Ninth Circuit found
1556. 647 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982).
1557. 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
1558. Id at 4-5.
1559. 660 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1981).
1560. Id at 387-88.
1561. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
1562. 660 F.2d at 387.
1563. Id
1564. Id at 387-88 (citing United States v. Martinez-Morales, 632 F.2d 112, 115 (9th Cir.
1980) (no sixth amendment violation under Mendez-Rodriguez where co-defendant deported
before defendant could interview him because missing witness had no connection with one
of the underlying charges and Government had no way of knowing witness was connected
with the other underlying charge); United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir.
1978) (no compulsory process violation where deported witness' testimony could not have
benefited the defendant), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979)).
1565. 660 F.2d at 388. Trinidad argued that the witnesses may have testified (1) that they
had not been kept in a shed; (2) that they never saw or heard of Trinidad; and (3) that they
may have overheard conversations with the transporting drivers that Trinidad was not in-
volved in smuggling. Id
1566. Id The Ninth Circuit affirmed Trinidad's conviction.
1567. 654 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982).
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error in the application of the Mendez-Rodriguez rule where the district
court dismissed appellee's indictment based on the deportation of
aliens later determined by the Ninth Circuit to clearly not be potential
material witnesses. 15 68 Border Patrol agents arrested eight illegal im-migrants in a motel room in Douglas, Arizona. 1 69 As the agents were
leaving, a taxi driver told them that on the previous day he had trans-
ported another group of aliens from the motel in Douglas to a motel in
Tucson.157 0 After questioning, the agents released to Mexico the eight
aliens arrested in Douglas.1 17 1 In Tucson, agents observed the motel
identified by the taxi driver and, two days after the Douglas arrest, ar-
rested Vasquez-Gonzalez and Ponce-Figueroa at the Tucson Interna-
tional Airport as they were seeing off six illegal aliens. 5 72 Vasquez and
Ponce were indicted for transporting illegal aliens at or near
Tucson.
1573
Ponce and Vasquez filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indict-
ment on the grounds that the aliens arrested in Douglas, but later re-
leased to Mexico, were material witnesses whose absence violated the
defendants' fifth and sixth amendment rights. 574  The district court
granted their motion, reasoning that when the aliens were released, the
Government was on notice that the aliens arrested in Douglas might be
part of the Tucson group. It would not have been an unreasonable
burden, in the district court's view, for the Government to hold the
eight aliens until the likelihood and imminence of an arrest were as-
sessed. 15 75 The Ninth Circuit, applying the clearly erroneous standard
of review, 5 76 reversed the district court, reasoning that aliens released
in one city could not have been eyewitnesses to an offense committed in
1568. Id. at 631.




1573. Id 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (Supp. 1978).
1574. 654 F.2d at 629.
1575. Id at 630.
1576. Id The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly applied this standard under analogous situa-
tions. Id at 630 n.3 (citing United States v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1980) (probable
cause for warrantless seizure of a briefcase); United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522 (9th
Cir. 1977) (probable cause to search), cert. deniedsub nom. Reeve v. United States, 435 U.S.
914 (1978); United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 801-03 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (whether
government used reasonable efforts to produce an informant), cert. denied sub nom. Robles
v. United States, 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); United States v. Trice, 476 F.2d 89 (9th Cir.) (finding
corroboration of informant's testimony sufficient), cert. denied sub nom Clayton v. United
States, 414 U.S. 843 (1973); McKinney v. United States, 487 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1973) (de-
fendant's incompetency to stand trial)).
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another city the next day and thus were not potential material
witnesses. 
1577
b. the demise of the Mendez-Rodriguez doctrine
To establish a compulsory process clause violation under the
Ninth Circuit's "conceivable benefit" test, a defendant need only show
that the absent witnesses were eyewitnesses to the crime. 1578 The
United States Supreme Court, however, in United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal,5 79 discarded the Ninth Circuit's "conceivable benefit" test' a8°
in favor of a "materiality" test whereby the defendant must persuade
the court that the absent testimony would have been both helpful and
material to his defense.
1581
Valenzuela-Bernal 58 2 entered the United States illegally and, in
exchange for not having to pay those who smuggled him across the
border, agreed to drive himself and five others to Los Angeles.
15 3
Valenzuela-Bernal and three of the passengers were apprehended by
Border Patrol agents. 5 4 An Assistant United States Attorney released
two of the passengers to Mexico because he determined that they pos-
sessed no evidence material to the prosecution or defense. A third pas-
senger, Romero-Morales, was detained to provide non-hearsay
evidence against Valenzuela-Bernal. Valenzuela-Bernal moved for dis-
missal in the district court, claiming violations of his fifth amendment
right to due process and his sixth amendment right to compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining favorable witnesses. 58 5 The district court denied the
motion and convicted the respondent on stipulated evidence. 586 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, applying the conceivable benefit test of Mendez-
Rodrguez. 5 87
1577. 654 F.2d at 631.
1578. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 647 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1981), rei'd, 102 S. Ct.
3440 (1982).
1579. 102 S. Ct. 3440 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; Brennan &
Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
1580. Id at 3446-47.
1581. Id
1582. Respondent was convicted in the district court for knowingly transporting an illegal
alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976), but the conviction was overturned by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals because of a compulsory process violation under the Men-









The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Ninth Circuit's "con-
ceivable benefit" test. 15 88 The Court discussed the conflict between the
government's duties to execute Congress' immigration policies by de-
porting illegal aliens and to prosecute persons, such as the respondent,
who have violated criminal statutes of the United States. 589 Budget
constraints and the unavailability of adequate detention facilities re-
quire the government's conduct to be judged by standards other than
those which might be appropriate if the government's only duty were to
prosecute criminals. 5 90 The Court concluded that the Government
had good reason to deport respondent's passengers once it had deter-
mined that they possessed no evidence relevant to the prosecution or
the defense of respondent's criminal charge.' 591
The Court criticized the Ninth Circuit's "conceivable benefit" test
as "a virtual 'per se' rule which requires little if any showing on the
part of the accused defendant that the testimony of the absent witness
would have been either favorable or material."' 1592 Furthermore, the
Court observed that "the [s]ixth [a]mendment does not by its terms
grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and
testimony of any and all witnesses: it guarantees him 'compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' "1593
The Court relied on Washington v. Texas 594 for the rule that a
sixth amendment violation exists when the defendant is arbitrarily de-
prived of "testimony [that] would have been relevant and material, and
. . . vital to the defense."1 595 Much of the Court's reasoning came from
cases it described as pertaining to "the area of constitutionally guaran-
teed access to evidence," 1596 noting that materiality is required for a
1588. Id at 3444-45.
1589. Id at 3445.
1590. Id at 3445-46. The Court indicated the factors affecting the government's pros-
ecutorial discretion by quoting from the petitioner's brief:
Because of budget limitations and the unavailability of adequate detention facili-
ties, it is simply impossible as a practical matter to prosecute many cases involving
the transportation or harboring of large numbers of illegal aliens, where all aliens
must be incarcerated for a substantial period of time to avoid dismissal of the
charges, even though the prosecution's case may be overwhelming. As a conse-




1593. Id (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
1594. 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (mere absence of testimony is not sufficient to establish a viola-
tion of the right to compulsory process).
1595. 102 S. Ct. at 3446 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added by
the Supreme Court)).
1596. Id at 3447.
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finding of a constitutional violation.'597 In addition, the Court noted
that other interests protected by the sixth amendment look to the de-
gree of prejudice incurred by the defendant resulting from governmen-
tal action or inaction.
1 598
The Court noted that the respondent had no access to the wit-
nesses who were deported after the respondent was indicted.1599 The
Court stated, however, that lack of access does not mean that the de-
fendant is excused from making a showing of materiality.1600 Lack of
access, however, could support a relaxation of the specificity required
in demonstrating materiality. A defendant may demonstrate the re-
quired materiality by looking to the events to which an absent witness
might testify and the relevance of those events to the crime charged.16
0
Thus, because Valenzuela-Bernal failed to explain what material,
favorable evidence the deported passengers would have provided for
his defense, he failed to establish a fifth or sixth amendment viola-
tion. 60 2 In some cases sanctions may be warranted1 60 3 for deporting
1597. Id (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution's suppression of
favorable evidence violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or
punishment); Moore v. Illinois, 403 U.S. 953 (1972) (Brady claim will prevail where the
evidence is both favorable and material to either guilt or punishment); United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (standard is whether the suppressed evidence might have affected
the trial outcome)).
1598. 102 S. Ct. at 3447-48 (citing United States v Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1972) (pre-indict-
ment delay claims held governed by the fifth amendment's due process clause, rather than
by the sixth amendments speedy trial guarantee); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783
(1977) (due process requires that consideration be given to the reasons for the delay as well
as the prejudice to the accused); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (a factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether the government's pretrial delay has violated the sixth amend-
ment's speedy trial guarantee is the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
delay); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (impairment of the defendant's
ability to mount a defense is the most serious consideration in analyzing the prejudice to the
defendant from the delay)).
1599. 102 S. Ct. at 3448.
1600. Id Valenzuela-Bernal argued that a materiality showing was unreasonable because
neither he nor his attorney had the opportunity to question the witnesses and determine
what favorable information they possessed. Id
1601. Id The Court relied on Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), for the conclu-
sion that although a defendant who has not had an opportunity to interview a witness may
face a difficult task in making a show of materiality, the task is not impossible. 102 S. Ct. at
3448. In Roviaro, a government informant was the sole participant, other than the accused,
in the crime charged, and the only one able to augment or contradict the testimony of other
government witnesses, one of whom had testified that the informer had denied ever knowing
or seeing Roviaro. The Roaro Court concluded that it was error to permit the government
to withhold its informer's identity in the face of repeated demands by the accused for his
disclosure. 353 U.S. at 64-65.
1602. 102 S. Ct. at 3449. The Court noted that because Valenzuela-Bernal was present
when the crime was committed, he knew what the deported witnesses said in his presence
relating to whether he knew that Romero-Morales, the illegally transported person, was an
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material witnesses, but only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
deported witnesses' testimony could have affected the judgment of the
trier of fact.1
6 4
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor concurred separately in the
judgment. In his short concurrence, Justice Blackmun advocated that
"[a]t least a 'plausible theory' of how the testimony of the deported
witnesses would be helpful to the defense must be offered." 160 Because
no such evidence was offered here, he concluded the district court prop-
erly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.
160 6
Justice O'Connor advocated an accommodation of the Govern-
ment's and defendant's competing interests by requiring "that deporta-
tion of potential alien witnesses be delayed for a very brief interval to
allow defense counsel, as well as the Government, to interview
them."'60 7 Under this approach, potential witnesses would be detained
illegal alien who had entered the country within the past three years. It was only Romero-
Morales who was relevant to the crime charged, and he remained fully available for exami-
nation by the defendant and his attorney. Id
Although prompt deportation of witnesses deprives the defendant of an opportunity to
interview them to determine precisely what favorable evidence they possess, the defendant
cannot be expected to render a detailed description of their lost testimony; however, the
defendant is not relieved of his duty to make some showing of materiality. The materiality
showing must indicate "that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been mate-
rial and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of avail-
able witnesses." Id at 3449-50. In some cases the showing may be based upon agreed facts
and will be in the nature of legal argument rather than a submission of additional facts. The
defendant may also advance additional facts, consistent with the existing facts or reasonably
explainable as to their inconsistency with the existing facts, so as to persuade the court that
the deported witness would have been material and favorable to his defense. Additional
facts that are advanced should be verified by oath or affirmation of either the defendant or
his attorney. Id at 3450.
1603. Id.
1604. Id In determining whether sanctions are warranted, the courts should afford some
leeway for the fact that the defendant can proffer only a description of the material evidence
rather than the actual evidence, and the courts may wish to defer determination of material-
ity until after the presentation of all the evidence.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) is instructive of how the trial court should
analyze the omitted evidence:
[T]he omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered,
there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already
of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might
be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
Id at 112-13.
1605. 102 S. Ct. at 3450.
1606. Id
1607. Id at 3452. Justice O'Connor's approach is an amalgam of the approaches of the
Ninth and Fifth Circuits in United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971)
and United States v. Avila-Dominguez, 610 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Perez
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for a brief period to allow the Government and defense counsel an
opportunity to interview them. 6 "8 If, during that period, the defendant
requests that certain aliens not be deported, a federal magistrate would
hold a hearing to determine whether deportation of any witness should
be deferred until after trial. 60 9 When the Government deports an alien
witness without affording the defendant any opportunity to interview
him, automatic dismissal of the indictment would not follow. Instead,
sanctions would "be available against the Government if the defendant
sets forth some plausible theory explaining how the deported witnesses
would have provided material evidence that was not simply cumulative
of evidence readily available to the defendant."' 1610  Because
Valenzuela-Bernal made no plausible showing that the deported wit-
nesses possessed any material evidence that was not merely cumulative,
Justice O'Connor concluded that the district court properly denied the
respondent's motion to dismiss the indictment.'
6"
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, criticized the Court's decision as a mockery of a criminal defend-
ant's constitutional right to interview eyewitnesses to his alleged crime
before his prosecutor deports them. 61 2 The majority, in Justice Bren-
nan's view, created an illusory "dilemma," repudiated by Supreme
Court precedents and common sense. 161 3 He argued that, the Execu-
tive Branch's myriad of responsibilities notwithstanding, "when the Ex-
ecutive Branch chooses to prosecute a violation of federal law, it incurs
a constitutional responsibility . . to ensure that the accused receives
the due process of law."'16 14 The dissent concluded that the Mendez-
v. United States, 449 U.S. 887 (1980), respectively. In Mendez-Rodriguez, the illegal alien
witnesses were held for an average period of five days, during which time defense counsel
had an opportunity to interview them and determine the materiality of their testimony. Af-
ter the interviews a federal magistrate held a hearing and ordered deportation of those
whose testimony would not be material. When the government deported witnesses consid-
ered material under the "conceivable benefit" test, the court dismissed the indictment. In
Avila-Dominguez, the Fifth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit rationale that a constitutional
violation exists if the government deports an alien witness before the defendant has had an
opportunity to interview him. The court nevertheless affirmed the defendant's conviction
because he failed to offer a "plausible theory" explaining how the witness' testimony would
have helped the defense. This approach would be imposed on the federal courts through the
Supreme Court's supervisory powers. 102 S. Ct. at 3452 n.2.
1608. 102 S. Ct. at 3452.
1609. Id
1610. Id at 3453.
1611. Id
1612. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1613. Id
1614. Id The dissent refused to accept the Government's argument that it is permissible to
infringe a criminal defendant's rights given the Executive Branch's "other responsibilities."
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Rodriguez doctrine was "a practical and sensitive accommodation be-
tween a criminal defendant's constitutional rights under the
[c]ompulsory [p]rocess [c]lause and the [g]ovemment's policy of prompt
deportation of illegal aliens." 1615 Ultimately, it should have been the
respondent, not the government, who was entitled to determine
whether or not the illegal alien eyewitnesses could give testimonies ma-
terial and relevant to the defense.
1 616
In United States v. Marquez-Amaya,161 7 the Ninth Circuit, follow-
ing the Supreme Court's abrogation of the rule in Mendez-Rodriguez,
set aside the dismissal of the indictments and affirmed the defendant's
conviction. 618  Marquez-Amaya was charged with distributing her-
oin1 619 and conspiring to distribute heroin. 162 0 The district court dis-
missed the charges and the Ninth Circuit affirmed basing its decision
on Mendez-Rodriguez.1621 The Supreme Court, however, vacated and
remanded the decision 62 2 to the Ninth Circuit for further considera-
tion in light of United States v. Valnezuela-Bernal. The Ninth Circuit,
after "carefully" reviewing the record on appeal, found its affirmance
to be in error.1 623  Like Valenzuela-Bemal, Marquez-Amaya had
"made no 'plausible showing that the testimony of the deported wit-
nesses would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways
not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses.' 1624
Id at 3453-54 (citing Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (in criminal proceedings
the Government can invoke its evidentiary privilege of not disclosing documents concerning
vital national interests only at the price of freeing the defendant)).
1615. 102 S. Ct. at 3454.
1616. Id at 3455. The dissent argued that Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)
rejected the Court's suggestion that a criminal defendant should be able to "demonstrate
either the presence or absence of the required materiality" even without having had an op-
portunity to interview the deported witnesses. 102 S. Ct. at 3455. In Roviaro, the Govern-
ment refused to release the identity of its informer "John Doe" to Roviaro. Roviaro, as in
the instant case, was present throughout the commission of the crime. The Roviaro Court
required disclosure because John Doe's testimony might have benefited the defense. Be-
cause the deported witnesses in the instant case, like Doe in Roviaro, played a prominent
part in Valenzuela-Bernal's alleged offense, they, like Doe, might have testified to respon-
dent's possible ignorance respecting essential elements of the crime charged. Id
1617. 686 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1618. Id at 748.
1619. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b) (1976).
1620. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
1621. 686 F.2d at 748.
1622. 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982).
1623. 686 F.2d at 748.
1624. Id (quoting United States v. Valeazuela-Bernal, 102 S. Ct. at 3449)).
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c. compulsoryprocess and the right against self-incrimination
A defendant's right to secure witnesses in his favor may be re-
stricted where a co-defendant's testimony might be self-incriminating
and the co-defendant faces the possibility of prosecution for other
charges. 62 In United States v. Moore,'6 26 the Ninth Circuit failed to
uphold a co-defendant's blanket refusal to testify. 1627 Appellant Moore
was convicted of unlawful possession of mail. 628  Moore and his
brother were arrested at their house by police acting on a mail theft
report. 629 At the conclusion of the Rule 11 guilty plea hearing, at
which Moore's brother pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful receipt
of mail, Moore's counsel informed the court that he wanted the brother
as a witness at trial. However, the brother stated under oath that if he
were called as a witness at the trial, he would refuse to testify, asserting
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 630 The trial
judge honored the brother's fifth amendment claim because he could
be prosecuted on other charges.1
631
The Ninth Circuit rejected, as overly broad, Moore's contention
that his brother had waived his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination by testifying at his Rule 11 hearing and was thus subject
to Moore's right to secure witnesses in his defense. 6 32  The Moore
court's analysis focused on the fact that the right to compulsory process
to secure a witness does not encompass compulsion of the witness to
waive his fifth amendment right. 1633 The brother's voluntary guilty
plea waived his fifth amendment privilege only as to the crime admit-
ted, not as to any other crimes. 16 34 A co-defendant who pleads guilty
cannot be forced to testify by another defendant if there is still a chance
1625. See generaly United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973)).
1626. 682 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1982).
1627. Id at 857.
1628. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1976).




1633. Id at 856 (citing United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub non. Fierro-Soza v. United States, 439 U.S. 1005 (1978)).
1634. 682 F.2d at 856 (citing United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1977)
(voluntary guilty plea waives privilege against self-incrimination only with respect to the
crime which is admitted), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v. Roberts, 503
F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974) (privilege against self-incrimination assertable by a witness
questioned on a particular count of an indictment if his testimony will implicate him on
another count to which he is still vulnerable), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975)).
[Vol. 16
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that the pleading co-defendant could be prosecuted for other charges
either under the original indictment or in a subsequent proceeding.1
63 5
The court looked to Hoffman v. United States163 6 to determine the
scope of the brother's privilege against self-incrimination 163 7 and to
United States v. Pierce163 8 for the rule that the application of Hoffman
requires a fifth amendment claim in response to specific questions.
63 9
A general refusal to answer any question is unacceptable. 1640 The
Ninth Circuit found that the record was devoid of any indications that
(1) the brother could have claimed privilege to essentially all relevant
questions,1641 or (2) the trial judge possessed any special knowledge
that would have allowed him to make such a determination.'" 2 The
district court therefore erred in accepting the brother's blanket refusal
to testify.'11 3 Nevertheless, the error did not warrant reversal of appel-
lant's conviction1 644
. The Right to a Speedy Trial
The sixth amendment'" 5 guarantee of an accused's right to a
1635. 682 F.2d at 856 (citing Roberts, 503 F.2d at 600 (co-defendant who has asserted his
privilege against self-incrimination may not be called as a witness by defendant); United
States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1978) (privilege against self-incrimination
remains where the witness is subject to prosecution for other crimes which his testimony
might tend to reveal); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973) (privi-
lege against self-incrimination upheld where witness remains vulnerable to other charges)).
1636. 341 U.S. 479 (1951). Hoffman holds that to sustain a fifth amendment privilege
claim it need only be evident from the questioning that an explanation of failure to respond
could be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Id at 486-87.
1637. 682 F.2d at 856.
1638. 561 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978).
1639. 682 F.2d at 856.
1640. Id (citing Pierce, 561 F.2d at 741). TheMoore court noted only one exception to the
rule announced in Pierce: when the trial court has extensive knowledge of the case that
allows evaluation of the claimed fifth amendment privilege, it can conclude, without specific
questions to the witness, that the witness could legitimately refuse to answer essentially all
relevant questions. 682 F.2d at 856 (citing United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 367-68 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991 (1982) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d
693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980)).
The Moore court found, however, that this exception did not apply in this case. The
trial court merely accepted a Rule 11 statement from Lembric admitting guilt to one count
of a two count indictment. This statement gave the district court no special knowledge of
either Lembric's susceptibility to further criminal prosecution or the nature of Lembric's
unprivileged testimony favorable to Nathaniel. 682 F.2d at 857.
1641. 682 F.2d at 857.
1642. Id
1643. Id
1644. Id at 858.
1645. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy. . . trial. ... "
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speedy trial is primarily designed to prevent long-term incarceration
before trial and to protect the defendant's rights before the resolution
of criminal charges.'" 6 A defendant's assertion of a sixth amendment
infringement is often accompanied by an alleged violation of the
Speedy Trial Act (the Act),16 4 7 which requires that an accused be
brought to trial within seventy days of his first appearance with coun-
sel. Recent trends evident in both Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
decisions, however, indicate an acceptance of extensive delays in trial
commencement.
Difficulties arise when criminal charges are dismissed and subse-
quently reinstituted after a lengthy delay. In United States v. MacDon-
aid,'" 8 a divided Supreme Court held that a delay between dismissal
of criminal charges by the United States Army and a subsequent civil-
ian grand jury indictment five years later could not be considered in
determining whether the defendant's sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial had been violated.
On May 1, 1970, MacDonald, a captain in the Army Medical
Corps, was formally charged by the Army with the murders of his preg-
nant wife and two children. 1649 After almost six months of investiga-
tion, the charges were dismissed, and MacDonald was honorably
discharged based on hardship. 650 Despite dismissal of all criminal
charges, the Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) continued its
investigation. By June 1972, the CID amassed a thirteen-volume re-
port which was submitted to the Justice Department with a recommen-
dation for continued investigation.' 65' On January 24, 1975,
MacDonald was indicted by a grand jury for all three murders.
1652
1646. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). See also United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (government's knowledge of defendants' identities and criminal
activities for three-year period prior to indictment not determinative of sixth amendment
violation); Barker v. Wi2ngo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972) (five-year delay between defend-
ant's arrest and trial did not violate sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where record
disclosed that defendant did not oppose a lengthy delay in trial).
1647. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 and Supp. V 1982).
1648. 456 U.S. 1 (1982).
1649. Id at 4. The facts of the case were not at issue. For a detailed account, see id at
nn.1 & 2 and accompanying text.
1650. Id at 5.
1651. Id
1652. Id The district court denied MacDonald's motion to dismiss the indictment based in
part on a sixth amendment speedy trial violation. The Fourth Circuit allowed MacDonald's
interlocutory appeal in MacDonald v. United States, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976), and re-
versed, holding that the delay between the 1972 submission of the CID report and the 1975
indictment violated MacDonald's right to a speedy trial. The United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Circuit erred in allowing the interlocutory appeal in United States v.
[Vol. 16
19831 CRIMINAL LAW SU RVEY
The time period between arrest and indictment must be taken into
account in determining whether a defendant's sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial has been violated. 1653 The period before a defendant
is arrested, indicted, or formally accused, however, is not to be consid-
ered. 654 Likewise, the speedy trial clause does not apply after the
Government formally dismisses charges in good faith.
1655
The interests to be served by the speedy trial clause of the sixth
amendment were addressed in United States v. Marion 1656 An ac-
cused's right to a speedy trial is primarily designed to protect his rights,
to prevent long-term incarceration before trial, whether released on
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978). On remand, the district court convicted MacDonald on
one count of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder. In MacDonald v.
United States, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit again held that the delay
violated MacDonald's sixth amendment rights, reversed the conviction and remanded to the
district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. The Supreme Court again granted
certiorari. 456 U.S. at 5-6.
1653. 456 U.S. at 7 (citing Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (twenty-two
month delay between defendant's arrest and indictment must be considered in determining
whether sixth amendment rights have been violated)).
1654. 456 U.S. at 6 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971)).
1655. The Court noted that this delay was to be scrutinized under the due process clause.
456 U.S. at 7.
The Court relied on the legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act to support its holding
that the delay between the dismissal of charges and subsequent reinstatement was not deter-
minative of a sixth amendment violation. Id at n.7. The Act provides that a delay between
dismissal and reinstatement of criminal charges is not to be used in a computation of the 70-
day limitation period. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(d), 3161(h)(6) (1976 and Supp. V 1982). See supra
note 1647 and accompanying text. Due to the interrelation of the sixth amendment and the
Act (see S. REP. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974)), the Court reasoned that such a
delay should also be excluded from a determination of MacDonald's alleged speedy trial
violation. The Court cited several circuits which are in accord. See e.g., United States v.
Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453, 457-58 (2d Cir. 1978) (no sixth amendment violation where indict-
ment was issued three years after defendant was formally charged); Arnold v. McCarthy,
566 F.2d 1377, 1383 (9th Cir. 1978) (nine-month delay after initial charges dismissed and
subsequent charges filed did not violate speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment); United
States v. Martin, 543 F.2d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 1976) (defendant's charges of possessing and
passing counterfeit currency were dismissed; his indictment and conviction for the same
offenses three years later did not violate the sixth amendment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050
(1977)); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 891-92 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no speedy trial
violation where charges were dismissed and a subsequent indictment was issued for the
same bribery offense resulting in a 20-month delay). But see United States v. Avalos, 541
F.2d 1100, 1112 (5th Cir. 1976) (Fifth Circuit condemned government's dismissal of charges
in one state and subsequent indictment in another state, in which prosecutors agreed to
sponsor a government witness) (dictum), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); see also 456 U.S.
at 17 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger noted that the decisions cited in the dissent failed to address the
specific issue involved in MacDonald; for example, whether the delay after dismissal of ini-
tial charges is determinative of a sixth amendment speedy trial violation. Id at 7 n.7.
1656. 404 U.S. 320 (1971). See supra note 1646.
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bail or not, and to minimize the disruptions of life that result while
criminal charges are pending. 1617 Prejudice to the defendant caused by
the mere passage of timeprior to his indictment may be analyzed under
the due process clause or statutes of limitations. 658
The MacDonald Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's holding
that criminal charges were pending against MacDonald throughout the
five-year period. 1659 During that time between dismissal of charges
and reindictment, MacDonald was not under arrest, incarcerated, or
subject to any criminal prosecution. 66 The Court indicated that Mac-
Donald was neither entitled to nor in need of sixth amendment protec-
tion during that time as he was "free to go about his affairs, to practice
his profession, and to continue with his life."' 661 The Fourth Circuit's
decision was reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
662
The Speedy Trial Act provides various exclusions used in the com-
putation of its seventy-day limitation period. Several of these exclu-
sions were the subject of controversy in United States v. Nance.1663 In
affirming the defendants' convictions of theft from interstate ship-
ments,16 64 the Ninth Circuit held that unanticipated delays in an inter-
1657. Id at 320. Although "[i]nordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may
impair" presentation of an effective defense, the sixth amendment primarily provides an
arrestee protection, whether free on bail or not, from disruption of employment, drain on
financial resources, curtailment of associations, public obloquy, and anxiety. Id See also
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532-33, supra note 1646.
1658. 456 U.S. at 8.
1659. Id at 9.
1660. Id at 10.
1661. Id Although the Court conceded that the prolonged investigation prior to the
Army's dismissal of charges created some of the undesirable consequences the sixth amend-
ment was designed to prevent, it focused instead upon MacDonald's freedom from incarcer-
ation. Id at 8. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented. 456
U.S. at 15. Justice Marshall interpreted the sixth amendment to provide a continuous
speedy trial guarantee to anyone accused of a crime despite dismissal and reindictment for
the same offense. "Nothing in the language suggests that a defendant must be continuously
under indictment in order to obtain the benefits of the speedy trial right." Id (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent considered Marion, upon which the majority relied, consistent with
the concept of a speedy trial guarantee which provides continuous protection once an official
accusation has been made. Id at 16. The dissent concluded that the delay was not justified
by the Government's "vague, unexplained references to internal disagreement about [Mac-
Donald's] prosecution." Id at 23-24.
1662. Id at 11. In his brief concurrence, Justice Stevens conceded that the five-year delay
did not suspend MacDonald's right to a speedy trial. He believed, however, that the Gov-
ernment was justified in "cautiously and deliberately" proceeding before finally deciding to
prosecute MacDonald. Id at 11 (Stevens J., concurring).
1663. 666 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982).
1664. Nance was convicted of two counts, and defendants Stelly and Lee of one count, of
theft from interstate shipments in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). Id at 355.
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vening trial which was scheduled for judicial economy were properly
excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. 665 An additional delay due to
illness of the trial judge was also properly excluded. 1666 A delay which
resulted from previously scheduled custody cases, however, was im-
properly excluded.
1667
On appeal, defendants argued that the Government's failure to ad-
here to the seventy-day limitation period under the Act required dis-
missal of their indictments. 1668  Defendants were brought to trial
eighty-two days after their indictments. 1669 The district court denied
defendants' January 13th motions to dismiss, relying on section
3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) of the Act. 1670 That section allows exclusion of con-
tinuances from the seventy-day limitation when the "ends of justice"
outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant.
1671
While conceding that part of the twenty-nine day continuance
from January 6 through February 4 was improperly excluded, the
Ninth Circuit held that the seventy-day limitation was met. 1672 As with
the uncontested exclusion of the original November 4th continuance,
the period from January 6 through the 12th, involving defense coun-
sel's conflicts, was properly excluded to ensure continuity of
counsel.
1673
1665. 666 F.2d at 354.
1666. Id at 358 n.ll.
1667. Id at 359. The following chronology describes the continuous delays in the com-
mencement of the Nance trial. The indictment was issued on September 12, 1980, and trial
was scheduled to begin on November 4, 1980. Due to a death in the family of defendant
Lee's attorney, however, trial was continued until January 6, 1981, the earliest date counsel
could appear. Trial was then continued until January 13th because Lee's attorney was in-
volved in a custody case on January 6th. In place of the Nance trial on January 6th, the
district scheduled another criminal trial (Lawton). Nance was rescheduled for February 10,
1981. Due to the trial judge's illness, the Lawton trial began late and ran two days longer
than expected. Lawton ended on a Friday, and because Mondays were reserved exclusively
for sentencing and law and motions, the Nance trial was delayed until January 20th. The
trial was again postponed because the judge had to attend a judges' meeting on January
22nd. In addition, three custody cases scheduled for the week of January 27th were ex-
pected to run into the first week of February. The Nance trial finally began on February 4,
1981. Id at 356-57.
1668. Id at 355.
1669. Id at 357.
1670. Id
1671. Id at 356-57. The district court's exclusion of the delay from November 4, 1980
through January 6, 1981 to ensure continuity of counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) (Supp. III 1979) was unchallenged by the defendants. They did chal-
lenge, however, exclusion of the subsequent delays. 666 F.2d at 356-57.
1672. Id at 357.
1673. Id at 357-58. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) (Supp. V 1982). The court reasoned
that because Lee's attorney was unavailable through Friday, January 9th, the Nance trial
1983]
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Scheduling an intervening trial to make use of the courtroom va-
cancy created by the January 6th Nance continuance was also
proper. 674 Despite unanticipated delays in the commencement and
conclusion of the intervening trial, 1675 the court held that the period
from January 6th through the 20th was properly excluded, 1676 relying
upon the "ends ofjustice" exclusion under section 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv).1
677
The court held that the remaining period from January 27th
through February 4th, however, was improperly excluded.1678 Without
explanation, the Ninth Circuit refused to consider whether the judge's
absence because of the Judicial Conference on January 22nd and 23rd
was properly excluded. 67 9 The Nance trial was pre-empted by the
scheduling of three custody cases during the week of January 27th.
Such scheduling merely contributes to the court calendar's "general
congestion," which, under section 3161(h)(8)(C) of the Act, is not ex-
cludable based on the "ends of justice" rationale. 1680 The court sug-
gested that such delays should have been anticipated and alleviated by
reassignment to another judge.'
681
could not have begun until Tuesday, January 13th, regardless of an intervening trial. 666
F.2d at 357 n.9; see supra note 1667.
In support of this proposition the court cited United States v. Edwards, 627 F.2d 460,
461 (D.C. Cir.) (continuance resulting from defense attorney's illness and prosecutor's con-
flicting trial schedule was properly excluded), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980); and United
States v. Howard, 590 F.2d 564, 568-69 (4th Cir.) (continuance requested by defense attor-
ney to accommodate his schedule was properly excluded even though he was partially at
fault for the delay), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
1674. 666 F.2d at 358. The time estimated for the intervening trial may not extend the 70-
day limitation of the continued trial. 1d When initially scheduled, the Lawton trial was
expected to last only four days. Id at 357.
1675. See supra note 1667.
1676. 666 F.2d at 358.
1677. Id In making use of the vacant courtroom, the district court attempted to take ad-
vantage of judicial resources and sufficiently manage its own docket. The Ninth Circuit
considered this "consistent with the speedy trial interests of the public and the defendants."
Id
1678. Id at 359.
1679. Id
1680. Id Section 3161(h)(8)(C) specifically precludes such exclusions because they would
undermine the rationale of the Act, which is to prevent such general court congestion. Id
See United States v. Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 376 (2d Cir. 1979) (judge's
commitment to other trials which contributed to a delay in defendant's trial was not exclud-
able); United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1188 (2d Cir. 1976) (court's crowded docket
insufficient reason to exclude delay); United States v. Drummond, 511 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2d
Cir.) (Second Circuit issued strong admonition that cases should be reassigned quickly when
a judge's schedule becomes burdensome), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 844 (1975).
1681. 666 F.2d at 359-60. See United States District Court, Central District of California,
General Order No. 209, Plan for Achieving Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, § 4(g)
(1980) (Speedy Trial Plan). Accord, Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551-52 (8th Cir.
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After final computation, the court found that the Nance trial had
actually begun within sixty-eight days of the initial indictments, in
compliance with the Act.1682 Fifty-three days elapsed between indict-
ment and the original November 4, 1980 trial date, and fifteen days
elapsed between January 19th and the commencement of the trial on
February 4, 1981. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that dismissal of
the defendants' indictment was unwarranted.
1 683
Co-defendant Stelly also claimed that his sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial, as implemented by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 48(b), was violated.1 684 The court explained that the Speedy Trial
Act was enacted to strengthen the sixth amendment speedy trial guar-
antee. 1685 In rejecting Stelly's claim, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
when the requirements of the Act have been met, there is usually no
additional sixth amendment violation. 1686 The court relied on Barker v.
Wingo 1687 to explain that the delay in the Nance trial, which was less
than five months, was not "presumptively prejudicial."'' 688 Stelly also
failed to specifically allege that the delay resulted in any prejudice to
him, as required by Barker.1689 Finally, the court refused to concede
that Stelly's speedy trial rights under Rule 48(b) had been violated.
690
1969) judges required to work together by reassigning cases if necessary to ensure protec-
tion of the defendants' sixth amendment rights). 666 F.2d at 360.
1682. 666 F.2d at 360.
1683. Id.
1684. Id. "If there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may
dismiss the indictment, information or complaint." FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
1685. 666 F.2d at 360 (citing United States v. Mehrmanesh, 652 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir.
1980).
1686. 666 F.2d at 360.
1687. 407 U.S. 514, 531-33 (1972). In Barker, the Court identified four factors to be used
in the determination of a sixth amendment violation: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for
delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his sixth amendment right; and (4) resulting prejudice to
the defendant. Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, however, the Court does not
analyze the remaining three factors. Id at 530-31. See United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d
616, 620-21 (10th Cir. 1973) (eighteen-month delay not presumptively prejudicial), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 972 (1974); United States v. Diaz-Alvarado, 587 F.2d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir.
1978) (five month delay), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 927 (1979).
Had the Nance court analyzed the other three Barker factors, Stelly's claim still would
have been unsuccessful because the delay was primarily caused by the court's desire to en-
sure continuity of counsel. 666 F.2d at 361.
1688. 666 F.2d at 360.
1689. Id at 361. See United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 665 (9th Cir. 1980) (district
court's refusal to dismiss indictment due to delay not error where defendant failed to show
actual prejudice caused by post-indictment delay), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981).
1690. 666 F.2d at 361. Compare United States v. Pilla, 550 F.2d 1085, 1092-93 (8th Cir.)
(trial court's determination that defendant's rights were not violated under FED. R. CruM. P.
48(b) will be reversed only for abuse of discretion), cert denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) with
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In United States v. Arkus, 1691 the defendant challenged his convic-
tion of mail fraud, 1692 contending that his sixth amendment rights had
been violated and that he was not tried within the requisite seventy-day
limitation period under the Act. Despite the lapse of 186 days between
the original indictment and trial, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Arkus'
conviction, holding that neither the sixth amendment nor the Act had
been violated.
1693
Arkus and three associates were indicted on July 31, 1980, and
their trial was scheduled for October 7, 1980. After the death of a criti-
cal prosecution witness,16 94 the Government moved on October 3, 1980
to dismiss the indictments pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 48(a). 1695 Arkus was reindicted for the same offenses on Decem-
ber 23, 1980, arraigned on the 29th, and was scheduled for trial on
February 3, 198 1.1696 The district court computed the thirty-six day
delay between arraignment and trial by adding the six days that re-
mained in the seventy-day period after the first indictment to the thirty-
day hiatus required after any arraignment under 18 U.S.C. section
3161(c)(2). 1697 Arkus moved to dismiss his indictment on January 13,
1981, but the motion was denied.
1693
In affirming the conviction, the Ninth Circuit held that exclusion
United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir.) (defendant must demonstrate that the
delay prejudiced him before rule 48(b) is applicable), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 911 (1969).
1691. 675 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1982).
1692. Id at 246. Arkus and three other defendants were convicted on eight counts of mail
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, ...
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or
thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service .. . shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
1693. Arkus, 675 F.2d at 249.
1694. Id at 246. The witness died on September 11th; however, the Government learned
of the death on September 25th and did not confirm it until September 30, 1980. Id
1695. Id FED. R. CGlM. P. 48(a) provides that "[t]he Attorney General or the United
States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or com-
plaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. Such a dismissal may not be filed
during the trial without the consent of the defendant."
Only six days remained before the expiration of the 70-day period when the indictment
was dismissed. 675 F.2d at 246.
1696. 675 F.2d at 246.
1697. Id at 248. Section 3161(c)(2) provides that absent an express waiver, a defendant
cannot be tried within less than 30 days of his first appearance through counsel.
1698. Id at 247. The district court ordered exclusion of the 23-day period from September
1 th to October 3, 1980 because of the death of the Government's critical witness. It relied
upon § 3161(h)(3)(A) of the Act which requires the exclusion of "[a]ny period of delay re-
sulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness." Id It
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of the period during which Arkus' motion was pending was proper.1699
In addition, the court excluded eighty-one days which lapsed between
dismissal of the first indictment on October 3 and reindictment on De-
cember 23, 19 80.111 Relying on congressional intent, the court also
held that the thirty-day hiatus requirement of section 3161(c)(2) was
applicable to reindictments as well as indictments, despite a contrary
provision in the Central District's Plan for Prompt Disposition of
Criminal Cases (PPD).17 0 ' The Ninth Circuit considered the Speedy
Trial Act controlling when it conflicted with the PPD.1
70 2
The district court correctly applied the thirty-day requirement to
the reindictment, but it erroneously added the six days which remained
in the seventy-day period after dismissal of the first indictment.1
70 3
Had the six days been included in the thirty-day period, Arkus would
have been tried at the earliest possible date and afforded enough time
to prepare a defense.
170
4
Section 3161(h)(1), requiring exclusion of the period during which
a pre-trial motion is pending, applies to both the seventy-day limitation
and the thirty-day hiatus.170 5 Because Arkus moved to dismiss the in-
dictment before the thirty-day period lapsed, and because the period
during which his motion was pending was excludable, the trial began
within the thirty-day period and the Act was not violated.170 6 In re-
jecting Arkus' sixth amendment claim, the court held that the six-
also relied upon the "ends of justice" exclusion provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A)
(1976). 675 F.2d at 247.
The 20-day period from January 13th to February 2, 1981, during which time Arkus'
motion to dismiss was under consideration, was also excluded. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) re-
quires the exclusion of any period during which a pretrial motion is pending. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1)(F) (Supp. V 1982).
1699. 675 F.2d at 247. The period which elapsed between the initial indictment and the
dismissal is included in the computation of the 70-day limitation. See S. REP. No. 1021, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974). See also United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782, 793 (8th Cir.
1980) (seventy-day limitation period begins to run when defendant is first indicted).
1700. 675 F.2d at 247. The court relied upon § 3161(h)(6) of the Act which provides that
the period between the Government's dismissal of an indictment or information and re-
indictment for the same offense or "any offense required to be joined with that offense.
be excluded. Id; 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (1976).
1701. 675 F.2d at 248. Section 5 of the PPD provides that the 30-day period is to be




1705. Id n.4. The court relied upon "The Senate Committee Report accompanying the
amendments adding the 30 day provision. . ." Id (citing A. Partridge, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF TrrLE I OF SPEEDY TWiAL AcT OF 1974 at 73-4 (1980)).
1706. 675 F.2d at 248.
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month delay was not presumptively prejudicial. 7 7 In addition, there
was no indication that Arkus suffered any actual prejudice as a result of
the delay.1
70 8
In United States v. Saavedra, 70 9 the court held that a twenty-nine
day lapse between impaneling the jury and commencement of trial, pri-
marily due to the assistant United States Attorney's request for the dis-
trict judge's voluntary recusal, did not violate defendant's sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial.17 10 Saavedra was arrested for her
involvement in a credit card misappropriation scheme and convicted of
wire fraud17 11 and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
7 12
Saavedra's trial was scheduled for September 18, 1980 and contin-
ued at her request to September 30th, at which time the jury was im-
paneled and sworn in. Suppression motions were heard through
October 3rd, and during that time the district judge expressed his dis-
pleasure with the assistant United States Attorney's conduct. The court
then continued the case until October 9th for a determination of possi-
ble guilty pleas. At that time, the assistant United States Attorney's
request for the judge's voluntary recusal due to their prior confronta-
tions was denied. Instead the judge again continued the case, this time
to determine whether it could be voluntarily sent back for reassignment
after the jury had been impaneled and sworn. The trial was to be con-
tinued until October 21st. Due to a conflict with defense counsel's
schedule, however, the case was continued until October 27th. On Oc-
tober 27th, the judge denied the Government's request for a mistrial
and reassignment and its formal motion for recusal. 71 3 The four-day
1707. Id (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531). See supra note 1686 and accompany-
ing text.
1708. 675 F.2d at 248 (citing United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d at 361). See supra notes
1685-87 and accompanying text.
1709. 684 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982).
1710. Id at 1296-97.
1711. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
[wlhoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, ...
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television commu-
nication in interstate or foreign commerce,. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
1712. 684 F.2d at 1295. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
1713. In addition, Saavedra's request to determine whether the delay in trial prejudiced
the jury was denied. 684 F.2d at 1296.
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trial finally commenced on October 28, 1980.
Saavedra claimed that her sixth amendment right to a speedy trial
was violated because of the delay precipitated by the assistant United
States Attorney's dispute with the judge."" She argued that the Gov-
ernment's failure to make a formal motion for disqualification after the
district court's refusal to voluntarily reassign the case, and after a con-
tinuance was granted to permit such a motion, indicated an inadequate
reason for requesting voluntary recusal1 715
The Ninth Circuit found no sixth amendment violation, balancing
the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo :1716 (1) the length of delay,
(2) the reasons for delay, (3) whether defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and (4) whether prejudice resulted from the delay. 17 17 Be-
cause Saavedra was not incarcerated during the three and one-half
week period, one week of which was at defense counsel's request, the
court considered the length of the delay relatively minor. 7 18 There
was also no claim that the delay caused loss of memory or unavailabil-
ity of any witnesses.
1 719
In rejecting Saavedra's claim as to the inadequate reason for the
delay, the court held that the Government's request for voluntary
recusal was appropriate. 72 ° The court recognized the Government's
concern with bias arising from the ongoing dispute with the district
judge.172' Despite its failure to make a formal motion for disqualifica-
tion as anticipated, the Government reasonably believed the court
would voluntarily transfer the case, provided the procedural concerns
were met.
722
Saavedra also contended that the delay and publicity resulting
from the ongoing courtroom dispute may have prejudiced the jury.
723
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, relying on the fact that the jurors were
present only on October 3rd when they were impaneled, on October
1714. Id.
1715. Id
1716. 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972) (citations omitted). See supra note 1687 and accompa-
nying text.
1717. 684 F.2d at 1296-97.
1718. Id at 1296.
1719. Id
1720. Id at 1297.
1721. Id at 1296.
1722. Id at 1296-97. The court was concerned about the "propriety" of reassignment of
the case without declaration of a mistrial, to which Saavedra refused to consent. The court
also wanted to avoid any possible double jeopardy implications. Id at 1296.
1723. Id The district court denied Saavedra's request to poll the jury to determine
whether such prejudice existed. Id
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9th when they were to report to court, and on October 28th when the
trial began.'724 The district court did not implicate Saavedra with re-
sponsibility for the delay. Instead, the district judge explained to the
jury that the delay was caused by administrative burdens resulting
from his recent appointment as Chief District Judge 1725 and certain le-
gal problems in the case. 1726 Despite the district court's denial of Saa-
vedra's request to poll the jury, the Ninth Circuit found no indication
ofjury prejudice. 7 27 The court also dismissed the claim of "prejudicial
publicity" because it had not been raised at trial.1
7 2
Additionally, Saavedra argued that pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 48(b), which provides for dismissal due to unnec-
essary delay in the commencement of trial, the district court's failure to
dismiss her indictment was an abuse of discretion. 1729 Generally, dis-
missal of an indictment, information, or complaint under Rule 48(b) is
discretionary, unless the defendant has successfully demonstrated a
sixth amendment violation. 1730 The court, however, did not need to
decide if Rule 48(b) was applicable to these facts because the jury had
already been impaneled.1731 Even if the rule had been applicable, fail-
ure to dismiss the indictment did not amount to abuse of the district
court's discretion.
1732
Finally, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Saavedra's Speedy Trial Act
claim,1 33 which was raised for the first time on appeal during oral ar-
gument. Failure to address the Speedy Trial Act claim until appeal
was not "plain error"1'7 34 and therefore not reviewable under Federal
1724. Id.
1725. Id
1726. Id Though the record is unclear, these "legal problems" apparently involved the
voluntary reassignment issue presented by the conflict between the judge and the assistant
United States Attorney.
1727. Id
1728. Id at 1297. The court dismissed Saavedra's fifth amendment due process claim.
The court found that the action complained of did not violate "'fundamental conceptions of
justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions,'. . . and which define 'the
community's sense of fair play and decency."' Id (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783, 790 (1977) (citations omitted)).
1729. 684 F.2d at 1297.
1730. Id (citing United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 887 n.l (5th Cir.) (dismissal on
speedy trial grounds not mandatory unless defendant demonstrates violation of constitu-
tional rights), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978)).
1731. 684 F.2d at 1297.
1732. Id
1733. See supra note 1647 and accompanying text.
1734. 684 F.2d at 1297 (citing United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1976)
(defendant not permitted to argue for the first time on appeal that police had probable cause
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). 1735 Because the issue was not re-
viewable, the court refused to address Saavedra's argument that the
trial did not begin until the evidentiary phase of the trial began and
thus the seventy-day period had expired. Even if the seventy-day pe-
riod had expired, Saavedra's failure to move for dismissal under the
Act prior to trial, pursuant to section 3162(a)(2), precluded her from
doing so on appeal.
1 736
E. The Right to a Public Trial
One of the guarantees which the sixth amendment provides a per-
son charged with the commission of a crime is the "right to a speedy
and public trial." 1737 The Constitution, however, does not explicitly
give the public a right of access to a criminal trial. The criminal trial,
though, has historically been open to the press and general public. The
right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in
the functioning of the judicial process. Public scrutiny of a criminal
trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding
process, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process.
1 738
The United States Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,17 39 acknowledged that certain unarticulated constitutional
rights are implicit in the enumerated guarantees, and held that the pub-
lie's right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the
first amendment. 174  The Ninth Circuit recently applied this rule in
United States v. Brooklier.1741
In Brooklier, an indictment had been returned charging the de-
fendants with violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act. 17 4 2 The indictment alleged that the defendants were
members of "La Cosa Nostra." Three years elapsed between the return
for her arrest two hours prior to warrantless entry thereby demonstrating absence of exigent
circumstances)).
1735. 684 F.2d at 1297. FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(b) provides that "[p]lain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention
of the court."
1736. Id. at 1297 n.2. The defendant waives the right to dismiss under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3162(a)(2) (1976) unless a motion for dismissal is made prior to trial.
1737. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
1738. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). See also Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
1739. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (murder trial closed to the public).
1740. Id. at 580. The underlying purpose behind the first amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. Id at 575.
1741. 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
1742. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976) prohibit participation in a criminal enterprise that en-
gages in racketeering activity.
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of the original indictment and the initiation of jury selection. Public
interest was considerable. After questioning the potential jurors as a
group in open court, the trial judge closed the voir dire to the press and
the public. The remaining voir dire was conducted in camera over the
next two weeks. 17 43 Although the record reveals no contemporaneous
objection, motions were made over the next several days to open the
voir dire to the press, to which both counsel for defense and the govern-
ment objected. 1744 In denying the motions, the district court stated that
the defendants' sixth amendment rights required closure. 174 The dis-
trict court had rejected sequestering the jury as a more extreme meas-
ure than simply excluding the press and public from voir dire.
746
Daily transcripts of the voir dire were being prepared for later release.
An in camera hearing was set for a motion to suppress evidence of
an oral statement allegedly made by one of the defendants to FBI
agents. 1747 An oral motion was made by attorneys representing Times
Mirror Corporation, a newspaper publisher, requesting the hearing on
the motion to suppress be held in open court. The motion was denied.
The trial court incorporated by reference its earlier general findings
made in denying the motion to open the voir dire, and stated that the
defendants' sixth amendment rights required closed proceedings.
1748
Three days later, before the beginning of the afternoon session, the
press and public were asked to leave the courtroom. A closed hearing
was held to consider whether portions of a taped interview, conducted
between an author planning to write a book and a government witness,
were relevant to the credibility of the witness and could therefore be
admitted into evidence. 1749 Apparently, the proceedings were held in
camera to protect the author's proprietary interest in the tape. 1750
While the trial was still in progress, a motion was made by Times
Mirror Corporation seeking an order releasing the transcripts of the
three closed hearings, and requiring that no further hearings be closed
until the press had been given notice" and an opportunity to be
1743. 685 F.2d at 1166.
1744. Id
1745. Id
1746. Id The only specific reason given by the court for excluding the public was that
potential jurors would answer more freely if questioned alone. The record also disclosed
that the court was concerned with the possibility of prejudice resulting from excessive pub-
licity. Id at 1166-67.
1747. Id at 1169.
1748. Id at 1170.




heard."" The district court ruled that the transcripts of the closed
hearings would not be released until the trial was completed. 1752 The
district court went on to state that although the media had no legal
right to notice and an opportunity to be heard, those present in the
courtroom when it was announced that the room would be cleared
would be given a chance to object and to be heard by the court.1753
Times Mirror Corporation and Gene Blake, a Times Mirror re-
porter, filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition
and a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals while
the trial was still in progress. On the same day that argument was
heard on the petition, the jury returned a verdict convicting the defend-
ants, and the district court released the transcripts of the three closed
proceedings. 1754 The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Brooklier, de-
clined to issue an emergency writ, 7 55 dismissed the appeal, 756 and de-
nied the petition for a writ of mandamus.
757
The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the district court had not
satisfied the procedural prerequisites to entry of a closure order.
758
The court held that the public's first amendment right of access to crim-
inal proceedings applied to voir dire, as it is generally considered part
of a trial. 75 9 Moreover, the court acknowledged the important rela-
tionship between the public scrutiny of the jury selection process and
the effective functioning of the judicial system.
760
1751. Id at 1172.
1752. Id
1753. Id
1754. Id at 1165.
1755. Id
1756. Id The appeal was dismissed because the Ninth Circuit has not recognized standing
to appeal in persons not parties to the case. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1360
(9th Cir. 1978).
1757. 685 F.2d at 1173. The court held that the case was not moot because closure orders
of the kind involved here were capable of repetition yet evading review. Id at 1165 (citing
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 603; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 563; Gannet Co., Inc.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Sacramento Bee v. United States District Court, 656
F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982)). The court then denied the
petition for writ of mandamus, finding not only that all of the transcripts had already been
released but that the controlling law was unclear at the time the district court ruled. The
court expressed confidence that the district court would act in accordance with the stated
guidelines, making the writ unnecessary. 685 F.2d at 1173.
1758. 685 F.2d at 1166.
1759. Id at 1167 (citing Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270, 271
(1977)); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Mont. 1980)). The
Brooklier court rejected the Government's argument that the first amendment right of access
applied only to trials and therefore the public had no right of access to voir dire as it was a
pretrial procedure.
1760. 685 F.2d at 1167 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606).
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The court established the guidelines for when a criminal proceed-
ing may be closed to the public. The proponent seeking closure must
establish that the closure is necessary in order to guarantee a fair
trial. 1761  This is accomplished by demonstrating a substantial
probability that: (1) the right to a fair trial will be irreparably damaged
from conducting the proceeding in public; (2) no alternative to closure
will adequately protect the right to a fair trial; and (3) closure will be
effective in protecting against the danger.
1762
Before these substantive guidelines need be examined, however,
two procedural prerequisites to entry of an order closing a criminal
proceeding to the public must be satisfied: "(1) those excluded from
the proceeding must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to state their
objections; and (2) the reasons supporting closure must be articulated
in findings."' 763
The Ninth Circuit found it questionable whether in closing voir
dire the district court satisfied the first procedural prerequisite; it was
clear, however, that the district court did not satisfy the second prereq-
uisite.1764 The court stated that when a closure motion is not filed of
record or made in open court, and members of the public wish to be
present at the proceeding, reasonable steps should be taken to provide
those persons with an opportunity to be heard before exclusion is ac-
complished.176 5 In the instant case, the record did not demonstrate that
any steps were taken to provide notice to the public before they were
excluded from voir dire.
17 6 6
To enable the appellate court to determine whether the closure or-
der was properly entered, the trial court should state on the record its
findings regarding the need for closure and should do so with sufficient
specificity so as to show that the three substantive prerequisites to clo-
sure have been satisfied.1767 The court held that the district court failed
to make specific findings to indicate that the three substantive prerequi-
1761. 685 F.2d at 1167 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 440-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (public excluded from a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress
evidence to be used in a murder trial)).
1762. 685 F.2d at 1167 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 440-42 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
1763. 685 F.2d at 1167-68.
1764. Id at 1168.
1765. Id In determining what steps are reasonable, the district court should avoid any
steps that would result in a material delay in the trial. Id (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 401
(Powell, J., concurring); id at 446 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
1766. 685 F.2d at 1168.
1767. Id at 1168-69.
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sites to closure had been satisfied. 1768 The court stated that a general
finding that a balancing of first and sixth amendment rights dictated
the closure of voir dire to the public did not afford a basis for determin-
ing whether the district court correctly concluded that public proceed-
ings would result in irreparable damage to the defendants' right to a
fair trial. 176 9 The record also failed to disclose whether the district
court found that no available alternatives to closure would have ade-
quately protected the defendants' rights. 1 770 The record indicated that
the only alternative considered by the district court was sequestration
of the jury, an admittedly extreme measure.' 77' Therefore, the court
concluded that the district court improperly entered the order closing
voir dire of the prospective jurors.
772
The court similarly analyzed the order closing the hearing on the
motion to suppress. The court held that the public's right of access to a
criminal trial under the first amendment was equally applicable to pre-
trial hearings on motions to suppress evidence. 1773 The court found
that the district court satisfied the first procedural prerequisite in that
Blake and Times Mirror Corporation had a full opportunity to be
heard in opposition to the closure order. 774 However, the district
court's findings supporting the closure suffered from the same deficien-
cies as the finding entered in closing the voir dire. The record did not
disclose the reasons why a public hearing on the motion would have
prejudiced the defendants' right to a fair trial.1775 Additionally, no rea-
son was given why alternatives other than total closure would not have
adequately protected that right.
1776
The Ninth Circuit held that the third order, closing the hearing on
a motion by a non-party to exclude from evidence certain tapes, must
satisfy the same procedural prerequisites and substantive standards as
the other two orders.1777 In this instance, no opportunity was provided
1768. Id at 1169.
1769. Id.
1770. Id Such findings are required. Id (citing Sacramento Bee, 656 F.2d at 482; United
States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 560-62 (3d Cir. 1982)).
1771. 685 F.2d at 1169 (citing Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1977)).
1772. 685 F.2d at 1169.
1773. Id at 1170 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring); id at 434-36
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
1774. 685 F.2d at 1171.
1775. Id
1776. Id
1777. Id (citing Fenner & Koley, Access to Judicial Proceedings, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rv. 415,443-44 (1981)). The court noted that a narrow closure might have been appropri-
ate if the procedural and substantive prerequisites could have been satisfied. 685 F.2d at
1171-72.
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to object to the closure, and no findings whatsoever were entered justi-
fying the closure.
1778
Lastly, the court held that transcripts of properly closed proceed-
ings must be released when the danger of prejudice has passed. ' 779 The
denial of a motion to release the transcripts must be tested by the same
procedural prerequisites and substantive standards as the initial closure
order.1780 The district court's findings in denying the motion to release
the transcripts of the three in camera proceedings immediately, rather
than at the close of trial, were not sufficient to demonstrate that the
court had made the determinations necessary to justify denial of the
public's first amendment right of access.
178 '
III. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Grand Jury Proceedings
1. Grand juror selection
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that before a defendant may be tried on felony criminal charges an
inoictment must be returned by a grand jury.1782 Typically, the grand
jury receives the prosecution's evidence and accedes to its recommen-
dation to go forward with the prosecution. If the grand jury finds that
prima facie grounds for criminal prosecution are lacking, however, the
case is dismissed.
178 3
Grand jurors are selected randomly, usually from voter registra-
tion lists or lists of actual voters. 1784 When the jury is selected and
impaneled, the court appoints one member as foreman and another as
deputy.178 5 The ultimate goal in selection and impaneling of grand ju-
rors is to assure a fair cross-section of the community on the jury. 786
An indictment may be set aside upon a proper showing that the system-
1778. 685 F.2d at 1172.
1779. Id (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring)). The court stated that
denial of access, even when appropriate, must be no greater than necessary to protect the
interest justifying it. 685 F.2d at 1172 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609; Sacramento
Bee, 656 F.2d at 482-83).
1780. 685 F.2d at 1172.
1781. Id at 1172-73.
1782. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 760-61 (1961).
1783. 9 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 22:421.
1784. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1863(b)(2) (1976)).
1785. FED. R. CRiM. PROC. 6(c) provides that "[t]he court shall appoint one of the jurors to
be foreman and another to be deputy foreman .... "




atic exclusion of a cognizable class of citizens or a substantive deviation
between identifiable groups has resulted in the failure of the juror pool
to represent a fair cross-section of the community. 1787 The Ninth Cir-
cuit has recently considered a case where the defendants challenged the
procedure employed to appoint grand jury forepersons.
In United States v. Coletta,78 8 the defendants sought dismissal of
their indictment because of alleged irregularities in the selection of
grand jury forepersons. They contended that the procedure used in the
Northern District of California. to appoint grand jury forepersons did
not require random selection, but allowed discretion in the choice of
these forepersons. 1719 They claimed, therefore, that the disproportion-
ate number of Caucasian males appointed as forepersons was an abuse
of discretion and a violation of their constitutional rights. 1790 The dis-
trict court held that the defendants, all Caucasian males, lacked stand-
ing to assert such a claim of discrimination against women and
minorities.
1791
The defendants based their challenge of the procedures employed
to select grand juror forepersons on Rose v. Mitchell,1 792 and claimed
they had standing to raise this challenge based upon the authority of
Peters v. Kff.17 93 In Rose, the Supreme Court held that the black de-
fendants who alleged systematic exclusion of blacks from appointment
as forepersons of state grand juries could state a claim under the equal
protection clause.1 794 In Peters, the Court held that a white defendant
had standing to challenge the system used to select his grand or petit
jury on the ground that it arbitrarily excluded blacks from service.
1795
The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court's position that the
defendants lacked standing to challenge the selection procedures for
grand jury forepersons. 1796 The court stated that the defendants' theory
that Peters granted them standing to seek dismissal of their indictment
based on Rose failed to distinguish the constitutional bases of the two
cases. 179 7 It first explained that the defendant in Peters had alleged a
due process violation, and thus under Peters, the defendants did have
1787. 579 F.2d at 1133.
1788. 682 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1187 (1983).
1789. Id. at 822-23.
1790. Id at 823.
1791. Id.
1792. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
1793. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
1794. 443 U.S. at 556.
1795. 407 U.S. at 504.
1796. 682 F.2d at 822-24.
1797. Id at 823.
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standing to challenge the selection procedures as due process viola-
tions. 1 798 The court held, however, that the defendants' allegations
were insufficient to state a claim under the due process clause.1 799 It
noted that while there might be some circumstances under which sys-
tematic discrimination in the choice of forepersons would so imperil
the integrity of the jury system that the resulting indictments and con-
victions would be fundamentally unfair, the defendants had failed to
show such prejudice. The court held the defendants' arguments "failed
to suggest how the selection of one person, serving on a correctly con-
stituted panel, could have a significant impact on the basic fairness of
the process. ' 'la°°
The court also held that the defendants had no standing under
Rose to challenge the selection of forepersons as an equal protection
violation.1 80 It held that, because the defendants were not members of
any group excluded from the foreperson selection process, they had ex-
perienced "no injury to their personal rights to equal protection" and
therefore lacked standing to assert the equal protection rights of those
who may have been excluded. 1802
2. Number of grand jurors in attendance
Relying on the fifth amendment and the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure,1 80 3 the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Leverage
Funding Systems, Inc. 1804 that an indictment is valid if: (1) the grand
jury returning the indictment consisted of between sixteen and twenty-
three jurors; (2) every grand jury session was attended by at least six-
teen jurors; and (3) at least twelve jurors voted to indict.1805 It is not
mandated that every juror voting to indict attend every session.la °e
1798. Id at 823-24.
1799. Id at 824.
1800. Id
1801. Id InRose, the Court stated that for a defendant to challenge a grand juror selection
procedure, he must "'show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial under-
representation of hfr race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs.'" 443 U.S. at 565
(quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (emphasis added)).
1802. 682 F.2d at 824 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1974); Halet v. Wend
Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308 (9th Cir. 1982)).
1803. FED. R. CriM. P. 6(a) provides: "(a) The grand jury shall consist of not less than 16
nor more than 23 members. The court shall direct that a sufficient number of legally quali-
fied persons be summoned to meet this requirement." FED. R. CiuM. P. 6(f) provides in
pertinent part: "(f) An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more
jurors ....
1804. 637 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
1805. Id at 648, 649.
1806. Id
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These requirements were at issue in several recent Ninth Circuit cases.
In United States v. Godoy, 1807 only ten of the seventeen grand ju-
rors voting to return the indictment attended all the evidentiary ses-
sions. Relying on the district court's decision in Leverage Funding,1
80 8
Godoy contended that the remaining seven grand jurors were not "le-
gally qualified" to vote the return of the indictment because they were
not fully informed. He argued therefore, that his indictment was inva-
lid because it was not returned "upon the concurrence of 12 or more
jurors," as required by Federal.Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(f).18°
The Ninth Circuit, noting it had reversed the district court in Leverage
Funding, simply held that the indictment satisfied the criteria set forth
in Leverage Funding and was therefore valid.1810
In United States v. Barker,I81I the defendant was convicted of as-
sault on a federal officer, deprivation of civil rights, making false state-
ments to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and perjury
before a grand jury. Barker moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that only eighteen grand jurors voting the indictment had at-
tended all the evidentiary sessions. Barker acknowledged the holding
in Leverage Funding,18 12 but asserted that a different result is warranted
when the grand jury considers a charge of perjury. He contended a
perjury charge rests on the grand jurors' determination of the credibil-
ity of other witnesses; therefore each grand juror must observe the de-
meanor of those witnesses to weigh the evidence properly. 
81 3
The Ninth Circuit stated that Leverage Funding requires a pre-
sumption that a grand juror who votes to indict has heard sufficient
evidence.18 1 4 The court thus presumed "in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, that the grand jurors voting to indict here heard all the evidence
on the perjury counts they were required to hear in order to perform
their duties properly."'' 8 5 The court thus did not decide whether a
different rule, requiring that each grand juror voting to indict hear spe-
1807. 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1981).
1808. 478 F. Supp. 799 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 637 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980).
1809. 678 F.2d at 86. See supra note 1803.
1810. 678 F.2d at 86. Similarly, in United States v. Mayes, 670 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1982),
the defendant moved to dismiss his indictment because only eleven grand jurors voting the
indictment attended every session. The Ninth Circuit stated that the resolution of this issue
was controlled by Leverage Funding and held the indictment valid. Id at 129.
1811. 675 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1982).
1812. See supra notes 1804-05 and accompanying text.
1813. 675 F.2d at 1057-58.
1814. Id at 1058 (citing United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 645,
649 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)).
1815. 675 F.2d at 1058.
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cific witnesses, is necessary in cases involving allegations of perjury
before the grand jury.
These decisions demonstrate the absence of a requirement in the
Ninth Circuit that the twelve or more jurors voting the indictment com-
prise part of the sixteen jurors at every evidentiary session. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that even in perjury cases, where witness credibility is at
issue, some of the jurors voting to indict did not observe important wit-
ness demeanor evidence. However, because imposing rigid guidelines
on grand jury procedure would impede its ability to "ferret out and
charge wrongdoers,"'' 8 1 6 and because the defendant has an opportunity
to test the government's evidence at trial, the Ninth Circuit logically
accords more weight to the importance of the grand jury's function
than to the minimal harm to the defendant in these types of cases.
3. Grand jury instructions
Before the grand jury decides whether to return an indictment on
the evidence presented, the prosecuting attorney may direct the grand
jury in matters of procedure, or read the statutes upon which the indict-
ment is to be founded.8 17 The prosecuting attorney may not advise the
grand jury as to questions of law affecting the rights of the accused, or
as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.18 18 However, because
"an indictment... valid on its face.., is enough to call for trial on
the charge on the merits,"' 819 an indictment may stand even though the
grand jury has been given allegedly improper instructions. 820 The
Ninth Circuit has recently reaffirmed this rule.
In United States v. Wright,18 2 1 the defendant challenged his con-
viction for tax evasion, contending that the indictment was returned by
a grand jury which had been erroneously instructed on a material as-
pect of the law by the prosecuting attorney. 1822 The Ninth Circuit first
1816. United States v. Trass, 644 F.2d 791,795-96 (1981). See also United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-46 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-88 (1972).
1817. 1 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES § 6.21 at 384
(1966) [hereinafter cited as ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
1818. Id
1819. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
1820. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.21 at 384.
1821. 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982).
1822. Id at 796. Wright had been charged with income tax evasion. The grand jury was
instructed by the prosecutor that it could infer that an increase in net worth was attributable
to taxable income which should have been reported. Wright, relying on Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), argued that the instruction was improper because the govern-
ment must prove that an increase in net worth was attributable to a likely source of taxable
income. He conceded that the grand jury was correctly instructed by an expert witness, but
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noted that an indictment is not subject to dismissal unless the prosecu-
tor's conduct was flagrant to the point of deceiving the grand jury, sig-
nificantly infringing on its ability to exercise independent judgment.
18 23
The court noted that the grand jury in this case was completely in-
formed on the permissible presumptions and inferences that it could
draw from the evidence, and on all the elements of the case that the
Government had to prove.1 824 The court therefore concluded that the
prosecutor's conduct neither significantly infringed on the grand jury's
ability to exercise its independent judgment, 1825 nor significantly
deceived the grand jury. 826 Therefore, it held that the trial court did
not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment. 8 27
4. Grand jury secrecy
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) generally imposes a
cloak of secrecy upon grand jury proceedings, forbidding disclosure of
matters occurring before the grand jury for any purpose other than to
assist the prosecuting attorney. 1828 The reasons for grand jury secrecy
are:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand
jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to in-
dictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the
witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear
at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect inno-
cent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact
that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of
contended that there is a significant distinction between instructions by the prosecutor and
testimony by a government witness. 667 F.2d at 796.
1823. Id. (citing United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1981)).
1824. 667 F.2d at 796. The grand jury had also been thoroughly informed about the effects
of non-taxable income. Id
1825. I (citing United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d at 1353).
1826. 667 F.2d at 796 (citing United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir.
1978)).
1827. 667 F.2d at 796.
1828. FED. R. ClM. P. 6(e)(3)(B) provides that "[amny person to whom matters are dis-
closed.., shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other than assisting the
attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal
criminal law...."
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standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.1829
The Ninth Circuit has recently considered the need for grand jury
secrecy in a situation involving the examination of secret grand jury
materials by an expert witness. In United States v. Mayes," 30 the de-
fendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for the asphyxia-
tion death of his ten month old daughter. Mayes contended that the
indictment against him should have been dismissed because Dr. Chad-
wick, an expert witness, examined secret grand jury materials before
testifying to the grand jury on the cause of death.'
831
The Ninth Circuit determined that allowing Dr. Chadwick to ex-
amine transcripts of witness testimony and other evidence was far more
"expeditious and reliable" than requiring the Government to use the
facts surrounding the child's death to pose a complex hypothetical
question. The court concluded that because Dr. Chadwick examined
these secret materials under court supervision, sufficient safeguards had
existed to prevent abuse of the procedure. 832 It therefore held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by authorizing disclosure of
these materials under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(e)(3)(C)(i),18 33 which provides that a court may order disclosure of
grand jury materials "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding."'
1 34
The Ninth Circuit again demonstrated in Mayes the higher prior-
ity it places on expediency and reliability rather than on procedures
which may encumber the grand jury process.
. Indictments
1. Challenges to the face of the indictment
Every defendant in a criminal prosecution has an inalienable right
"to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation""" against
1829. United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958) (quoting United
States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
1830. 670 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1982).
1831. Id at 128-29.
1832. Id at 129.
1833. FED. R. CraM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i) provides that "[d]isclosure otherwise prohibited by
this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made. . . when so directed
by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.. .."
1834. 670 F.2d at 129. The court stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether a grand
jury proceeding is a 'Judicial proceeding" under Rule 6(e), as grand jury proceedings are
clearly at least preliminary to a judicial proceeding. Id (citing United States v. Stanford,
589 F.2d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 1978)).
1835. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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him. A primary function of the indictment is to fulfill this notice re-
quirement. 18 36 In Russell v. United States,"37 the Supreme Court for-
mulated the test by which the adequacy of an indictment is to be
measured. First, the indictment must contain the elements of the of-
fense to be charged and must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what
he must be prepared to meet at trial. 1838 Second, the indictment must
allow the defendant to plead a bar to future prosecution for the same
offense.1839  The Ninth Circuit recently considered challenges to the
faces of indictments, both on their content and on their form.
For instance, in United States v. Gilman,' 840 the defendants chal-
lenged the content of their indictment for the inclusion of certain fac-
tual allegations. The Gilman defendants were convicted of mailing
obscene material and of conspiracy. They contended that certain overt
acts listed in the conspiracy count of the indictment contained prejudi-
cial information which should have been stricken.1
8 4 1
The Ninth Circuit held that the overt acts listed were relevant and
properly included in the indictment because they were necessary ele-
ments of the crime of conspiracy. 8 42 Further, the Government was
entitled to prove the conspiracy by introduction of probative evidence,
regardless of the defendants' willingness to stipulate.
8 43
In Douglas v. Long, 8 44 the defendant was convicted in an Arizona
court of unlawfully offering to sell narcotic drugs. On appeal after de-
nial of a petition for habeas corpus, Douglas challenged the form of the
indictment against him. The indictment charged him with one count of
offering to sell narcotic drugs, or, in the alternative, with one count of
obtaining money by false or fraudulent pretenses. Douglas contended
that the grand jury should have charged him with one count and an-
1836. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763, 765 (1962).
1837. Id. at 763-64.
1838. Id. at 763, 765.
1839. Id. at 764.
1840. 684 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1982).
1841. Id. at 622. The acts listed were that: (1) one of the defendants used the San Fran-
cisco Redevelopment Agency facilities at least once to print order forms for obscene
magazines; and that (2) the defendants offered for sale obscene magazines containing photo-
graphs taken at one defendant's home. Id.
1842. Id. (citing United States v. Kalama, 549 F.2d 594, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1110 (1977); United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978)). The essential elements of conspiracy are: (1) an agree-
ment to accomplish an illegal objective coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance
of that objective; and (2) the requisite intent to commit the underlying substantive offense or
offenses. United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1980).
1843. 684 F.2d at 622. Cf. United States v. Durcan, 539 F.2d 29, 30-31 (9th Cir. 1976).
1844. 661 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982).
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other, not with one count or another.18 45 He further contended that the
indictment was improper because it stated that the charges in the two
counts were mutually exclusive alternatives. I 46
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the usual rule forbidding alter-
native or inconsistent charges within a single count. 8 47 It explained
that if a jury returns a single verdict on a count charging mutually ex-
clusive offenses, it becomes impossible to determine which charge the
jury sustained. Review, therefore, is difficult or impossible.1 48  The
court then held that the usual rule does not extend to cases where the
inconsistent charges are made in separate counts.' 8 4 9 The court rea-
soned that the indictment gave Douglas adequate notice of the charges
against him,18 50 since the two charges merely covered two plausible in-
terpretations of his actions.'18 5  The court stated that Douglas was fur-
ther protected because he could not have been convicted of both
offenses.1s52 Finally, the court noted that Douglas could not have been
prejudiced by the two counts being connected by the word "or," since
use of this connective could only have "emphasize[d] to the jury that
[Douglas] could not be found guilty on both counts."'
853
1845. Id. at 748. Douglas argued that his case was distinguishable from Fuller v, United
States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969). In
Fuller, according to Douglas, the prosecutor charged the defendant with premeditated mur-
der and felony murder in separate counts of an indictment; however, Douglas continued, the
Fuller court did not permit the defendant to be charged with having committed one crime or
another. 661 F.2d at 748.
1846. Id. at 749. The court noted that Douglas apparently accepted the propriety of charg-
ing alternate offenses to allow for contingencies in proof. Id. at 748 (citing Sutton v. United
States, 434 F.2d 462, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971)).
1847. 661 F.2d at 749 (citing United States v. Donovan, 339 F.2d 404, 406-07 (7th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 975 (1965); State v. Fowler, 174 Ohio St. 362, 189 N.E.2d 133
(1963)).
1848. 661 F.2d at 749 (citing In re Bell, 19 Cal. 2d 488, 499-500, 122 P.2d 22, 29 (1942); 2
WHARTON'S CRiMNAL PROCEDURE § 291 & n.19).
1849. 661 F.2d at 749.
1850. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
1851. 661 F.2d at 749. The court stated that such an indictment gives "no less notice than
one that appends a lesser included offense, where intent is at issue and a conviction may not
be had for both crimes." Id. Cf. United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 547-50 (1976).
1852. 661 F.2d at 749. The court noted that this case was similar to the Supreme Court's
hypothetical in United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 550 (1976). The Gaddis Court ex-
plained that if a person participated in a bank robbery and then received proceeds from the
robbery, it is obviously appropriate for a grand jury to return an indictment charging both
robbery and receiving. If the trial judge is satisfied that sufficient evidence is presented to go
to the jury on both counts, the judge must instruct the jurors that they may not convict the
defendant on both counts. 424 U.S. at 550 (citing Heffin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415
(1959); Milanovoch v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961)).
1853. 661 F.2d at 749. Judge Hoffman, in a special concurrence, stated that he concurred
in the opinion because the case involved a matter of state procedure, approved by the Ari-
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In United States v. Williams,854 the defendant was convicted on
seven counts of making false statements in the acquisition of firearms.
Williams had purchased seven guns on five separate occasions and had
made a false statement on the form that he filled out for each gun. He
contended that, because there were fewer than seven offenses, certain of
the seven counts in the indictment should have been dismissed.
8 55
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to dismiss any
of the counts. The court stated that successive acts, no matter how
close in time, are separate offenses. 1 856 The court concluded that since
Williams made a false statement in connection with each gun, he was
correctly indicted on seven counts.1
8 57
In United States v. Mehrmanesh,8"" the defendant was convicted
of two counts of distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. section
841(a)(1) .18 9 The first count arose from the delivery of a heroin sam-
ple by Mehrmanesh's associates to a Government informant; the sec-
ond count was based on a later delivery of the balance of the heroin.
Mehrmanesh was sentenced to a separate prison term on each count.
On appeal, Mehrmanesh argued that he should have been sen-
tenced on only one count. The court rejected this argument and held
that the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution was inapplicable,
reasoning that the clause applies only where the same act gives rise to
two offenses and not where, as in Mehrmanesh, two different acts are
alleged. 1
86 0
Mehrmanesh also argued that the distribution of the sample to the
informant was part of a single transaction whereby all the heroin was
distributed, and that the first count was therefore multiplicitous and
zona state courts, which did not raise a federal constitutional question. He stressed, how-
ever, that alternative counts in an indictment are not necessarily entitled to the "same
consideration in a federal criminal action," and repeated the majority's statement that "'in-
consistent charges with a count have long since been condemned.' "Id. at 750 (Hoffman, J.,
concurring). Noting that alternative relief is not provided for in the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, although it is under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he
concluded that, unless modified by statute or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, he
would not "sanction alternative charges in an indictment under the federal system." Id.
1854. 685 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir. 1982).
1855. Id. at 320.
1856. Id. at 321 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
1857. 685 F.2d at 321.
1858. 682 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982).
1859. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) provides that "(a) . . . [i]t shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. .. ."
1860. 682 F.2d at 1305 (distinguishing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958), and
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).
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should have been dismissed.8 61 He relied on United States v. Fergu-
son, 1862 where the court construed 26 U.S.C. section 4705(a), a prede-
cessor to the Act under which Mehrmanesh was convicted, to require
conviction on a per-sale or per-purchase basis.186 3 The Mehrmanesh
court held that the two deliveries constituted separate offenses under
section 841(a)(1),' 86 relying in part on the statutory definition of a
"distribution" as a delivery of a controlled substance.1865 The court
further noted that the Act reaches not only buyers and sellers, but all
participants in the chain of distribution, 866 and reasoned that to limit
offenses under the Act to discrete purchases or sales would be unrea-
sonable in view of the broad scope of possible defendants.' 67
2. Adequacy and competency of evidence
The Supreme Court has held that when a duly constituted grand
jury returns an indictment valid on its face, no independant inquiry
may be made into the nature of the evidence supporting the indict-
ment. 1'8 68 The Ninth Circuit therefore accords substantial deference to
the judgment of grand juries as to the adequacy and competency of the
evidence presented to them. 869 Thus, dismissal of indictments is re-
quired only in "extreme situations"' 187 0 or "flagrant cases."'187' The
1861. 682 F.2d at 1305.
1862. 498 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
1863. Id. at 1009.
1864. Mehrmanesh, 682 F.2d at 1307.
1865. Id. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1976) (defining "distribution") and 21 U.S.C. § 802(8)
(1976) (defining "delivery" as a transfer of a controlled substance).
1866. 682 F.2d at 1306 (citing United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973)).
1867. Id.
1868. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956). In Costello, the Court held as
valid an indictment based exclusively on hearsay evidence. The Court stated:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the
merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not
required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted
and unbiased grand jury. . . is enough to call for trial of the charges on the merits.
Id. at 363.
1869. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956)). In Basurto, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to im-
port and distribute marijuana. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the general rule that, when
a duly constituted grand jury returns an indictment that is valid on its face, no independent
inquiry may be made to determine the kind of evidence considered by the grand jury in
making its decision. The Basurto court, however, reversed the defendant's conviction be-
cause the indictment was based on perjured testimony which was both material to the case
and known to the Government as being perjured. Id. at 787.
1870. United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Ninth Circuit recently considered cases in which indictments were
challenged on grounds that the evidence supporting them was inade-
quate and incompetent.
In United States v. Tham, 1872 the defendant argued that the indict-
ment charging him with embezzlement of union funds and with false
entries on union records should have been dismissed by the district
court because the Government failed to provide the grand jury with
certain information. The Government had alleged that Tham spent
union funds entertaining various friends, including Aladana (Jimmy)
Fratianno, for purposes unrelated to union business. 18 73 Tham con-
tended that his expenditures were permitted by the union's bylaws, and
that the Government therefore should have read the bylaws to the
grand jury. Tham further argued that the Government should have
presented evidence of Fratianno's lack of credibility, and should have
presented Fratianno's testimony live, rather than by means of a tran-
script of earlier grand jury testimony. 1874
The Ninth Circuit reiterated that ordinarily, there will be no in-
dependent inquiry into the kind of evidence presented to the grand
jury. 18 75 The court concluded that Tham's contentions were merit-
less. 8 76 This was not an extreme situation, such as when a prosecutor
knowingly presents perjured testimony; therefore, the grand jury need
not be advised of all matters concerning a witness's credibility.
1877
Similarly, in United States v. Eden,1878 the defendant contended
that the trial court erred in refusing to compel the Government to pres-
ent exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Eden was indicted and
convicted of embezzlement and conversion of government funds and
concealing material facts from the Department of Health, Education
1871. Id. In Thompson, the defendant appealed his conviction for forging the name of a
payee on a United States treasury check. He contended that the indictment against him
should have been dismissed because the grand jury was never told of the payee's affidavit,
which conceivably might have borne on the payee's credibility. The court stated:
The contention is without merit. The grand jury need not be advised of all matters
bearing on the credibility of potential witnesses. Dismissal of an indictment is re-
quired only in flagrant cases in which the grand jury has been overreached or
deceived in some significant way, as where perjured testimony has knowingly been
presented. There is nothing shocking to the conscience in the circumstances here.
Id. at 786.
1872. 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
1873. Id. at 857.
1874. Id. at 862-63.
1875. Id. at 863 (citing United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974)).
1876. 665 F.2d at 863.
1877. Id (citing United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978)).
1878. 659 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982).
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and Welfare. 9 Prior to trial, he voluntarily submitted to a polygraph
examination. The trial court, according to Eden's argument, should
have required that the results be presented to the grand jury; Eden ar-
gued that such a procedure would have been a proper exercise of the
court's supervisory power to prevent Government impropriety in grand
jury investigations. °880
The Ninth Circuit upheld the exclusion, relying on the Thompson
rule 881 that a grand jury need not be provided with all information
bearing on the credibility of potential witnesses.18 2 Therefore, under
the Thompson "flagrant case" standard, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to compel the Government to present evidence
which was later determined to be inadmissible anyway.
883
In United States v. Garner,88 4 the defendant challenged the indict-
ment charging her with wire fraud on the ground that the trial court
had denied her motion to inspect certain grand jury attendance records.
She contended that the disclosure was necessary to show that a quorum
of the grand jurors voting to return the indictment had not directly
heard the evidence supporting the indictment.1
8 8 5
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying Garner's motion. 1886 Examination of the record
showed that the jurors who voted to indict were provided a complete
transcript of all testimony previously taken, as well as testimony sum-
marizing the transcripts. The court noted that the prosecution need not
present live testimony if it provides complete transcripts. 88 7 Thus,
since Garner had not shown any impropriety in the indictment,18 88 and
since the trial court had ordered disclosure of all testimony taken by
the grand jury, Garner's motion was properly denied.
In United States v. Traylor, 89 the defendants contended that the
1879. Id. at 1377.
1880. Id. at 1382.
1881. See supra notes 1870-71.
1882. Id. (citing United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978)).
1883. 659 F.2d at 1382.
1884. 663 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
1885. Id. at 840.
1886. Id.
1887. Id. (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977)).
1888. 663 F.2d at 840. The court noted that an indictment will be upheld if "'(1) the grand
jury returning the indictment consisted of between 16 and 23 jurors, (2) every grand jury
session was attended by at least 16 jurors, and (3) at least 12 jurors vote to indict.'" /d.
(quoting United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 637 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981)).
1889. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
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indictment charging them with various drug-related offenses, including
conspiracy, was supported by the perjured testimony of a key Govern-
ment witness. 1890 The Ninth Circuit let the indictment stand, although
the witness admitted at trial that he had made certain false statements
before the grand jury, because the statements were immaterial.1891 The
discrepancies between the witness's grand jury and trial testimony did
not alter the defendants' alleged involvement in the conspiracy, and
therefore did not require dismissal of the indictment.
189 2
These Ninth Circuit decisions demonstrate the deference accorded
a grand jury indictment in even the most extreme cases. There exist,
however, countervailing policies. For example, no person should be
made to stand trial on the basis of unfounded accusations. But the
necessity of bringing wrongdoers to trial, and the assurance that the
trial jury will examine the indictment and explore the credibility of wit-
nesses, appear to outweigh these policies.
3. Time delays
a. pre-indictment delay
Section 3282 of title 18, United States Code, provides that a person
shall not be prosecuted for any non-capital offense unless an indict-
ment is instituted within five years after the offense is committed.
8 93
This five year statute of limitations represents a balance of the govern-
ment's need for sufficient time to discover and investigate crime and the
defendant's right to avoid perpetual liability for past offenses.18 94
However, Congress also provided in section 3290 of title 18 that no
statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.
1895
In United States v. Gonsalves,1 8 96 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the five year statute of limitations tolled on a federal indict-
ment during a period of the defendant's flight from justice on an unre-
lated federal indictment in another jurisdiction. In 1980 Gonsalves was
indicted in San Diego for his involvement, five years and fifty-six days
1890. Id. at 1334.
1891. Id. (citing United States v. Bracy, 566 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439
U.S. 818 (1978); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974)).
1892. 656 F.2d at 1334.
1893. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976) provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the
indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense
shall have been committed."
1894. United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1980).
1895. 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1976).
1896. 675 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 83 (1982).
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earlier, in an aborted scheme to import hashish from Lebanon. The
district court rejected the Government's contention that the statute of
limitations tolled on the San Diego indictment because Gonsalves was
fleeing from an unrelated 1976 indictment in Las Vegas, and dismissed
the San Diego indictment.
1897
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that it was "un-
able to reconcile the district court's restrictive reading of [section] 3290
with the statute's unqualified language that 'no' statute of limitations
shall extend to 'any' person fleeing from justice." 1898 Noting that when
an accused flees from justice, he thwarts all federal law enforcement
authorities from uncovering facts essential to any prosecution impend-
ing against him,1899 the court construed section 3290 to deny the bene-
fits of all statutes of limitations to a person fleeing from justice in any
federal jurisdiction.19
Gonsalves also argued that the Government had not proved that
he fled from prosecution under the Las Vegas indictment so as to toll
the statute of limitations on the San Diego indictment.1 901 Since the
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, he reasoned, the Gov-
ernment's burden under section 3290 was to prove every element be-
yond a reasonable doubt.1902 Gonsalves also argued that the statute of
limitations, tolled because he had made a good faith effort to surrender
to the Las Vegas authorities and, thus, as a matter of law could not be
found to have "fled from justice" on the Las Vegas indictment.
1 913
Because the Ninth Circuit determined that the statute of limita-
tions defense was unrelated to the issue of guilt, it held that the proper
burden under the tolling statute was a preponderance of the evi-
dence.' 9° The court noted that where a defendant raises an afflrmative
defense relevant to the issue of guilt, the prosecution must disprove
each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The rationale for this rule is
to avoid factual errors and unreliable verdicts.1 9°5 However, a lower
standard of proof on a statute of limitations issue would not affect a
1897. Id. at 1052.
1898. Id.
1899. Id. at 1053 (citing United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d 1287, 1289 n.1 (9th Cir. 1976)).
1900. 675 F.2d at 1052.
1901. Id. at 1053. In order to take advantage of § 3290, the Government must prove that
the defendant knew he was wanted and failed to submit to arrest. United States v. Balles-
teros-Cordova, 586 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1978).
1902. 675 F.2d at 1053.
1903. Id. at 1054-55.




verdict's reliability. 9 ' In this regard, the court noted that the defense
would be able to argue that the evidence relating to the statute of limi-
tations issue was too old to be probative, and that the trial court should
exclude stale evidence.190 7 The court determined that in Gonsalves'
case a finding should be made based on the preponderance of the evi-
dence on the issue of whether Gonsalves had fled from the Las Vegas
charges for more than 56 days, thereby tolling the statute of
limitations. 190 8
The court, however, agreed in part with Gonsalves' second argu-
ment, holding that the statute would not be tolled if a defendant who
has notice of an arrest warrant outstanding against him makes a good
faith effort to surrender. The court reasoned that the requisite intent to
flee from justice is absent in such a situation. 190 9 The court determined,
however, that Gonsalves' record did not, as a matter of law, show a
good faith effort to surrender, and therefore remanded the case to the
district court for the necessary findings of fact.1910
b. post-indictment delay
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) provides that a court
may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint for unnecessary
delay in bringing a defendant to trial. 1911 This rule grants district
courts much discretion, however, and dismissal of an indictment is not
mandatory unless the defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights are
violated by the delay. 1912 The Ninth Circuit recently examined
whether a post-indictment delay resulting from a Government appeal




1909. Id. at 1055.
1910. Id. This issue can be raised even if the Government has filed the indictment within
the statute of limitations. In United States v. Wilder, 680 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam), the defendant was convicted of tax evasion. He appealed on a number of grounds,
including error by the district court in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for
unreasonable delay between the time of his offense and the indictment. The Ninth. Circuit
held that Wilder's arguments were frivolous because he had neither shown that the Govern-
ment deliberately delayed his prosecution, nor that he had been prejudiced by the delay. Id.
at 60 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971); United States v. Cederquist,
641 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Mills, 641 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 902 (1981); United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 310 (5th Cir.), cer. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 828 (1981)).
1911. FED. R. CRiM. P. 48(b).
1912. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 887 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968
(1978).
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In United States v. Booth, 1913 the district court dismissed a robbery
indictment against the defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48(b). The Government had appealed the district court's
pretrial order suppressing certain evidence. Because the Government
failed to show that the evidence suppressed by the district court was
substantial proof of a material fact, the district court ruled that the
Government's appeal unnecessarily delayed the trial. 1914
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Government's appeal
of a suppression order is proper under 18 U.S.C. section 3731 if it meets
three conditions: (1) the defendant has not been placed in jeopardy;
(2) the appeal has not been taken for purposes of delay; and (3) the
evidence suppressed is substantial proof of a fact material in the pro-
ceeding.1915 The court determined that Booth had not been placed in
jeopardy, that the delay of trial was necessary to permit the Govern-
ment to exercise its section 3731 appeal, and that some of the sup-
pressed evidence was substantial proof of the Government's case. 1 6 It
therefore held that the district court had erred in dismissing the indict-
ment, especially in light of the broad construction to be given to the
Government's right to appeal under section 3731.1917
Indictments may also be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial
Act,' 918 which requires that trial be commenced within seventy days
(1) after the filing of an indictment or (2) after the defendant appears
1913. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
1914. Id. at 1241.
1915. Id. (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)). LoudHawk involved a multi-count indictment charging the
defendants with possessing firearms and dynamite. The trial court suppressed the dynamite,
and the Government appealed under § 3731. The trial court then dismissed the entire in-
dictment with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court the
counts of the indictment related to dynamite possession. The court found that the defend-
ants had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and that the delay was necessary to permit the
Government to exercise its right to appeal under § 3731. The court concluded that the delay
caused by the appeal was not "unnecessary" under Rule 48(b) because the suppressed dyna-
mite was necessary evidence for the Government's case. Id. at 1150.
1916. 669 F.2d at 1241. Some of the suppressed evidence was identification testimony nec-
essary to identify Booth as one of the robbers. Id.
1917. Id. (citing United States v. Humphries, 636 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981)). In United States v. Saavedra, 684 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982),
the defendant contended that the court should have dismissed her indictment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) due to a three and one half week delay between
the impaneling of the jury and the beginning of the trial. The Ninth Circuit, however, held
that the court's refusal to dismiss the indictment was not an abuse of discretion because
Saavedra's constitutional speedy trial rights had not been violated. 1d. at 1297.
1918. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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before a judicial officer, whichever is later. 919 The Speedy Trial Act
also provides that, in cases where the defendant is to be retried after an
appeal or a collateral attack, the trial shall commence within seventy
days after the action resulting in retrial becomes final. 920 The Ninth
Circuit recently considered the application of both provisions to de-
fendants' argument for dismissal of their indictments.
1 92'
In United States v. Ross,1912 the defendants were convicted of at-
tempted extortion. They earlier had been convicted of attempted bank
robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, but those convictions
had been reversed because they had been improperly charged. The su-
perseding indictment charging the defendants with attempted extortion
was delivered shortly after the reversal of the bank robbery convictions,
but just one week before the filing of the mandate in the vacated con-
victions. The defendants contended that their indictments should have
been dismissed because the Government violated the Speedy Trial
Act.
1923
The Ninth Circuit stated that it was unclear which section of the
Speedy Trial Act applied to the defendants' case. The defendants ar-
gued that their extortion trial was untimely under the "new case" pro-
vision1 924 because it occurred more than seventy days after their first
appearance before a judicial officer on the bank robbery charges, and
that their extortion trial was untimely under the "retrial" provisions
925
1919. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Section 3161(c)(1) provides in part:
In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged
in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence
within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or
indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of
the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.
1920. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (Supp. V 1981). Section 3161(e) provides in part:
If the defendant is to be tried again following an appeal or a collateral attack, the
trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action occasioning the
retrial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend the period
for retrial not to exceed one hundred and eighty days from the date the action
occasioning the retrial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors
resulting from passage of time shall make trial within seventy days impractical.
1921. See Saavedra, 684 F.2d at 1297. In Saavedra, the Ninth Circuit deemed it unneces-
sary to determine whether the delay in Saavedra's trial exceeded the time limits prescribed
by the Speedy Trial Act since Saavedra did not make any claims based on the Act at trial;
her motion to dismiss was based solely on her constitutional speedy rights. When an issue is
not raised at trial, it cannot be raised on appeal except in very exceptional situations, not
present in Saavedra's case, "'wherein it appears to be necessary in order to prevent a miscar-
riage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1976)).
1922. 654 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 926 (1982).
1923. Id. at 614-15.
1924. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 1919.
1925. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 1920.
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because it occurred more than seventy days after the date of the filing
of the decision reversing their bank robbery convictions. The court re-
jected these arguments. It stated that if the extortion trial was treated
as a new case, it was only necessary that the trial occur less than sev-
enty days after the defendant's appearance on the extortion charges. 1926
It further stated that if the extortion trial was treated as a retrial, it was
necessary only that the trial occur less than seventy days after the date
the mandate was issued. 1927 The court therefore held that there was no
violation of the Speedy Trial Act, and that the trial court did not err in
its refusal to dismiss the defendants' indictments.1
928
These decisions reflect the Ninth Circuit's general reluctance to
dismiss indictments due to post-indictment delays. In fact, unless fac-
tors such as the three conditions articulated in Booth are present, or
there is a substantial delay in the commencement of trial such that the
defendant's constitutional rights to a speedy trial are violated, the court
will not dismiss an indictment or reverse a conviction.
4. Variances
Variances between an indictment and the proof occur when the
evidence offered at trial proves facts varying from the acts charged in
the indictment. A variance will not require reversal of a conviction
unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties. 1929 The Ninth Cir-
cuit recently decided several cases in which the defendants claimed that
the proof offered at trial fatally varied from the crimes charged in the
indictments.
In United States v. Kaiser,1930 the defendants were convicted of
conspiracy to distribute heroin, possessing heroin with intent to dis-
1926. 654 F.2d at 615.
1927. Id. at 616 (citing Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); FED. R. APP. P. 40 & 41).
1928. 654 F.2d at 616. The defendants also challenged their convictions on the basis that
the grand jury and the district court lacked jurisdiction over either the extortion indictment
or the trial. They argued that the district court lost jurisdiction when the appeal on the bank
robbery conviction was filed and did not regain it until the mandate was issued. According
to their argument, the district court did not have jurisdiction of the second action because
the second indictment was issued before the mandate. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, stating that the two indictments and trials involved completely different offenses, and
that the Government was therefore free to pursue an indictment for attempted extortion.
The court stressed that although the extortion indictment was labeled "superseding," it actu-
ally was a new indictment. The grand jury and district court therefore had jurisdiction. Id.
at 615.
1929. United States v. Durades, 607 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v.
Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 116 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1930. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 455 U.S. 956 (1982).
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tribute, distributing heroin, and violating the Travel Act. 3' Defend-
ants Remsing and Schafer challenged their conspiracy convictions on
grounds that the evidence offered at trial was insufficient to support
their convictions and that the facts proved fatally varied from the
crimes charged in the indictment. 932 They asserted that the Govern-
ment (1) failed to prove that they were part of any conspiracy, or failed
to connect the other defendants to the conspiracy, if one existed,
(2) failed to prove a conspiracy lasting five years, and (3) proved multi-
ple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy for which they were
indicted.1 9 33 The defendants also challenged their convictions under
the Travel Act on the ground that the evidence showed only isolated
instances of proscribed interstate travel, rather than the continuous
course of criminal conduct required for a conviction under that
statute.
19 34
Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the conspiracy convictions of
these defendants on other grounds,1 93- it nonetheless addressed the
claims of variance because those claims were framed within allegations
of insufficient evidence which, if true, might invoke double jeopardy
protections aginst retrial. 936 With respect to the conspiracy challenges,
the court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Remsing and
Schafer. 1937 The court then found that the other variances alleged by
the defendants were not fatal, as they did not affect the defendants'
substantial rights. 1931 Prejudice is not shown every time the govern-
ment fails to connect one or more of the defendants to a conspiracy;
and, in fact, convictions of multiple conspirators have been upheld
where the convictions of some co-conspirators have been reversed.
939
1931. 660 F.2d at 728; 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(2) and § 1952(a)(3) (1976).
1932. 660 F.2d at 730.
1933. Id.
1934. Id. at 731. The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, forbids interstate travel to further
unlawful "business enterprises" involving narcotics or controlled substances. Conviction re-
quires a continuous course of criminal conduct rather than sporadic or casual involvement
in a proscribed activity. Id. (citing United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir.
1971) (placing one bet for a co-defendant did not constitute a continuous course of criminal
conduct)).
1935. 660 F.2d at 731. The reversal was based on certain evidentiary errors.
1936. 660 F.2d at 730.
1937. Id. (citing United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1980)). The
court stated that the standard of review is whether, "'viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."' 660 F.2d at 730 (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)).
1938. 660 F.2d at 730.
1939. Id. (citing United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1977)).
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The court concluded that, because the testimony pertaining to three
other defendants who were acquitted on the conspiracy count did not
relate to or implicate Remsing and Schafer, there was no reason to as-
sume that their rights had been prejudiced by the possibility of guilt
transference. 1940 The court also noted that the alleged variance be-
tween the duration of the conspiracy charged and that proven was un-
founded; the indictment merely charged that the conspiracy began
"within the last five years."' 94 Finally, the court found that because
there was no evidence of multiple conspiracies, there was no variance
between the number of conspiracies charged and proven. 1942
With respect to the Travel Act challenges, the Ninth Circuit held
that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Remsing and Schafer had
violated the Act. 94 3 It stated that the Act requires only that the busi-
ness enterprise promoted by the defendants during their interstate
travel be continuous, not that the travel itself be continuous. 1944 The
evidence of the defendants' repeated sales of heroin and of their travels
on four occasions across state lines to pursue these activities was
enough to compel the conclusion that Remsing and Schafer had en-
gaged in a continuous course of criminal conduct in violation of the
statute.1
945
In United States v. Brock,19 4 1 the defendants were convicted of
manufacturing methamphetamine and of conspiring to possess with in-
tent to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine.1947 The defend-
ants had been arrested after DEA agents observed on three occasions
the defendants' co-conspirator picking up the chemicals used in
manufacuring methamphetamine. The defendants contended that the
indictment only charged them with a conspiracy relating to one of the
chemical pickups, while tesimony at trial revealed that the different
chemical pickups involved at least two distinct conspiracies. 1941 They
1940. 660 F.2d at 730 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United
States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1982)).
1941. 660 F.2d at 730.
1942. Id.
1943. Id. at 731.
1944. Id.
1945. Id.
1946. 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (amended opinion), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2012 (1983).
1947. Id. at 1313.
1948. Id. at 1313-16. After the first drug pickup surveillance was terminated. Surveillance
following the second pickup revealed that drugs were delivered to defendants' cabin. De-
fendants argued that this series of events constituted one conspiracy. Surveillance after the
third drug pickup showed that drugs were delivered to a group of motor homes in a state
park. After that delivery, defendants as well as those individuals who had picked up the
Vol. 16
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therefore argued that they were prejudiced by the transfer of guilt from
the conspiracy not charged to the one that was charged. 949
The Ninth Circuit held that both chemical pickups were within the
scope of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, 1950 and concluded
that the jury easily could have inferred that the activities in question
were all part of a continuing conspiracy. The court stated that the
existence of potential subgroups to a conspiracy does not negate the
existence of a single conspiracy. 1951 Finally, the court emphasized that
the defendants had not even asked for a multiple conspiracy instruction
at trial since it had not been a theory of their defense.1952
In United States v. Hazeem,1953 the defendant was convicted of
conspiracy and aiding and abetting the purloining and misapplication
of bank funds. Hazeem contended on appeal that he was prejudiced by
a variance between the amounts of money charged in the indictment as
having been purloined and the amounts proved at trial.1954 Hazeem
claimed that the trial court had limited a co-conspirator's crime to the
purloining of the money she actually received, rather than to the pur-
loining of the full amount shared by Hazeem and his two co-conspira-
tors; therefore, Hazeem's crime also should have been limited to the
amount he actually received.1
95 5
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had not made the deter-
mination alleged by Hazeem and that the jury had not been instructed
to limit his co-conspirator's crime; therefore, there was no variance.
195 6
It further held that any variance, if it occurred, would have constituted
drugs were arrested. Defendants argued that this latter event constituted the second
conspiracy.
1949. Id. The defendants relied for their argument on Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 773-74 (1946) ("failure to demonstrate the existence of a rim [in a multiple wheel-
type conspiracy] made obvious the prejudice to the defendant which results from proof of
criminal acts committed by those not a party to the defendant's illegal activity") and United
States v. Durades, 607 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1979) ("proof of multiple conspiracies when
single conspiracy charged requires reversal where prejudice is obvious").
1950. 667 F.2d at 1316-17. The court stated that although the only acts alleged in the
indictment related to the last chemical pickup before the defendants' arrest on April 7, 1978,
the conspiracy was alleged to have begun "on or about January 1, 1978." Id. at 1316.
Therefore, the other chemical pickup in question, which occurred on March 27, was clearly
within the scope of the indictment. Id. at 1317.
1951. Id. at 1317 (citing United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981)).
1952. 667 F.2d at 1317 (citing United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1337 (9th Cir. 1981),
ceri. denied, 454 U.S. 828 (1982)).
1953. 679 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 106 (1982).
1954. Id. at 772.
1955. Id. at 773.
1956. Id.
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harmless error because the indictment was sufficiently explicit to notify
Hazeem of the charges against him and to protect him from double
jeopardy.
1957
In United States v. Coleman, '9 1 the defendant was convicted of
robbing a savings and loan association in violation of section
2113(a). 1959 Thereafter, Coleman filed a motion for a judgment of ac-
quittal, contending that the indictment charged her with robbing a fed-
erally chartered institution while the proof at trial showed that the
institution was federally insured.
1960
The Ninth Circuit stated that the indictment should be liberally
construed because Coleman did not object until after trial.' 96' It then
held that because section 2113(a) provides for federal jurisdiction if the
savings and loan institution is either federally chartered or federally
insured, the indictment was adequate.1962 The court stated that the ref-
erence to the statute in the indictment sufficiently clarified the indict-
ment so as to enable Coleman to prepare her defense and to plead a
former conviction to a subsequent indictment for the same offense.1
963
1957. Id. at 773-74 (citing FED. R. CRUM. P. 52(a); United States v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493,
496 (9th Cir. 1976)).
1958. 656 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1981).
1959. Id. at 510. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) proscribes the robbery of a "savings and loan associ-
ation," which is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(g) as any "Federal savings and loan associa-
tion" and any "'insured institution' as defined in § 401 of the National Housing Act, as
amended." The National Housing Act definition includes institutions insured by the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
1960. 656 F.2d at 510. The indictment charged Coleman with robbing the Pacific First
Federal Savings and Loan Association, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The trial court
determined that the word "Federal" in the name of the savings and loan association was
enough to allege that the institution was federally chartered, but not federally insured. The
Government, however, introduced evidence that this savings and loan association was in-
sured by the FSLIC. Id.
1961. Id. (citing United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 360-61 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. '1099 (1977)).
1962. 656 F.2d at 511. The court analogized the case to Head v. United States, 364 F.
Supp. 29, 31 (W.D. Wash. 1973). The court there rejected the defendant's challenge that his
sentence should be set aside because the indictment to which he had pled guilty provided
adequate notice even though it failed to allege that the deposits of a bank were insured by
the FDIC. It held that the defendant had been apprised of the essential elements of the
offense and was not prejudiced by the wording of the indictment. 364 F. Supp. at 31.
The Coleman court also cited Gearing v. United States, 432 F.2d 1038, 1041 (5th Cir.
1970), cer. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971), for the general principle that "[w]hile it is often true
that the choice of language controls the validity of the indictment. . . . inclusion in it of the
statutory citation provides a means by which a defendant can inform himself of the elements
of the offense." 656 F.2d at 511 (citing United States v. Roberts, 296 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.
1961)).
1963. 656 F.2d at 512.
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In United States v. Adkins,9 '4 the defendants were convicted of
receiving kickbacks for Medicaid referrals, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
section 1396h(b)(1)(A).1 965 Although the indictment charged the de-
fendants with receiving kickbacks from a clinical laboratory in return
for referring patients to that laboratory, the evidence showed that none
of Adkins' patients traveled from his office to the laboratory; instead,
Adkins himself sent blood and urine specimens to the laboratory.
966
The Ninth Circuit, relying on United States v. Stewart Clinical
Laboratory, Inc. ,1967 held that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port the defendants' convictions. 1961 In Stewart, the court held that an
indictment charging the payment of kickbacks in return for referring
patients to a laboratory could not support a conviction based on the
referral of laboratory work to that laboratory. 1969 The Adkins court
stated that because the only difference between Stewart and this case
was that between the payment of kickbacks and the receipt of kick-
backs, it was bound in this case by the decision in Stewart. 197
In all of the above cases, exceptAdkins, the Ninth Circuit liberally
construed the indictments in question and found that the evidence of
the defendants' activities fell within the parameters set forth in the in-
dictments and the statutes violated. Minor or technical deficiencies in
the indictments did not prejudice the defendants. The variances there-
fore were "harmless errors" and did not affect "substantial rights."
InAdkins, however, the Ninth Circuit summarily reversed the de-
fendants' convictions, relying heavily on Stewart. In so doing, the
court neglected to address the issue of whether the variance affected the
defendants' substantial rights. Accordingly, the court focused on the
distinction between referring medical patients and referring medical
services, an approach that incorporates a more narrow construction of
the relevant statute than that applied in Kaiser, Brock, Hazeem, and
Coleman. Adkins would have been more consistent with general Ninth
Circuit law if the majority had adopted Judge Schroeder's dissenting
1964. 683 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
1965. Id. at 1289. 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979) provides in part:
Whoever. . . solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe,
or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind -
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or ar-
ranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made
in whole or in part under this subchapter. . . shall be guilty of a felony. ...
1966. 683 F.2d at 1289.
1967. 652 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1981).
1968. 683 F.2d at 1289-90.
1969. 652 F.2d at 807.
1970. 683 F.2d at 1290.
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opinion in Stewart, where he stated: "It should make no difference
whether the substance to be analyzed arrives at the defendants' prem-
ises in the bladder or in the bottle."
1 97'
In large part these cases demonstrate the Ninth Circuit's rule that
because a grand jury's purpose is to expeditiously ferret out and charge
criminals, there is little room in the indictment process for grappling
with minute details or technicalities in the way the indictment is
framed. As long as the indictment fulfills its two-fold purpose, to give
notice to the accused and to protect the accused from double jeopardy,
a grand jury's indictment will invariably be upheld.
5. Vindictive prosecution
a. pre-United States v. Goodwin
A defendant has a fundamental right to exercise constitutional or
statutory rights during criminal proceedings without suffering retalia-
tory or vindictive increases in the severity of the charges by the govern-
ment.197 2 Before the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Goodwin, 973 the Ninth Circuit applied a single stan-
dard of evaluation to appeals based on vindictive prosecution, regard-
less of whether the allegedly vindictive governmental actions occurred
before or after trial. 974 In either case, if the defendant showed an "ap-
pearance of vindictiveness" on the part of the prosecutor, usually in the
form of a re-indictment with increased charges following the defend-
ant's assertion of a constitutional or statutory right, the burden shifted
to the prosecution to prove that it had no vindictive motive.19 75 To
sustain the re-indictment, the prosecutor was required to show that his
actions were "justified by independent reasons or intervening circum-
stances which dispel the appearance of vindictiveness."' 9 76 There were
two reasons for placing this burden on the prosecution. The first was to
protect the defendant in the present case, and the second, and perhaps
more important, was to prevent a "chilling" of the exercise of rights by
1971. 652 F.2d at 808.
1972. United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v.
Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1980), affd, 451 U.S. 182 (1981); United States
v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977)).
1973. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
1974. United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d at 836.
1975. Id.





For example, in United States v. Motley, 1978 two defendants
claimed that they were the victims of vindictive prosecution when, fol-
lowing a mistrial on their motion, the Government re-indicted them on
different charges. Defendant Motley was originally charged with one
count of violating the RICO Act, one count of conspiring to violate the
RICO Act, and one count of using a firearm to commit a felony.
1979
Following the trial court's dismissal of the firearm count, Motley's pos-
sible penalty was forty years in. prison and $50,000 in fines. 1980 After
Motley's mistrial motion was granted, the Government sought a super-
seding indictment charging four counts of possession and distribution
of methamphetamine and heroin.1981 Motley's possible penalty under
the new charges amounted to forty years in prison, plus a ten year en-
hancement for a prior conviction and $80,000 in fines.
198 2
Motley claimed that the possibility of ten additional years in
prison and the $30,000 additional fine created the appearance of vin-
dictiveness which, if not dispelled by the Government, was a due pro-
cess violation. The Government claimed that it would not utilize the
ten-year enhancement provision unless some of the other charges
against Motley were dropped, and therefore Motley was not subject to
a longer prison term.1983
The Ninth Circuit stated that the effect of an enhancement provi-
sion on the determination of whether a superseding indictment in-
creases the severity of the charges was a question of first impression in
the circuit. It rejected the Government's claim, stating that the en-
hancement provision raised the "same dangers of vindictiveness and a
chilling effect on future defendants as does an indictment that is more
severe on its face."' 19 8 4 The prosecutor's assertion not to use the en-
hancement provision was not persuasive since the Government "cannot
by its own later self-restraint cure the chilling effect of its original
action."s1985
1977. United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977).
1978. 655 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1981).
1979. Id. at 187.
1980. Id.
1981. Id.
1982. Id. at 188.
1983. Id.
1984. Id. at 189.
1985. Id. at 189 (citing United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 646 F.2d 384, 386-89
(9th Cir. 1981) (government's voluntary dismissal of some counts in second indictment so as
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The court also noted that the enhancement provision makes it
more likely that the defendant will receive the maximum sentence since
the prosecutor can keep it in reserve if difficulties force the dismissal of
one of the other charges. 98 6 Therefore, it concluded that Motley suc-
ceeded in establishing an appearance of vindictiveness, and the Gov-
ernment thus bore the burden of justifying the more severe
indictment. 987 Since the Government failed to adequately justify the
increased severity of the charges, 198 8 the court dismissed the supersed-
ing indictment against Motley. 989
The superseding indictment against the second defendant, Musick,
did not expose him to a longer prison term, yet he also made a claim of
vindictive prosecution. 990 The original charges against him were the
same as against Motley except for an additional firearm count, expos-
ing Musick to a total possible penalty of sixty years in prison and
$50,000 in fines. 1991 After the mistrial, the Government simplified its
case and brought a superseding indictment on various substantive drug
and firearm charges, exposing him to a penalty of thirty seven years in
prison and $55,000 in fines. 1992 Musick did not claim that he was faced
with increased penalties, but rather claimed that the simplification of
the charges against him enhanced the possibility of his conviction and
thus gave rise to the appearance of vindicativeness.1
993
to lower possible penalties to less than those in the original indictment did not cure appear-
ance of vindictiveness), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982)).
1986. 655 F.2d at 189.
1987. Id. Because the court found an appearance of vindictiveness from the inclusion of
the enhancement provision in the superseding indictment, it did not address the issue of
whether the increased fine created an appearance of vindictiveness. Id. at n.3.
1988. Id. at 190. The Government claimed that the superseding indictment was justified
because the trial judge had recommended that the Government simplify its case for the
second trial. The Government did so by dropping the RICO and conspiracy charges, and
replacing them with the substantive drug charges albeit with more severe penalties. The
Ninth Circuit did not accept this justification, stating that the Government was required to
justify not the change in the nature of the charges, but rather the increase in the severity of
the charges. Id. at 189. The Government also claimed that the prosecutor who drew up the
superseding indictment did not realize the possibility of a more severe penalty. The court
stated that carelessness was not an acceptable justification, id. at 190 (citing United States v.
Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976)), and that the Government must show
objective factors, not merely subjective good faith. 655 F.2d at 190 (citing United States v.
Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981)).
1989. 655 F.2d at 190. The court declined to dismiss any of the different counts or to bar
the enhancement provision, preferring to let the Government seek a new indictment which
would not carry an appearance of vindictiveness. Id.
1990. Id.
1991. Id. at 188.
1992. Id.
1993. Id. at 190. Musick did not argue that the increased possible fine made the charges
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The Ninth Circuit did not find an appearance of vindictiveness. 1994
The court stated that the simplification of charges, even if it increased
the likelihood of conviction, was merely the risk a defendant faced
when he moved for a mistrial. 1995 The court carefully distinguished be-
tween a case where the prosecutor reformulates the charges, increasing
the chance of conviction, and a case where the prosecutor increases the
severity of charges. Only the latter can create an appearance of
vindictiveness. 1996
In United States v. Bendis,'997 the defendants were indicted in Ha-
waii on various charges related to the unlawful transport of a money
order. The defendants had previously been convicted in Kansas on
charges arising from a similar scheme.1998 The defendants claimed that
the Hawaii indictments were filed only after their Kansas sentences
were reduced upon their motions, and hence gave rise to the appear-
ance of vindictiveness. 1999
The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the defendants made a
prima facie showing of vindictiveness, but it did determine that the
Government adequately established that the reduction of sentences in
Kansas played no role in initiating the Hawaii indictments. 2 °° In fact,
because the Hawaii proceedings began before the sentences were re-
duced in Kansas, the court held that any appearance of vindictiveness
more severe. Id. at 191 n.7. Musick relied solely on United States v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp.
954 (D.R.I. 1980). In DWAo, the district court ruled that the reformulation of charges based
on knowledge gained at a first trial which was declared a mistrial on the defendants' motion
was a violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process if it increased the potential for
conviction. Id. at 960. The DAio court relied on the holding in Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974), where the Court held that a defendant was denied due process when he was
charged with a felony after requesting a trial de novo, as authorized by state law, following a
misdemeanor conviction.
1994. 655 F.2d at 191.
1995. Id. The court declined to follow the D'AIo court's extension of Blackledge, implying
that a reformulation of charges after a defendant's exercise of his right gives rise to an ap-
pearance of vindictiveness only if the severity ofpenalty is increased and not the chance of
conviction. The court, however, noted that a constitutional double jeopardy problem might
arise if the prosecutor used a first trial to "test" his case and discover defense strategy, and
then provoked the defendant into requesting a mistrial in order to have a better chance of
conviction at a second trial. Id. at 191 n.6 (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611
(1976)).
1996. 655 F.2d at 191.
1997. 681 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 306 (1982).
1998. Id. at 563.
1999. Id. at 568. Vindictive prosecution can arise where there are two independent prose-
cutor's offices involved. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 646 F.2d 384, 387
(9th Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982).
2000. 681 F.2d at 569.
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was successfully dispelled and did not dismiss the indictments.2"'
The Motley and Bendis cases demonstrate the two key points of a
vindictive prosecution appeal as handled in the Ninth Circuit before
Goodwin. In Motley, defendant Musick failed to convince the court
that the simplification of charges in a superseding indictment
amounted to an "appearance of vindictiveness," and his claim was re-
jected. The Bendis defendants' indictment in one state on the same
charges for which they received a reduced sentence in another state
might have cleared the first hurdle of an "appearance of vindictive-
ness," but the Government successfully dispelled the appearance, and
thus the claim was also rejected. Defendant Motley, on the other hand,
succeeded in showing an "appearance of vindictiveness" in the Gov-
ernment's inclusion of an enhancement provision in a superseding in-
dictment, and the Government was unable to dispel this appearance;
thus his claim was upheld.
b. United States v. Goodwin
In United States v. Goodwin,2°"2 the Supreme Court ruled that no
presumption of vindictiveness arose when a prosecutor reformulated
charges so as to carry a more severe penalty after the defendant exer-
cised his constitutional rights in a pretrial setting. Defendant Goodwin
had been charged with various misdemeanor offenses, including as-
sault, after allegedly trying to run down a federal officer with his
car.2" 3 He did not appear for his scheduled trial before a magistrate
and was found in custody in another state three years later. °°4 On his
return, he elected a jury trial in the district court.2 °°5 Six weeks later,
the prosecutor obtained an indictment charging Goodwin with two fel-
ony counts, including assaulting a federal officer, and two misde-
meanor counts.2 "6 Goodwin was convicted on the felony count and on
one related misdemeanor charge.
200 7
The district court denied Goodwin's motion to set aside the verdict
on the ground of vindictive prosecution, finding that "'the prosecutor
. . . [had] dispelled adequately any appearance of retaliatory in-
tent.,' , 2008 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a presumption of
2001. .d. (citing United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 837 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2002. 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
2003. Id. at 370.
2004. Id.
2005. Id. at 370-71.
2006. Id. at 371.
2007. Id.
2008. Id. The prosecutor stated that he had sought the felony indictment because:
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vindictive prosecution had arisen because the circumstances surround-
ing the felony indictment gave rise to a genuine risk of retaliation.2 °°9
It stated that the government is prohibited from bringing more severe
charges after a defendant exercises his right to a jury trial unless it can
show that those charges could not have been brought before the de-
fendant exercised that right.
20 10
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that, in a
pretrial setting, "a mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to
justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule." 201 1 The Court first noted
that in cases where action detrimental to the defendant has been taken
after the exercise of a legal right, a presumption of vindictiveness has
been applied only if there was a reasonable likelihood that vindictive-
ness existed.2112 In North Carolina v. Pearce,2013 for example, the Court
applied a presumption of vindictiveness because the judge had imposed
a harsher sentence on retrial after the defendant successfully over-
turned his conviction in an initial trial.20 14 Similarly, in Blackledge v.
Perry,20 15 the Court applied a presumption of vindictiveness because
the defendant, after being convicted of a misdemeanor and exercising
his statutory right to a trial de novo, was indicted and convicted on
(1) Goodwin's conduct had been such a serious violation of law; (2) Goodwin had a lengthy
history of violent crime; (3) Goodwin's conduct had possibly been related to major narcotics
transactions; (4) Goodwin might have committed perjury at his preliminary hearing; and
(5) Goodwin had failed to appear for his original trial. Id.
2009. United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1981).
2010. Id. at 254. The court noted that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had adopted a balanc-
ing test, weighing the chilling of the defendant's rights against the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Id. The key difference between the Fourth Circuit and the Fifth and Sixth Cir-
cuits was that the Fifth and Sixth Circuits allowed an investigation of the prosecutor's actual
motives while the Fourth Circuit limited its inquiry to whether the charges could have been
brought initially. Id. The Ninth Circuit's requirement that the prosecutor's actions be "jus-
tified by independent reasons or intervening circumstances," see supra notes 1973-77 and
accompanying text, is closer to the Fifth and Sixth Circuit's balancing test than to the rather
mechanical analysis of the Fourth Circuit.
2011. 457 U.S. at 384.
2012. Id. at 373.
2013. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
2014. Id. at 726. In Pearce, combining cases from North Carolina and Alabama, the
Court upheld the reversals of two defendants' convictions because the States had made no
explanation of the reason for their increased sentences. "'[The conclusion is inescapable
that the State. . . is punishing petitioner. . . for his having exercised his post-conviction
right of review .... "' Id. (quoting Rice v. Simpson, 274 F. Supp. 116, 122 (M.D. Ala.
1967), aft'd, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1968), aft'd, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)). The Court noted that
the increased sentences might have been acceptable had the record reflected "objective in-
formation concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant[s] occurring after the
time of the original sentence proceeding." 395 U.S. at 726.
2015. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAlW.REVIEW [Vol. 16
felony charges.20 16 In Bordenkircher v. Hayes,20 17 however, the Court
declined to apply a presumption of vindictiveness because the defend-
ant, although threatened by the prosecutor during plea bargaining with
the prospect of additional charges if he did not plead guilty to the ini-
tial charges, was aware of the consequences of his refusal to plead
guilty and was plainly subject to prosecution on the additional
charges.
20 18
The Goodwin Court stated that the case at bar was similar to
Bordenkircher in that both arose from a pretrial decision to modify
charges.20 19 The Court then considered several reasons why the adop-
tion of a presumption of vindictive prosecution in a pretrial setting re-
quired more caution than it did in a posttrial setting such as Pearce or
Blackledge. 2020 First, during the time period before trial but after the
filing of initial charges, the prosecutor is still developing the case and
may find justifiable reasons for changing the charges.2 21 In addition,
2016. Id. at 28-29. As in Pearce, there was no showing in the Blackledge record which
justified the increased charges. Id. at 29 n.7. Again the Court implied that to overcome the
presumption the Government would have to "[have] shown that it was impossible to pro-
ceed on the more serious charge at the outset ... " Id.
2017. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
2018. Id. at 364-65. Bordenkircher, unlike Pearce and Blackledge, involved pretrial ma-
neuvering by the prosecutor. The Court distinguished the" 'give-and-take negotiation com-
mon in plea bargaining"' from the "unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant
who [has] chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction." Id. at 362. The
Court held that in the "give-and-take" plea negotiation atmosphere where a defendant is
free to accept or reject an offer by the prosecutor, a threat to file additional charges does not
constitute a due process violation. Id. at 365.
2019. 457 U.S. at 380. Goodwin attempted to distinquish Bordenkircher on the ground
that he was not engaged in plea bargaining when the prosecutor obtained the felony indict-
ment. He had, in fact, refused to plead guilty. Id. at 382 n.15. The Court, in response,
stated that the basis for the defendant's claim of vindictiveness in Bordenkircher was that
while involved in plea negotiations the threatened increased charge was "an unjustified re-
sponse to his legal right to stand trial." Id. The Court implied that Goodwin's position was
weaker than the defendant's in Bordenkircher because the only support for Goodwin's alle-
gation of vindictiveness was that the felony indictment was obtained after his request for a
jury trial. Id.
2020. Id. at 380-81.
2021. Id. at 381. The Court recognized that the prosecutor should have broad discretion
before trial to protect the "societal interest" in the prosecution. Id. at 382. It noted that due
to limited resources prosecutorial investigations might not be complete when the initial
charges are filed. Id. at n.14. Newly discovered information should not be rendered useless
because of the prosecutor's initial charging decision. The Court also stated that even when a
prosecutor could charge all the offenses initially, that might be detrimental to defendants
who "'would bargain against a greater charge, face the likelihood of increased bail, and run
the risk that the court would be less inclined to accept a bargained plea.'" Id. at 379 n.10
(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Furthermore,
where a defendant accepted a plea bargain, the additional dismissed charges on the record
might unnecessarily damage his reputation. 457 U.S. at 379 n.10. Thus, a prosecutor's ini-
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defendants routinely file pretrial motions during this period, and it
would be unrealistic to assume that the prosecutor's actions during the
same period are retaliatory or vindictively motivated." 22 After trial,
however, it is more likely that any changes the prosecutor makes in the
charges might be "improperly motivated. 2 23 This improper motiva-
tion might result from the duplicative expenditures of prosecutorial re-
sources that a second trial would entail,20 24 or from the reluctance of
the prosecutor or the judge "'to do over what it thought it had already
done correctly,' ,,2025 or from a bias against the retrial of decided
questions.2 26
The Court also considered the nature of the right asserted by
Goodwin to determine whether an increase in charges after its exercise
required a presumption of vindictiveness.2 27  Again relying on
Bordenkircher, the Court first noted that an increase in charges after a
defendant refuses to accept a plea agreement, thus in effect exercising
his right to trial, does not give rise to a presumption of vindictive-
ness.20 28 Goodwin, however, claimed that his request for a jury trial
did justify the presumption that subsequent prosecutorial actions were
vindictively motivated.20 29 The Court allowed that a jury trial is more
of a burden on the prosecution and judiciary than a bench trial. The
jury must be selected, and testimony and argument must be more care-
fully prepared and controlled to avoid mistrial. However, the Court
emphasized that the most important aspect of the trial, the presentation
of the case by the prosecutor and the defense by the defendant, is the
same whether before a judge or ury.
2
030
The Court therefore held that, considering the pretrial setting and
the nature of the right asserted by the defendant, the possibility that the
prosecutor's increased charges were punitive and in response to Good-
win's request for a jury trial was "so unlikely that a presumption of
vindictiveness certainly is not warranted."20 31 The Court thus left in-
tial charging decision is dependent on a number of circumstances and "should not freeze
future conduct." I at 381.
2022. Id. at 381.
2023. Id.
2024. Id. at 383.
2025. Id. (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1971)).
2026. 457 U.S. at 383.
2027. Id. at 382.
2028. Id. at 382-83. See supra notes 2017-18 and accompanying text.
2029. 457 U.S. at 383.
2030. Id.
2031. Id. at 384. The Court noted that it did not foreclose the possibility that a defendant
could prove objectively that the prosecutor's decision was motivated by a desire to punish
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
tact its presumption of vindictiveness rule in a posttrial setting, but now
requires, in a pretrial setting, that the defendant prove objectively the
prosecutor's punitive motive.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the ma-
jority's distinction between pretrial and posttrial settings in a determi-
nation of a presumption of vindictiveness.2"32 He argued that the rule
of Blackledge20 33 and pearce2 34 applied equally to this case because
the prosecutor had unilaterally added the felony charges after Good-
win's exercise of a legal right. Justice Blackmun restated from his dis-
senting opinion in Bordenkircher20 35  that "'[p]rosecutorial
vindictiveness in any context is still prosecutorial vindictiveness.' "2036
Justice Blackmun thus felt that a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness
had arisen, entitling Goodwin to the presumption. However, he noted
that a prosecutor may add charges in a pretrial setting if the addition is
based on objective information concerning the defendant's conduct af-
ter the initial charging decision or on objective information that the
prosecutor could not reasonably have been aware of at the time of the
initial charging decision.20 37 He concluded that in this case the Gov-
ernment had set forth such information, thus dispelling the appearance
of vindictiveness.
20 38
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, was unper-
suaded by the majority's attempt to distinguish Black/edge from the
Goodwin facts.20 39 He argued that the case was not merely one of "pre-
sumptions," but rather whether the prosecutor's increase in charges
presented a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. '2 °4° Justice Brennan
relied on the underlying policy of Blackledge that a defendant must be
him for exercising a legal right; however, in this case the record clearly indicated that the
prosecutor had no vindictive motive. Id.; see supra note 2008.
2032. 457 U.S. at 385 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
2033. See supra notes 2015-16 and accompanying text.
2034. See su.pra notes 2013-14 and accompanying text.
2035. See supra notes 2017-18 and accompanying text.
2036. 457 U.S. at 385 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 (1978) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting)).
2037. 457 U.S. at 386 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969)).
2038. 457 U.S. at 386. Justice Blackmun seems to advocate the adoption of a less rigorous
test alluded to in Pearce and Black/edge, by which the Government can rebut a presumption
of vindictiveness. See supra notes 2014 & 2016. In those cases, the Court implied that the
appearance of vindictiveness could only be overcome if the increased charges could not hare
been brought at the time of the initial filing decision. Justice Blackmun's approach, how-
ever, is more similar to that adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. See supra notes
1973-77 & 2010 and accompanying text.
2039. 457 U.S. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2040. Id. at 389.
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protected against the fear or apprehension of retaliatory or vindictive
prosecution because such fear "'may unconstitutionally deter a de-
fendant's exercise' of his rights."0'° He suggested that defendants in
Goodwin's position might be deterred from exercising their rights if
faced with a possible increase in charges, and thus, there was a reason-
able likelihood of vindictiveness in these circumstances.2 ° 2
Justice Brennan also disagreed with the majority's characterization
that the burden imposed by a defendant's request for a jury trial is
minor compared to the burden of a complete retrial.2° 3 Selection of
the jury, evidentiary proceedings out of the hearing of the jury, careful
preparation of witnesses and instructions, statements to avoid mistrial
or reversible error, and the possibility of an "irrationar' acquittal all
drive the prosecutor to prefer a bench trial. Because of this
prosecutorial preference, Justice Brennan concluded that an increased
charge following a defendant's request for a jury trial poses a realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness. 34
Finally, Justice Brennan found the analogy between Goodwin and
Bordenkircher2 045 inappropriate. 2046  He thought that the rule of
Bordenkircher applied only to the narrow context of plea bargaining
and that the facts in Goodwin plainly fit within the pattern ofPearce 217
and Blackledge204 8 rather than Bordenkircher.
The majority's rule that a presumption of vindictiveness should
not arise from certain types of pretrial maneuvering is an attempt to
strike an appropriate balance between a defendant's constitutional
rights and prosecutorial discretion and efficiency. It bears too heavily,
however, on defendants' rights. Refusing to apply a presumption of
vindictiveness forces defendants to prove objectively that prosecutorial
actions were improperly motivated. It might well be difficult or impos-
sible for defense counsel to get sufficient information to raise the issue
and prove the existence of such a retaliatory or vindictive motive. In
fact, the Government admitted in its Goodwin brief that "only in a rare
case would a defendant be able to overcome the presumptive validity
of the prosecutor's actions through such a demonstration."
2 49
2041. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)).
2042. 457 U.S. at 389-90.
2043. Id. at 390. See supra note 2021 and accompanying text.
2044. Id.
2045. See supra notes 2017-18 and accompanying text.
2046. 457 U.S. at 391.
2047. See supra notes 2013-14 and accompanying text.
2048. See supra notes 2015-16 and accompanying text.
2049. 457 U.S. at 384 n.19.
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In contrast, allowing the defendant such a presumption when there
is even the appearance of vindictiveness forces the prosecution to rebut
by justifying its actions. When combined with a reasonably flexible
standard of justification, such as the "actual motives" analysis of the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits or the 'justified by independent reasons or in-
tervening circumstances" analysis of the Ninth Circuit, 2°50 this is not an
unreasonable burden for the prosecution.
While the new rule of Goodwin might slightly ease the prosecutor's
job and prevent some frivolous appeals, it does so at the expense of
possibly allowing improperly motivated retaliatory or vindictive
prosecutorial decisions to go undeterred, with the resultant chilling of
defendants' rights. The Court could have accomplished much the same
goal without the same sacrifice of defendants' rights simply by redefin-
ing, in a more flexible way, the burden the government must carry to
rebut a presumption of vindictiveness.
c. post- United States v. Goodwin
After the Supreme Court's decision in Goodwin, the Ninth Circuit
decided four cases which raised the issue of vindictive prosecution. In
United States v. Barker,2"5 ' the defendant was indicted for first degree
murder. Subject to a plea agreement, Barker pleaded guilty to second
degree murder, but then moved to set aside her plea and conviction.
2052
The district judge set aside the conviction and vacated his order dis-
missing the original indictment.0 53 Barker then pleaded not guilty to
the reinstated indictment for first degree murder, and moved to dismiss
the indictment, claiming vindictive prosecution.2 54
The Ninth Circuit briefly dismissed Barker's contention, stating
that the reinstatement of the indictment was simply the result of the
court's vacating the dismissal of the indictment following Barker's first
guilty plea and not due to any action of the prosecutor. 55 It noted
that the reinstated indictment did not expose her to increased punish-
ment and thus could not imply a vindictive or retaliatory motive on the
2050. See supra notes 1973-77 & 2010 and accompanying text.
2051. 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982).
2052. Id. at 590. Barker contended that because of her limited ability in the English lan-
guage, she was not adequately informed of the nature of the second degree murder charge.
Id.
2053. Id.
2054. Id. at 592.
2055. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1175 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 1975)).
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part of the prosecutor. 056
In United States v. Gallegos-Curiel,2 °s7 the defendant was initially
charged with misdemeanor illegal entry by the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS), which has authority to fie such misdemeanor
complaints for later prosecution by the United States Attorney. Gal-
legos-Curiel pleaded not guilty at his initial appearance.20 5  After re-
viewing the defendant's past record, which had not been available to
the INS, the Assistant United States Attorney sought and received a
felony illegal entry indictment from the grand jury.2"59 Gallegos-
Curiel successfully moved in district court to dismiss the indictment as
the product of vindictive prosecution. °60
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the indictment, the
Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Goodwin and its predecessors .2°  The
court noted that the not guilty plea was entered on the same day the
misdemeanor complaint was filed and the subsequent felony indict-
ment was sought only a few days later.2° 2 Thus, at such an early stage
of the proceedings, the prosecutor could certainly have discovered ad-
ditional facts justifying a more severe charge.2°63 In fact, the Assistant
United States Attorney did have access to Gallegos-Curiel's complete
record while the INS agent who filed the initial misdemeanor charge
did not.
2064
The court also noted that not guilty pleas early in proceedings are
routine actions much like the pretrial motions discussed by the Court in
Goodwin.2065 Such pleas and motions are "expected as part of the ad-
versary process," 20 66 and it would not be realistic to assume that the
prosecution's pretrial actions were vindictive responses. 67 The court
further stated that because the entering of a plea does not in every case
absolutely commit a defendant to a certain course of confrontation,
and because the entering of a plea before trial does not require "dupli-
2056. 681 F.2d at 593. The court noted the holding in Goodwin, stating that even if the
reinstated indictment carried more severe penalties, that alone would not give rise to a pre-
sumption of vindictiveness. Id. (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982)).
2057. 681 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1982).
2058. Id. at 1166.
2059. Id. at 1166-67.
2060. Id. at 1167. The district court acted before the Supreme Court's ruling in Goodwin.
2061. Id. at 1167-68.
2062. Id. at 1169.
2063. Id. (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381).
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cative expenditures of prosecutorial resources, ' 20 6 there was little like-
lihood of vindictiveness. 2069 The court ruled that, "[i]n every case
alleging inferred vindictive prosecution, there must be a threshold
showing of vindictiveness or the likelihood of it before the court is jus-
tified in inquiring into the prosecutor's actual motives. 20 7 °
In United States v. Banks,2 07 1 the Ninth Circuit also reversed a
pre-Goodwin district court dismissal of an indictment based on allega-
tions of vindictive prosecution. Defendant Banks was originally in-
dicted in 1975 on five counts relating to the possession and
transportation of firearms and explosives. 0 72 Between 1975 and 1980,
Banks challenged the indictment on evidentiary and procedural
grounds until, as a result of a Ninth Circuit decision,0 73 the Govern-
ment was allowed to seek a new indictment. 0 74 The new indictment
charged Banks with an additional count of receiving firearms while
under indictment for a felony. 0 75 Banks challenged the new indict-
ment on the basis of vindictive prosecution, and the district court dis-
missed all six counts, finding that the additional count in the new
indictment gave rise to an undispelled appearance of vindictiveness.0 76
On appeal, the Government contended that the dismissal of all six
counts was an incorrect remedy and asked the Ninth Circuit to rein-
state the first five counts.2 °77 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the rem-
edy issue raised by the Government but concluded that in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Goodwin, no presumption of vindictiveness
was warranted.0 78 After reciting the rationale from Goodwin for not
applying a presumption of vindictiveness in a pretrial setting, the court
determined that not only did the prosecutor here "clearly [have] a legit-
imate reason to reconsider the scope and content of the new pretrial
2068. Id.
2069. Id. Gallegos-Curiel argued that the United States Attorney would not have re-
viewed his record and filed the felony indictment except for his plea of not guilty. The court
responded to this argument that it is the likelihood of retaliation that is crucial, not the
particular sequence of events. Id. at 1171.
2070. Id. at 1169.
2071. 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1982).
2072. Id. at 843.
2073. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980).




2078. Id. at 845 (citing United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.
1982)).
[Vol. 16
CRIMINAL LAW SUI]R VEY
indictment, ' 20 79 but that the prosecutor had been compelled by court
order to obtain a new indictment from a new grand jury.20 80 The court
also noted the district court's finding that "'there is no evidence that
the Government's action was vindictive infact. . . nor did I find that
the Government acted with a malicious or retaliatory motive.' "2081
The court therefore held that the dismissal of all six counts was errone-
ous; however, since the Government did not contest the sixth count, it
reinstated only the first five.20 82
In United States v. Currie,2 83 the Ninth Circuit re-examined and
reversed its earlier decision in the same case2 084 as a result of Goodwin.
Defendant Currie was charged, by information, with a misdemeanor
conversion of a stolen United States Treasury check having a value not
in excess of $100.00. After arraignment, about three weeks before the
date set for trial, Currie's attorney informed the prosecution that Currie
intended to go to trial. Soon thereafter, the Assistant United States
Attorney informed Currie's counsel that the Government intended to
seek a felony indictment for the same act under the same statute as the
misdemeanor charge.2085 The Government indicated, however, that it
would abandon its attempt to obtain a felony indictment if Currie were
to plead guilty to the original misdemeanor charge within one week.
20 86
Currie refused to plead guilty, and at a pretrial hearing the district
court judge dismissed the felony indictment on the ground of vindictive
prosecution.2 87
On appeal, the Government argued that Bordenkircher v.
Hayes20 8  allowed the "use of threatened reindictment as a bargaining
chip in plea negotiations. 2 89 In its first ruling in this case, the Ninth
2079. 682 F.2d at 841.
2080. Id. at 846.
2081. Id.
2082. Id.
2083. 682 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
2084. 667 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
2085. Id. at 1252.
2086. Id.
2087. Id.
2088. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
2089. 667 F.2d at 1252. In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor threatened, during plea bargain-
ing conferences, to re-indict the defendant under a more severe habitual criminal statute if
he did not plead guilty to an existent felony charge of uttering a forged instrument. The
defendant did not so plead and was ultimately re-indicted and convicted on the more severe
charges. 434 U.S. at 359. The Supreme Court held that due process rights were not violated
if the prosecutor threatened increased charges during plea negotiations, so long as the bar-
gaining was plainly presented, and the defendant was clearly subject to the increased
charges. Id. at 364-65.
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Circuit distinguished Bordenkircher, stating that there had been no plea
negotiations before Currie's not guilty plea, and thus Currie had not
been "fully informed of the true terms of the offer when he made his
decision to plead not guilty. '20 90 The court noted that Currie had had
no notice of the prosecutor's intent to indict him until after he had
communicated to the prosecutor his intent to stand trial on the misde-
meanor charge. It also noted that in Bordenkircher the prosecution had
to prove additional facts to convict under the superseding indictment
while in Currie's case essentially the same facts could sustain a convic-
tion on either the original misdemeanor charge or the superseding fel-
ony charge.2 91 The court concluded that this case was within the
holding of United States v. Alvarado-Sandova 20 92 and affirmed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of the indictment on the basis of vindictive
prosecution.0 93
After this decision, Currie petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court
then vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of Goodwin.2094
On remand, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
the district court for reinstatement of the indictment.20 95 The court did
note that the district court could take further evidence on the question
of actual vindictiveness to determine if Currier's claim could be sus-
tained under the more restrictive rule of Goodwin.2096
The holdings in the above cases clearly indicate the effect the
Supreme Court's decision in Goodwin will have in the Ninth Circuit on
a defendant's claim of vindictive prosecution in a pretrial setting.
Before Goodwin, the events spoke for themselves; a defendant's asser-
tion of a constitutional or statutory right, followed by a reindictment
carrying more severe penalties, created the appearance of vindictive-
ness. This appearance of vindictiveness could only be dispelled by the
prosecution showing that its actions were "justified by independent rea-
2090. 667 F.2d at 1253 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360 (1978)).
2091. 667 F.2d at 1253.
2092. 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Inylvarado-Sandoval, the defendant was
arraigned on a misdemeanor, and after no guilty plea was entered, the Government sought
a felony indictment. Following conviction on the felony charges, the defendant appealed on
the ground of vindictive prosecution. Id. at 645. The court held that only the appearance of
vindictiveness was required and that the defendant had met that burden. The actual mo-
tives for the Government's seeking of a felony charge were held immaterial. Id. at 645-46.
2093. 667 F.2d at 1253.
2094. United States v. Currie, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
2095. United States v. Currie, 682 F.2d at 847.
2096. Id.
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sons or intervening circumstances."2 97 This was not always an easy
task as shown by the facts in Motley,209s Gallegos-Curiel, Banks, and
Currie. Now, the burden lies with the defendant to make at least a
threshold showing of vindictiveness or the likelihood of it before the
court will inquire into the prosecutor's actual motive.2 99
d vindictive prosecution versus selective enforcement
In United States v. Hooton,21°° the Ninth Circuit briefly considered
the applicability of a claim of vindictive prosecution in a different fac-
tual context. Defendant Hooton was convicted of engaging in the busi-
ness of dealing in firearms without a federal license.210 1 He claimed
that his indictment was in retaliation for his filing civil actions against
the government and a government agent, and for charges made by him
against a friend of the government agent.210 2
The Ninth Circuit cogently reviewed its past holdings and re-
peated the pre-Goodwin rule that the defendant need only show the
appearance of vindictiveness to shift the burden to the prosecution.
210 3
It also stated that vindictive prosecution usually arises from instances
of increases in the severity of charges in retaliation for a defendant's
assertion of rights in an existent criminal proceeding.21 4
The Government claimed that the rule on vindictive prosecution
should not be applied since Hooton was challenging his initial indict-
ment rather than an increase in charges.2 0 5 It claimed that the proper
rule to apply was that of selective or discriminatory enforcement, where
the defendant must show "(1) that others similarly situated generally
have not been prosecuted for similar conduct and (2) that his selection
for prosecution was based on an impermissible ground such as race,
2097. See supra notes 1975-1977 and accompanying text.
2098. See supra notes 1978-1996 and accompanying text.
2099. See supra notes 2090-2096 and accompanying text.
2100. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1982).
2101. d. at 630.
2102. Id. at 633. The Government agent was allegedly angered by these charges. d.
2103. Id.
2104. Id. at 633-34 (citing United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1976)). The court noted that these cases stemmed from North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969) (trial court's reasons for imposing heavier sentence upon retrial must affirma-
tively appear), and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (indictment on increased charges
following defendant's exercise of right violates due process when circumstances "pose a real-
istic likelihood of 'vindictiveness' "). See supra notes 2013-2016 and accompanying text.
2105. 662 F.2d at 634.
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religion or his exercise of his right to free speech." 210 6
The Ninth Circuit, however, determined that "the mere filing of an
indictment can support a charge of vindictive prosecution. 210 7 Never-
theless, it upheld Hooton's conviction, stating that Hooton had not
shown the requisite appearance of vindictiveness.
2108
The Ninth Circuit in this case has blurred the previously clear line
between vindictive prosecution and selective or discriminatory enforce-
ment. The burden on the defendant was much less under the rule for
vindictive prosecution, and application of that rule to a wider set of
facts, such as those in Hooton, would have resulted in greater burdens
for the prosecution. However, since the Supreme Court's holding in
Goodwin has eliminated the presumption arising from an appearance
of vindictiveness in pretrial settings, the defendant is now faced with
about equal burdens in showing either vindictive prosecution or selec-
tive or discriminatory enforcement. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's holding
in Hooton that "the mere filing of an indictment can support a charge
of vindictive prosecution" will have little practical effect.
C. Zdent(/cations
In determining whether an out-of-court identification is admissi-
ble, the Ninth Circuit applies the standard set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States.2 0 9 If an identifica-
tion procedure is "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification," 211 0 the identifi-
cation testimony will be excluded as violative of the defendant's right
to due process. However, because "reliability is the linchpin in deter-
mining the admissibility of identification testimony, '21 1' a suggestive
identification procedure will not be held to violate due process if there
are sufficient indicia of reliability.2 2
A two step analysis is used to decide if admission of the identifica-
tion testimony will result in "irreparable misidentification." First, the
reliability of the identification must be determined by considering five
factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court: (1) the witness'
2106. Id. (citing United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Scott,
521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976)).
2107. 662 F.2d at 634.
2108. Id. The only animus Hooton had shown was that of the agent, and the agent had
had no charging authority. Id.
2109. 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
2110. Id at 384.
2111. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
2112. Id at 106.
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opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the wit-
ness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior descrip-
tion of the criminal; (4) the level of the witness' certainty at the
confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.2 1 3 Second, the degree of the identification's reliability
must be weighed against the "corrupting effect of the suggestive identi-
fication itself."2114 The Ninth Circuit has recently applied this totality
of the circumstances approach to cases involving both pretrial photo-
graphic identifications and pretrial show-up identifications.
In United States v. Hanigan,11 5 the defendant was convicted of
aiding and abetting a robbery. Before trial, the victims had identified
Hanigan from his picture in a high school yearbook as one of the per-
sons who robbed and tortured them.2116 Hanigan argued that this pre-
trial photographic identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive because his name, which appeared under his picture in the
yearbook, was the same as the name posted in front of the ranch where
the victims were taken during the crime.21 7
In applying the Supreme Court's five factors, the Ninth Circuit
found sufficient indicia that the photographic identifications were relia-
ble.2118 Not only were the victims held by their assailants during the
daytime, the identifications were made the following day and two of
the victims were positive in their identifications. The court then
weighed the reliability of the identifications against the corruptive ef-
fect of any suggestiveness, and held that the identifications were admis-
sible because they were the result of observations made at the time of
the crime rather than impressions received during a suggestive
procedure.2119
In United States v. Booth,2120 the defendant was charged with bank
robbery. Booth had been picked up by an officer because he appeared
to match the description of one of the alleged bank robbers. He was
later handcuffed and transported to the bank for a show-up identifica-
tion.2121 The district court suppressed the identification testimony of
2113. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972).
2114. United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)).
2115. 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1189 (1983).
2116. Id. at 1132-33.
2117. Id at 1133.
2118. Id (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972); Green v. Loggins, 614 F.2d
219, 223 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2119. 681 F.2d at 1133 (citing United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 866 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2120. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
2121. Id at 1234.
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three eyewitnesses who viewed Booth at the show-up because it found
the procedure highly suggestive. There were no exigent circumstances
requiring Booth to be handcuffed and taken back to the bank for the
show-up. 2
122
The Ninth Circuit stated that a show-up is a permissible means of
identification, regardless of a showing of exigency.2123 It also deter-
mined that the district court had applied the wrong standard because
the test was not whether there was a likelihood of misidentification or
whether the overall circumstances resulted in a fair identification.
Rather, the correct analysis was whether, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the show-up procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as
to give rise to the strong probability of an irreparable misidentifica-
tion.2124 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the district court for
application of the appropriate standard.2 25
In United States v. Hammond,2 26 the defendant was convicted of
bank robbery. Hammond had been arrested after a bank teller ob-
served him in the bank's parking lot and reported that he looked like
the man who had robbed the bank the previous week. Two of the tell-
ers who witnessed the robbery identified Hammond as the bank robber
at a show-up identification in which Hammond stood outside the bank
and the tellers observed him through the bank's window. On appeal,
Hammond argued that the identification testimony resulting from the
show-up procedure should have been suppressed because it was the
product of an unconstitutional show-up identification.
1 27
The Ninth Circuit held that, in light of the Supreme Court's five
factors, the identifications were reliable.1 28 The court stated that the
two tellers' identifications were particularly reliable because of the op-
portunity and length of time they had to observe the robber at the time
of the crime, and their degree of attention.212 9 It acknowledged that
2122. Id at 1239.
2123. Id (citing United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1020 (1980); United States v. Coades, 549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977)).
2124. 669 F.2d at 1239 (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968); United
States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 865 (9th Cir. 1980)).
2125. 669 F.2d at 1239.
2126. 666 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1982).
2127. Id at 437.
2128. Id at 439-40 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977)). The Court
reiterated in Manson the factors it established in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972).
2129. 666 F.2d at 440. It was the robber's suspicious manner which caused one of the
tellers to activate the bank's surveillance cameras. When the robber entered the bank for the
first time, he remained several minutes, left, and then returned five to fifteen minutes later.
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there was little evidence that the tellers had provided prior descriptions
of the robber,2130 but stated that this did not preclude a determination
of reliability. 21 3I Finally, the court stated that the tellers' levels of cer-
tainty were high enough to be reasonably reliable,a1 32 and that a time
lapse of one week between the robbery and identification was not long
enough to indicate unreliability.2133
These decisions demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit determines the
reliability of identification testimony on a case-by-case basis, because
of the need to apply the Supreme Court's five factors to the particular
facts of each case. Even though these factors were formulated for cases
involving suggestive photographic identifications, the Ninth Circuit ap-
plies them in cases involving suggestive show-up identifications and
line-up identifications, 134 as well as to cases involving photographic
identifications.
D. Bail
A defendant in a federal criminal case may be released from cus-
tody before trial, during trial, before sentencing or pending appeal, on
his personal recognizance or by the execution of an appearance bond.
Such release is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46
and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, in accordance with the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, and is subject to the eighth amendment prohibi-
tion on excessive bail.21 35
At this time, he looked around the bank as though he were trying to determine how many
employees were on duty. Id
2130. Id In an attempt to bolster its reliability argument, the Government introduced the
descriptions of the robber given by the witnesses at trial. However, these descriptions were
clearly irrelevant to the determination of reliability because they may have been based on
the witnesses' observations of Hammond at the show-up, rather than on their observations
of the robber at the time of the commission of the crime. Id at 440 n.2.
2131. Id at 440.
2132. Id One teller testified that she had positively identified Hammond at the show-up,
while the other teller stated that she thought she knew Hammond was the perpetrator. Id at
440 n.3.
2133. Id at 440 (citing United States v. Williams, 596 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 946 (1979)).
2134. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
2135. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required." The
Ninth Circuit briefly addressed this issue in United States v. Wilder, 680 F.2d 59 (9th Cir.
1982) (per curiam). Wilder appealed his tax offense conviction on numerous grounds which
the Ninth Circuit characterized as frivolous, unreasonable and vexatious. Id at 60-61. One
of Wilder's claims was that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a $10,000 cash
bond pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit dismissed his claim, stating, without authority, that
Wilder waived his right to such an appeal by not raising it in a motion to modify the bond
conditions, but rather waiting to raise it on appeal. Id at 61.
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1. "Bail jumping"
A defendant who willfully fails to appear after being released on
bail may be subject to forfeiture of the bail and prosecution for "bail
jumping" under 18 U.S.C. section 3150.2136
In United States v. Burns,21 7 the Government appealed the district
court's dismissal of Bums' indictment for "bail jumping," brought
when Bums failed to appear for sentencing following his conviction of
a tax offense. Bums was initially indicted for the tax offense and was
issued a summons under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(a).113
He was present in court "on summons," after arraignment, and again
after conviction, when he was allowed "to leave based on the summons
and to return" for sentencing. When he did not appear for sentencing,
a bench warrant was issued. He later surrendered and was indicted for
violation of 18 U.S.C. section 3150.2139
Bums contended in the district court that he had not been released
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3146;214 therefore, he could not be in-
dicted under section 3150. The district court dismissed the indictment,
2136. 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976) provides:
Whoever, having been released pursuant to this chapter, willfully fails to appear
before any court or judicial officer as required, shall subject to the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, incur a forfeiture of any security which was
given or pledged for his release, and, in addition, shall, (1) if he was released in
connection with a charge of felony, or while awaiting sentence or pending appeal
or certiorari after conviction of any offense, be fined not more than $5,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both, or (2) if he was released in connection
with a charge of misdemeanor, be fined not more than the maximum provided for
such misdemeanor or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, or (3) if he
was released for appearance as a material witness, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
2137. 667 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010 (1982).
2138. Id at 782. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) provides:
If it appears from the complaint, or from the affidavit or affidavits filed with
the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been com-
mitted and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the
defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it. Upon the re-
quest of the attorney for the government a summons instead of a warrant shall
issue. More than one warrant or summons may issue on the same complaint. If a
defendant fails to appear in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue.
2139. 667 F.2d at 782.
2140. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending
trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appear-
ance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer deter-
mines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is
made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods
of release, impose. . . conditions of release which will reasonably assure the ap-
pearance of the person for trial. ...
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holding that at the time Bums failed to appear, his status was that of a
fugitive rather than a person released under section 3146.2141
The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that while it was true that
Bums became a fugitive after the bench warrant was issued, the section
3150 indictment was for a failure to appear before the bench warrant
was issued.2142 The court reasoned that although the district court did
not explicitly cite section 3146 in allowing Bums' release before sen-
tencing, it must have been pursuant to that section because after con-
viction the court could only have released him pursuant to section 3146
or have detained him.2 143 Since Bums was informed of the terms of his
release and the consequences of a failure to reappear at the appointed
time, the court concluded that Bums was released on personal recogni-
zance under section 3146.214
2. Bond forfeiture
A defendant in a noncapital case may be released from custody
before trial on his personal recognizance, or by the execution of an
appearance bond in an amount specified by a judicial officer accompa-
nied by certain conditions of release.a 45 If a defendant breaches a con-
dition of his bond, the district court must declare a forfeiture of the
bail.2 14  However, the court has discretion to either set aside2 147 or re-
mit21 48 the forfeiture.21 49 In determining whether to set aside or remit a
2141. 667 F.2d at 782. The district court relied on the Ninth Circuit's earlier ruling in
United States v. Castaldo, 636 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1980). In Castaldo, the defendant was
initially released pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3146, then failed to appear at a hearing, and for-
feited bond. After Castaldo failed to appear at a second hearing, he was indicted for violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 3150. In dismissing the indictment, the Ninth Circuit held that at the time of
nonappearance at the second hearing, Castaldo was a fugitive and therefore no longer re-
leased pursuant to § 3146. Id at 1172.
2142. 667 F.2d at 782. This distinguished Burns from Castaldo, who was indicted for fail-
ure to appear after the bench warrant was issued and hence was a fugitive not released
under § 3146.
2143. Id at 783. The Ninth Circuit noted that the only statutory authority for post-convic-
tion release is 18 U.S.C. § 3148, which provides in part that "[a] person. . . who has been
convicted of an offense... shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section
3146."
2144. 667 F.2d at 783.
2145. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a). See supra note 2140.
2146. FED. R. CRiM. P. 46(e)(1) states that "[i]f there is a breach of condition of a bond, the
district court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail."
2147. FED. R. CRaM. P. 46(e)(2) states that "[t]he court may direct that a forfeiture be set
aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not
require the enforcement of the forfeiture."
2148. FED. R. CuM. P. 46(e)(4) states that "[a]fter entry of such judgment [of default on
the bond], the court may remit it in whole or in part under the conditions applying to the
setting aside of forfeiture in paragraph (2) of this subdivision."
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forfeiture, the trial court may consider: the willfullness of the breach;
the participation of the bondsman in the arrest; the cost, inconvenience,
and prejudice to the government; explanations or mitigating factors
presented by the defendant;2150 the appropriateness of the amount of
the bond; and whether the sureties were professionals, or family or
friends.21 51 The trial court's determination will be reversed only upon
a showing of abuse of discretion, with the burden of proof on the de-
fendant.15 2 The Ninth Circuit recently reviewed two cases where sure-
ties were denied a setting aside or remission of a forfeiture following
the defendants' breach of bond conditions.
In United States v. Castaldo,1 53 bonding companies who were
sureties for the defendant contended that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion by not setting aside or remitting a bond forfeiture after the de-
fendant failed to appear at a post-conviction hearing, and not holding
an evidentiary hearing on the motion to set aside or remit the forfei-
ture.2154 They further contended that the forfeiture would have a chil-
ling effect on bond companies, which would inhibit them from assisting
defendants in exercising their constitutional right to bail.2155
In upholding the trial court's rulings, the Ninth Circuit noted that
the defendant's breach was willful, that the sureties took no part in
apprehending the defendant, and that the Government incurred con-
siderable expense during its 170-day search for the defendant.
2156 It
further noted that there were no mitigating factors present, and that the
bonding companies were experienced professionals aware of the risks
involved in bonding the defendant. The court rejected the argument
concerning an evidentiary hearing, noting that the sureties never re-
quested an evidentiary hearing and that the affidavits submitted to the
trial court contained sufficient evidence for its decision.2157 Finally, the
2149. United States v. Stanley, 601 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
2150. Id at 382. In Stanley, the defendant was denied remission of forfeited bail because
he willfully breached the travel restrictions of his bond. The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion, notwithstanding that there was no showing of cost,
prejudice, or inconvenience to the government caused by the defendant's breach. Id
2151. United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978) (forfeiture of $25,000 exces-
sive where defendant violated travel restrictions of his bond but did not injure or delay the
government's prosecution of his case, and equity of forfeiture dependent on whether bonds-
man is professional or merely a friend or relative of defendant). Cf. United States v. Stanley,
supra note 2150.
2152. United States v. Nolan, 564 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir. 1977).
2153. 667 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 978 (1981).
2154. Id at 21-22.
2155. id at 22.
2156. Id at 21.
2157. Id at 22.
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court rejected the sureties' policy argument, stating that the forfeiture
would encourage bonding companies to be more careful in dealing
with their clients and to cooperate more fully in efforts to apprehend
defendants who fail to appear.21 58
In United States v. Frias-Ramirez,2 159 sureties of a defendant who
did not appear as required at a pretrial hearing appealed both the for-
feiture of the bond and the trial court's denial of their motion to set
aside or remit the forfeiture. As their first challenge to the forfeiture,
the sureties contended that the defendant had died in a boat fire ten
days before the scheduled appearance date, therefore relieving them of
liability. 160 However, since the defendant's body was never recovered
and there was no proof that he was on the boat during the fire, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding that the suggestion of the
defendant's death was the "wildest speculation." 2161 As their second
challenge to the forfeiture, the sureties asserted that the magistrate
failed to fully inform them of the risks and responsibilities of signing
the bail bond.2162 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that
the magistrate, who had spoken through an interpreter because the
sureties were Spanish-speaking with a limited understanding of Eng-
lish, had told them "you are obligating yourself to pay the United
States $250,000 if he [defendant] doesn't appear. In addition to that,
you'll be losing your property in all possibility if he doesn't appear."
21 63
The sureties also contended that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by failing to set aside or remit the forfeiture on their motion.2164
After reviewing the factors to be considered in determining whether an
abuse of discretion occurred, 165 the Ninth Circuit failed to find such
abuse. Although sympathetic to the plight of the sureties, 21 66 the court
2158. Id
2159. 670 F.2d 849 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 94 (1982).
2160. 670 F.2d at 851. Death of the defendant exonerates sureties from liability on a bond.
Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 369 (1872).
2161. 670 F.2d at 851.
2162. Id at 851-52. The Ninth Circuit noted that this argument raised the issue of
whether a judicial officer has a duty to communicate to the sureties, as opposed to the de-
fendant, the full extent of their liability if the defendant breaches a bond condition. The
court did not decide this issue, however, because in this case the sureties were fully informed
of their liability. Id at 852 n.3.
2163. Id at 852.
2164. Id at 852-53.
2165. See supra notes 2137-38 and accompanying text.
2166. 670 F.2d at 852. The sureties, who were relatives and friends of the defendants,
conveyed trust deeds to the government for their residences, representing a combined equity
of approximately $185,000. In addition, they were personally liable for the remainder of the
$250,000 bond not satisfied by foreclosure of their property. Id at 851.
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noted that the defendant's failure to appear was willful, absent con-
vincing evidence of his death in the boat fire; that the Government was
inconvenienced by his nonappearance; that the amount of bail was ap-
propriate; and that the sureties were aware of the risks involved.
21 6 7
The court thus concluded that the trial court's decision was neither ar-
bitrary nor capricious and was therefore not an abuse of discretion.21 68
Although the decision in Frias-Ramirez appears harsh, it is simply
a reflection of the great deference the Ninth Circuit gives the trial court
in evaluating bail forfeitures and remissions. The cold record on ap-
peal cannot possibly convey all of the factors that the trial judge con-
sidered in making his decision, and thus the Ninth Circuit is reluctant
to reverse absent clear signs of abuse of discretion.
E. Defendant's Right to Disco very
Some discovery rights for defendants have developed as constitu-
tional mandate in case law, but most have their bases in statutory law
or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2169 Trial judges are gener-
ally given broad discretion in applying sanctions for noncompliance
with discovery requirements.2170 Recent Ninth Circuit cases have dis-
cussed defendants' rights under all three types of discovery.
The Jencks Act2171 prohibits the pretrial discovery of statements
2167. Id at 852-53. The court noted that while the Ninth Circuit had not yet held that a
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside or remit bail forefeitures, other cir-
cuits had found such abuse. Id at 853 n.4 (citing United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440, 444
(5th Cir. 1979) (forfeiture of $40,000 unreasonable where defendant appeared at all proceed-
ings but had inconvenienced the court and prosecutors for fourteen and one-half hours until
his body was found after his suicide); United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747, 752 (4th Cir.
1970) (forfeiture of $25,000 excessive where the defendant's willful nonappearance caused
only minimal injury to the government, and $2,500 was a reasonable forfeiture); United
States v. D'Argento, 339 F.2d 925, 928-29 (7th Cir. 1964) (forfeiture of $15,000 reversed
where the defendant unknowingly violated travel restrictions which did not prejudice the
government)). See also United States v. Bass, 573 F.2d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1978), supra note
2151.
2168. 670 F.2d at 853.
2169. F. MILLER, R. DAwsON, G. DIX AND R. PARNAS, PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION
719 (2d ed. 1982).
2170. Id at 723.
2171. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the
subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on di-
rect examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination,
the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any
statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United
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made by a prospective government witness.2 17 z After such an individ-
ual has actually testified at trial, however, the Act requires that the gov-
ernment produce upon demand those statements made which relate to
the subject matter of the testimony given. 173 The Act narrowly defines
"statement" as (1) a writing made by the witness and "signed or other-
wise adopted or approved," or (2) an account which is "a substantially
verbatim recital" of the witness' oral statement "recorded contempora-
neously with the making of such oral statement; or (3) a statement
made by a witness to a grand jury." '2174
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Harris,2175 held that a wit-
ness' statements, as defined under the Jencks Act, may also implicate
the rule of Brady v. Maryland.21 76 In Brady, the Supreme Court held
that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.2 177
Written or recorded statements made by a defendant which are in
the government's possession may also be inspected or obtained under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A).1 78 Similarly, the pre-
trial production of any documents may be compelled by the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c).2179
States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If
the entire contents of any such statements relate to the subject matter of the testi-
mony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defend-
ant for his examination and use.
2172. Id. § 3500(a).
2173. Id § 3500(b).
2174. Id § 3500(e).
2175. 543 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (9th Cir. 1976) (FBI must preserve original notes taken by
agents during prospective witness interviews so that court can determine what evidence must
be produced pursuant to Jencks Act).
2176. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2177. Id at 87.
2178. FED. R. CRM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) provides, in part, that
[u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy. . . any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant
[which are] within the possession, custody or control of the government, the exist-
ence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to
the attorney for the government.
The Rule further provides that the government shall disclose the substance of any oral state-
ment it intends to offer in evidence at the trial which was made by the defendant in response
to interrogation by a person then known to the defendant to be a government agent.
2179. FED. R. CuM. P. 17(c) provides that "[a] subpoena may also command the person to
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated
1983]
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1. Investigator's rough notes
The Ninth Circuit recently considered several cases in which the
above discovery rights were asserted with respect to an investigator's
rough notes. In United States v. Grfin,21 80 the defendant was indicted
by a grand jury for embezzlement of union funds and embezzlement
from an employee benefit plan.2181 This indictment was the result of
two and one-half years of investigation, during which time civil com-
pliance officers from the Department of Labor conducted thirty-seven
interviews of twenty-four persons.218 2 During these interviews, the of-
ficers had taken rough handwritten notes which they later used to pre-
pare formal interview reports. Some of these rough notes were then
destroyed, including those taken during Griffin's interviews and the in-
terviews of five potential Government witnesses.2 83
After discovering the existence of the handwritten notes, Griffin
filed a motion seeking their production. In response, the Government
provided a list of all persons interviewed, the dates of the interviews,
and whether rough notes had been retained. Relying on the Jencks
Act, United States v. Harris, and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, Griffin then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,
or, in the alternative, to strike the testimony of those witnesses for
whom rough interview notes had not been retained.2 84 The trial court
chose to dismiss with prejudice the indictment against Griffin, stating
that while the Jencks Act problem could be eliminated by merely strik-
ing the testimony of each of the Government witnesses, the Brady
problem would remain absent an outright dismissal.2 85
Following the Government's appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that
the district court had erred in dismissing the indictment and ordered
the case remanded for further proceedings. 2186 According to the court,
therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compli-
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive."
2180. 659 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
2181. Id at 934. The defendant was charged with embezzlement from union funds under
29 U.S.C. § 501(c) and with embezzlement from an employee benefit plan under 18 U.S.C.
§664.
2182. Id at 934-35.
2183. Id at 935. At a pretrial hearing, a compliance officer testified that her rough notes
were completely incorporated into her formal reports, and that she neither had shown nor
read the notes to the interviewees. Id
2184. Id at 936. See supra notes 2171, 2175 & 2178 and accompanying text.
2185. Id The Brady problem was the suppression of evidence possibly favorable to the
defendant by the Government, which could not be determined since the evidence had been
destroyed.
2186. Id at 941.
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any dismissal under Brady was improper where, as here, the defendant
failed to raise "at least a colorable claim that the investigator's dis-
carded rough notes contained evidence favorable to defendant and ma-
terial to his claim of innocence or to the applicable punishment.
2 8 7
The impropriety of this sanction, the court explained, stemmed from
the fact that absent such a claim, no constitutional violation of due
process was established.188
The circuit court also considered producibility of the rough inter-
view notes under the Jencks Act, noting in dicta that two factors must
be affirmatively established before sanctions can be imposed under that
Act: (1) that the notes constituted "statements" of either the inter-
viewee or the Government interviewing agent, and (2) that the notes
"relate[d] to the subject matter" of the testimony offered. 218 9 The court
determined that unless the testimony of the compliance officer was dis-
puted, the rough notes could not be characterized as Jencks Act "state-
ments" because they were neither verbatim recitals of the interviewee's
oral statements, nor were they "signed or otherwise approved" by the
interviewees. 2190 The court further observed that the cryptic and in-
complete nature of rough notes probably precluded the finding that
they constituted an agent's statement as envisioned by the Jencks
Act.2191 The court concluded its discussion of this issue by admonish-
2187. Id at 939. The court stated that unless there is some indication that the rough notes
were destroyed in bad faith or that they met the Brady requirements of materiality, dismissal
was not the proper sanction. Id at 939 n.7. It also noted that reading Brady as broadly as
Griftfn requested would require the Government to preserve all material even arguably re-
lated to the criminal transaction. Such a broad view confficts with the restrictive rules for
disclosure established by Congress in the Jencks Act. Furthermore, the Supreme Court re-
jected this argument in United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1969), in which it
stated that because the precise nature of an agent's lost interview notes could not be deter-
mined from the record, the court would not presume that they were a sufficient transcript of
a witness' remarks to be a Jencks Act "statement." See also Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343, 347, 350 (1959).
The Grfin court concluded that a constitutional error would be committed only if the
nondisclosed evidence would have created a reasonable doubt, and its omission must be
evaluated in the context of the entire record. 659 F.2d at 939 (citing United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976)). InAgurs, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe mere possibility
that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have af-
fected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense."
Id at 109-10.
2188. 659 F.2d at 939.
2189. Id at 937-38.
2190. Id at 937 (citing United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 558 n.21 (9th Cir. 1980); 18
U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1) & (2)). The court stated that if the district court finds that the notes are
Jencks Act "statements," the proper sanction is to strike only that witness' testimony. 659
F.2d at 937 n.3.
2191. 659 F.2d at 937 (citing United States v. Spencer, 618 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980)). In
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ing the district court to permit the Government witnesses to testify on
remand if, consistent with the evidence presented, it determined that
the compliance officers' rough notes did not constitute "statements"
under the Jencks Act.2192
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the destruction of
those portions of the rough notes containing statements made by Grif-
fin violated his Rule 16(a)(1)(A) rights." 93 Three formal interview re-
ports were prepared on Griffin-a seventeen page report, which he
reviewed, corrected and signed, a one-half page report and a ten line
report.2194 The court stated that with respect to the seventeen page re-
port, no error could arise from the failure to produce rough notes be-
cause Griffin had adopted the final report.2195 With respect to the notes
utilized to prepare the remaining reports, the court observed that Grif-
fin had made no showing that the Ninth Circuit compels sanctions for
the destruction of these kinds of notes. The court also suggested that
Griffin's Rule 16 argument was further weakened by the fact that he
had not established that the Government intended to offer statements
made in those reports into evidence at trial.2 196 The Ninth Circuit thus
Spencer, the court found that since the congressional policy behind the Jencks Act was to
protect witnesses from being impeached with words which were not their own, or were an
incomplete version of their testimony, an agent's rough notes will not be construed as "state-
ments" under the Act when they "are not complete, are truncated in nature, or have become
an unsiftable mix of witness testimony, investigators' selections, interpretations, and interpo-
lations." Id at 606 (citing United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 354-56 (1969); Pa-
lermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959); Wilke v. United States, 422 F.2d 1298,
1299 (9th Cir. 1970)).
However, the GriFfn court indicated that portions of the final report may become Jencks
Act "statements" of the agent, if the portion which records the agent's thoughts and observa-
tions is adopted and approved by the agent. 659 F.2d at 937-38. The court also stated that
the portion of the agent's rough interview notes which simply records the interviewee's re-
marks cannot be a "statement" for Jencks Act purposes when the agent testifies as a witness
because it is not the agent's own words. Id at 938. The Supreme Court reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the Jencks Act, in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), and con-
cluded that "[i]t is clear that Congress was concerned that only those statements which could
properly be called the witness' own words should be made available to the defense for pur-
poses of impeachment." Id at 352 (footnote omitted).
2192. 659 F.2d at 938.
2193. Id at 939.
2194. Id at 939-40.
2195. Id at 940.
2196. Id at 941. See Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 389
U.S. 839 (1967). In Kaplan, the Ninth Circuit held:
We find no error in the denial of [defendants'] motion to have government sum-
maries of defendants' statements given before trial produced for [defendants'] use.
No such statements were offered in evidence against defendants, or used at the trial
against them in any way. [Defendants] demanded in. . . their motion the produc-
tion of written memoranda made by government agents of oral statements made by
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concluded that the district court was free on remand to bar the intro-
duction of these statements or to enter any order it deemed just under
the circumstances of the case.
2 197
In United States v. Kaiser,2'98 an undercover Drug Enforcement
Administration agent made a handwritten rough draft of a report per-
taining to his purchase of heroin from one of the defendants. At trial
the agent could only produce a typed transcript of the notes.2199 The
district court held that this constituted a violation of the Jencks Act,
and the agent's testimony was ordered stricken.22 °°
The Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that destruction of the hand-
written draft did not result in a Jencks Act violation.2 0 1 According to
the court, the draft was not intended as a final report, nor was it similar
to witness interview notes which are intended to be factual accounts of
what a witness said.2202 Consequently, it was not "adopted or ap-
proved" by the agent within the meaning of the Jencks Act, and was
not producible under that statute. 20 3
In United States v. Bagnariol,22 4 an undercover FBI agent met
defendants not shown to nor signed by defendants. They were not records "be-
longing" to [defendants]. Rule 16, Fed. R. Crim. P.
Id. at 900 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
The circuits are split on the issue of whether the written summary of an oral statement
made by the defendant to a government agent is discoverable under Rule 16. Several circuits
have held that such a summary is not a " 'written or recorded statement made by the defend-
ant'" subject to discovery. 659 F.2d at 940 (quoting United States v. Krilich, 470 F.2d 341,
351 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973)). Other circuits have held that such a
written summary is discoverable at the discretion of the trial court. 659 F.2d at 940 (citing
United States v. Johnson, 525 F.2d 999, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920
(1976)). The Griffin court found that Griffin's reliance on United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d
1247 (9th Cir. 1976) was misplaced because Harris failed to address the issue of whether
Rule 16 requires the preservation and production of an agent's rough notes. 659 F.2d at 940.
2197. 659 F.2d at 941. FED. R. CRAm. P. 16(d)(2) provides:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
(emphasis added).
2198. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1121 (1982).
2199. Id at 731.
2200. Id
2201. Id at 731-32.
2202. Id at 732 (citing United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1976)). The
court also found that the draft differed from surveillance notes, which are not producible
"statements." 660 F.2d at 732 (citing United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 557-58 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Jencks Act not intended to cover rough surveillance notes; Harris rule should not
be extended to rough surveillance notes)).
2203. 660 F.2d at 732 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1) (1976)).
2204. 665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982).
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several times with the defendants to establish their participation in a
scheme to legalize gambling in the State of Washington. After each of
these meetings he prepared a report in longhand. He then sent these
drafts to a typing pool, and after correcting typographical errors he dis-
carded the handwritten drafts.
220 5
Reaffirming its decision in United States v. Kaiser,22°) the Ninth
Circuit held that the destruction of the agent's handwritten drafts did
not violate the Jencks Act or the Harris preservation rule.220 7 The
court found that although Harris required the preservation of notes
that may be potentially producible under the Jencks Act, the rationale
of Harris was inapposite to the facts as presented. 220 8 The court noted
that the Harris court relied principally on United States v. Harrison,220 9
wherein it was held that disclosure of an agent's final report was not an
adequate substitute for disclosure of the rough interview notes. The
Harris ruling was based on (1) a characterization that information con-
tained in rough notes of a witness interview may be more favorable to a
defendant's position, and (2) a corresponding desire to reduce the pos-
sibility of misunderstanding or error in the transfer process. 2210 The
Bagnoriol court, however, concluded that the typing of a handwritten
draft and the correction of the typed version did not entail the same
risk of distortion that would be inherent in the compilation of a report
from rough notes.22 Furthermore, the court expressed doubt as to the
applicability of Harris based on the fact that its use in the past had
been confined to instances in which there had been some basis for be-
lieving that the destroyed material may have contained a more accurate
account than the material disclosed.2212
2205. Id at 889.
2206. 660 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981). See supra notes 2198-2203 and accompanying text.
2207. 665 F.2d at 889-90. In asserting the existence of a Jencks Act violation, the defend-
ants relied on United States v. Walden, 578 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1978). In Walden, the Third
Circuit suggested that handwritten drafts of a final report by a government agent might be
deemed "adopted or approved" because the drafts were sent to the agent's superior for re-
view before they were typed in final form. 578 F.2d at 970. Since the agent in Bagnariol had
not sent his reports to his superiors until after he had reviewed and corrected the typed
version, the Ninth Circuit determined that any reliance on Walden was misplaced. 665 F.2d
at 889-90.
2208. 665 F.2d at 890.
2209. 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2210. 665 F.2d at 890 (citing United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d at 428-30).
2211. 665 F.2d at 890. The court reasoned that the copying and correcting of the typed
copy presented little chance for inadvertent input from the agent. If that agent's account
was, in fact, fabricated, he would have tailored his observations to fit his conclusions in
writing the original drafts. Thus, there was no basis for suggesting a substantial difference
between the handwritten and typed reports. Id
2212. Id (citing United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied,
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In United States v. Traylor,22 3 the district court denied a request
for the production of notes taken by a prosecuting attorney during the
interview of a Government witness. 2214 This denial was based on a
finding that the notes constituted attorney work product.2215
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis, noting that
in Goldberg v. United States,221 6 the Supreme Couit had conclusively
established the absence of a "work product" exception to the produc-
tion of material pursuant to the Jencks Act.22 7 The court observed,
however, that notes prepared by a Government attorney are producible
"statements" under that Act only when they relate to the subject matter
of the testimony and have been signed or adopted by the witness.221 8
Satisfaction of this latter requirement, in turn, depends on whether the
lawyer read back or the witness herself read what the lawyer had writ-
ten.2219 Applying the Goldberg principles to the facts as presented, the
court determined that because the Government witness had neither
seen the interview notes nor reviewed them with the attorney, the notes
did not constitute "statements" under the Jencks Act.2220 Accordingly,
the court also determined that the district court had not erred in deny-
ing the defendant's request for production of these notes.
2221
These cases show that the Ninth Circuit applies a strict interpreta-
tion of the Jencks Act when determining whether to impose sanctions
for the destruction of an investigator's rough notes. In order for such
notes to be classified as Jencks Act material, they must fall within the
narrow definition of "statement," and they must be related to the sub-
ject matter of the testimony offered. The destruction of a handwritten
investigative report, from which a typed final copy was made, for ex-
ample, will not constitute a violation of the Jencks Act. In addition,
notes taken during witness interviews by a government attorney are not
444 U.S. 1019 (1980); United States v. Well, 572 F.2d 1383, 1384 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217,
1223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309,
312 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 (1977)).
2213. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
2214. Id. at 1335.
2215. Id
2216. 425 U.S. 94 (1976).
2217. Id at 98.
2218. 656 F.2d at 1336 (citing Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. at 98).
2219. 656 F.2d at 1336 (citing Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. at 110-11 n.19).
2220. 656 F.2d at 1336 (citing United States v. Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 973 (1979)).
2221. 656 F.2d at 1336.
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producible pursuant to the Act, unless statements contained therein are
signed or adopted by the witness.
The Ninth Circuit also appears to be narrowing the application of
Harris, which absolutely required law enforcement agents to preserve
their original notes from interviews with prospective government wit-
nesses.2222 Now district courts must determine through secondary evi-
dence if the destroyed notes contained Jencks Act "statements" before
they can apply sanctions by striking the witness' testimony.
2223
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has not hesitated in placing a heavy bur-
den on the defendant before it will apply the Brady rule. Specifically,
the defendant must show that discarded notes, unless destroyed in bad
faith, contained evidence which was both favorable and material.2224
Even under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanc-
tions are not applied when investigators destroy rough notes from in-
terviews with the defendant, unless those statements will be introduced
at trial.
2225
2. Tape recorded statements
In United States v. Bailleaux,2226 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the Government's use of an undisclosed tape recording vio-
lated the defendant's right to discovery. Bailleaux was charged with
conspiring to interfere with commerce by threats or violence and at-
tempted extortion. During cross-examination, the Government intro-
duced into evidence a taped telephone conversation that Bailleaux had
with his business associate. The prosecution used this evidence in an
attempt to impeach Bailleaux's testimony that he had traveled to San
2222. The Griffin court reaffirmed its holding in United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247,
1253 (9th Cir. 1976), to the extent that it requires law enforcement agents to preserve their
original notes taken during interviews with prospective government witnesses or with an
accused in order to permit the courts to determine whether evidence must be produced
under the Jencks Act. However, it also stated that the imposition of sanctions is not justified
where the rough interview notes of an agent are destroyed in good faith, and those notes can
be determined not to be Jencks Act "statements" by secondary evidence. 659 F.2d at 938
n.5; see United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355 (1969); Ogden v. United States, 323
F.2d 818, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
The Grffin court added that routine sanctions are appropriate where it appears that
rough interview notes have been destroyed in bad faith. 659 F.2d at 938 n.5; see also United
States v. DeLeon, 498 F.2d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lonardo, 350 F.2d
523, 529 (6th Cir. 1965).
2223. 659 F.2d at 938; see supra note 2187 and accompanying text.
2224. Id at 939 n.7; see supra note 2187 and accompanying text.
2225. See supra note 2196 and accompanying text.
2226. 685 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Diego on business at the prompting of this associate. 2227 Despite his
repeated requests for discovery of any "tapes made of conversations,"
Bailleaux was not informed of the existence of this tape until he was
being cross-examined.2228 As a result, Bailleaux claimed on appeal
that: (1) the tape should have been turned over to him under either
Rule 16(a)(1)(A) 2229 or Brady v. Maryland;'2230  and (2) he was
prejudiced when he elected to testify in his own defense without knowl-
edge of the tape recording.
2 23'
The Ninth Circuit first noted that "while the decision in Brady
requires disclosure of all exculpatory material, Rule 16 requires the
Government to turn over all relevant written or recorded statements by
the defendants. 2232 The court then held that because the taped con-
versation was not exculpatory, it was not subject to disclosure under
Brady.2 233 The court also determined, however, that the tape was rele-
vant within the meaning of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and should have been dis-
closed to Bailleaux.2234
In reaching this latter conclusion, the Ninth Circuit specifically re-
jected the Government's argument that it had no obligation to disclose
the tape under Rule 16 because the Assistant United States Attorney
received the tape only the night before it was used.2235 The court stated
that Rule 16 requires disclosure if the statement "is in the custody or
control of the Government" and "its existence is known or by the exer-
cise of due diligence could have become known to the attorney for the
Government. 2236 The court found that it was sufficient for purposes of
the custody requirement that the tape was in the possession of the
2227. Id at 1112. Prior to the introduction of the tape, Bailleaux testified on direct exami-
nation that he arranged to meet his associate in San Diego, and had waited there for three
days and then left. Bailleaux admitted on both direct and cross-examination that he had
never received an explanation from his associate about his failure to appear in San Diego.
The tape contained the first conversation between defendant and his business associate after
the alleged business trip, and defendant did not question his associate about his failure to
appear. Id This had a tendency to show that Bailleaux was not disturbed by his associate's
failure to appear and that his trip to San Diego may have been for another purpose.
2228. Id at 1112-13.
2229. See supra note 2178 and accompanying text.
2230. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See supra notes 2176 & 2177 and accompanying text.
2231. 685 F.2d at 1113.
2232. Id (emphasis in original).
2233. Id (citing United States v. Eddy, 549 F.2d 108, 113 (9th Cir. 1976)).
2234. 685 F.2d at 1115.
2235. Id at 1113.
2236. Id
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FBI, 2237 and it assumed that the attorney could have discovered the
existence of the tape through due diligence. 238 The circuit court also
rejected the Government's second argument that the relevance of the
tape for impeachment purposes was not known until Bailleaux testified
on direct examination. 2239 According to the court, "the Government
should disclose any statement made by the defendant that may be rele-
vant to any possible defense or contention that the defendant might
assert.' 224° If there is any doubt, then the statement should be dis-
closed if the proper request is made. The court ultimately found it er-
roneous to admit into evidence a statement which was not provided to
the defendant in violation of Rule 16 and where the defendant was not
otherwise granted the opportunity to review the proffered evidence.224'
It concluded, however, that the error in this case was not of sufficient
magnitude to require reversal.2242
3. Subpoenas
Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the
use of subpoenas in criminal cases. Subsection (c) of that rule pertains
to subpoenas of documentary evidence.2243 The fundamental purpose
of these subpoenas is to expedite the trial process by providing a time
and place before trial for the inspection of subpoenaed materials.22'4
Rule 17(c) was not intended to provide a general means of discovery
for criminal cases, 2245 and subpoenas duces tecum "may be quashed if
2237. Id (citing United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1978) (government
not excused from obligation under Rule 16 when documents were in possession of FBI)).
2238. 685 F.2d at 1114.
2239. Id The Government contended that it had "no duty to anticipate the nature of the
defendant's testimony to determine if the statement may have some impeachment value."
Id See United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082
(1980).
2240. 685 F.2d at 1114. The court also found that this tape was relevant not only because
of Bailleaux's failure to mention the San Diego trip to his business associate, but because
there was another tape of the extortionist's voice which had been identified by four wit-
nesses. The jury could thus compare Bailleaux's voice on the tape to that of the extortionist.
Id
2241. 685 F.2d at 1115 (citing United States v. Walker, 538 F.2d 266, 268-69 (9th Cir.
1976) (Government's nondisclosure of tape's existence until middle of trial constituted Rule
16 violation)).
2242. 685 F.2d at 1115-16 (citing United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir,
1977); United States v. Walker, 538 F.2d 266, 268-69 (9th Cir. 1976)).
2243. See supra note 2179 and accompanying text.
2244. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698-99 (1974) (citing Bowman Dairy Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951)).
2245. 418 U.S. at 698. In United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 195 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981), the Third Circuit discussed the difference between exculpatory
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their production would be 'unreasonable or oppressive.'
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Nixon,2247 set forth the
tests the moving party must meet to justify the production of docu-
ments prior to trial. According to the Court, the moving party must
show that: (1) the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) the doc-
uments cannot reasonably be procured in advance of trial by the exer-
cise of due diligence; (3) such production and inspection in advance of
trial is essential to the moving party's proper preparation for trial, and
the failure to obtain such inspection may unreasonably delay the trial;
and (4) the application is made in good faith.2248 The Ninth Circuit
has recently considered the validity of certain subpoenas duces tecum
in light of the above requirements.
In United States v. Fields,224 9 the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's denial of a non-party witness' motion to quash a subpoena
duces tecum for pretrial production of documents.2250 The defendants
argued that the documents could be used for impeachment pur-
poses.2 51 The court concluded that the need for evidence to impeach
witnesses is generally insufficient to justify the pretrial production of
documents,2252 even where production was sought from a third party
rather than from the United States. 2253 Consequently, the court ruled
that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying the motion to
material which the prosecution possesses and exculpatory evidence which third parties pos-
sess. "Only the latter is retrievable under a rule 17(c) subpoena; naked exculpatory material
held by third parties that does not rise to the dignity of admissible evidence simply is not
within the rule. That is the teaching of Bowman Dairy and Nixon .... " Id
2246. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698 (quoting FED. R. CrIuM. P. 17(c)).
2247. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2248. Id at 699-700 (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. lozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1952)).
2249. 663 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1981).
2250. Id at 881. The defendants had subpoenaed Wells Fargo Bank, a nonparty witness,
to produce the statements and transcribed interviews of its employees who would be called
as witnesses at the criminal trial. Id
2251. Id
2252. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701). In United States v. Cuthbertson,
630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981), the court found that verbatim
statements of government witnesses, held by CBS, Inc. for their 60 Minutes program, would
be relevant to those witnesses' credibility. It also noted, however, that "because such state-
ments ripen into evidentiary material for purposes of impeachment only if and when the
witness testifies at trial, impeachment statements, although subject to subpoena under rule
17(c), generally are not subject to production and inspection by the moving party prior to
trial." Id at 144 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701; United States v. Rothman,
179 F. Supp. 935, 938 (W.D. Pa. 1959)).
2253. 663 F.2d at 881 (citing United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 186, 195 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1056 (1981)).
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2 25 4
In United States v. Eden,2255 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in quashing the defendant's sub-
poena to the Secretary of Education for the production of documents
prior to trial.225 6 The trial court determined that much of the material
subpoenaed could have been reasonably procured prior to trial, or that
the documents were not so voluminous that pretrial production was
required. 2257  The Ninth Circuit affirmed, observing that Eden also
failed to meet his burden of showing relevancy by anything other than
conclusory statements.2258 In addition, the court found that the docu-
ments provided to Eden by the Government were adequate for Eden's
contention on appeal.22 9
The Fields and Eden decisions demonstrate that it is difficult for
criminal defendants in the Ninth Circuit to obtain documents by sub-
poena prior to trial. This accentuates the difference between the uses of
subpoenas duces tecum in criminal and civil trials. Rule 17(c) is
broadly written, but the courts consistently restrict the use of subpoenas
in criminal trials to avoid "fishing expeditions ' 2260 and general discov-
ery. The courts apply the same criteria to subpoenas issued to non-
2254. 663 F.2d at 881. Because the trial court was found to have abused its discretion, the
Ninth Circuit was compelled to reverse without: (1) considering whether the defendants had
met the required factors needed to warrant an in camera production, or (2) determining
whether the documents sought were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id (citing
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1126
(1981); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
The Fields court suggested, however, that because there was a strong showing by Wells
Fargo Bank of similarity between the statements and transcribed interviews of its employees
and the situation in Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-91, 393 (communications between corporation's
employees and its general counsel held protected by the attorney-client privilege, and could
not be compelled by an IRS summons when these communications were made to secure
legal advice from the general counsel), the issuance of the subpoena was questionable even
apart from its insufficiency under Rule 17(c). 663 F.2d at 881.
2255. 659 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981).
2256. Id at 1381. The defendant, a college president, was convicted of embezzlement,
conversion of federal student loan funds, and concealment of material facts from the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare. Id at 1377. His subpoena duces tecum to the
Department of Education requested, in part, all documents which related to: (1) the student
financial aid fund paid to California Business College for 1974-76; (2) accreditation and/or
loss of accreditation of California Business College; (3) the payment of $100,000 to Associ-
ated Colleges of California, by Treasury Check No. 83,760,968 dated September 15, 1975;
and (4) the allocation and/or payment of student financial aid to unaccredited institutions in




2260. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700.
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party witnesses, and a lesser evidentiary standard is used only in cases
where the courts require an in camera inspection of the documents.
2261
4. Non-disclosure of informant's identity
The informer's "privilege" is actually the government's privilege
"to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish infor-
mation of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that
law. ' 2262 This privilege must give way if the informant's identity or the
contents of his or her communication is relevant or helpful to the de-
fense or essential to a fair trial.2263 The scope of the privilege is within
the discretion of the district judge, who must balance the government's
interest in non-disclosure with the defendant's interest in obtaining evi-
dence.22 4 The defendant, on the other hand, bears the burden of
showing a need for disclosure.2265
In United States v. Tham,2266 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the district court erred either in failing to order the Government to
disclose the identity of a confidential informant or in failing to require
an in camera examination of the informant.2267 Tham claimed it was
crucial to his defense to have an opportunity to interview the inform-
ant, identified as Source Four, who stated in an affidavit information
which might have exculpated Tham.2 2 68 Rather than agree to disclo-
sure or an in camera hearing, the Government offered to stipulate to
the truth of the statement made by Source Four in the affidavit.22 69
Based on this stipulation, the district court denied Tham's motions for
2261. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1980) (second and third
elements of Nixon test do not apply when production is only for in camera viewing, and not
for moving party), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
2262. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
2263. .d at 60-61.
2264. United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063
(1975).
2265. United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d 995, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1063 (1977).
2266. 665 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
2267. Id. at 859-60. For a discussion of what is necessary to require an in camera hearing,
see United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 473, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1978).
2268. 665 F.2d at 859. Tham was convicted of embezzlement of union assets and of false
entry in union records. Id at 855. Source Four's affidavit stated that while attending a
concert in New York, he overheard Tham and two other persons, Fratianno and Marson,
discussing an eye care plan that they were promoting for unions on the West Coast. Tham's
travel and entertainment expenses for this concert and the trip to New York were the basis
of one of the counts in the indictment. Tham contended that if he was discussing the eye
care plan, he was spending union funds to benefit the union. Id at 859.
2269. 665 F.2d at 859.
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disclosure.227 °
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court judge had not abused
his discretion in ruling that Tham failed to meet his burden of showing
a need for disclosure.2271 The court stated that the stipulation was the
most favorable evidence Tham could have secured concerning the ex-
culpatory information contained in the affidavit,2272 and that Tham
had not shown how the disclosure of Source Four's identity would have
better assisted him in his defense. 22 73 The court found that Tham's
claim that Source Four may have provided useful information was
mere speculation and, therefore, insufficient to require disclosure or an
in camera hearing.2274
F Right to Inmate Assistance
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment2 275 gives in-
mates the right of access to the courts, including a right to assistance in
the preparation and filing of legal papers.2276 Constitutionally proper
2270. Id
2271. Id at 859-60.
2272. Id at 859.
2273. Id at 860. Despite the stipulation, Fratianno, as a government witness, continued to
deny that there was any discussion at the concert about an eye care plan for the union, but
contended that there may have been a discussion concerning the creation of a private con-
tact lens enterprise. The prosecution argued that the stipulation could be interpreted to
mean that the parties discussed the contact lens venture, rather than a union eye care plan.
The district court instructed the jury that the stipulation must be accepted as proven fact.
Id at 859. The Ninth Circuit found that Fratianno's testimony could only benefit Tham
because it was contrary to facts the Government had already conceded, and the trial judge
adequately instructed the jury concerning the proper treatment of the stipulation. Id at 860.
2274. 665 F.2d at 860 (citing United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 473, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1978)).
The Kim court stated that the accused's burden of proving that the informant's identity is
relevant and helpful to the defense or essential for a fair trial is not met by merely raising a
suspicion that the informant might aid in the preparation of a defense. 557 F.2d at 478
(citing United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 426 U.S.
923 (1976)).
2275. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I states that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
2276. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). In Bounds, inmates complained that they
were denied access to the courts due to the state's failure to provide legal research facilities.
After the state adopted a plan for establishing several libraries throughout the state, the
inmates appealed, contending that the state must provide prisoners with legal assistance as
well as law libraries. In rejecting the inmates' argument, the Supreme Court stated that the
due process clause only required that prisoners be provided with law libraries or legal assist-
ance from trained people. Id. at 828. The Court conceded that, although providing law
libraries for prisoners often avoids discipline problems involved with writ writers and usu-
ally leads to the efficient handling of the prisoner's case, states may provide other means of
access to the courts such as providing inmates with an organization of volunteer attorneys or
with full-time staff attorneys. Id. at 830-31.
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means of access include providing prisoners with adequate law libraries
and assistance from people trained in the law.2211 When an inmate has
no access to a law library or a trained legal assistant, a state cannot
deny him the use of an inmate writ writer. 278 In Storseth v. Spell-
man,2279 the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner does not have the right
to the service of an inmate writ writer when an adequate means of ac-
cess to the court has already been provided.2280
In 1977, an inmate writ writer, Riddell, prepared and filed a civil
rights action for Storseth, who was a prisoner in a Washington state
penitentiary.2 8 I After transferring Storseth to another prison, the state
prohibited any correspondence between Riddell and Storseth. In 1978,
upon Riddell's request, the court appointed an attorney for Storseth
and authorized only necessary communication between Riddell and
Storseth.22 12 Riddell, however, continued to file pleadings on Storseth's
behalf, which caused the court-appointed attorney to withdraw from
the case and the state to bar all communication between Storseth and
Riddell. In 1979, the district court ordered the court clerk to no longer
accept pleadings from Riddell and informed Storseth that he would be
appointed counsel only if he agreed to engage in an attorney-client re-
lationship without interference from third parties. 283 The district judge
also refused to reverse the state's ruling that prohibited any correspon-
dence between Storseth and Riddell. 284
In affirming the district court order, the Ninth Circuit stated that
Storseth had been provided constitutionally adequate access to the
courts because he had the opportunity to receive court appointed coun-
sel . 2 5 The court held that since the state, not the inmate, has the right
2277. Id. at 830-3 1. The state also has the burden of proving the adequacy of the method
chosen. Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916
(1979).
2278. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The Supreme Court in Johnson held that if
the state has failed to provide an inmate with meaningful access to the courts, a state cannot
deny a prisoner assistance from an inmate writ writer. In Johnson, a writ writer was disci-
plined for violating a prison regulation which prohibited inmate writ writers. The defendant
appealed, claiming the regulation was invalid because it barred prisoners' right of access to
courts. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that when no alternative exists, prisoners must
be allowed the help of an inmate writ writer, or else an inmate's potentially valid constitu-
tional claims will never be heard in court. Id. at 487.
2279. 654 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981).
2280. Id. at 1351.
2281. Id.
2282. Id.
2283. Id. at 1352.
2284. Id.
2285. Id. at 1353. The Storseth court also noted that court appointed counsel is probably
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to choose the proper access to the courts,228 6 an inmate who does not
take advantage of an adequate means of access, does not have the right
to insist upon an alternative method of access.2287 Thus, an inmate has
no right to request the services of a particular writ writer when alterna-
tive means of access are adequate.2288 The court also noted that once an
attorney is appointed to represent an inmate, the attorney should be
free to develop the inmate's case without interference from an inmate
writ writer whom he does not represent.2289
The Ninth Circuit also noted that even if court appointed counsel
is not an adequate means of access to court, Storseth still had no right
to an inmate writ writer because the state had provided him with the
opportunity to use a prison law library and the Institutional Legal
Services. 229 Therefore, the court held that Storseth's access to the court
was constitutionally adequate and that both the state and district courts
were justified in refusing to allow Riddell to assist Storseth.229'
the best means of access to the courts because attorneys are able to handle an inmate's case
more skillfully and do not have the discipline problems often involved with an inmate writ
writer. 654 F.2d at 1353. The Ninth Circuit, therefore, refused to declare that court ap-
pointed counsel is not a constitutionally permissible method of access. id.
2286. Id. (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. at 828).
2287. 654 F.2d at 1353 (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 583 (10th Cir. 1980) (inade-
quate access to court due to defective law library; no reason to allow inmates to choose
among alternative avenues of access to courts), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981)). See
Williams v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978) (under Bounds, no absolute right to
any particular legal assistance), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979).
2288. 654 F.2d at 1353 (citing Fair v. Givan, 509 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ind. 1981)). In
Fair, the prisoner refused the services of a court appointed counsel yet requested the assist-
ance of another inmate to assist him in court. The district court held that a criminal defend-
ant has no constitutional right to have an unlicensed attorney or a layman represent him,
adding that once an inmate has been provided with a proper means of access to the courts,
the prisoner has no right to request another alternative. 509 F. Supp. at 1090.
2289. 654 F.2d at 1353.
2290. Id. at 1353-54. The court stated that throughout Storseth's lawsuit, the prison pro-
vided him with law libraries satisfying the American Association of Law Libraries' recom-
mended minimum standards for prison law libraries. Id. at 1354. The Institutional Legal
Services also provided all indigent inmates with civil legal assistance through state contracts
with various legal service organizations. Id.
2291. Id. at 1354. The Ninth Circuit stated that the difficulty and delay involved with
inter-institutional communication could seriously jeopardize Storseth's ability to meet court
deadlines. The court also questioned the value of Riddell's assistance since Riddell had no
access to a law library.
Regarding the disciplining of writ writers, the Ninth Circuit stated that if courts have
the power to discipline and disbar attorneys, the courts should certainly be able to discipline
unethical inmates. Id. (quotingln re Green, 586 F.2d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1978) (courts not
powerless to discipline inmate who violated court order enjoining him from writ writing
activities on behalf of other inmates), cert. deniedsub noa. Green v. Wyrick, 440 U.S. 922
(1979)).
In considering the legal authority of inmate writ writers, the court stated that although
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In addition to claiming that he was denied proper access to the
courts, Storseth also argued that his first amendment right to corre-
spond"2 '2 was violated by the district court's order prohibiting commu-
nication with Riddell.2293 The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that
inmates retain their first amendment rights while in prison, subject to
the penological objectives of the correctional system.2294 The court
stated that the Government must be able to justify its reasons for re-
stricting a prisoner's first amendment rights.22 95 Since there was no evi-
dence explaining the Government's interest in prohibiting
communication between Storseth and Riddell, the court reversed the
district judge's order denying the inter-institutional correspondence.22 96
G. Destruction of Evidence
The principal concern of the court when criminal evidence has
been lost or destroyed is whether the defendant can nevertheless re-
ceive a fair trial.2297 In making this determination, the court balances
the government's conduct in connection with the loss or destruction of
the evidence against the degree of prejudice to the defendant.2298 The
government bears the burden of justifying its conduct concerning the
evidence, while the defendant bears the burden of proving
prejudice.2299 The more important determination to be made by the
court, however, is whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient
to sustain the defendant's conviction.230°
an inmate may assist in the preparation of another prisoner's petition for post-conviction
relief, a writ writer cannot file papers with the court as the inmate's legal representative. 654
F.2d at 1355 (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. at 490).
2292. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging
the freedom of speech. . ....
2293. 654 F.2d at 1355.
2294. Id. Penological objectives include the preservation of internal order and discipline,
maintenance of institutional security, and rehabilitation of prisoners. Id. (citing Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974)).
2295. 654 F.2d at 1355 (citing Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1077 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (prison regulation barring all communication between inmates in segregation units
invalid since no showing that regulation furthered penological objectives or was preferable
to less severe alternatives); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 230 (7th Cir. 1978) (court's re-
view of prison policy ineffective unless state has burden of proving valid reason for violating
inmates' first amendment rights), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979)).
2296. 654 F.2d at 1355-56.
2297. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
2298. Id. at 1152.
2299. Id. See United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1977).
2300. United States v. Traylor, 656 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing United
States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1151-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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In United States v. Traylor,230 defendant Andrews was convicted
on charges stemming from his involvement in a conspiracy to import
and distribute cocaine. The Government had seized the cocaine from
Andrews' co-conspirator, then sent it for testing to a chemist in the Los
Angeles Sheriffs Department. The cocaine was destroyed shortly after
the co-conspirator pleaded guilty. Andrews argued that the chemist's
testimony verifying the substance seized as cocaine was inadmissible
because Andrews had been unable to test the substance himself.
230 2
The Ninth Circuit held that the destruction of the cocaine did not
deny Andrews a fair trial. It noted that the decision to destroy the evi-
dence was made by the state, not the federal authorities,2 03 and that at
the time of its destruction, there was no evidence linking the co-con-
spirator with Andrews. The court further determined that any
prejudice to Andrews was decreased by the probity and reliability of
the chemist's testimony as secondary evidence, and by defense coun-
sel's extensive cross-examination of the chemist regarding the testing of
the substance in question.2304
In United States v. Cates,23 °5 the defendant was convicted of re-
ceipt of firearms by a felon. On appeal, Cates contended that the han-
dling of the seized firearms by government officials, which resulted in
fingerprints not being preserved, required either dismissal or suppres-
sion of the evidence.230 6 The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's
argument and found the government's actions were neither unreasona-
ble nor materially prejudicial to Cates' case.
230 7
In United States v. Astorga-Torres,10 8 the defendants were con-
victed of various charges stemming from a conspiracy to distribute her-
oin. The defendants had packaged the heroin in condoms. After their
arrest, Drug Enforcement Agency agents retrieved twelve condoms
from the septic tank servicing the defendants' motel room. Three of
these condoms were retained as evidence against the defendants, and
the others were discarded.23 9 The Ninth Circuit held that this destruc-
2301. 656 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
2302. Id. at 1334.
2303. Id. at 1335. Initially, the cocaine was seized by United States Customs, but the mat-
ter was turned over to local officials for prosecution. Id.
2304. Id.
2305. 663 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1981).
2306. Id. at 949.
2307. Id. (citing United States v. Tercero, 640 F.2d 190, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979) (en
banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)).
2308. 682 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 455 (1983).
2309. Id. at 1333-34.
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tion did not result in the requisite prejudice to the defendants. 23 1°
These decisions indicate that the Ninth Circuit rarely finds that the
destruction of evidence renders a trial so unfair as to require reversal.
Although it purports to use a balancing approach in evaluating the ef-
fect of the destruction on the defendant's trial, it appears that the de-
fendant's burden in showing prejudice may be heavier than the
government's burden of justification. So long as the government's ac-
tions were made in good faith, were reasonable, and did not materially
prejudice the defendant, the Ninth Circuit never reaches the "more im-
portant determination" of whether the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction.
H. Forfeiture Proceedings
All actions involving the deprivation of a defendant's property, in-
cluding temporary deprivation, must conform with the due process re-
quirements of the Constitution.23 11 Due process requires that the
defendant be given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the deprivation. 2312 Only "extraordinary situations" may justify
failure to provide notice and pre-deprivation hearings.231 3 In such situ-
ations, due process requires that a hearing be provided at the earliest
possible time after the deprivation.2 
1 4
In United States v. Spilotro,2315 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether the defendant's due process rights were violated when the dis-
2310. Id. at 1337. See United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974).
2311. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84-86 (1972).
2312. Id. at 80-82.
2313. Id. at 90-91. Three conditions must be met to justify a failure to provide notice and
a pre-deprivation hearing. First, the seizure must be necessary to preserve an important
governmental or public (rather than private) interest. Second, there must be a need for very
prompt action. Third, the seizure must be initiated by a government official who is responsi-
ble for determining under a narrowly drawn statute that the seizure was in fact necessary.
Id.
The Supreme Court applied this three-fold test in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), and upheld the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican statute
which provided for the ex parte seizure and ultimate forfeiture of vessels used for the trans-
port of illegal substances. Id. at 676-80.
2314. United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1982). In Crozier, the defend-
ants were charged with manufacturing methamphetamine, and their house and personal
property were subjected to a restraining order under 21 U.S.C. § 848(d) (Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970). The defendants appealed the restraining
order after more than a year pending trial, and the Ninth Circuit held that in the absence of
specific statutory language to the contrary, the district court must grant hearings on motions
for preliminary injunctions at the earliest possible time after a temporary restraining order is
granted without notice. Id. at 1297 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 65).
2315. 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
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trict court issued an order restraining him as officer, director, and sole
shareholder of Gold Rush, Ltd. from selling, transferring, encumber-
ing, or otherwise disposing of any of Gold Rush's property during the
pendency of proceedings under a RICO2316 indictment. Spilotro was
indicted under the RICO Act for using Gold Rush, Ltd. to deal in sto-
len jewelry, to commit wire fraud, and to conspire to do both.2317 On
the same day of the indictment's return and pursuant to section 1963(b)
of the RICO Act,2318 the court granted an ex parte motion for an order
restraining Spilotro from disposing of any assets or interest in Gold
Rush, Ltd. It also set a hearing date approximately one month later for
a Government motion requiring Spilotro to post bond pending trial.231 9
At this hearing, the Government asserted that substantial physical evi-
dence was available which made conviction likely. It did not, however,
introduce this evidence at the hearing. The district court granted the
Government's motion and required Spilotro to post a $180,000 bond
pending trial, the liquidation value of Gold Rush's assets.2320 On ap-
peal,232' Spilotro argued that his due process rights had been violated
because he had not been given notice of the action against him prior to
the issuance of the restraining order, and because the Government
failed to present sufficient evidence to allow the district court to con-
tinue the restraining order .
2 2
The Ninth Circuit first found that Spilotro's due process rights had
not been violated for lack of notice because: (1) there was a govern-
mental interest in preventing continued illegal use of the premises and
in enforcing criminal sanctions; (2) prompt action was necessary to pre-
vent Spilotro from destroying, concealing, or removing the stolen jew-
elry to another jurisdiction; and (3) the seizure was initiated by
2316. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(1976).
2317. 680 F.2d at 614.
2318. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976) provides:
In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district courts of
the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibi-
tions, or to take such other actions, including but not limited to, the acceptance of
satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest
subject to forfeiture under this section, at it shall deem proper.
2319. 680 F.2d at 614-15.
2320. Id. at 615.
2321. The court permitted an interlocutory appeal because a significant interest of the de-
fendant was involved which required immediate review, and the appeal was separable
enough from the primary proceeding that neither proceeding would impede the other. Id. at
615 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); United States v. Cro-
zier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982)).
2322. 680 F.2d at 616.
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Government officials rather than by private parties.2323 The court then
found, however, that the Government did fail to meet its burden of
proof at the post-deprivation hearing. It held that the Government's
burden of proof in a RICO prosecution is similar to that in a continu-
ing criminal enterprise prosecution. 324 Therefore, the Government
must show that it is likely to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of violating the RICO Act, and that the
profits or properties at issue are subject to forfeiture under the RICO
Act. 2325 The court stated that this showing must be sufficient to allow
the district court to independently assess whether the burden has been
met; the Government cannot rely upon an indictment alone.2326
The court concluded that because the Government had presented
none of the evidence of Spilotro's guilt at the hearing, the district court
could not have independently determined whether the Government's
assertions were merely expressions of prosecutorial optimism or
whether the evidence was indeed probative, admissible, and likely to
establish Spilotro's guilt.2 327 It therefore remanded Spilotro's case to
the district court for a full evidentiary hearing to be commenced with-
out unreasonable delay.32
2323. Id. at 617 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678
(1974), see supra note 2313; Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978)).
2324. 680 F.2d at 681. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976).
2325. 680 F.2d at 617-18 (citing United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d Cir. 1981)).
To meet his burden of proof, Spilotro relied on a standard set forth in United States v.
Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976). In Mandel, the court stated that for an injunction
in a civil proceeding the petitioner must show that: (1) he or she is likely to prevail on the
merits at trial; (2) irreparable harm will result in the absence of relief; (3) issuance of the
injunction will not substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings; and
(4) public interest supports the issuance of the injunction. 408 F. Supp. at 682. It noted,
however, that in a criminal proceeding the first requirement would involve the government's
showing that it was likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
this was incompatible with a defendant's presumption of innocence. Id. at 682-83.
The Spilotro court, however, adopted the contra rule in United States v. Long, 654 F.2d
911 (3d Cir. 1981), where the Third Circuit stated that the purpose of the presumption of
innocence doctrine is to allocate the burden of proof at trial and has no application to a
determination of the rights of a pre-trial detainee. 654 F.2d at 916 n.8 (quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979)).
Spilotro also argued that the government must show a likelihood that the property
would be transferred if the restraining order were not issued. The Ninth Circuit found that
in a case involving jewelry, which by its very nature poses the threat that it will be disposed
of before trial, an independent showing regarding its likely transfer is not required. The
court left open whether a showing of transfer is required with other types of property. 680
F.2d at 618 n.3.
2326. Id. at 618.
2327. Id. at 618-19.
2328. Id. at 619. Spilotro also argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) does not grant the district
court jurisdiction to enter restraining orders and set performance bonds until the defendant
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is convicted. id. at 616. The Ninth Circuit, however, did not agree with such a narrow
reading of the statute. It cited statements in the House Report that the purpose of
§ 1963(b)'s provisions for orders and performance bonds is to preventpre-convction trans-
fers of property. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007,4033). It also noted that § 1963(c) authorizes the court
to act only "upon conviction" of the defendant, while § 1963(b) authorizes the issuance of a
restraining order "in any action." 680 F.2d at 616. See supra note 2318.
Spilotro then contended that RICO provisions apply only against a defendant's "inter-
est" in an enterprise rather than against the enterprise itself; that since Gold Rush, Ltd. is
not a party to the proceedings, it is not subject to a restraining order; that his wife's 50%
community property interest in Gold Rush, Ltd. stock is not subject to a restraining order;
that the $180,000 performance bond was prohibitively high; and that the appraisal of and
demand for records of his property were in violation of his fourth and fifth amendment
rights. The Ninth Circuit declined to decide these issues because of the possibility of moot-
ness should the Government fail to meet its burden at the full evidentiary hearing upon
remand. Id. at 619.
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